Thread: Scientism Board: Oblivion / Ship of Fools.
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Posted by Mark Betts (# 17074) on
:
I've started this thread from a post in another thread, as we were going off topic:
quote:
Originally posted by SusanDoris:
quote:
Originally posted by Mark Betts:
I used the term scientism for a reason - because 'scientism' is a philosophy, whereby the person believes that science is the only place where mankind can get answers, even to questions which have nothing to do with science.
Thank you. Scientism is a word that I have met only recently, so am wary of using it.
One thing I have noticed is that anyone I think of as (possibly) a scientismist will never acknowledge this - to them it is all science.
Anyway, play nicely!
Seconds out...
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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Ah, this one gets my juices going very nicely. Just two points to start with.
1. Scientism is self-refuting, since it is not a scientific claim, but a philosophical one, hence, according to scientism, cannot contribute any useful knowledge.
2. I'm not sure there are any genuine scientismists. Can you actually live only according to scientific knowledge? Are you not allowed the occasional intuition or irrational fancy?
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Mark Betts:
One thing I have noticed is that anyone I think of as (possibly) a scientismist will never acknowledge this - to them it is all science.
Isn't "scientist" an already-existing word for someone who believes in the explanatory power of science and works to expand that understanding? Making up cumbersome neologisms for already-existing terms seems pointless, but maybe I'm just being a grammaratarianismist about it.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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Being a scientist does not indicate scientism at all. Many scientists would accept that science only describes part of reality.
Posted by Mark Betts (# 17074) on
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quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Are you not allowed the occasional intuition or irrational fancy?
Thinking back to some of the things Richard Dawkins (you knew it wouldn't be long!) has said, it seems that he is allowed these fancies, but his disciples have to believe and hang onto his every word - that's what he calls "thinking for yourself."
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Being a scientist does not indicate scientism at all. Many scientists would accept that science only describes part of reality.
My problem is that "scientism" is usually only trotted out as whipping boy (how's that for a mixed metaphorationism?) whenever science has something particular to say about someone's pet issue. (e.g. heliocentrism, descent with modification, climate change) It's usually a tactic to avoid discussing the specifics of a particular case and instead argue "all science is stupid and subjective".
Posted by Mark Betts (# 17074) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
Isn't "scientist" an already-existing word for someone who believes in the explanatory power of science and works to expand that understanding?
No, the answer is in your question - I've even italicised it for you. Science isn't a belief at all.
Nb. A "theory" isn't a belief.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Mark Betts:
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
Isn't "scientist" an already-existing word for someone who believes in the explanatory power of science and works to expand that understanding?
No, the answer is in your question - I've even italicised it for you. Science isn't a belief at all.
Nb. A "theory" isn't a belief.
Ah, semantic games. Gotcha.
So your argument is that scientist don't really believe in quantum dynamics or gravity or any of those other crazy theories they've been advocationizing to the rest of us, it's just a huge deception in order to . . . what?
Posted by BroJames (# 9636) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
quote:
Originally posted by Mark Betts:
One thing I have noticed is that anyone I think of as (possibly) a scientismist will never acknowledge this - to them it is all science.
Isn't "scientist" an already-existing word for someone who believes in the explanatory power of science and works to expand that understanding? Making up cumbersome neologisms for already-existing terms seems pointless, but maybe I'm just being a grammaratarianismist about it.
Well I agree that scientismist is a cumbersome (and IMHO unattractive) neologism. Scientism, though, as a word to describe the view that (broadly speaking) the only proper kind of knowledge is scientific knowledge, is a useful term. Many scientists don't accept scientism, and many who do accept it are not scientists.
Posted by Mark Betts (# 17074) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by BroJames:
Many scientists don't accept scientism, and many who do accept it are not scientists.
What do you mean by "accept" Scientism? Do you mean accept the usage of the word, or believe it?
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Mark Betts:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Are you not allowed the occasional intuition or irrational fancy?
Thinking back to some of the things Richard Dawkins (you knew it wouldn't be long!) has said, it seems that he is allowed these fancies, but his disciples have to believe and hang onto his every word - that's what he calls "thinking for yourself."
Yes, I'm not convinced that Prof Dawkins actually advocates scientism. I know that he is pretty sniffy about philosophy, but of course, he puts forward various philosophical arguments himself, which are not scientific in nature.
I think it is often a straw man, although I accept that some thinkers come close to scientism. I just don't think they can live it in practical terms.
Posted by BroJames (# 9636) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Mark Betts:
quote:
Originally posted by BroJames:
Many scientists don't accept scientism, and many who do accept it are not scientists.
What do you mean by "accept" Scientism? Do you mean accept the usage of the word, or believe it?
I mean that they don't accept the view that (broadly speaking) the only proper kind of knowledge is scientific knowledge.
Posted by Lawrence (# 4913) on
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Science is an approach to investigate and explain phenomena and scientism is a belief that the scientific approach will eventually explain everything?
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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I think it's a view that science will eventually describe everything; I'm not sure about 'explain'. I suppose so.
Posted by tclune (# 7959) on
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quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I think it's a view that science will eventually describe everything; I'm not sure about 'explain'. I suppose so.
What we really need a catchy word for is those dingbat assholes who keep talking about "debating the controversy" and the like. I saw on the news last night that North Carolina political cretans are trying to pass a law that would require the state to ignore climate change in any of their official planning and the like. Apparently, the real estate biz has a bunch of asshats who are afraid that talk of the rising sea level will depress the ocean-front property market. Do you really think that folks putting too much stock in fact-based reasoning is the great problem we face as a society?
--Tom Clune
[ 24. October 2012, 16:44: Message edited by: tclune ]
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
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How about instead of attacking a straw-man "scientism" you can argue against specific arguments from actual scientists.
For example:
Sean Carrol
He is arguing that the laws of Physics we currently have rule out things like astrology , life after death. Any teleological description of nature and so on.
Why is he wrong? assuming he is, which I doubt.
Posted by Lawrence (# 4913) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I think it's a view that science will eventually describe everything; I'm not sure about 'explain'. I suppose so.
That is probably the nub of this thread, is scientism a belief that science can ultimately give us "meaning", however stark or cold that meaning may be, or a belief that science will just give us a jolly good description of how everything works.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Lawrence:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I think it's a view that science will eventually describe everything; I'm not sure about 'explain'. I suppose so.
That is probably the nub of this thread, is scientism a belief that science can ultimately give us "meaning", however stark or cold that meaning may be, or a belief that science will just give us a jolly good description of how everything works.
Yes, but the trouble now is that the concept of explanation is ambiguous. The idea of 'describe and explain' is supposed to be a hallmark of science in relation to its own observations, hypotheses, and theories. It does not mean 'explain' in a wider philosophical sense.
This is one reason that many of these discussions are tricky, as people are using the same words with different meanings!
Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Mark Betts:
Nb. A "theory" isn't a belief.
While I agree with your major point, my understanding (per Kuhn) is that a theory is (or once was) definitely a belief. A scientist tries to make sense of observations by forming a hypothesis. When a hypothesis has attracted the support of a fair number of other scientists, it is called a theory. Belief in the theory grows as experiments confirm its predictive power. But sometimes observations are noticed which the theory cannot explain. Then belief becomes strained and scientists look for a new explanatory hypothesis-- either a conflicting one or a more comprehensive one. Sometimes theories must be discarded, i.e. we don't believe them anymore.
Posted by Mark Betts (# 17074) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Lawrence:
That is probably the nub of this thread, is scientism a belief that science can ultimately give us "meaning", however stark or cold that meaning may be, or a belief that science will just give us a jolly good description of how everything works.
I think scientism has already decided that for one to enquire about the meaning of life is a pointless (I think I've heard someone say "stupid") question. They believe there is no meaning to anything - it just happened.
Posted by Holy Smoke (# 14866) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
He is arguing that the laws of Physics we currently have rule out things like astrology , life after death. Any teleological description of nature and so on.
Why is he wrong? assuming he is, which I doubt.
That's a good example of the scientistic fallacy.
Thus, there's no such thing as life after death because it would contradict basic laws of physics.
Intelligent design is wrong because science has proven that evolution proceeds by natural selection.
And so on.
The trouble is, like the atheist, the believer in the omniscience of science is so convinced of the self-evident truth of his position, that he thinks he can argue his way out of any argument to the contrary, before he has even begun. So he wouldn't even question the validity of the statements above, because to him they are self-evident truth.
So in answer to your question, I'm not even going to start trying to explain why those statements are wrong.
Posted by Mark Betts (# 17074) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Holy Smoke:
...So in answer to your question, I'm not even going to start trying to explain why those statements are wrong.
I wish you would - I'm drowning here... help!!!
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Holy Smoke:
That's a good example of the scientistic fallacy.
Thus, there's no such thing as life after death because it would contradict basic laws of physics.
Intelligent design is wrong because science has proven that evolution proceeds by natural selection.
And so on.
Like trying to decide if rain is caused by the hydrologic cycle or Zeus pissing through a sieve. Most objectications to scientism I've come across read not so much as appeals to ignorance as appeals for ignorance. The idea that any kind of scientific explanicationing for anything is an assault on everyone else's inalienable right to believe falsehoods.
Posted by Lawrence (# 4913) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Mark Betts:
quote:
Originally posted by Lawrence:
That is probably the nub of this thread, is scientism a belief that science can ultimately give us "meaning", however stark or cold that meaning may be, or a belief that science will just give us a jolly good description of how everything works.
I think scientism has already decided that for one to enquire about the meaning of life is a pointless (I think I've heard someone say "stupid") question. They believe there is no meaning to anything - it just happened.
I think the "meaning of life" that they believe in is in fact the "meaninglessness of life". Science can describe and explain how things work, but it can not say whether anything has "meaning" because that is not the point of science. Life may be "meaningless" but science can not say one way or the other.
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
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Carrol could answer by expanding on his argument in his talk. We have no examples of human intelligence in the real world that acts or exists independently of their physical bodies. No neurons firing, no mind. No Biochemistry, no life.
If you then propose a non-physical "ghost in the machine". He or she would have to interact with the physical body in some way. We would be able to measure that. We see no evidence in Nature of any other forces than the 4 fundamental interactions Gravity,Electromagnetism, The strong nuclear interaction and the Weak nuclear interaction.
If they were other forces that could interact with
us we would have measured them already with the experiments we have done. We have not so they are not there.
If you follow his talk he is not saying that Science already can explain or describe in detail
everything we see. It might in the future.
He is saying that from what Is already known there is no place for telekinesis, astrology, life after death etc in the real world.
If there was we could measure it.
[ 24. October 2012, 17:22: Message edited by: Ikkyu ]
Posted by Carex (# 9643) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
...It's usually a tactic to avoid discussing the specifics of a particular case and instead argue "all science is stupid and subjective".
This has been my experience as well: the only time I have come across the term is when it appears to be used a straw man used to attack Science in general because the scientific data contradict a person's pet beliefs in an area that is well within the realm of Science rather than outside of it.
Now, if someone wants to give a some clear, specific examples of actual Scientism at work that are consistent with given definitions and the way the term has been used on the Ship, I'm willing to listen. But from the attempts at defining it so far, it isn't an approach that I recognize in any of the scientists and engineers that I work with regularly.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Mark Betts:
quote:
Originally posted by BroJames:
Many scientists don't accept scientism, and many who do accept it are not scientists.
What do you mean by "accept" Scientism? Do you mean accept the usage of the word, or believe it?
And wouldn't the acceptance of scientism be scientismism? Where will the wordification end?
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
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What Carex said.
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
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There is a good example in this thread. I pointed to a concrete example of what a scientist actually said and the answer was that "scientismists" believe in the omniscience of Science. And that "scientimsts" claim the self-evidence of scientific arguments.
Something which neither myself or the source I quoted claimed. Carrol just speaks about what we have learned from decades of very careful and clever experiments. Nothing "self-evident" about that. Scientism is a straw man argument.
To answer the arguments of people like Carrol you actually have to deal with what they actually say.
Posted by Mark Betts (# 17074) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
There is a good example in this thread. I pointed to a concrete example of what a scientist actually said and the answer was that "scientismists" believe in the omniscience of Science. And that "scientimsts" claim the self-evidence of scientific arguments.
Something which neither myself or the source I quoted claimed. Carrol just speaks about what we have learned from decades of very careful and clever experiments. Nothing "self-evident" about that. Scientism is a straw man argument.
To answer the arguments of people like Carrol you actually have to deal with what they actually say.
Nope. "Scientism" is a term, not a Straw Man.
Wiki article on Scientism
It is a pejorative term, and has more than one use (see the article) - but that doesn't make it a straw man, just because some people don't like it.
[ 24. October 2012, 18:26: Message edited by: Mark Betts ]
Posted by Holy Smoke (# 14866) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
Carrol could answer by expanding on his argument in his talk. We have no examples of human intelligence in the real world that acts or exists independently of their physical bodies. No neurons firing, no mind. No Biochemistry, no life.
That is generally because any evidence to the contrary - of past lives, spirits, or whatever - is automatically discarded - as 'unscientific'.
quote:
If you then propose a non-physical "ghost in the machine". He or she would have to interact with the physical body in some way. We would be able to measure that.
What would we measure it with? So if it can't be measured by any of our existing instruments, then it doesn't exist. Scientism.
quote:
If you follow his talk he is not saying that Science already can explain or describe in detail everything we see. It might in the future. He is saying that from what Is already known there is no place for telekinesis, astrology, life after death etc in the real world.
The 'real world'... You mean those phenomena which are observable by our current scientific instruments. Of course not, how would they? So even if we could observe the results of telekinesis (let's say, someone can move a candle flame by thought alone), then it hasn't really happened, because there is no scientific mechanism for it to happen. Again, that's scientism - genuine science proceeds from actual observations, and attempts to form and prove hypotheses to explain them. Scientism starts with current scientific theory, and proceeds to ignore or supress any fact or observation which contradicts it.
But as I said, it's not a rational, logical position, however much its adherents may protest otherwise.
Posted by Mark Betts (# 17074) on
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Thanks Holy Smoke!
Posted by Holy Smoke (# 14866) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
There is a good example in this thread. I pointed to a concrete example of what a scientist actually said and the answer was that "scientismists" believe in the omniscience of Science. And that "scientimsts" claim the self-evidence of scientific arguments.
Something which neither myself or the source I quoted claimed...
I'm tempted to suggest that an inability to read is another symptom of scientism, but perhaps that's rather overgeneralizing.
You claim I said '"scientismists" believe in the omniscience of Science.'
What I actually said was 'the believer in the omniscience of science is so convinced of the self-evident truth of his position, that he thinks he can argue his way out of any argument to the contrary, before he has even begun.'
Thus I am talking about those people who believe in the omniscience of science, and how they think (based partly on recalling my own opinions from some years back, I might add), rather than making a truth claim about 'scientismists'. In other words, I am suggesting that belief in the omniscience of science is a distinguishing characteristic of pseudo-scientists, and a means of identifying the species, to which your friend appears to belong.
Also, you claim that I said '"scientimsts" claim the self-evidence of scientific arguments.'
What I actually said was 'he wouldn't even question the validity of the statements above, because to him they are self-evident truth.'
Note, it is not 'scientific arguments' which are self-evident, but his own faulty pseudo-scientific arguments.
Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
quote:
Originally posted by Mark Betts:
One thing I have noticed is that anyone I think of as (possibly) a scientismist will never acknowledge this - to them it is all science.
Isn't "scientist" an already-existing word for someone who believes in the explanatory power of science and works to expand that understanding? Making up cumbersome neologisms for already-existing terms seems pointless, but maybe I'm just being a grammaratarianismist about it.
You haven't understood at all what Mark wrote. Scientism is a perfectly good term that describes the belief that the empirical, naturalistic scientific method can - and indeed ought to - describe and explain everything, whereas science is limited in its scope. I am very surprised that you haven't grasped this really quite obvious distinction.
One example of scientism (aka practical philosophical naturalism) is the idea that science can explain morality. If so, then consider the following...
Someone presents you with a stick of dynamite. Please show him how the empirical scientific method can explain - with appropriate reasonable evidence - what he ought to do with it. Should he place it on a crowded train to blow people to bits, or should he use it in a controlled explosion to demolish a derelict building safely? How does science ALONE answer this question?
Failure to provide a proper answer strictly according to the empirical scientific method will prove that your conflation of science and scientism is unwarranted, and that Mark's point is completely valid.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
Scientism is a straw man argument.
And yet, people still buy books by Matt Ridley on economics.
But Matt Ridley writes his books believing in the explanatory power of evolutionary psychology and working to expand that understanding. Therefore, according to Croesos, he is a scientist doing science. Questioning the competence of evolutionary psychology to dictate results to economics is, according to Croesos, an appeal to ignorance and an assault on, say, Paul Krugman's inalienable right to believe falsehoods.
Posted by Mockingale (# 16599) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Holy Smoke:
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Ikkyu:
[qb]The trouble is, like the atheist, the believer in the omniscience of science is so convinced of the self-evident truth of his position, that he thinks he can argue his way out of any argument to the contrary, before he has even begun. So he wouldn't even question the validity of the statements above, because to him they are self-evident truth.
What you present as "scientism" sounds an awful lot like religious fundamentalism: I don't have to entertain any alternative theories, arguments or apparent evidence to the contrary of phenomenon X because my Holy Scriptures and/or tradition say otherwise, and it's plainly obvious that they're right because they're from God.
Without getting too far into equines that have ceased to be, that's the kind of refutation that young-earth creationists offer (to appease their fellow travelers). I heard a creationism guy on the radio argue (and this is just an example) that studies indicating that birds may have evolved from dinosaurs are absurd because flying creatures were created before terrestrial beasts, according to Genesis 1.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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I think EE (above) has presented a good example of scientism, in the attempt to describe and explain morality in scientific terms, something which Sam Harris appears to be trying to do.
I would also venture that logical positivism in the early 20th century also advocated scientism, since it argued that metaphysics was meaningless.
I suppose various forms of verificationism were also like this.
But positivism seemed to collapse under its own contradictions, which is revealing I think, since any form of scientism is a philosophical doctrine, not a scientific claim. Hence, it is self-refuting.
Posted by Holy Smoke (# 14866) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Mockingale:
What you present as "scientism" sounds an awful lot like religious fundamentalism: I don't have to entertain any alternative theories, arguments or apparent evidence to the contrary of phenomenon X because my Holy Scriptures and/or tradition say otherwise, and it's plainly obvious that they're right because they're from God...
I suppose you could liken it to religious fundamentalism, but I think I would tend to think of it more as a kind of socio-political ideology, which acts a an underpinning, not to science per se, but to modern society. After all, a lot of decisions and criteria as to what should or should not be investigated by respectable science are basically societal decisions, when it comes down to it - society decides not to give official credence to reports of certain phenomena, and thus respectable scientists (who value their careers and reputations) do not investigate them. But then that is society's perogative, and perhaps there are good reasons for her choices.
But the ideology only really works if it is accepted implicitly, and not held up to examination, and so part of the ideology is that the respectable scientist doesn't actually publically admit that any such ideology exists. It just naturally transpires that certain subjects are so obviously 'unscientific' that nobody will touch them with a barge-pole, without their needing to give a rational justification for their decision.
So it's probably only when it comes up against religion or spirituality that its premises are tested, and when it is called by name, and when it starts looking like some kind of religious fundamentalism - most of the time, it is just taken for granted.
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Holy Smoke:
That is generally because any evidence to the contrary - of past lives, spirits, or whatever - is automatically discarded - as 'unscientific'.
Give me an example of objective evidence for those things that has been “automatically discarded”.
quote:
Originally posted by Holy Smoke:
What would we measure it with? So if it can't be measured by any of our existing instruments, then it doesn't exist. Scientism.
So you are claiming that some “ghost in the machine” could affect a physical body made of protons neutrons and electrons in a way that affects their behavior and not be measurable with our existing detectors?. (If It does not affect behavior its irrelevant.)
Carroll's argument would be that according to Quantum Filed theory, (the most precisely tested by experiment theory we have),this implies that it would be an interaction that is mediated by a particle that would already have been observed in one of our particle detectors IF it existed.
He is not saying that if we can’t measure it, it does not exist. Carroll is saying that if it existed we would have already been able to measure it. Our experiments cover the range of distances and magnitudes we are talking about. If the force you said was undetectable it would not be able to do what you claim it could do, that is, to interact with the Physical body.
This conclusion would the same for telekinesis and Astrology.
quote:
Originally posted by Holy Smoke:
Scientism starts with current scientific theory, and proceeds to ignore or suppress any fact or observation which contradicts it.
What is your evidence for this suppression? What evidence is being ignored?
There are some people that want to explain morality in scientific terms. Carroll if you watch his talk is not one of them.
But stating the fact that some people try to use science to explain things that it probably can't explain, is not a valid argument to use against people who use science to explain things it definitely can explain.
For example to claim "scientism" as an argument against the overwhelming evidence in favor of the scientific position on some DH topics is a straw-man argument.
And those people who claim they can apply the scientific method to morality don't claim they already have the answer. Just that it can be done.
They may fail, and I agree with Carroll that they probably will fail. But that has no bearing on issues like the existence of telekinesis and ghosts.
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
quote:
Originally posted by Mark Betts:
One thing I have noticed is that anyone I think of as (possibly) a scientismist will never acknowledge this - to them it is all science.
Isn't "scientist" an already-existing word for someone who believes in the explanatory power of science and works to expand that understanding?
No. "Scientist" is the genus of which the species are physicist, chemist, biologist, botanist, and so forth. People who undertake scientific research and theorification and so forth. To put it crudely, people who "do" science.
Scientism is a philosophical belief, and scientismists (horrid word, I agree) are those who hold that philosophical belief. You can have a scientist that isn't a scientismist, and a scientismist that isn't a scientist (I assume most scientismists aren't).
[ 24. October 2012, 20:31: Message edited by: mousethief ]
Posted by Holy Smoke (# 14866) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
Give me an example of objective evidence for those things that has been “automatically discarded”.
Well you show me examples of serious investigations of these subjects - past lives, ghosts, spiritual manifestations - in mainstream scientific journals. That's what I mean by 'supressed'.
quote:
So you are claiming that some “ghost in the machine” could affect a physical body made of protons neutrons and electrons in a way that affects their behavior and not be measurable with our existing detectors?...Our experiments cover the range of distances and magnitudes we are talking about. If the force you said was undetectable it would not be able to do what you claim it could do, that is, to interact with the Physical body.
Nice argument, but it's still scientism. Real empirical science would start with the observation, and then try to construct an explanatory hypothesis, not start with the theory, and try to disprove the observation. Or it would take the observations as empirical evidence which refutes quantum field theory.
quote:
But stating the fact that some people try to use science to explain things that it probably can't explain, is not a valid argument to use against people who use science to explain things it definitely can explain.
For example to claim "scientism" as an argument against the overwhelming evidence in favor of the scientific position on some DH topics is a straw-man argument.
With respect, I think you are placing the dolly in the cup here. Nobody is saying that the existence of scientism is an argument against the Theory of Evolution, or whatever. It is rather that the arguments put forward (without going into the details here) are based on scientism rather than science.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Holy Smoke:
quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
Give me an example of objective evidence for those things that has been “automatically discarded”.
Well you show me examples of serious investigations of these subjects - past lives, ghosts, spiritual manifestations - in mainstream scientific journals. That's what I mean by 'supressed'.
Erik Weisz (a.k.a Harry Houdini) spent a good deal of time investigating the phenomena you describe, sometimes even in conjunction with mainstream scientific journals. What you seem to be complaining about is that these phenomena have been investigated and the results aren't to your liking.
One could, of course, argumentize on similitudinous grounds that the scientific community is suppressing evidence of leprechauns. After all, when was the last time a mainstream scientific journal devoted space to an investigation of the subject?
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Holy Smoke:
Real empirical science would start with the observation, and then try to construct an explanatory hypothesis, not start with the theory, and try to disprove the observation
What observation? Who has observed forces that are not detectable in particle accelerators?
Good luck refuting Quantum Field theory.
Precision Tests of QED
This example is for the most tested part, QED but you can find many experimental results that agree with it and no counter examples. (And counter examples HAVE been looked for, it would mean a guaranteed Nobel Prize. )
quote:
Originally posted by Holy Smoke:
It is rather that the arguments put forward (without going into the details here) are based on scientism rather than science.
So for example, what would make Carroll's arguments "scientism"?.
About "suppression" quoting Carl Sagan:
"Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" .
Should scientists publish papers on the existence of pink unicorns? Only in the case physical evidence for one was found. In the absence of it what would they publish?
Again were is the objective evidence that is not been published in scientific papers? Sources?
Would that evidence be of the same kind that you would hope Engineers use when designing airplanes? Or does a looser standard of evidence apply?
Posted by Squibs (# 14408) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
My problem is that "scientism" is usually only trotted out as whipping boy (how's that for a mixed metaphorationism?) whenever science has something particular to say about someone's pet issue. (e.g. heliocentrism, descent with modification, climate change) It's usually a tactic to avoid discussing the specifics of a particular case and instead argue "all science is stupid and subjective". [/QB]
That may or may not be so. But this thread is about the tenability of scientism as a philosophy, not the reason why somebody may accuse another person of holding that philosophy.
If somebody wantS to see a scientist endorse scientism they need look no further that Peter Atkins.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Mark Betts:
Nope. "Scientism" is a term, not a Straw Man.
Wiki article on Scientism
It is a pejorative term, and has more than one use (see the article) - but that doesn't make it a straw man, just because some people don't like it.
Do I really need to explainify that just because something has an entry on Wikipedia that doesn't necessarily mean that it really exists?
Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on
:
Croesos -
Ah, I see. Ignoring my moral challenge.
I will therefore draw the appropriate conclusion.
But please carry on with your denials of scientism with your, ahem, diversionificatory tactics.
Posted by Squibs (# 14408) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
How about instead of attacking a straw-man "scientism" you can argue against specific arguments from actual scientists.
For example:
Sean Carrol
He is arguing that the laws of Physics we currently have rule out things like astrology , life after death. Any teleological description of nature and so on.
Why is he wrong? assuming he is, which I doubt.
If you want a repost to at least some of Carrol's points then you might be interested in some of William Lang Craig's recent podcasts.
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/reasonable-faith-podcast/latest
Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on
:
Are there any authorities here on Thomas Kuhn and his Structure of Scientific Revolutions? I studied this book as a freshman in college and wrote a paper which our fearless leader, a philosopher, liked very much, arguing that Kuhn explains scientific progress. Some years later, I heard a lecture by another philosophy professor whose thesis was that Kuhn's book denies scientific progress. When I later expressed my doubts about this to him, he objected that I had missed the whole point of the book.
The article on Kuhn in Wikipedia goes into this as a disputed topic that has received much discussion; and states that the latter view is by now discredited. In fact, it was (I gather) in view of this controversy that Kuhn himself said, "I am not a Kuhnian!" This reassures me that my 18-year-old self and my illustrious prof were not, after all, idiots.
It reminds me of a learned article in a journal or anthology about the music of Penderecki, discussing the composer's aleatoric passages. It seemed to me that he was missing the forest for the trees. Later in the same volume, Penderecki himself gladdened my heart by saying in an intervew, "I NEVER write aleatoric music!"
Can anyone comment further?
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Croesos -
Ah, I see. Ignoring my moral challenge.
I will therefore draw the appropriate conclusion.
But please carry on with your denials of scientism with your, ahem, diversionificatory tactics.
The obvious answer is to simply look on Wikipedia, the ultimate authority on all things. According to this font of wisdom:
quote:
Dynamite is mainly used in the mining, quarrying, construction, and demolition industries, and it has had some historical usage in warfare. However the unstable nature of nitroglycerin, especially if subjected to freezing, has rendered it obsolete for military uses.
Purely scientific objective information from a source you yourself consider unimpeachable! It is moralicious to use dynamite for mining, quarrying, constructicating, and demolishizing. It used to be moral for warfare, but not any more.
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
:
@ EtymologicalEvangelical
Or he could consult his upbringing, experience empathy for other people etc..
His exposure to Human culture his family history coupled with his evolutionary heritage and the particular circumstances will be fairly good clues about what he will probably do.
A complete scientific description of all of the above still awaits more research.
Science will probably be able to describe what happens very well in the future. The current gaps can be filled in by our experience of such things in real life for the moment.
Basing a moral code on scientific ideas is a completely different topic. But you failed to explain why science HAS to provide a moral code, it only has to describe the moral codes that exist. The explanation will probably go "Evolution + Culture + History +....." obviously lots of details need to be filled in.
@Squibs:
I can't listen to podcasts since I don't own ithings (ipad,iphones ..). If you could post any relevant arguments I would be grateful. Or point me to a transcript or some such.
[ 24. October 2012, 22:25: Message edited by: Ikkyu ]
Posted by Squibs (# 14408) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
[QUOTE]It used to be moral for warfare, but not any more.
But again you miss the point. Why is it immoral to use dynamite? What scientific theory or hypothesis told us so? And if it is immoral why do we now use explosives that are many times more powerful to kill each other?
Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
Purely scientific objective information from a source you yourself consider unimpeachable! It is moralicious to use dynamite for mining, quarrying, constructicating, and demolishizing. It used to be moral for warfare, but not any more.
Typical Croesos fudge, as per.
If science can tell us what is moral and proclaims that the violent use of a substance is immoral, then I assume that no scientists are involved in the arms industry? I assume that sophisticated weaponry and WMD can be produced without any involvement of science?
quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu
Basing a moral code on scientific ideas is a completely different topic. But you failed to explain why science HAS to provide a moral code, it only has to describe the moral codes that exist. The explanation will probably go "Evolution + Culture + History +....." obviously lots of details need to be filled in.
Science doesn't have to do any such thing! I never suggested this at all, in fact the very opposite! Science cannot provide this kind of explanation, and never will be able to, because morality lies outside its purview. We know this a priori. If you disagree, then please show me the oughts that the empirical study of nature provides. I'm afraid I have never seen the words "thou shalt not steal" (for example) spelt out in the clouds, or naturally tattooed on the wing of a magpie!
As for the evolutionary 'explanation' for the origin of human morality: that is not a conclusion from the operation of the empirical scientific method, but is simply philosophical speculation. So typical that philosophical naturalism is passed off as 'science'!
"...you can't fool all of the people all of the time."
Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
The obvious answer is to simply look on Wikipedia, the ultimate authority on all things.
...
Purely scientific objective information from a source you yourself consider unimpeachable!
Evidence for that comment, please. I don't recall ever singing the praises of Wikipedia, but there you go. No accounting for some people's imagination...
Now, be a good scientist and back up your assertions...
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
Yes, EE is correct above. Science cannot cross the is/ought boundary. It can describe to us the particular values in a society, probably, but it cannot tell me whether I ought to follow a particular value.
But I think most scientists would agree with this; I suspect that scientism is actually quite rare, and is probably found more often amongst philosophers. This is ironic, since philosophical arguments themselves cannot be described by science.
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by : EtymologicalEvangelical
Please show him how the empirical scientific method can explain - with appropriate reasonable evidence - what he ought to do with it.
So if you say science cannot do this why did you ask?
I'm not claiming science can do it. I also said that it is not the "job" of science to do that.
I clearly also did not claim that science had already explained the origin of morality. I said that when it does and I don't see a reason why not. "The explanation will probably go "Evolution + Culture + History +....."
Since I did not say it was anything but well founded speculation I don't think I was "fooling" anybody.
I'm still waiting on somebody to explain why what Carroll says is "scientism".
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
Purely scientific objective information from a source you yourself consider unimpeachable! It is moralicious to use dynamite for mining, quarrying, constructicating, and demolishizing. It used to be moral for warfare, but not any more.
Typical Croesos fudge, as per.
Not at all. Just pointing out, for what feels like the thousandth time, that the "scientism" you describulate is a cartoonish strawman that doesn't, as far as I can tell, have any adherents. What's usually called "scientism" is typically someone else pointing out that your pet hypothesis is erroneous, and demonstrably so.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
The obvious answer is to simply look on Wikipedia, the ultimate authority on all things.
...
Purely scientific objective information from a source you yourself consider unimpeachable!
Evidence for that comment, please. I don't recall ever singing the praises of Wikipedia, but there you go. No accounting for some people's imagination...
Now, be a good scientist and back up your assertions...
Sorry. Conflated one of your posts with
Mark Betts', whose position you were defendulating at the time.
Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
Not at all. Just pointing out, for what feels like the thousandth time, that the "scientism" you describulate is a cartoonish strawman that doesn't, as far as I can tell, have any adherents. What's usually called "scientism" is typically someone else pointing out that your pet hypothesis is erroneous, and demonstrably so.
Good.
I'm glad that you acknowledge that scientism is a load of bollocks, and, I assume the same goes for any philosophy dependent on it, such as philosophical naturalism?
Logical consistency isn't really a lot to ask, is it?
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
Not at all. Just pointing out, for what feels like the thousandth time, that the "scientism" you describulate is a cartoonish strawman that doesn't, as far as I can tell, have any adherents. What's usually called "scientism" is typically someone else pointing out that your pet hypothesis is erroneous, and demonstrably so.
Good.
I'm glad that you acknowledge that scientism is a load of bollocks, and, I assume the same goes for any philosophy dependent on it, such as philosophical naturalism?
Logical consistency isn't really a lot to ask, is it?
Since I suspect whatever you mean by "philosophical naturalism" is an equally cartoonish misrepresenationment, most likely.
So what is "philosophical supernaturalism" then?
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
Purely scientific objective information from a source you yourself consider unimpeachable! It is moralicious to use dynamite for mining, quarrying, constructicating, and demolishizing. It used to be moral for warfare, but not any more.
Typical Croesos fudge, as per.
Not at all. Just pointing out, for what feels like the thousandth time, that the "scientism" you describulate is a cartoonish strawman that doesn't, as far as I can tell, have any adherents. What's usually called "scientism" is typically someone else pointing out that your pet hypothesis is erroneous, and demonstrably so.
It's possible that scientism is indeed a strawman, but I would have thought that Sam Harris has certain scientistic ideas in relation to morality. I haven't read 'The Moral Landscape', but I have read bits of his stuff where he seems to argue that science can cross the is/ought boundary. I would say that is nonsense.
However, this doesn't mean that Harris is totally scientistic, since I don't know what his views are on other controversial areas, such as philosophy, aesthetics, and subjectivity.
I suspect there are very few advocates of 100% scientism, as it would seem to contradict itself, simply by being asserted.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
Philosophical unnaturalism? What's the correctified term?
Posted by HughWillRidmee (# 15614) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Holy Smoke:
So even if we could observe the results of telekinesis (let's say, someone can move a candle flame by thought alone), then it hasn't really happened, because there is no scientific mechanism for it to happen. Again, that's scientism - genuine science proceeds from actual observations, and attempts to form and prove hypotheses to explain them. Scientism starts with current scientific theory, and proceeds to ignore or supress any fact or observation which contradicts it.
But as I said, it's not a rational, logical position, however much its adherents may protest otherwise.
First move your candle flame by thought alone and then we’ll discuss it – until then you’re indulging in idle speculation.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
Just pointing out, for what feels like the thousandth time, that the "scientism" you describulate is a cartoonish strawman that doesn't, as far as I can tell, have any adherents.
So your position, as far as I can understand it, is that
a) scientism as described is a cartoonish strawman that nobody believes;
b) and if anybody did believe it they would be right to do so because it's true?
There is a long history of people using some background in natural philosophy or some natural science to gain a spurious authority when making pronouncements about psychology or the social sciences or philosophy. Usually, they do so for right-wing ends. (See Gould's Mismeasure of Man for some particularly egregious examples.) The idea that the social sciences and philosophy are not real subjects of knowledge, and are just waiting for proper scientists to come along and put them in order, is a long-standing piece of ideological puffery. It needs a name so we can call it out: scientism or parascience will both do.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
There is one philosopher who seems brave enough to come out and say that scientism is correct. This is Alex Rosenberg, whose helpfully named book 'The Atheist's Guide to Reality' has just come out. I haven't read it, but Mr Rosenberg has provided this helpful little bon mot:
"My conception of scientism is almost the same as that of those who use it as a term of abuse. They use the term to name the exaggerated and unwarranted confidence that science and its methods can answer all meaningful questions. I agree with that definition except for the ‘exaggerated’ and ‘unwarranted’ part."
I say, bravo Mr Rosenberg!
http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=4209
Posted by Adeodatus (# 4992) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
There is one philosopher who seems brave enough to come out and say that scientism is correct. This is Alex Rosenberg, whose helpfully named book 'The Atheist's Guide to Reality' has just come out. I haven't read it, but Mr Rosenberg has provided this helpful little bon mot:
"My conception of scientism is almost the same as that of those who use it as a term of abuse. They use the term to name the exaggerated and unwarranted confidence that science and its methods can answer all meaningful questions. I agree with that definition except for the ‘exaggerated’ and ‘unwarranted’ part."
I say, bravo Mr Rosenberg!
http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=4209
Yes, I remember scientism from before it became a pejorative word. Jacques Monod used to be the big name. Dawkins is certainly a scientism-ist, or was until he backed off from it on finding that it's unfashionable. And I think Rosenberg defines it very nicely indeed.
He's wrong, of course.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
I don't think Prof Dawkins really adheres to scientism. For example, in TGD, he is quite happy to debate various philosophical arguments, well, OK, he does it quite badly, but never mind.
But surely this kind of argumentation would be ruled out by scientism? Philosophy is one of the interesting areas which science does not cover, although I suppose this could be countered by saying that philosophy does not actually lead to any gain in human knowledge.
Posted by Adeodatus (# 4992) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I don't think Prof Dawkins really adheres to scientism. For example, in TGD, he is quite happy to debate various philosophical arguments, well, OK, he does it quite badly, but never mind.
But surely this kind of argumentation would be ruled out by scientism? Philosophy is one of the interesting areas which science does not cover, although I suppose this could be countered by saying that philosophy does not actually lead to any gain in human knowledge.
It's always difficult when Dawkins gets mentioned, because to me at least, it appears that what he adheres to most consistently is his own publicity. His various shifts of stance over the years certainly look as if one of his major concerns is Making Dawkins Look Good. I believe that at one point, Dawkins dissed all philosophy as being worthless, but I've struggled to find a citation, so I could be wrong. Perhaps it's somewhere in one of his rhetorical fist-fights with Mary Midgley.
But yes, this kind of discussion would be regarded as dust and ashes by a thorough-going scientism-ist, because we're asking meaningless questions and then discussing them in meaningless language. It's like an extreme version of old-fashioned logical positivism. The standard objection to scientism is, as has been pointed out here, that it can't give rise to a theory of ethics. Monod disagreed - he thought it could, though I can't remember the details of his argument.
He's wrong, too.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
Well, Sam Harris seems to be rejigging this argument in relation to morality, although it seems to be another version of consequentialism, as far as I can see.
I think Prof Dawkins is unfairly tarred with the brush of scientism, although possibly at times he has half-suggested that he adheres to it.
You do sometimes find scientists who proclaim that philosophy is dead, or useless, but quite often in the next breath they make a statement which is clearly philosophical and not scientific.
Of course, ironically, scientism itself is not a scientific claim! I have a vague memory of A. J. Ayer admitting ruefully that verificationism was self-refuting, although possibly I am a bit blurry on that.
Posted by SusanDoris (# 12618) on
:
Oh dear, just noticed this... but I'm away until tomorrow evening, so will have to wait until then to read!
Posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard (# 368) on
:
Sigh, the usual false dichotomy.
William Lane Craig just trots out the Kalam Cosmological Argument.
There is NOTHING in creation or logic that 'proves' God (apart from Fermi's Paradox of course). There is NOTHING in science that refutes Him.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
There is a long history of people using some background in natural philosophy or some natural science to gain a spurious authority when making pronouncements about psychology or the social sciences or philosophy. Usually, they do so for right-wing ends. (See Gould's Mismeasure of Man for some particularly egregious examples.) The idea that the social sciences and philosophy are not real subjects of knowledge, and are just waiting for proper scientists to come along and put them in order, is a long-standing piece of ideological puffery. It needs a name so we can call it out: scientism or parascience will both do.
I'm pretty sure using inapplicalble measures to support spurious hypothesis is already knownified as "quackery". This seems like a perfectly good termification and has the advantages of already being in common use and not being linguistically inelegant.
Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Croesos -
Ah, I see. Ignoring my moral challenge.
I will therefore draw the appropriate conclusion.
But please carry on with your denials of scientism with your, ahem, diversionificatory tactics.
The nub of the problem. EE offers a moral challenge, Croesos chooses not to respond directly, EE draws the appropriate conclusion.
Foolishly I thought the challenge might have been ignored for a variety of reasons (I, for example, felt no overpowering urge to respond), but EE already knows there is only one appropriate conclusion to draw. No further evidence is required, EE already knows the only explanation. Scientists have no hope against someone who doesn't need to consider alternatives.
[ 25. October 2012, 14:09: Message edited by: que sais-je ]
Posted by BroJames (# 9636) on
:
The OED lists references to scientism going back to the 1870s. It refines into the more specific sense in which it is being used in this discussion in the early part of the last century. There's a list of references in this post - and more discussion of the term in the thread that follows it.
If scientism is quackery, then it is a specific kind of quackery and specific terminology is useful. (Just in the same way as, if I go to my doctor and tell her I'm ill, I want her to be a bit more specific than telling me I've got a disease.)
Posted by BroJames (# 9636) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by que sais-je:
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Croesos -
Ah, I see. Ignoring my moral challenge.
I will therefore draw the appropriate conclusion.
But please carry on with your denials of scientism with your, ahem, diversionificatory tactics.
The nub of the problem. EE offers a moral challenge, Croesos chooses not to respond directly, EE draws the appropriate conclusion.
Foolishly I thought the challenge might have been ignored for a variety of reasons (I, for example, felt no overpowering urge to respond), but EE already knows there is only one appropriate conclusion to draw. No further evidence is required, EE already knows the only explanation. Scientists have no hope against someone who doesn't need to consider alternatives.
For the benefit of this contributor, what is the response to the moral challenge, or is the challenge in some respect not an appropriate test of the idea that science can explain morality?
Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by BroJames:
If scientism is quackery, then it is a specific kind of quackery and specific terminology is useful.
Is it significant that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (which I prefer to Wikipedia on such matters) has no mention of scientism?
quote:
Originally posted by Alogon:
Are there any authorities here on Thomas Kuhn and his Structure of Scientific Revolutions?
And while on the superiority of SEP their article on Kuhn may help. Personally I'm with you - though not an expert.
quote:
Originally posted by holy smoke:
The trouble is, like the atheist, the believer in the omniscience of science is so convinced of the self-evident truth of his position, that he thinks he can argue his way out of any argument to the contrary, before he has even begun.
Actually lots of people on SoF seem to feel that way. I do sometimes.
Posted by Pre-cambrian (# 2055) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I suspect there are very few advocates of 100% scientism, as it would seem to contradict itself, simply by being asserted.
That's hardly surprising as "scientism" only seems to exist in the eye of the beholder.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
Well, it has become a pejorative term, so few people are going to celebrate it; hence kudos to Alex Rosenberg.
As others have said, you can discern it in earlier ideas, such as logical positivism, verificationism, and so on, many of which seemed to crash and burn.
I suppose today eliminative materialism is quite close to scientism, but perhaps there is a subtle difference.
Posted by BroJames (# 9636) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by que sais-je:
quote:
Originally posted by BroJames:
If scientism is quackery, then it is a specific kind of quackery and specific terminology is useful.
Is it significant that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (which I prefer to Wikipedia on such matters) has no mention of scientism?<snip>
Well... there isn't a contents entry for scientism (nor, come to that, for logical positivism), but searching the SEP throws up 21 entries in which the term occurs. In any event it is no more or less significant than the fact that The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy and The Oxford Companion to Philosophy both do have references for scientism.
Posted by Pre-cambrian (# 2055) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Well, it has become a pejorative term, so few people are going to celebrate it; hence kudos to Alex Rosenberg.
And, as with most use of pejorative terms, its use says more about the user that it does about the person at whom the finger is being pointed.
quote:
As others have said, you can discern it in earlier ideas, such as logical positivism, verificationism, and so on, many of which seemed to crash and burn.
I suppose today eliminative materialism is quite close to scientism, but perhaps there is a subtle difference.
Maybe you (think) you can discern it. Maybe some of them (think they) can. That does not mean that people generally can see, or that it is actually there. Is the desire to label perceived opponents with an acknowledged pejorative term the main motive for this discernment?
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Pre-cambrian:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Well, it has become a pejorative term, so few people are going to celebrate it; hence kudos to Alex Rosenberg.
And, as with most use of pejorative terms, its use says more about the user that it does about the person at whom the finger is being pointed.
quote:
As others have said, you can discern it in earlier ideas, such as logical positivism, verificationism, and so on, many of which seemed to crash and burn.
I suppose today eliminative materialism is quite close to scientism, but perhaps there is a subtle difference.
Maybe you (think) you can discern it. Maybe some of them (think they) can. That does not mean that people generally can see, or that it is actually there. Is the desire to label perceived opponents with an acknowledged pejorative term the main motive for this discernment?
It might be, or might not. I suppose it is interesting to look back at some of these earlier views, which seemed to crash and burn, and ask why they did. One reason might be because they had begun to use philosophical arguments, which they had themselves ruled out of operation, as meaningless.
So this brings up the question as to which questions can be answered by science, and which cannot. But is that itself a scientific question?
I think the rejection of philosophy weighs quite heavily on such discussions, as it is a brave man or women who does that, and can actually achieve it.
Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on
:
What's wrong with the idea that science can explain morality, at least in part?
It doesn't count for much. Moral codes differ markedly from one culture to another on certain points.
What if it can explain why a Brit believes that a widow ought to be provided for, while in many parts of India for centuries, one believed that a widow should commit suicide. If this expectation has changed, it is mainly because the British were horrified, and the British ruled. Does might make right? What says science?
Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by que sais-je
Foolishly I thought the challenge might have been ignored for a variety of reasons (I, for example, felt no overpowering urge to respond), but EE already knows there is only one appropriate conclusion to draw. No further evidence is required, EE already knows the only explanation. Scientists have no hope against someone who doesn't need to consider alternatives.
Errm... actually I am very willing to consider alternatives. That is why I asked the question!
So, come on, what are these 'alternatives' (or perhaps just one) that I apparently think that I don't need to consider?
Do please enlighten me. Or are you just going to give in to your overpowering urge to ignore my question, while comforting yourself with the thought that you don't need to answer someone who you have judged isn't prepared to listen, even though you have no evidence that I am not willing to listen, because you haven't bothered to give any answer that I *can* consider!!
Sheesh...
Posted by Drewthealexander (# 16660) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Pre-cambrian:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I suspect there are very few advocates of 100% scientism, as it would seem to contradict itself, simply by being asserted.
That's hardly surprising as "scientism" only seems to exist in the eye of the beholder.
To what extent would you agree with the proposition that "science and its methods can answer all meaningful questions"?
Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by BroJames:
In any event it is no more or less significant than the fact that The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy and The Oxford Companion to Philosophy both do have references for scientism.
Significant for me - I don't have a copy of the other two!
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Pre-cambrian:
That's hardly surprising as "scientism" only seems to exist in the eye of the beholder.
Very much so. Those decrying "scientism" often issue caveatations claiming to support "science", provided science knows its place and keeps its big nose out of whatever pet issues the decrier happens to cherishize. They're particularly vague about where this line is drawn.
For instance, take the case of Peter Popoff. Now you'd think that divine revelation would be an area outside the scope of legitimate science, even if God chooses to reveal Himself via radio frequencies in a voice that sounds incredibly like Mrs. Popoff. (Especially in such cases, pro-Popoff anti-scientismistas might argue.)
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
I'm pretty sure using inapplicalble measures to support spurious hypothesis is already knownified as "quackery". This seems like a perfectly good termification and has the advantages of already being in common use and not being linguistically inelegant.
I don't believe that's the usual connotation of 'quackery'. Furthermore, trading on the prestige of the natural sciences to support conclusions reached for other reasons, or reached solely because of the perceived prestige, is enough of a special case to warrant its own term.
Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
quote:
Originally posted by Pre-cambrian:
That's hardly surprising as "scientism" only seems to exist in the eye of the beholder.
Very much so.
Oh, I agree. Peter Atkins is one such beholder, he of "science is omnipotent" fame. Simple logic put him right on that point, of course.
quote:
Those decrying "scientism" often issue caveatations claiming to support "science", provided science knows its place and keeps its big nose out of whatever pet issues the decrier happens to cherishize. They're particularly vague about where this line is drawn.
Oh yes. The following are, admittedly, pretty vague...
1. Morality
2. Reason
3. The uniformity of nature
4. The universality of cause and effect
5. The validity of the empirical scientific method itself
6. Aesthetics
7. A whole host of innate ideas without which sense perception (and, ahem, dear old science) is impossible (do I really need to fish out my copy of Critique of Pure Reason to elaborate on this?)
I have no problem with "that which is omnipotent" having a go at tackling these. Good luck to it.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Oh yes. The following are, admittedly, pretty vague...
1. Morality
2. Reason
3. The uniformity of nature
4. The universality of cause and effect
5. The validity of the empirical scientific method itself
6. Aesthetics
7. A whole host of innate ideas without which sense perception (and, ahem, dear old science) is impossible (do I really need to fish out my copy of Critique of Pure Reason to elaborate on this?)
You forgot mathematics, which is not derived via the scientific method but rather via logical reasoning. I find it fascinating that your straw scientismistinistafarians seem to so confident in the power of science while utterly rejecting mathematics. I'm sure someone agreeulating with your assertifying will be along to explainify this . . . any . . . day . . . now . . .
Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
I find it fascinating that your straw scientismistinistafarians seem to so confident in the power of science while utterly rejecting mathematics.
Rest assured I am no supporter of Peter Atkins, so no need to talk about "your straw scientismist..blah..blah..blah..."
But it really is quite heart warming to see Croesos and William Lane Craig agreeing with each other. Like footie in no man's land on Christmas Day on the Somme.
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on
:
quote:
And, as with most use of pejorative terms, its use says more about the user that it does about the person at whom the finger is being pointed.
My sentiments exactly. The overreach of natural scientists into areas that apparently should not concern them varies so widely that the term is useless except as an insult in lieu of an argument. So, its usage is common in academic turf wars such as those that Dafyd mentions and commoner still deployed by creationists and Christian apologists. But the umbrage taken in each case is due to markedly different perceived slights. The outrage a philosopher or a historian may feel when a scientist tells them their methods are merely a subset of science has nothing in common with a creationist opposing evolution, with a Christian protesting there is a special spiritual realm closed to science or a dualist of any stripe declaring that neuroscience can never ever explain consciousness.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Alogon:
What's wrong with the idea that science can explain morality, at least in part?
It doesn't count for much. Moral codes differ markedly from one culture to another on certain points.
What if it can explain why a Brit believes that a widow ought to be provided for, while in many parts of India for centuries, one believed that a widow should commit suicide. If this expectation has changed, it is mainly because the British were horrified, and the British ruled. Does might make right? What says science?
Yes, I think science can describe extant moral codes, and so on, but the argument over morality and science is usually about the is/ought boundary. Given certain values, can science tell me if I ought to follow them? I don't see how it could do that.
Harris uses the idea of 'well-being' to indicate that scientific descriptions of this are available, and also descriptions of which behaviours promote it.
But this is a variety of consequentialism, and is wide open to criticism. You can define well-being in completely different ways - who is to say which one is right for me?
Posted by Pre-cambrian (# 2055) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Yes, I think science can describe extant moral codes, and so on, but the argument over morality and science is usually about the is/ought boundary. Given certain values, can science tell me if I ought to follow them? I don't see how it could do that.
OK. Are you saying that science, within the current boundaries of scientific knowledge, cannot tell you this? Or are you saying that science will never be able to tell you this. That there will never be a discovery that x, y or z process drives a moral decision. If the latter, what are the grounds on which you are so confidently deciding the bounds of future scientific knowledge? To say dogmatically that science can never explain morality sounds like, to coin a phrase, religionism.
Posted by Pre-cambrian (# 2055) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Simple logic put him right on that point, of course.
Is this logic or "Etymologic"? Experience on the Ship suggests there can be a sizeable gap between the two.
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Yes, I think science can describe extant moral codes, and so on, but the argument over morality and science is usually about the is/ought boundary. Given certain values, can science tell me if I ought to follow them? I don't see how it could do that.
I don't think it can cross the is/ought boundary either. But it does not have to.
Morality is a cultural product and as such is subjective. Describing extant moral codes and were they come from, which you admit science can do, is enough to explain everything we refer to when we talk about morality.
Humans,the product of millions of years of evolution create morality. There are many different moral systems competing for which one is the best, Science will not give the answer to which one is best. It can't do that. But the knowledge we get from science can inform our decisions on that front.
While this is true it does not mean that suddenly quantum physics stops working, that evolution did not happen,that global warming is not real,that we are been driven around by "ghosts in the machine".
The existence of limits to scientific knowledge does not mean that now magic is possible.
The fact that we don't know everything does not mean we know nothing.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Pre-cambrian:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Yes, I think science can describe extant moral codes, and so on, but the argument over morality and science is usually about the is/ought boundary. Given certain values, can science tell me if I ought to follow them? I don't see how it could do that.
OK. Are you saying that science, within the current boundaries of scientific knowledge, cannot tell you this? Or are you saying that science will never be able to tell you this. That there will never be a discovery that x, y or z process drives a moral decision. If the latter, what are the grounds on which you are so confidently deciding the bounds of future scientific knowledge? To say dogmatically that science can never explain morality sounds like, to coin a phrase, religionism.
But science explaining morality is not the issue. Of course, social science and psychology and anthropology and so on, can explain various moral codes.
But the issue is the conversion of is to ought, and I have never been able to see how that can be accomplished, not just by science, but by any system of ideas, or any argument. It seems to me that 'is' is just of a different category from 'ought'.
Posted by Pre-cambrian (# 2055) on
:
Other systems of ideas do seem to think that they can convert "is" to "ought" so I don't see why science shouldn't have a go too. But that is by the by.
However, what I was getting at more was whether the distinction between "is" and "ought" is not a consequence of our current ideas/understanding of what morality is. I think it is not inconceivable that research into brain function could not reach a stage where it can be accurately predicted that, given background situations A, B and C, brain X will reach moral conclusion Y. The effect of that is to break down the distinction between "is" and "ought". It also, of course, has the potential of raising a question mark over the whole idea of morality.
But is to conceive of that "scientism"? I don't see why it should be.
Edited to add that some of those levying accusations of "scientism" do seem to resent any role of any scientific discipline in explaining morality.
[ 26. October 2012, 00:00: Message edited by: Pre-cambrian ]
Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Pre-cambrian
Is this logic or "Etymologic"? Experience on the Ship suggests there can be a sizeable gap between the two.
I see that you have supported that assertion with plenty of evidence.
Well done. A true "scientist" in action!!
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Pre-cambrian:
Other systems of ideas do seem to think that they can convert "is" to "ought" so I don't see why science shouldn't have a go too. But that is by the by.
However, what I was getting at more was whether the distinction between "is" and "ought" is not a consequence of our current ideas/understanding of what morality is. I think it is not inconceivable that research into brain function could not reach a stage where it can be accurately predicted that, given background situations A, B and C, brain X will reach moral conclusion Y. The effect of that is to break down the distinction between "is" and "ought". It also, of course, has the potential of raising a question mark over the whole idea of morality.
But is to conceive of that "scientism"? I don't see why it should be.
Edited to add that some of those levying accusations of "scientism" do seem to resent any role of any scientific discipline in explaining morality.
You keep talking about 'explaining morality', but that is to conflate two separate issues. I don't think anybody is objecting to that.
I can't even understand how I can get from 'is' to 'ought', since one is naturalistic, the other is not. So perhaps you could give a concrete example?
Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Holy Smoke:
That is generally because any evidence to the contrary - of past lives, spirits, or whatever - is automatically discarded - as 'unscientific'.
This claim is pure ignorance. There ar a lot of scientists and stage magicians who spend a lot of time investigating such things. (Magicians tend to be better at it than scientists because nature doesn't lie and magicians are all about illusion). James Randi has a $1,000,000 prize for anyone who can demonstrate something that would according to you be discarded as uncientific.
I've seen stage magicians do weird things in front of me that defied my powers to explain. But the explanation is physical. And such claims have been and are investigated by science, scientists, and stage magicians. The reason that such claims are ignored by most scientists is twofold - the first is that all scientists are aware of their limitations and that they only specialise in a tiny fragment of science, so they leave such claims to the scientists in that specialty. The second is, to quote Tim Minchin "Throughout history every mystery ever solved has turned out to be Not Magic." And most people have better things to worry about than ideas that have never worked in history but this time will be different.
quote:
quote:
If you then propose a non-physical "ghost in the machine". He or she would have to interact with the physical body in some way. We would be able to measure that.
What would we measure it with? So if it can't be measured by any of our existing instruments, then it doesn't exist. Scientism.
And that just displays a fundamental lack of imagination. It's not that the ghost can't be measured by any of our existing instruments. It's that nothing the ghost ever does can be measured by any of our existing instruments.
The ghost can not move objects. If it could move objects we could measure the objects being moved.
The ghost can not communicate with more than one person. If it could we could test that and have two people who couldn't directly communicate relaying messages by means of the ghost.
The ghost can not both communicate with one person and see. We could test that with Zenner Cards - having the person try to match a set based on the ghost's reading of them.
So the Ghost can neither touch the real world nor communicate with it.
quote:
The 'real world'... You mean those phenomena which are observable by our current scientific instruments.
No. Those phenomena that have any impact at all that intersects with anything we can measure.
quote:
Of course not, how would they? So even if we could observe the results of telekinesis (let's say, someone can move a candle flame by thought alone), then it hasn't really happened, because there is no scientific mechanism for it to happen. Again, that's scientism - genuine science proceeds from actual observations, and attempts to form and prove hypotheses to explain them. Scientism starts with current scientific theory, and proceeds to ignore or supress any fact or observation which contradicts it.
And this is just a clean demonstration of why scientism is in most cases a slander made up by people who don't like science. To quote Isaac Asimov "The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discoveries, is not “Eureka” but “That’s funny...”"
quote:
But as I said, it's not a rational, logical position, however much its adherents may protest otherwise.
Indeed. But the chief adherents to Scientism are those who try to claim that that's how the scientific establishments operates. People like you and Mark Betts. This isn't a logical or rational position, merely a slur based on a group that is less mainstream than Creationists are to Christians.
I'm not saying that there weren't Scientismists. But it is impossible to be a scientismist and have any sort of well-rounded understanding of modern science. In terms of Philosophy of Science, the Vienna Circle in the 20s and early 30s were basically Scientismists (or Logical Positivists), but Logical Positivism hasn't held any sort of dominance since the 50s - and by the 70s even its own former proponents were saying things like "I suppose the most important [defect]...was that nearly all of it was false."
"Scientism" has been dead and buried more than thirty years. (It should have been killed in the thirties based on [url= http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems]Godel's Incompleteness Theorems[/url]). The only serious adherents Scientism has are those who desperately want to dig up and mutilate its corpse to give themselves something to flog.
And @Dafyd, I think the term you're looking for is "Engineer's Disease" - or just a mundane Appeal To Inappropriate Authority. @Adeodatus, I don't think Dawkins has ever decried Philosophy as useless - I think he did to Theology?
[ 26. October 2012, 11:07: Message edited by: Justinian ]
Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Errm... actually I am very willing to consider alternatives. That is why I asked the question!
Do please enlighten me. Or are you just going to give in to your overpowering urge to ignore my question, while comforting yourself with the thought that you don't need to answer someone who you have judged isn't prepared to listen, even though you have no evidence that I am not willing to listen, because you haven't bothered to give any answer that I *can* consider!!
Sheesh...
My apologies for being unclear. You said you would draw the appropriate conclusion from Croesos not answering. I thought there were lots of reasons why he might not have answered - other parts of what you said were more interesting maybe, or he thought the question was unimportant or whatever. You seemed to think you knew why he hadn't answered. I felt, probably wrongly, that you were assuming that someone not answering a question you had posed didn't have an adequate response. Again, my apologies if I doubted your philosophical charity towards those who don't share your views.
Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
One example of scientism (aka practical philosophical naturalism) is the idea that science can explain morality. If so, then consider the following...
Someone presents you with a stick of dynamite. Please show him how the empirical scientific method can explain - with appropriate reasonable evidence - what he ought to do with it. Should he place it on a crowded train to blow people to bits, or should he use it in a controlled explosion to demolish a derelict building safely? How does science ALONE answer this question?
Failure to provide a proper answer strictly according to the empirical scientific method will prove that your conflation of science and scientism is unwarranted, and that Mark's point is completely valid.
OK. You want an answer?
I can't do it through empiricist science alone. I need to take in rationalist philosophy in the only setting it works. Mathematics and Game Theory in specific. (And yes, empiricist science is allowed to use mathematics). Like all other moral systems, Game Theory generally leads (via tests like the [url= http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma]Prisoner's Dilemma[/url] and Pareto optimal approaches) to the Golden Rule in most cases with a few wrinkles.
Should he place it on a crowded train to blow people to bits,
Probable consequences of placing it on a crowded train if successful: Dead people. Direct personal gain: None. Estimated probability of being caught: 10% (back of the envelope). Personal consequences for being caught doing this: Multiple consecutive life sentences at best. People out for revenge at worst.
Probable direct consequences for failure: Blowing yourself up. Very bad.
Recommendation: Don't. This is a self-destructive course of action with the best path leading to no substantive gain.
or should he use it in a controlled explosion to demolish a derelict building safely?
Personal direct consequences of success: pleasure of watching the explosion and demolition. Pleasure of a job well done. Payment if you were doing it legally. Potential of being caught with a far lower sentence than in previous case if you weren't (even if you accidently kill someone).
Personal direct consequences of failure: Getting yelled at. Negative but not seriously so. Possible prison sentence for arson.
Recommendation: This course of action may have benefits that outweigh the negatives depending on exact circumstances. More data is needed for an accurate assessment.
Of course this isn't the only way to assess things. But it is a valid way.
Method 2 through empiricism: Almost all systems of ethics intersect at The Golden Rule. Therefore even if we do not know the exact reasons the Golden Rule is correct we can treat it as at the very least a working hypothesis, and very possibly a theory as it explains all non-trivially incorrect data, and as shown in many ways a moral code is necessary for long term interactions to work. Which of the courses of action is compatable with The Golden Rule? The answer is left as an (easy) excercise for the reader.
Posted by Drewthealexander (# 16660) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Pre-cambrian:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Yes, I think science can describe extant moral codes, and so on, but the argument over morality and science is usually about the is/ought boundary. Given certain values, can science tell me if I ought to follow them? I don't see how it could do that.
OK. Are you saying that science, within the current boundaries of scientific knowledge, cannot tell you this? Or are you saying that science will never be able to tell you this. That there will never be a discovery that x, y or z process drives a moral decision. If the latter, what are the grounds on which you are so confidently deciding the bounds of future scientific knowledge? To say dogmatically that science can never explain morality sounds like, to coin a phrase, religionism.
To what extent would you agree with the proposition that "science and its methods can answer all meaningful questions"?
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
Presumably anybody agreeing with that will think that 'To what extent would you agree with the proposition that "science and its methods can answer all meaningful questions"?' can be answered by science, or that it's a meaningless question. The latter case is, I think, one reason that things like logical positivism crashed and burned, since it meant that some of the questions they were asking, were themselves meaningless. The snake bites its own tail.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
Reminds me of the old joke: science can answer all the human questions, except the important ones.
Plus, the dialogue based on that:
A: Science can answer all questions except this one.
B. Which one?
A: That one.
Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
To what extent would you agree with the proposition that "science and its methods can answer all meaningful questions"?
Godel's Incompleteness Theorem states that in any field of study big enough to encompass arithmetic (which science is) there are statements that are true but not provable. So the idea that science and its methods can answer all meaningful questions is clerly false.
Alternatively Popper would say that science can't provide any true answers. It can merely determine which answers are wrong. So science can't actually by this answer any meaningful questions about what is - it can merely answer ones about what isn't.
This doesn't mean that you can automatically define Religion as the answer to statements Science can't prove.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
Can't we also say that some questions are naturally dealt with in philosophy? For example, what is beauty? Or the question, 'can't we also say that some questions are naturally dealt with in philosophy?'.
Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on
:
Any coined word that was good enough for the late Jacques Barzun (R.I.P.) is good enough for me.
Very few other scholars would be accorded 3/4 page of obituary even in the New York Times. I've sensed that he was a kindred spirit ever since stumbling onto The House of Intellect in my mid-20s, and this eulogy confirms it abundantly, with his erudite blend of liberalism, conservatism, and romanticism.
This article describes Barzun as seeing scientism as "modernity's unjust revenge against Romanticism". He described science as "at once a mode of thought, a source of strong emotion and faith as fanatic as any in history." While praising science as "one of the most stupendous and unexpected triumpths of the human mind," he saw baleful consequences in "mechanical scientism." However, it will not be the direct primary cause of the collapse of the West. He predicted "liquidation of 500 years of civilization" from an "internal crisis in the civilization itself, which be believed had come to celebrate nihilism and rebellion."
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
I can't do it through empiricist science alone. I need to take in rationalist philosophy in the only setting it works.
Just to be clear, are you really saying that the only things worthwhile being done in philosophy departments use mathematics and game theory?
quote:
Mathematics and Game Theory in specific. (And yes, empiricist science is allowed to use mathematics). Like all other moral systems, Game Theory generally leads (via tests like the Prisoner's Dilemma and Pareto optimal approaches) to the Golden Rule in most cases with a few wrinkles.
You really need to think a bit harder about game theory. (And while you may or may not be able to take a game theoretic optimum and call it a moral system, game theory is not a moral system itself.) The consensus at the moment is that single-run prisoner's dilemma leads to both sides defecting. (That's probably not the golden rule, although see below.) An iterated prisoner's dilemma leads to some version of tit-for-tat as an optimum strategy. (Again, probably not the golden rule.) But iterated prisoner's dilemma is highly unrealistic, since it presupposes two parties who have equal payoffs, equal power, and who retain that position of equality after each round. In real life, people rarely start from positions of equality and certainly don't retain positions of equality after one party defects.
quote:
Method 2 through empiricism: Almost all systems of ethics intersect at The Golden Rule.
This is stretching the definition of empiricism to breaking point.
Also, I don't think you'd accept an argument that justified the existence of spirits on the grounds that almost all systems of religion intersect at the existence of immaterial personal agents. Using a method of argument in one area that you'd scornfully reject in another area is special pleading.
quote:
Which of the courses of action is compatable with The Golden Rule? The answer is left as an (easy) excercise for the reader.
This kind of argument reminds me of this: Step Three Profit.
The problem is that actually my reactions to other people are wildly inconsistent. That is, I would if I'm honest with myself quite like it if other people waited on me hand and foot. I would also like other people not to expect me to wait on them hand and foot. From either of those reactions I can by the Golden Rule develop a system of ethics. The problem is I can't develop a system of ethics via the Golden Rule that includes both reactions. The Golden Rule shares the defect of all formal approaches to morality in that taken alone it is entirely empty. In order to get it to work you have to insert pre-moralised reactions. The Golden Rule works if you start off from a system of morality or as an induction into a system of morality. You can't generate a system of morality from the Golden Rule.
[ 26. October 2012, 19:52: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
You forgot mathematics, which is not derived via the scientific method but rather via logical reasoning.
Consistent philosophical naturalists reject quite a lot of mathematics.
For example, the theorem that the power set of the reals has a greater cardinality that the set of the reals, is not a theorem that any philosophical naturalist can assent to.
Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
[qb]
OK. You want an answer?
Probable consequences of placing it on a crowded train if successful: Dead people. Direct personal gain: None. Estimated probability of being caught: 10% (back of the envelope). Personal consequences for being caught doing this: Multiple consecutive life sentences at best. People out for revenge at worst.
Probable direct consequences for failure: Blowing yourself up. Very bad.
Recommendation: Don't. This is a self-destructive course of action with the best path leading to no substantive gain.
So lets say we provide you with a better concealable device, in fact lets put it on a stealth drone. We'll pay you copious amounts, and demonstrate the resources and will to protect you (and in any case we'll blame someone local).
...you'll change your mind?* **
*NB stating the obvious, this is purely hypothetical (and any gaps where we need to change payoff, etc.. included)
**you could of course question why my Dr Evil organisation would do that, and I could come up with some tale involving oil or something. Or do some analysis on the whole of humanity in which case we'll keep the aliens away for 100 years, and ask why we care.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
**you could of course question why my Dr Evil organisation would do that, and I could come up with some tale involving oil or something. Or do some analysis on the whole of humanity in which case we'll keep the aliens away for 100 years, and ask why we care.
We don't have to cast around for hypotheticals. Or rather, we can refer to an hypothetical that was once seriously contemplated by someone with the means to implement it. The Allies at one point discussed the possibility and utility of smuggling explosives onto Hitler's personal train (Führersonderzug), possibly by subborning the domestic staff assigned to it. The idea was eventually dismissed as unworkable since Hitler would often change his plans at the last minute. I have no idea whether the proposed explosive was dynamite or something else, but I'm pretty sure that's not the relevant feature of the scenario from a moral perspective.
[ 26. October 2012, 20:47: Message edited by: Crœsos ]
Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on
:
Fair point and definitely an interesting situation to consider the morals/ethics.
Although to some extent that situation is of minimum personal gain, high risk, but classically worth considering . So it is almost the counterpoint of what I was thinking.
Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
I can't do it through empiricist science alone. I need to take in rationalist philosophy in the only setting it works.
Just to be clear, are you really saying that the only things worthwhile being done in philosophy departments use mathematics and game theory?
No. I'm saying that even full on logical positivists can use mathematics and game theory and end up at a moral outcome using that. It was a "Here is one way to do it."
quote:
You really need to think a bit harder about game theory. (And while you may or may not be able to take a game theoretic optimum and call it a moral system, game theory is not a moral system itself.) The consensus at the moment is that single-run prisoner's dilemma leads to both sides defecting.
And genuine single run situations that provide no information for onlookers happen very rarely.
quote:
An iterated prisoner's dilemma leads to some version of tit-for-tat as an optimum strategy. (Again, probably not the golden rule.)
Tit-for-tat comes close to the golden rule under normal circumstances.
quote:
This is stretching the definition of empiricism to breaking point.
Also, I don't think you'd accept an argument that justified the existence of spirits on the grounds that almost all systems of religion intersect at the existence of immaterial personal agents.
Probably not. Although that is because you are excluding a significant proportion of people when you exclude atheists. I'd reject it because "where most people end up" is a low value system; it's just that with abstract concepts it's hard to find higher. Spirits, however, are not abstract concepts.
I'd scornfully reject simply eyeballing to guess the height of the building if we had proper surveyor's tools. But I wouldn't reject it if it was the only tool available. I therefore don't consider this special pleading.
Posted by Carex (# 9643) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
I'd scornfully reject simply eyeballing to guess the height of the building if we had proper surveyor's tools. But I wouldn't reject it if it was the only tool available. I therefore don't consider this special pleading.
To continue this analogy a bit, it would also make a difference whether eyeballing the height or pulling out the surveyors theodolite would make a difference in the result based on how you use the data.
For example, if the question is whether or not a fall from the roof would likely be fatal, an eyeball estimate that the building is 5 storeys tall is probably sufficient; measuring the exact height is wasted effort for unneeded precision because it doesn't add any value: the answer is clear without it. Similarly there may be cases where a standard surveyor's chain isn't accurate enough and you need to use the laser distance measuring equipment with multiple averaging instead.
This concept of the value of data being based upon how it is used leads us into the discipline of Decision Analysis, a combination of probability, games theory, and techniques to encode humans' perceptions of the world into forms that can be applied to the process of making decisions.
This isn't the same thing as making moral decisions, because morals are subjective. But it can take personal moral values into account in recommending a decision. In fact, one of the biggest problems is getting people to state their moral beliefs in a clear enough form that it can be used in the process. It isn't uncommon for one choice to appear more in accordance with a person's stated moral principles on the surface, but the unseen side effects may mean it is actually the least moral choice for some people, depending on the relative priorities of the "moral" principles they hold and how they choose to deal with conflicts among them.
Posted by SusanDoris (# 12618) on
:
Quite a few of my contemporaries think of discussion forums as rather superficial chats, but if only they would read SofF they would have to change their minds. It is such a pleasure to read and learn here. I find myself as usual agreeing with Croesus, Justinian etc, however, I don't think I'll try using the word 'scientism', as I'm sure I'll get it wrong!
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
Well, that illustrates how scientism would pulverize human discussions, since most of the discussions on this forum are philosophical in nature, or folk-philosophical, so therefore, according to a strict understanding of scientism, they are meaningless.
But hardly anyone does claim that. If you like a watered down version - science is jolly jolly good - that is not scientism.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
I'm saying that even full on logical positivists can use mathematics and game theory and end up at a moral outcome using that. It was a "Here is one way to do it."
I think a full on logical positivist would have to claim that applying mathematics to emotional noises still results in nothing more than emotional noises.
quote:
Tit-for-tat comes close to the golden rule under normal circumstances.
I'd say tit-for-tate is downright incompatible with the golden rule.
Be nice to other people because you'd like them to be nice to you is obviously compatible with the Golden Rule.
Dog eat dog, and if you're the dog that gets eaten that's just how it is, is compatible.
But defecting because you want to discourage the other person from defecting again is by definition treating the other person in a way that you don't want to be treated yourself. Retaliation i.e. behaviour designed to punish that same course of behaviour in another person, is flatly forbidden on any phrasing of the Golden Rule.
Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
I'm saying that even full on logical positivists can use mathematics and game theory and end up at a moral outcome using that. It was a "Here is one way to do it."
I think a full on logical positivist would have to claim that applying mathematics to emotional noises still results in nothing more than emotional noises.
And that has what to do with unvarnished self interest, mathematics, and game theory?
quote:
quote:
Tit-for-tat comes close to the golden rule under normal circumstances.
I'd say tit-for-tate is downright incompatible with the golden rule.
Be nice to other people because you'd like them to be nice to you is obviously compatible with the Golden Rule.
The problem the golden rule has is what when someone wants to play meanly? If what I want is to torture someone else? It's a three body problem where the Golden Rule can't be extended and tit for tat allows for a justice system. Under the Golden Rule, somewhat perversely, I believe you are allowed a justice system to protect others but you can not protect yourself.
But yes, you have a point.
Posted by HughWillRidmee (# 15614) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Can't we also say that some questions are naturally dealt with in philosophy? For example, what is beauty? Or the question, 'can't we also say that some questions are naturally dealt with in philosophy?'.
You may be on dodgy ground with "beauty". There is experimental evidence that shows that when it comes to facial beauty at least the subjects rated symmetry very highly, and symmetry is surely dependent upon mathematics is it not?
link includes Recent studies have shown that the secret of beauty may at last be understood. It seems that attractiveness may be hard wired in our brains.
Experiments designed to measure attractiveness usually involve showing a series of images of human faces and asking subjects to rate their visual appeal. Surprisingly, people from a variety of different ages, races and cultures agree on what is and isn't beautiful. Babies as young as 3 months can identify and prefer faces that most adults would deem beautiful. Europeans can pick out the same beautiful Japanese faces as Japanese subjects; Japanese can agree on which European faces another Europeans will view as beautiful. In fact, humans can even agree on the attractiveness of monkey faces, thus ruling out most unique racial, cultural and even species influences. So what's going on?
Facial recognition is a complex process. Only recently, with the need to spot criminals and terrorists, computer facial recognition programs have been developed to analyze the subtle variations of such things as the space between our eyes, the size of our noses and the proportions of our facial features. Scientists have discovered certain mathematical facial proportions that identify beautiful people. But is there more to beauty than the mere arrangement of eyes, noses and chins?
Our brains seem to do much more than simply recognize a beautiful face. Most people can assess emotions, personality traits and fertility -- as well as beauty -- almost instantaneously. In fact, the human brain has special part called the fusiform, located in the back of the head near the spine. It's the same neural pathway needed to recognize faces of family, friends and people we have met. When it's damaged, the patients cannot recognize anyone, even people they has just met. Also, in experiments, they cannot discriminate between photographs of plain and beautiful faces.
Studies show that when we recognize a face as "beautiful" we are actually making a judgement about the health and vitality of that individual. We interpret facial symmetry (the similarity of left and right halves of a face) and the smoothness of the skin to mean that a person has good genes and has been free from diseases. This is part of what we mean by "beautiful" but it is just the beginning.
Studies have shown that facial symmetry is one of the best observational indicators of good genes and healthy development and that these traits are what we mean when we say someone is attractive.
My embolding (embolding?)
Posted by Truman White (# 17290) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by HughWillRidmee:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Can't we also say that some questions are naturally dealt with in philosophy? For example, what is beauty? Or the question, 'can't we also say that some questions are naturally dealt with in philosophy?'.
You may be on dodgy ground with "beauty". There is experimental evidence that shows that when it comes to facial beauty at least the subjects rated symmetry very highly, and symmetry is surely dependent upon mathematics is it not?
link includes Recent studies have shown that the secret of beauty may at last be understood. It seems that attractiveness may be hard wired in our brains
Studies have shown that facial symmetry is one of the best observational indicators of good genes and healthy development and that these traits are what we mean when we say someone is attractive.
My embolding (embolding?)
So if you Missus doesn't meet these mathematical requirements and you tell her "Darling, you're beautiful" are you having a laugh?
Get real Hugh.
[ 28. October 2012, 08:48: Message edited by: Truman White ]
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
HughWillRidMee
How about if I'm walking along the beach, and I see a pile of decaying seaweed, with some driftwood next to it, and an old trainer that's been washed up, and I stop, and exclaim, how beautiful that is, and photograph it?
But my wife says, yuk, come away, it pongs.
If said wife and I then have a discussion about whether it's beautiful or not, do you think our discussion should/would be a scientific one?
[ 28. October 2012, 09:22: Message edited by: quetzalcoatl ]
Posted by SusanDoris (# 12618) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
If said wife and I then have a discussion about whether it's beautiful or not, do you think our discussion should/would be a scientific one?
It wouldn't matter if the discussion itself was scientific or not; the Science is in the understanding that it is the brain that enables the discussion to take place, I think.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by SusanDoris:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
If said wife and I then have a discussion about whether it's beautiful or not, do you think our discussion should/would be a scientific one?
It wouldn't matter if the discussion itself was scientific or not; the Science is in the understanding that it is the brain that enables the discussion to take place, I think.
So you are saying that your post is itself a scientific observation?
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
I think a full on logical positivist would have to claim that applying mathematics to emotional noises still results in nothing more than emotional noises.
And that has what to do with unvarnished self interest, mathematics, and game theory?
Statements about unvarnished self interest are not falsifiable. If I say that such-and-such is in somebody's interest, that is not falsifiable unless you make a purely stipulative definition of what 'interest' means.
Therefore, statements such as 'such-and-such is in so-and-so's interest' are meaningless. It's an act of emotional suasion on the part of the speaker rather than an indicative statement. And therefore mathematics and logic can't be applied to it.
But that's an aside.
Posted by HughWillRidmee (# 15614) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Truman White:
So if you (sic) Missus doesn't meet these mathematical requirements and you tell her "Darling, you're beautiful" are you having a laugh?
Get real Hugh.
Have you ever come across the concept of rational debate? – it means refuting something you would like to be untrue with evidence rather than making a glib comment and hoping to be taken seriously.
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
HughWillRidMee
How about if I'm walking along the beach, and I see a pile of decaying seaweed, with some driftwood next to it, and an old trainer that's been washed up, and I stop, and exclaim, how beautiful that is, and photograph it?
But my wife says, yuk, come away, it pongs.
If said wife and I then have a discussion about whether it's beautiful or not, do you think our discussion should/would be a scientific one?
Your reactions (visual and olfactory) will be processed according to procedures hard-wired into your brains. Culture and experience may influence why you articulate different reactions.
Presumably your discussion would be scientific if it followed the scientific method
It is an interesting idea that, perhaps, everything comes down to arithmetic; the ratio of musical wavelengths, the appreciation of beauty, the bonding of atoms, the relationships of electrons and up-quarks {(?)getting out my depth here so will stop}.
Just because the appreciation of beauty may be arithmetical rather than mystical doesn’t make the beauty, or its appreciation, any the less does it?
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
HughWillRidmee
So you seem to be supporting some version of scientism then? Perhaps something like, 'science can answer all meaningful questions'? Or, 'science can describe everything'?
Posted by HughWillRidmee (# 15614) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
HughWillRidmee
So you seem to be supporting some version of scientism then? Perhaps something like, 'science can answer all meaningful questions'? Or, 'science can describe everything'?
I don't know - but we seem to finding out more and more about the underlying simplicity of life - how our brains work for instance. We now know that we are not seeing most of what we think we see - most of the image in our brain is put there by memory - rather like a digital TV updating only the pixels that change. We also know that most of our memories are constructed by our brain from a few (hopefully salient) points stored in different locations within the brain and then dredged up and linked with a narrative that seems to make sense at the time. (hence the unreliability of witness' evidence). Terry Pratchett may have been very close to the mark when he suggested that, rather than the arrogance of homo sapiens, we should call ourselves pan narrans. - the ape that tells stories.
Evolution is simple – it takes a long time but it’s fundamentally simple.
Music is basically simple – it’s harmonics are arithmetical (multiples of wavelength as I recall from little-attended music classes fifty years ago).
So – do I think that science can answer all meaningful questions? – no, clearly not. Is it possible that science will be able to answer all meaningful questions? – maybe at some future time. As Dara O'Briain (@ about 1m50secs) says “science knows it doesn’t know everything, otherwise it would stop”. But I don’t worry about where the scientific method is leading us – hopefully we will get a better understanding of what is, and that would open the possibility of being able to continue the practice of thousands of years (starting with language/writing/tool-making/farming etc.) of improving life (the only one we know we have) for ourselves and future generations.
Ultimately we should, I believe, follow the evidence and manage where we end up.
Posted by W Hyatt (# 14250) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by HughWillRidmee:
Ultimately we should, I believe, follow the evidence and manage where we end up.
That sounds to me like great advice for all of us. I would note, however, that the trick is in drawing sound conclusions and reading neither too little nor too much into the evidence we encounter.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by W Hyatt:
quote:
Originally posted by HughWillRidmee:
Ultimately we should, I believe, follow the evidence and manage where we end up.
That sounds to me like great advice for all of us. I would note, however, that the trick is in drawing sound conclusions and reading neither too little nor too much into the evidence we encounter.
EVIDENCE?!? Don't you know that considerating actual evidence is philosophical naturalism, the slippery slope to scientism?
Posted by W Hyatt (# 14250) on
:
I guess I've been underestimating the danger I've been in.
Posted by Tea (# 16619) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
...the theorem that the power set of the reals has a greater cardinality that the set of the reals, is not a theorem that any philosophical naturalist can assent to.
I wonder if this claim might not be quite accurate.
Philosophical naturalists whose understanding of mathematics is physicalist or psychologistic will have a problem with this theorem.
On the other hand, those naturalists who are nominalist or fictionalist with regard to mathematics won't find this theorem an obstacle.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Tea:
On the other hand, those naturalists who are nominalist or fictionalist with regard to mathematics won't find this theorem an obstacle.
I suppose so. But I think fictionalism is a fundamentally implausible get out clause. It's as if a YEC were to take a fictionalist approach to pre-4004 BC geology and palaeontology. It looks like a duck and quacks like a duck; but because our metaphysics tells us there can't be a duck we'll just say we're pretending it's a duck and leave it at that.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by HughWillRidmee:
]Have you ever come across the concept of rational debate? – it means refuting something you would like to be untrue with evidence rather than making a glib comment and hoping to be taken seriously.
And HughWillRidmee shoots and he scores! Back of his own net! Own goal at post 124.
Really, that deserves some kind of prize for most self-deconstructing comment on the Ship.
Posted by SusanDoris (# 12618) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
So you are saying that your post is itself a scientific observation?
The words I chose may not be considered to convey a scientific idea, but I know that it is my evolved brain which is doing the work of choosing them, and that research is enabling people to know more and more about the ways our brains work. HughWillridMee says it better.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by SusanDoris:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
So you are saying that your post is itself a scientific observation?
The words I chose may not be considered to convey a scientific idea, but I know that it is my evolved brain which is doing the work of choosing them, and that research is enabling people to know more and more about the ways our brains work. HughWillridMee says it better.
So you are saying that that is a scientific observation?
Posted by Mark Betts (# 17074) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by HughWillRidmee:
Have you ever come across the concept of rational debate? – it means refuting something you would like to be untrue with evidence rather than making a glib comment and hoping to be taken seriously.
And HughWillRidmee shoots and he scores! Back of his own net! Own goal at post 124.
Really, that deserves some kind of prize for most self-deconstructing comment on the Ship.
Well spotted Dafyd - but despite the constant stream of posts from like minded people which seem to finish off any deep and meaningful topic on here, I don't think his side were ever winning. Own goals don't help of course!
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Tea:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
...the theorem that the power set of the reals has a greater cardinality that the set of the reals, is not a theorem that any philosophical naturalist can assent to.
I wonder if this claim might not be quite accurate.
Philosophical naturalists whose understanding of mathematics is physicalist or psychologistic will have a problem with this theorem.
On the other hand, those naturalists who are nominalist or fictionalist with regard to mathematics won't find this theorem an obstacle.
Boy I guess I don't know what a philosophical naturalist is then. They're dead set against mathematical realism are they? Or they're all constructivists with a watertight denial of Choice?
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
Boy I guess I don't know what a philosophical naturalist is then. They're dead set against mathematical realism are they? Or they're all constructivists with a watertight denial of Choice?
I would define a philosophical naturalist as one who thinks that our theories shouldn't include entities whose ontological basis falls outside the realm of the physical sciences.
If you're a realist about mathematics you either have to show how mathematical entities can be reduced to physical entities, or else reject philosophical naturalism as so defined.
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
:
No "to be is to be the value of a bound variable" then?
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
No "to be is to be the value of a bound variable" then?
Quine is something of a special case, I think.
[ 30. October 2012, 17:20: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
No "to be is to be the value of a bound variable" then?
Quine is something of a special case, I think.
A realist? A pragmatist?
[ 30. October 2012, 17:32: Message edited by: mousethief ]
Posted by HughWillRidmee (# 15614) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Truman White:
So if you (sic) Missus doesn't meet these mathematical requirements and you tell her "Darling, you're beautiful" are you having a laugh?
Get real Hugh.
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by HughWillRidmee:
]Have you ever come across the concept of rational debate? – it means refuting something you would like to be untrue with evidence rather than making a glib comment and hoping to be taken seriously.
And HughWillRidmee shoots and he scores! Back of his own net! Own goal at post 124.
Really, that deserves some kind of prize for most self-deconstructing comment on the Ship.
quote:
Originally posted by Mark Betts:
Well spotted Dafyd - but despite the constant stream of posts from like minded people which seem to finish off any deep and meaningful topic on here, I don't think his side were ever winning. Own goals don't help of course!
1 – I don’t have a “Missus”.
2 – I have a partner of some twenty years standing – she no more wishes to be married again than do I.
3 – Depends on what sort of beauty you’re talking about – but I don’t lie to her.
4 – We have quite a lot of laughs
5 – If like-minded (to me) people’s posts finish off topics which you consider to be deep and meaningful the rational conclusion is that either a) you agree with those posts or b) you disagree but can’t construct a logical, evidence-based response to justify your disagreement.
6 – Are you more concerned with “winning” than with sensible discussion?
7 - Telling someone to “get real” is glib unless you provide some reason why they are unreal. The article (I assume you read it) that I linked to included references to work by
Professor Victor Johnstone, of the University of New Mexico
Dr Devendra Singh from the University of Texas
Dr Michael Cunningham of Elmhurst College, Illinois
Dr David Perrett, of the University of St Andrews
Dr Eleanor Weston, palaeontologist at the Natural History Museum.
Some might think that, unless you can substantiate a claim that you have greater expertise in their areas than those quoted, your responses would not be amiss in a primary school playground.
Posted by SusanDoris (# 12618) on
:
HughWillRidmee
Well said, in my opinion.
Posted by Truman White (# 17290) on
:
@HughWillridmee
Is a tarantula beautiful?
Posted by Mark Betts (# 17074) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Truman White:
@HughWillridmee
Is a tarantula beautiful?
Of course it is! But I hope some will excuse me if I don't get my science books out, my calculator and my retractable tape measure, just to make sure mathematically!
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
:
Think you may have missed Dafyd's point, Hugh. He can speak for himself, but here's a view from the side. And here is the quote from your post
quote:
Have you ever come across the concept of rational debate? – it means refuting something you would like to be untrue with evidence ..
If your a priori position is your desire to refute "something you would like to be untrue" - and that is the plain meaning of what you wrote - then that desire may get in the way of rational debate, rational consideration of the evidence. You're not free from the temptation to rationalise your desires, Hugh. None of us are. Rational debate involves a setting aside of such desires, surely, rather than seeking to confirm them?
An unfortunate choice of words? Or a deeper error? That's a matter for you. But you can hardly blame the critic for seeing what he did.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Barnabas62:
If your a priori position is your desire to refute "something you would like to be untrue" - and that is the plain meaning of what you wrote - then that desire may get in the way of rational debate, rational consideration of the evidence.
There's that, but I think that removing this kind of emotional bias is only possible up to a point. If we didn't care at all about the truth we wouldn't debate it.
I was more concerned that Hugh WillRidMee's sudden objection to glib comments was a) itself a glib comment and b) only applied to glib comments by people Hugh WillRidMee disagrees with.
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
:
Sure, from all points of view, "bias is normal", however caused. But there is something wrong in applying the techniques of rational debate for the primary purpose of achieving what you want. In rational debate, the primary purpose isn't to win "your" POV. For if it becomes that, then the debate has moved from being rational to merely competitive rationalising. That's not the ideal.
Maybe too high a view? What do you think?
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Barnabas62:
Sure, from all points of view, "bias is normal", however caused. But there is something wrong in applying the techniques of rational debate for the primary purpose of achieving what you want. In rational debate, the primary purpose isn't to win "your" POV.
I agree that rational debate is different from trying to get a win. That's why you try to debate rationally - because you do care about whether what you would like to be true is actually true.
I don't think you can engage in debate or the enquiry after truth without prior commitments. The task to be able to modify those commitments in favour of better ones should that turn out to be required.
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on
:
quote:
I agree that rational debate is different from trying to get a win.
Well, according to a hypothesis from, depending on where one stands, either a bunch of crazy mofo scientismists sticking their noses where they are not wanted or some cognitive social scientists looking into the nature of rationality, it may be a mistake to think so.
The exchanging of glib one liners, rhetorical flourishes, point scoring and faux philosophical assertions common here* and in many online interaction, as well as the abysmal level of rationality in politics and public life in general, lend a certain weight to the hypothesis, IMO.
* I don't exclude my own contributions, naturally.
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
:
I think the words "honest" and "self-critical" should get a look in somewhere. Of course, in practice, much reasoning is argumentative with the purpose of defending or promoting strongly held opinions. But there comes a point when you recognise that your reasoning is imperfect, is failing the rationality test. A mind change is in order. If honesty matters, that is.
The power of a winning argument is not dependent upon the prior opinions of the arguer - or that arguer's character, come to think of it. which can be very annoying. The need for a change of mind rests with the loser. Whether the loser does in fact do so, or retreats into some form of obscurantist rationalisation to save their position is in the end a matter of personal morality.
And there is always the possibility that both parties uncover flaws in their own understanding. With honesty in play, that's a win-win. Otherwise not so sublime.
Posted by Tea (# 16619) on
:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by Tea:
On the other hand, those naturalists who are nominalist or fictionalist with regard to mathematics won't find this theorem an obstacle.
I suppose so. But I think fictionalism is a fundamentally implausible get out clause. It's as if a YEC were to take a fictionalist approach to pre-4004 BC geology and palaeontology. It looks like a duck and quacks like a duck; but because our metaphysics tells us there can't be a duck we'll just say we're pretending it's a duck and leave it at that.
Plausibility depends on time, place, and the socially accepted web of background beliefs. For many of us today, the suggestion that we, spatio-temporal entities, can interact with entities that exist outside of time and space so as to have knowledge of them is no more plausible than fictionalism. Appeals to plausibility won’t help us much either way here.
In addition, it’s odd for Christians to appeal to the plausible today. In the Europe of 1312, I daresay atheism was so implausible as to verge on the unthinkable. Although the situation hasn’t quite been reversed, I think Christians would have to admit that in the Europe of 2012 a large number of thoughtful and well educated adults find the beliefs expressed in the Nicene Creed “fundamentally implausible.”
Now I’m aware that many Christians will point out that these credal claims will appear “fundamentally implausible” only if they are interpreted in a crudely literalistic fashion. Nobody, many Christians will argue, is expected to believe that Jesus is literally above us in the sky or in space sitting to the right of God the Father. That part of the creed, they might continue, should be understood figuratively; it expresses, they might say, something about the divine nature and authority of Jesus. I think that kind of response is justified as a rebuttal to those New Atheists who attempt to saddle the religious with beliefs about the natural world to which no rational person could offer assent today.
How, though, do the Christians who make this successful rebuttal get from the text of the creed to its nonliteral meaning? One way they do so might be by interpreting the words of the creed in a fictionalist manner; the creed is making a truth claim, it refers to a spatial location - on the right hand of the Father - but they know that this location does not exist and that therefore the proposition “Jesus sits on the right hand of the father” is false. Nevertheless, they continue to make this false declaration not because they erroneously believe in its literal truth but because engaging in the pretense – reciting the Nicene Creed as if they were asserting the truth of those words - serves other purposes; the words facilitate the assent to a belief that is true but is difficult to state or grasp, the words help the persons uttering them develop the appropriate attitude of respect or veneration, they link today’s reciters of the Nicene Creed with those who have spoken the same words in the past…I don’t think that this is a far-fetched picture of what many Christians are doing with respect to the literally untrue claim about the current spatial position of Jesus and a multitude of other similarly false claims.
If, however, Christians find it helpful to engage in pretense, why can’t philosophical naturalists do the same with mathematical entities? In fact, I wonder if fictionalism’s applicability extends way beyond the particular case of our talk about mathematical entities to being the best way of understanding our seemingly indispensable everyday language of persons and objects in the light of the truth of the quite different picture of the world given to us by the sciences.
Now, I am perfectly ready to admit that fictionalism might ultimately fail as a way of making sense of mathematics. The philosophical naturalist would not thereby be required to assent to mathematical platonism, because other nominalist interpretive pathways remain open. Besides, even if these pathways turned out not to lead anywhere, I would not see the adoption of mathematical platonism as a philosophical disaster. I am attracted to fictionalism because it sidesteps the need for a giant error theory, because it is ontologically parsimonious, and also, because, as I suggested in the preceding paragraph, it might be a fruitful and unifying resource for metaphysics in general. I’m not wedded to it, however; if our best science really did require ontological commitment to abstract objects, I would be ready to accept that.
In the meantime, could you explain how you make sense of credal language that seems to be making a false assertion?
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Tea:
Plausibility depends on time, place, and the socially accepted web of background beliefs. For many of us today, the suggestion that we, spatio-temporal entities, can interact with entities that exist outside of time and space so as to have knowledge of them is no more plausible than fictionalism. Appeals to plausibility won’t help us much either way here.
Clearly you find the fictional suggestion that we're interacting with entities out of time and space sufficiently plausible to go along with.
If we don't understand how these entities can be actual, what are we supposed to be understanding when we treat them as fictional? It violates suspension of disbelief. If you can come up with a fictional account of how we know about fictional entities beyond space and time you've come up with an account of how we could know about real entities beyond space and time. Furthermore, it doesn't address all the reasons for adopting realist accounts for mathematics - it just handwaves them.
(If you're going to argue that the argument I'm putting forward fails because it depends upon a web of background beliefs, you need to identify and criticise the background beliefs in question. You can't just invoke 'background beliefs' airily.)
As regards to your final question, I am a supernaturalist about some claims and a figurativist about most of them. (A metaphor is not a fiction.)
Posted by Squibs (# 14408) on
:
Ian Hutchinson (an MIT physics chap) gives a talk about scientism here. It worth a watch/ listen.
I also notice that the featured video on the above site deals with a very similar topic. I haven't listened to it myself but it sounds interesting.
Posted by Tea (# 16619) on
:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
If we don't understand how these mathematical* entities can be actual, what are we supposed to be understanding when we treat them as fictional?
* Inserted by Tea for clarificatory purposes
I am not claiming that mathematical platonism is inconceivable; instead, I am arguing for the implausibility of our getting to know of entities wholly outside of space and time, given the belief that many of us have that we exist wholly within space and time and that our knowledge of other entities can best be explained as a set of processes taking place within space and time.
quote:
It violates suspension of disbelief.
I’m not sure that “suspension of disbelief”, a concept which might – or, more probably, might not – help us understand our engagement with certain kinds of fictional narrative is relevant here. Consider this use of a fiction:
“The average Londoner is captured on camera around 300 times a day.”
The “average Londoner” does not, of course, literally exist, for what would we make of somebody who went out to look for one specific person? We don’t, however, “willingly suspend our disbelief” when talking about this “average Londoner.” Instead, we use this fictional talk as a representational aid.
quote:
If you can come up with a fictional account of how we know about fictional entities beyond space and time you've come up with an account of how we could know about real entities beyond space and time.
I do not share your understanding of fictionalism as explaining “how we know about fictional entities beyond space and time,” as I do not think that fictionalists assert, in some kind of Meinongian fashion, the existence of fictional entities. (Perhaps I did not make that sufficiently clear in previous posts – my apologies). What mathematical fictionalists are providing is, in the first place an account of the semantics of mathematical theories – that these theories are literally untrue because the entities to which they refer do not exist - and secondly, some kind of explanation of why we are nevertheless justified in our use of these literally untrue theories. As the term “use” suggests, this explanation will be most likely be some kind of instrumental account.
Consequently, I disagree with the equivalence you posit between a fictionalist account of the entities mentioned in mathematical theories and the ontological commitment to those entities in the platonist understanding of those theories, just as I do not accept the equivalence of an instrumentalist or constructive empiricist account of theoretical entities in the sciences to that of a scientific realist.
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Furthermore, it doesn't address all the reasons for adopting realist accounts for mathematics - it just handwaves them…
I wonder if you could be more specific about the specific reasons for adopting platonism in mathematics that you claim fictionalism does not address.
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As regards to your final question, I am a supernaturalist about some claims and a figurativist about most of them. (A metaphor is not a fiction.)
The final assertion about metaphors is an unsupported claim that labels, but does not solve, the problem of how the Christian today is supposed to interpret a credal statement such as “Jesus ascended into heaven and sits on the right hand of the Father.” You have to explain how we get from the literal untruth of the statement to its “metaphorical” or “figurative” truth. I’m not sure that in this explantion that fictionalism can be summarily dismissed.
To return to the thread’s central concern: no doubt you consider my preference for a fictionalist account of mathematics a mistake arising from a scientistic outlook. How do you reply to those Christians who are theologically more conservative than you when they, confronted with your figurative interpretation of credal claims, accuse you of falling prey to scientism?
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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Originally posted by Tea:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
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If we don't understand how these mathematical* entities can be actual, what are we supposed to be understanding when we treat them as fictional?
* Inserted by Tea for clarificatory purposes
I am not claiming that mathematical platonism is inconceivable; instead, I am arguing for the implausibility of our getting to know of entities wholly outside of space and time, given the belief that many of us have that we exist wholly within space and time and that our knowledge of other entities can best be explained as a set of processes taking place within space and time.
I'm not entirely sure what the difference you're drawing between being inconceivable and being implausible is.
A mathematical platonist must surely think that truths about mathematical entities have an explanatory power in regards to truths about physical entities. That momentum is conserved in an interaction between physical objects is going to be dependent upon the appropriate mathematical truths. Yes, that's something that we're by the nature of the thing not going to be able to analyse in terms of intra-space-time cause and effect. But it does mean that we don't have to posit any special organ for knowing about entities outside space-time since the entities in question impinge upon space-time events in themselves.
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It violates suspension of disbelief.
I’m not sure that “suspension of disbelief”, a concept which might – or, more probably, might not – help us understand our engagement with certain kinds of fictional narrative is relevant here. Consider this use of a fiction:
“The average Londoner is captured on camera around 300 times a day.”
The “average Londoner” does not, of course, literally exist, for what would we make of somebody who went out to look for one specific person? We don’t, however, “willingly suspend our disbelief” when talking about this “average Londoner.” Instead, we use this fictional talk as a representational aid.
I don't think it's illuminating to describe 'the average Londoner' as a fiction. I think that adding reference to a fictional individual as a representational aid is an unnecessary step in the analysis of the sentence - more likely to result in confusion than clarification should somebody actually use it.
It seems to me that fictional narrative is our paradigm case of fiction. That is, it's the one area in which a fictionalist account is uncontroversial. I'm not even sure that fictional characters aren't dependent upon a prior account of fictional narrative. (That's an old aesthetic debate, and the consensus is largely in favour of the priority of narrative.) That being the case I think that dismissing things that may or may not be relevant to fictional narrative as irrelevant to what you mean when you say 'x is fiction' is cutting off the branch you're trying to sit on.
If you're not using fictional narrative as a paradigm then it's not clear to me what the proposal amounts to. To whit, later on you say that at a semantic level mathematical statements are to be analysed as statements that are untrue because the entities they refer to don't exist. But at a semantic level statements about the average Londoner don't work in that way. On your account a mathematical Platonist is correct about the semantic meaning of the sentence. Someone who thinks 'Mr Micawber walked past a security camera', is about a real world person understands the semantic statement. But someone who mistakenly takes the statement to be about a concrete individual called 'the average Londoner' doesn't understand what 'average' means.
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What mathematical fictionalists are providing is, in the first place an account of the semantics of mathematical theories – that these theories are literally untrue because the entities to which they refer do not exist - and secondly, some kind of explanation of why we are nevertheless justified in our use of these literally untrue theories. As the term “use” suggests, this explanation will be most likely be some kind of instrumental account.
I don't see what it adds to instrumentalist accounts to clutter them up with references to non-existent entities. You're presumably going to claim that an instrumentalist account on its own can't give a full analysis of the meaning of the statements. So you're claiming that they mean what they mean on a platonist analysis - it's just that they're false. But that looks really rather like you're trying to have your platonist cake and arbitrarily reject the ontological commitments that come with it.
(Quite apart from that, you then need to distinguish between the falsity of '2+2=4' or 'for each prime number there exists a larger prime number,' and the falsity of '2+2=5' or 'there is a prime number for which there is no larger prime number'. I agree that's possible; but it is adding unnecessary complexity.)
I'm really not sure what fictionalism adds to instrumentalism. You've ruled out Meinongian entities; you've ruled out an account based on fictional narrative. I'd say that you're left with the rather trivial statement that some sentences use noun phrases where no actual entity is envisaged, but even that doesn't seem a sufficient definition. Consider 'Happiness is a glass of warm beer'. Fictionalism won't do for that, since I have no idea how to interpret a claim that it's a literally false but true in the fiction claim about a fictional entity called 'happiness'.
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To return to the thread’s central concern: no doubt you consider my preference for a fictionalist account of mathematics a mistake arising from a scientistic outlook. How do you reply to those Christians who are theologically more conservative than you when they, confronted with your figurative interpretation of credal claims, accuse you of falling prey to scientism?
Unless you're proposing that the question can be properly settled by neuroscientists and not otherwise, I wouldn't accuse you of scientism.
As I've never had that argument with a more conservative Christian I wouldn't know. For that matter, reasons for thinking God doesn't have hands predate and have little to do with anything that looks much like modern science.
Suppose a creationist claims Darwinian evolution of being a form of scientism? Well, Darwinian evolution is neither extending the methods of the natural sciences to an area that they can't handle, nor is it dismissing questions outside of its remit as meaningless. Somebody who argues Darwinian evolution, therefore laissez faire capitalism, you can't argue with science, is committing scientism - because the extension of the scientific result to economics and social theory and the consequent dismissal of what economists and social scientists are up to aren't warranted by the methodology.
Posted by Russ (# 120) on
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Originally posted by Tea
Nobody, many Christians will argue, is expected to believe that Jesus is literally above us in the sky or in space sitting to the right of God the Father. That part of the creed, they might continue, should be understood figuratively; it expresses, they might say, something about the divine nature and authority of Jesus. I think that kind of response is justified as a rebuttal to those New Atheists who attempt to saddle the religious with beliefs about the natural world to which no rational person could offer assent today.
How, though, do the Christians who make this successful rebuttal get from the text of the creed to its nonliteral meaning? One way they do so might be by interpreting the words of the creed in a fictionalist manner; the creed is making a truth claim, it refers to a spatial location - on the right hand of the Father - but they know that this location does not exist and that therefore the proposition “Jesus sits on the right hand of the father” is false. Nevertheless, they continue to make this false declaration not because they erroneously believe in its literal truth but because engaging in the pretense...
I don't see any pretense here. The place at table to the immediate right of the host is the place of honour. The meaning is plain to one familiar with the cultural context.
Figurative use of language is not, I think, quite the same thing as a shared fiction. Suppose that in a certain family it is customary to pretend that annoying behaviour causes a literal pain in the neck of the person annoyed. A great deal of ham acting out of sudden aches in the upper vertabrae might ensue. Most people don't do that - they understand that the phrase "a pain in the neck" refers figuratively to an annoying person without a shared fiction that there is a literal pain. It's a convention, but then all use of language is a convention.
I would say that elsewhere in the gospels there is less agreement amongst Christians about whether particular phrases are to be interpreted literally or figuratively. Did Jesus literally ascend ? Is He literally Son (given that God has no DNA) ?
But the account of these statements as a shared fiction of literal truth doesn't ring true in most cases. Although conceivably there may be cases - a figuratively-minded congregation entering into a shared fiction in order not to disturb the faith of a literalist minister ?
And mathematics is not a fiction, it's an abstraction.
Best wishes,
Russ.
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