UBB.classicTM 6.5.0
quote:From my perspective the biggest problem with this assertion is that if morality is "objective", there shouldn't be so much disagreement about it. Most other things that are "objective" generate greater agreement the more they're observed. Moral codes seem to proliferate over time.
Originally posted by Squibs:
These days there is much chatter on the internetz about subjective and objective morality. The claim is often made that without God objective morality can not exist. Without getting to much into the particulars of the argument, I must say that I find it convincing. In short, I believe that there are certain actions that are wrong and that God is the best ontological foundation for such a belief.
quote:This "counter-argument" is based on a Platonic falsehood that sees morality as some kind of external yardstick (an "idea") with which to measure action. That is not the case. Rather, morality in an Aristotelian sense is simply the good of a creature that can make rational decisions. The good of a squirrel consists in part in collecting nuts and storing them away for winter. Where a squirrel can't do that, for example because it has a broken leg, we call it "ill". In other cases of interruption of its good we may call it "disturbed" or "confused" etc. The good of a human being consists in part in not killing innocent human beings. Where a human being does kill innocent humans, we call him "evil" if this arises from his own free decision. Where it doesn't, we call him "(mentally) disturbed" or perhaps "confused" etc. So this is in strict analogy to the squirrel, the only difference being that a human has the ability to turn away from his good by a free choice, and hence can be judged by "morals" (how well choices accord with goods).
Originally posted by Squibs:
One of the few decent arguments against the concept of objective morality derived from God (perhaps I've worded that wrong) is to claim that God's morality is itself subjective because it is based upon God's own ideas. As the objective card is removed from the table (or the attempt is made), the conclusion is that God's ideas are no "better" than any other views on morality.
quote:The only thing that needs to be said concerning this is that nobody has ever claimed that it is easy to discover these objective truths. "Natural" as in natural moral law does not at all mean "obvious". We are spending incredible efforts to discover objective natural physical law, with plenty of ferocious disagreement along the way. There is no particular reason why "morals" should not likewise contain difficult problems that are hard to resolve. And so it does.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
From my perspective the biggest problem with this assertion is that if morality is "objective", there shouldn't be so much disagreement about it.
quote:I agree with you in thinking the Aristotelian view makes more sense - but that's because neither you nor I are Platonists. They might reasonably say you can't dump Plato's view by fiat. But we'll see if any Platonists join in.
Originally posted by IngoB:
This "counter-argument" is based on a Platonic falsehood that sees morality as some kind of external yardstick (an "idea") with which to measure action. That is not the case. Rather, morality in an Aristotelian sense is simply the good of a creature that can make rational decisions.
quote:Well, actually I'd guess that the view of some kind of separable moral is not Platonic, as in the historical school of philosophy associated with the philosopher Plato. I merely meant "Platonic" in the generalized sense of "abstracting an idea from things and declaring that it has a kind of independent existence on its own, and in fact then is taken to be the external measure of the things from which it was abstracted". That was perhaps a bit confusing, since I did use "Aristotelian" more properly.
Originally posted by que sais-je:
I agree with you in thinking the Aristotelian view makes more sense - but that's because neither you nor I are Platonists. They might reasonably say you can't dump Plato's view by fiat. But we'll see if any Platonists join in.
quote:First, I do not argue the existence of God from the existence of morals. I think all such arguments are as weak as our practical grasp of morals, i.e., very weak indeed. Second, it is no surprise that an Aristotelian explanation of morals would be very close in spirit to any "biologically derived" explanation. Aristotle is very much a "natural philosopher". Just as for any physical phenomenon, however, it is false to assume that Divine explanations come in as another cause among the natural ones. Rather, Divine causality is external to the whole set of circumstances and natural causes, causing all of it in a non-temporal sense. So in reading off morals from "nature", we are not eliminating God. We are rather discovering God's design. Third, the true difference comes to light not in the analysis of human morality, but in the evaluation of it. What is the force of discovering that this or that moral rule is best for human flourishing in a natural sense? In particular so if general human progress allows one to artificially modify and delay the expected "pay-offs" of our choices? Can we exert control over our morality, can we shape it to our liking?
Originally posted by que sais-je:
But if creature act too much against their own virtues (here just a synonym for their good) they would probably not survive as social groupings. Too many murders/thefts/adulteries impairs trust make group survival less likely. It's not clear that a Creator is necessary to arrange things - it just happens.
quote:This is basically a pointless comment as far as our discussion here is concerned. It may well be the case that we learn the morals of "not hitting others" from our parents. But this does not explain why our parents are not teaching us "hit them harder" instead. The mode of establishing morals is not the same as the content of morals. Humans in general require much more learning than other animals, but what we have to learn in order to flourish remains part of our nature. It is not good for humans to "hit each other harder", because for one this disrupts community and humans flourish better in groups. Furthermore, we can of course see the very act of parents teaching their children as part of an ongoing investigation into human flourishing. We may say for example that on the subject of hitting each other we have progressed beyond the parents in ancient Sparta, and we can demonstrate this objectively by "out-flourishing" them.
Originally posted by que sais-je:
It seems to me that our ethical systems may be no more that assimilation of early learning projected, as humans are prone to do, onto a wider world.
quote:The problem of course is that in claiming that God's ideas are themselves only subjective, the arguer simultaneously gets rid of any real ground for discounting them. If God's morality is only subjective there is no reason why God shouldn't impose them on anybody God chooses.
Originally posted by Squibs:
One of the few decent arguments against the concept of objective morality derived from God (perhaps I've worded that wrong) is to claim that God's morality is itself subjective because it is based upon God's own ideas. As the objective card is removed from the table (or the attempt is made), the conclusion is that God's ideas are no "better" than any other views on morality.
quote:The area of human learning that commands greatest agreement is mathematics. Now either mathematics has no objective existence, or else mathematics falsifies materialism, or some other option obtains.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
From my perspective the biggest problem with this assertion is that if morality is "objective", there shouldn't be so much disagreement about it. Most other things that are "objective" generate greater agreement the more they're observed.
quote:Such an action is certainly not necessarily immoral from a naturalistic point of view, because burning your daughter merely involves the reconfiguration of matter, which is what nature does. It's no more immoral than two rocks hitting each other as they hurtle through space. And if such an action provides utility to the person performing the act, then what's 'wrong' with that (within a naturalistic paradigm)?
Originally posted by Martin PC...
Then it is moral to burn your daughter alive for being raped.
quote:Is that so?
Originally posted by Crœsos:
Most other things that are "objective" generate greater agreement the more they're observed. Moral codes seem to proliferate over time.
quote:I find that interesting, because for me the concept of morality (note the, erm, key change there) is a knock-down argument against materialism. I acknowledge that it's not that way for other doubtless cleverer people but I've yet to encounter a description of morality that didn't seem to boil down to one of two options - either that morality is an illusion (and therefore we can't call any choice or action evil) or that morality is part of the nature of reality (which whilst not proving theism, makes it look a reasonable option and certainly kicks strict materialism off its pedestal).
Originally posted by IngoB:
First, I do not argue the existence of God from the existence of morals. I think all such arguments are as weak as our practical grasp of morals, i.e., very weak indeed.
quote:That simply doesn't follow. Even if there is no such thing as an independent objective morality it doesn't mean we can't say that we think murder is evil. It just means we have to persuade other people to agree with our position rather than appealing to an external authority in order to impose it on them.
Originally posted by GreyFace:
either that morality is an illusion (and therefore we can't call any choice or action evil)
quote:So are you trying to argue then that if the entire human race agreed with one voice that murder was not evil, it would become good?
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
That simply doesn't follow. Even if there is no such thing as an independent objective morality it doesn't mean we can't say that we think murder is evil. It just means we have to persuade other people to agree with our position rather than appealing to an external authority in order to impose it on them.
quote:As far as we were concerned, yes.
Originally posted by GreyFace:
So are you trying to argue then that if the entire human race agreed with one voice that murder was not evil, it would become good?
quote:Then any claim that murder is evil is an illusion. It is, in your mind, nothing more than the opinion of a large number of people and therefore not subject to challenge.
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
As far as we were concerned, yes.
quote:Yes. Because I believe in the concept of objective morality, I can consider whether or not the majority opinion, or even my individual opinion, might be wrong. Calling it wrong requires there to be a standard to which it can theoretically be compared, whether or not we have any certain access to that standard. You on the other hand are stood, philosophically speaking, on a branch which you've just sawn through because you've defined your standard as the unanimous vote and therefore ruled out the possibility of a unanimous vote being wrong.
Is that any different in principle from the situation that actually pertains, namely that the entire human race agree that murder (albeit with varying definitions of the word!) is bad, therefore we consider it to be evil.
quote:If morality is objective because it comes from the circular God is Moral argument I'm going to take the consequences a step further. It means that as a necessary consequence you have an objective morality because Might Makes Right. Nothing more, nothing less. God is the mightiest therefore he says what is right. That is the single and sole source of God's morality. "Because I can enforce this and am the biggest there is."
Originally posted by Squibs:
These days there is much chatter on the internetz about subjective and objective morality. The claim is often made that without God objective morality can not exist. Without getting to much into the particulars of the argument, I must say that I find it convincing. In short, I believe that there are certain actions that are wrong and that God is the best ontological foundation for such a belief. God is a better explination that anything am Harris has devised (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Moral_Landscape. But perhaps this is for another thread.
One of the few decent arguments against the concept of objective morality derived from God (perhaps I've worded that wrong) is to claim that God's morality is itself subjective because it is based upon God's own ideas. As the objective card is removed from the table (or the attempt is made), the conclusion is that God's ideas are no "better" than any other views on morality.
On the face of it the only option is to offer a circular argument that seeks to establish an immutable God with goodness and goodness with this God. Alternatively, one could propose that morality lies outside God, which would pose some very awkward questions.
It's a fascinating argument, and one that I don't necessarily have a rebuttal against.
Any takers? Or anyone want to run with this?
quote:The fact that you're raising this objection suggests that you think it's then possible for there to be an objective morality to which God does not adhere, but that he might decree a different morality and enforce it by power. This is philosophically possible but in it God has become a creature in the broad sense because you could theorise the existence of an entity who has equal power yet is more moral according to the objective standard, and this alternative would be God (or closer to God) as monotheists conceive him to be.
Originally posted by Justinian:
If morality is objective because it comes from the circular God is Moral argument I'm going to take the consequences a step further. It means that as a necessary consequence you have an objective morality because Might Makes Right.
quote:Not an illusion. A belief.
Originally posted by GreyFace:
Then any claim that murder is evil is an illusion.
quote:I didn't say it was not subject to challenge. Perhaps you misunderstood the meaning of "as far as we were concerned"? I mean, if you posit a scenario where humanity speaks with one voice then by definition there are no people challenging that voice!
It is, in your mind, nothing more than the opinion of a large number of people and therefore not subject to challenge.
quote:Calling it wrong merely requires an alternative moral framework from which one can make such a claim. It doesn't require either side to be objectively right or wrong.
Because I believe in the concept of objective morality, I can consider whether or not the majority opinion, or even my individual opinion, might be wrong. Calling it wrong requires there to be a standard to which it can theoretically be compared, whether or not we have any certain access to that standard.
quote:If it's truly unanimous then nobody will be claiming it's wrong in the first place, which I'll grant means it won't be overturned. And for all practical purposes I'd say any moral claim that is agreed upon by every single person on the planet is true, as far as we're concerned.
You on the other hand are stood, philosophically speaking, on a branch which you've just sawn through because you've defined your standard as the unanimous vote and therefore ruled out the possibility of a unanimous vote being wrong.
quote:Marvin the Martian believes murder is wrong. Fred Bloggs believes murder is right. There is no objective morality, therefore neither can be said to be right or wrong according to your argument. You can tell Fred he's done evil, and he can say that he believes he hasn't. You can never at any point appeal to Fred to change his belief from the wrong one to the right one, because there is no right one in your mind, there is only your preference.
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
Not an illusion. A belief.
quote:No, I don't think I did. I ignored it because I thought you were using it to evade the question. Let's narrow down that question. Bunch of children on an island grow up to believe that people with blond hair should be thrown off a cliff. That's their belief. I can say they're wrong. You can say nothing better than that their beliefs differ from yours. And I can say that if they were the only people in existence, they would still be wrong. You can't, in fact you've already said that they would be right (with the qualifier, as far as they're concerned).
I didn't say it was not subject to challenge. Perhaps you misunderstood the meaning of "as far as we were concerned"?
quote:Quite so, and for me that means everybody is wrong, whereas you're not prepared to say that. I suspect this is because you know that you can't, without conceding the point that there's an objective morality. And in case it's not obvious I acknowledge that I cannot know they are wrong any more than you can. But because I believe in the possibility of true right and wrong, I can think it consistently. You cannot. All you can say is that you don't share their beliefs.
I mean, if you posit a scenario where humanity speaks with one voice then by definition there are no people challenging that voice!
quote:But if neither side is right or wrong, then it's not a moral framework but a system of preferences and nothing more. You not only have no basis to judge between them, the concept of judging is meaningless. How do you morally judge between flavours or colours or scents?
Calling it wrong merely requires an alternative moral framework from which one can make such a claim. It doesn't require either side to be objectively right or wrong.
quote:A common argument against the existence of objective morality but it's complete rubbish. Without an objective morality you have nothing else to say to a wrongdoer than "I don't like it." Your definition of immorality is that which you don't like, or more broadly that which lots of people don't like. It's precisely because there is an objective morality that "I know you like that but it's wrong" is neither a nonsense thing to say not a paraphrase for "I know you like that but I don't", and this is why your claim here is rubbish.
It is, in fact, your view that prevents any questioning of morality, because it states that X moral opinion is utterly and objectively true and cannot be argued against.
quote:There's that disclaimer again. It's coming across as you conceding that the claim could be wrong (objective morality) but nobody would then be reasonably held responsible for so being wrong. If that's your position then I agree with it.
And for all practical purposes I'd say any moral claim that is agreed upon by every single person on the planet is true, as far as we're concerned.
quote:Wtf?
Originally posted by Squibs:
One of the few decent arguments against the concept of objective morality derived from God (perhaps I've worded that wrong) is to claim that God's morality is itself subjective because it is based upon God's own ideas. As the objective card is removed from the table (or the attempt is made), the conclusion is that God's ideas are no "better" than any other views on morality.
quote:Who said anything about "obvious" or "easy"? I'm simply making the case that the more time is spent examining most objective phenomena, the greater the consensus on those pheonomena. To take the suggested example of air (which was well known and intensely examined even before the existence of reliable vacuum pumps), we actually know a lot about air and how it behaves. And the more we examine air, the more we can say about it with a reasonable degree of confidence.
Originally posted by que sais-je:
quote:I agree, but also if it was very easy to be moral, morality would cease to be visible. It's like air - the experience of it's absence makes us notice it and makes it an object of study.
Originally posted by IngoB:
The only thing that needs to be said concerning this is that nobody has ever claimed that it is easy to discover these objective truths. "Natural" as in natural moral law does not at all mean "obvious". We are spending incredible efforts to discover objective natural physical law, with plenty of ferocious disagreement along the way. There is no particular reason why "morals" should not likewise contain difficult problems that are hard to resolve. And so it does.
quote:Sure it does! If you only have to avoid "killing innocent human beings" and no human beings actually qualify as "innocent", it's a stricture you can avoid just as easily as the question of whether or not griffins are kosher.
Originally posted by Matt Black:
Not as between human beings, it doesn't.
quote:IngoB didn't specify a context. Of course, if God's will is objective, there's no reason the two couldn't be equivalent. In fact, if morality is objective we would expect them to be.
Originally posted by Matt Black:
'Not innocent in God's eyes' <> 'not innocent in human eyes'.
quote:Are they? I thought the argument was being advanced that human morality is essentially 'hard wired' in by God.
Originally posted by Matt Black:
But relationally they are different.
quote:I can appeal to him to change to my belief though. And if we have any kind of shared understanding of life, the universe and everything then I may even succeed.
Originally posted by GreyFace:
Marvin the Martian believes murder is wrong. Fred Bloggs believes murder is right. There is no objective morality, therefore neither can be said to be right or wrong according to your argument. You can tell Fred he's done evil, and he can say that he believes he hasn't. You can never at any point appeal to Fred to change his belief from the wrong one to the right one, because there is no right one in your mind, there is only your preference.
quote:Yes to all points. Of course, that wouldn't stop me from trying to convince them that they're wrong - but it would stop me from barging into their society, taking it over and completely destroying the whole thing so that I could stop it happening. That ain't my place.
Let's narrow down that question. Bunch of children on an island grow up to believe that people with blond hair should be thrown off a cliff. That's their belief. I can say they're wrong. You can say nothing better than that their beliefs differ from yours. And I can say that if they were the only people in existence, they would still be wrong. You can't, in fact you've already said that they would be right (with the qualifier, as far as they're concerned).
quote:Indeed. Well done.
Quite so, and for me that means everybody is wrong, whereas you're not prepared to say that. I suspect this is because you know that you can't, without conceding the point that there's an objective morality.
quote:Yes, correct.
And in case it's not obvious I acknowledge that I cannot know they are wrong any more than you can. But because I believe in the possibility of true right and wrong, I can think it consistently. You cannot. All you can say is that you don't share their beliefs.
quote:And yet people do have favourite colours, tastes and scents. And the ones that are most popular with most people are the ones that proliferate in society. Why can't it be the same with moral codes?
But if neither side is right or wrong, then it's not a moral framework but a system of preferences and nothing more. You not only have no basis to judge between them, the concept of judging is meaningless. How do you morally judge between flavours or colours or scents?
quote:Correct.
Without an objective morality you have nothing else to say to a wrongdoer than "I don't like it." Your definition of immorality is that which you don't like, or more broadly that which lots of people don't like.
quote:I see no difference between the two. Any time anyone uses the second, they're just using it in place of the first in order to prevent discussion of the point.
It's precisely because there is an objective morality that "I know you like that but it's wrong" is neither a nonsense thing to say not a paraphrase for "I know you like that but I don't", and this is why your claim here is rubbish.
quote:Well, I'm using it because I personally do believe murder is wrong, and I don't want to be seen to be promoting it.
There's that disclaimer again. It's coming across as you conceding that the claim could be wrong (objective morality) but nobody would then be reasonably held responsible for so being wrong. If that's your position then I agree with it.
quote:The argument from adverse consequences is a particularly pernicious type of fallacy. Here your argument seems to be that morality must be objective because if it's not it would be harder (or impossible) for you to pass judgement on other people's moral codes. While that may be so, reality is not necessarily ordered for your personal rhetorical convenience. The fact that you'd like for your moral code to be endorsed and enforced by an omniscient superbeing is not proof that it is.
Originally posted by GreyFace:
But if neither side is right or wrong, then it's not a moral framework but a system of preferences and nothing more.
quote:The same question can (and has) been asked about God. He usually gets some kind of a Prime Directive exemption based on free will.
Originally posted by Matt Black:
But if you have the power to stop the blond children from being thrown off the cliff, but you choose to not exercise that power, are you not guilty of their deaths?
quote:The problem is that a social agreement or a biological development or a cultural tradition is not an "illusion" as far as practical consequences go. For example, if I claim that all morality is merely a product of evolution, then you may answer that such morals are hence an illusion and that nothing stops you from rejecting a merely biologically conditioned restriction through a free and rational decision. But this is not the case. Because I am then biologically conditioned to make your life miserable in response. As far as practical effects go, there is little difference there to "real" morals and "illusory" morals commanding our obedience. There may be some, but with the blunt instrument of our moral understanding it will be quite hard to mount a compelling case.
Originally posted by GreyFace:
I find that interesting, because for me the concept of morality (note the, erm, key change there) is a knock-down argument against materialism. I acknowledge that it's not that way for other doubtless cleverer people but I've yet to encounter a description of morality that didn't seem to boil down to one of two options - either that morality is an illusion (and therefore we can't call any choice or action evil) or that morality is part of the nature of reality (which whilst not proving theism, makes it look a reasonable option and certainly kicks strict materialism off its pedestal).
quote:You are here simply re-importing basically the entire moral system through that word "innocent". Because one is innocent if one has done no evil, but whether this is the case or not is in itself a moral question. The point is however that given some definition, any definition, of "innocence", all modern moral systems agree that killing such a person is murder and not allowed. You may get away with killing one person in one moral system and not the other, because they disagree about whether the victim is innocent. But you will not get away in either system with killing a person that this system considers innocent. There has been historical development on this, showing that progress in moral discernment is possible, but it is now basically a moral principle accepted by all (at least in the sense that lip service is paid to it by the vast majority of sane people - morals are never absolute in terms of how real people actually apply them in everyday life).
Originally posted by Crœsos:
On the other hand, the more a moral question is examined the more fragmentary the answers become. Take IngoB's example of "killing innocent human beings", a question examined by moral codes for a very long time indeed. Despite several millennia of examining this question, there still seems to be no consensus on exactly who qualifies as "innocent" under this rubric.
quote:That sounds awfully . . . subjective. Why not simply use this objective morality everyone's so hot on to judge innocence?
Originally posted by IngoB:
The point is however that given some definition, any definition, of "innocence", all modern moral systems agree that killing such a person is murder and not allowed. You may get away with killing one person in one moral system and not the other, because they disagree about whether the victim is innocent.
quote:I'm not particularly interested here in appealing to consequences though I note in passing that Marvin apparently would prefer to let babies die of exposure on a hillside than interfere with another culture, and I find that appalling. No, I'm arguing that morality as a concept requires objective morality.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
quote:The argument from adverse consequences is a particularly pernicious type of fallacy.
Originally posted by GreyFace:
But if neither side is right or wrong, then it's not a moral framework but a system of preferences and nothing more.
quote:Almost but not quite. I'm saying that if there is no objective morality, then there is no way that one can pass judgment on another's moral codes or even have a disagreement about morality. You might consider that a good thing, and it seems ssensible. I'd be interested to see if you applied it when I robbed your house though.
Here your argument seems to be that morality must be objective because if it's not it would be harder (or impossible) for you to pass judgement on other people's moral codes.
quote:Nevertheless when you speak of there being no objective morality yet behave in all ways as though there is, you sound to me very much as though you're speaking nonsense. I mean that literally - not making a poor argument, just saying something that is self-evidently contradictory. It would be logically consistent to say that morality is just a set of rules that is not related to concepts of good and evil of course. Are you doing that?
While that may be so, reality is not necessarily ordered for your personal rhetorical convenience.
quote:Strawman, irrelevant, and untrue. Superficially I'd prefer it if there was no objective morality because then I wouldn't be answerable to it. I would extend Marvin's argument and do what the fuck I liked and could get away with, probably.
The fact that you'd like for your moral code to be endorsed and enforced by an omniscient superbeing is not proof that it is.
quote:That's all very interesting but are you going to answer the question?
quote:The same question can (and has) been asked about God.
Originally posted by Matt Black:
But if you have the power to stop the blond children from being thrown off the cliff, but you choose to not exercise that power, are you not guilty of their deaths?
quote:Exactly so. I'm not seeing any convincing argument as to why the Universe must necessarily be set it up in such a way to make it more convenient for you to "pass judgment on another's moral codes". Personal convenience is not a convincing argument for something's existence or non-existence.
Originally posted by GreyFace:
quote:Almost but not quite. I'm saying that if there is no objective morality, then there is no way that one can pass judgment on another's moral codes or even have a disagreement about morality.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
The argument from adverse consequences is a particularly pernicious type of fallacy. Here your argument seems to be that morality must be objective because if it's not it would be harder (or impossible) for you to pass judgement on other people's moral codes.
quote:Because objective morality is far from easy to discern, develop and apply in general, and the blanket term "innocent" can refer to any number of difficult cases and issues. However, if you gun down a toddler tomorrow as "too evil", then the reaction that you will get will show that objective morality is not entirely impotent in discerning innocence.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
That sounds awfully . . . subjective. Why not simply use this objective morality everyone's so hot on to judge innocence?
quote:It's not about personal convenience, it's about having a coherent position. You agree then that the consequence of your position is that you cannot criticise anyone else's morality? I plead Godwin's Law for not taking the obvious next step and rest my case.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
Exactly so. I'm not seeing any convincing argument as to why the Universe must necessarily be set it up in such a way to make it more convenient for you to "pass judgment on another's moral codes". Personal convenience is not a convincing argument for something's existence or non-existence.
quote:The argument is fallacious. You're switching between a conception of moral neutrality that only obtains in certain metaphysical systems (reconfigurations of matter are morally neutral) and applying it to a naturalistic conception of morality which would almost certainly consider it a straw man.
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Such an action is certainly not necessarily immoral from a naturalistic point of view, because burning your daughter merely involves the reconfiguration of matter, which is what nature does. It's no more immoral than two rocks hitting each other as they hurtle through space. And if such an action provides utility to the person performing the act, then what's 'wrong' with that (within a naturalistic paradigm)?
quote:Not at all. That makes as much sense as saying you can't offer opinions on art unless aesthetics is objective, or compare the merits of various athletes unless the rules of football are somehow embedded in the universe.
Originally posted by GreyFace:
It's not about personal convenience, it's about having a coherent position. You agree then that the consequence of your position is that you cannot criticise anyone else's morality?
quote:It depends on what you mean by persuade. We can bribe other people to agree with our position. We can flatter them or fast talk them, or use a stirring speech to befuddle them. We can coerce them. We can certainly appeal to external authority - if we bung the right politician a big enough bribe impose our preferences on anybody we like.
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:That simply doesn't follow. Even if there is no such thing as an independent objective morality it doesn't mean we can't say that we think murder is evil. It just means we have to persuade other people to agree with our position rather than appealing to an external authority in order to impose it on them.
Originally posted by GreyFace:
either that morality is an illusion
quote:If morality is an illusion it follows that the prohibition 'we can't call any choice or action evil' is also an illusion. Therefore, if morality is an illusion we can call choices and actions evil as much as we like.
Originally posted by GreyFace:
that morality is an illusion (and therefore we can't call any choice or action evil) or that morality is part of the nature of reality (which whilst not proving theism, makes it look a reasonable option and certainly kicks strict materialism off its pedestal).
quote:Most societies have something they define as air. But the number of definitions of air have multiplied over time. The Ancient Greeks claimed it was one of four elements, but our society defines it as a mixture of elements with a few compounds thrown in.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
Most societies have something they define as "murder", but the parameters can vary wildly. "Honor killings" seem a fairly obvious example. Or the execution of heretics.
quote:Your argument equivocates between 'objective' in the sense of 'about something that's objectively there' and 'objective' in the sense of 'the thing that's objectively there'. Your conclusion only follows if the two formulations are equivalent. If they aren't equivalent then there's no reason to expect human opinions about what's objectively there to be the same as what's objectively there. In fact, the definition of objective amounts to a claim that the two formulations can always be distinguished in principle, and that therefore there's always a possibility that they can be distinguished in fact too.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
quote:IngoB didn't specify a context. Of course, if God's will is objective, there's no reason the two couldn't be equivalent. In fact, if morality is objective we would expect them to be.
Originally posted by Matt Black:
'Not innocent in God's eyes' <> 'not innocent in human eyes'.
quote:Why do you need a place?
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
Of course, that wouldn't stop me from trying to convince them that they're wrong - but it would stop me from barging into their society, taking it over and completely destroying the whole thing so that I could stop it happening. That ain't my place.
quote:That is your opinion – you cannot demonstrate that it is truth.
Originally posted by Evensong:
Wtf?
Objectivity = truth.
God makes and sustains the world.
quote:That also is your opinion – you cannot demonstrate that it is truth, nor can the archaeologists who have been attempting to do so pretty much since the end of the six-day war
God saved the Israelites from slavery and oppression in Egypt.
quote:Assuming you are referring to the version in Exodus 20 – the first three don’t add much to the quality of community life do they? (Exodus 34 doesn't enhance your argument either does it?)
Only quite a bit later did God give the Ten Commandments. And these were commandments so people could live well in community. They weren't for God's sake, they were for God's people's sake.
quote:May need separate thread, but, and I suspect that this is an area you know far better than I, there seems to be strong experimental evidence that our decisions are made by the unconscious brain based upon past influences (genetics and experience) which remove the option of genuinely free decision (free will?). If this is true killing an innocent is still “evil” – but it is the action that is “evil” rather than the person since the perception of decision making is merely the story by which our conscious mind accepts inevitably constructed instruction from the unconscious. The extension of this, of course, is that, were we created by an all knowing/all powerful god that god would have created us unable to choose good or bad.
Originally posted by IngoB:
... The good of a human being consists in part in not killing innocent human beings. Where a human being does kill innocent humans, we call him "evil" if this arises from his own free decision. Where it doesn't, we call him "(mentally) disturbed" or perhaps "confused"
quote:
Originally posted by HughWillRidmee:
quote:That is your opinion – you cannot demonstrate that it is truth.
Originally posted by Evensong:
Wtf?
Objectivity = truth.
God makes and sustains the world.quote:Truth? What kind of truth? You cannot demonstrate that it is not true.
My position is more philosophically and logically sound however. The thing that creates, sustains and redeems the world is the source of objectivity precisely because it is creator, sustainer and redeemer. Without those things, there would be no life so objectivity is null and void.
Your position, as an atheist, is the weaker position as you have no logical source of objectivity. You have no source of truth.
quote:The first three are the source of objectivity from which the others flow. Perfectly logical. One does not put the cart before the horse. The horse comes first.
Originally posted by HughWillRidmee:
quote:Assuming you are referring to the version in Exodus 20 – the first three don’t add much to the quality of community life do they?
Only quite a bit later did God give the Ten Commandments. And these were commandments so people could live well in community. They weren't for God's sake, they were for God's people's sake.
quote:I think you've strayed into Russell's teapot territory.
Originally posted by Evensong:
Truth? What kind of truth? You cannot demonstrate that it is not true.
quote:Actually, I think the problem with this entire argument is that it assumes that "objectivity" is a property of the thing being observed, rather than a quality of the relation between the observer and the observed. It assumes that "morality" is some kind of thing (an "object") that can be set apart from those observing it, such that they can analyze its properties and come to agreement about its nature. But morality is in us, and we as social animals exist in it--no separation is possible. Objectivity and subjectivity are not coherent constructs in this domain (I'm not sure they're coherent with regard to anything more complex than a rock, but that's another discussion).
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:Your argument equivocates between 'objective' in the sense of 'about something that's objectively there' and 'objective' in the sense of 'the thing that's objectively there'. Your conclusion only follows if the two formulations are equivalent. If they aren't equivalent then there's no reason to expect human opinions about what's objectively there to be the same as what's objectively there. In fact, the definition of objective amounts to a claim that the two formulations can always be distinguished in principle, and that therefore there's always a possibility that they can be distinguished in fact too.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
quote:IngoB didn't specify a context. Of course, if God's will is objective, there's no reason the two couldn't be equivalent. In fact, if morality is objective we would expect them to be.
Originally posted by Matt Black:
'Not innocent in God's eyes' <> 'not innocent in human eyes'.
quote:No, this is wrong on several levels. First, let's assume the absurd position of materialism as true, for the sake of argument. In this case, there is obviously no "evil" in a strict sense, since the world is then merely a collection of atoms (quarks, gluons, what have you...) in motion (taken as term for any sort of change). However, it still makes sense to classify a particular (only relatively slowly changing) set of these atoms as a "person" that "acts", since this improves the predictability of atomic movements around this "person" greatly. Likewise their "acts" can be efficiently described by their effect on other "objects" and "persons", i.e., other collections of atoms that display lasting coherence in their motions. Certain "acts" can then be tagged as "evil" according to how much they disrupt the activities of a "person", the so-called "victim". And since such "acts" are committed by another "person", it remains perfectly appropriate to assign this label "evil" to the origin of the "act", a "person" that one might label "perpetrator". This again improves predictability about the atomic motions, since an "evil person" is likely to commit more "evil acts" in the future. So while materialism is obvious nonsense, one can in fact reconstruct the moral order entirely in terms of "efficient descriptions" of matter in motion. (Why is materialism obvious nonsense? Because the most fundamental and undeniable experience that you have, being you, cannot be explained materialistically. "Cannot" as in strictly impossible, not as in "currently unknown".)
Originally posted by HughWillRidmee:
May need separate thread, but, and I suspect that this is an area you know far better than I, there seems to be strong experimental evidence that our decisions are made by the unconscious brain based upon past influences (genetics and experience) which remove the option of genuinely free decision (free will?). If this is true killing an innocent is still “evil” – but it is the action that is “evil” rather than the person since the perception of decision making is merely the story by which our conscious mind accepts inevitably constructed instruction from the unconscious.
quote:This follows from nothing that you have said, has not internal logic and is manifestly false.
Originally posted by HughWillRidmee:
The extension of this, of course, is that, were we created by an all knowing/all powerful god that god would have created us unable to choose good or bad.
quote:Whyever not? Obviously there needs to be some level of shared understanding in order for it to be possible, but as that is in fact the case for pretty much all humans everywhere then I fail to see the problem.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
What we cannot do, if morality is not objective, is persuade them if by persuade we mean offer relevant reasons.
quote:Yes, but doesn't that demonstrate my point above: that God's application of morality to mankind does not equate to ours entre nous (between ourselves)? "My ways are not your ways", and all that.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
quote:The same question can (and has) been asked about God. He usually gets some kind of a Prime Directive exemption based on free will.
Originally posted by Matt Black:
But if you have the power to stop the blond children from being thrown off the cliff, but you choose to not exercise that power, are you not guilty of their deaths?
quote:I'd agree up to a point. Certainly, these kinds of discussion are bogged down by people talking past each other.
Originally posted by Timothy the Obscure:
Actually, I think the problem with this entire argument is that it assumes that "objectivity" is a property of the thing being observed, rather than a quality of the relation between the observer and the observed. It assumes that "morality" is some kind of thing (an "object") that can be set apart from those observing it, such that they can analyze its properties and come to agreement about its nature. But morality is in us, and we as social animals exist in it--no separation is possible. Objectivity and subjectivity are not coherent constructs in this domain (I'm not sure they're coherent with regard to anything more complex than a rock, but that's another discussion).
quote:You can't offer someone relevant reasons to prefer champaigne to bitter. You can appeal to snob value, but snob value isn't a relevant reason in this sense.
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:Whyever not? Obviously there needs to be some level of shared understanding in order for it to be possible, but as that is in fact the case for pretty much all humans everywhere then I fail to see the problem.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
What we cannot do, if morality is not objective, is persuade them if by persuade we mean offer relevant reasons.
quote:I understand "objective morality" to mean a morality that is in some sense hard-wired into the universe such that it is discoverable by a disinterested and competent intelligent creature.
Originally posted by Squibs:
The claim is often made that without God objective morality can not exist. Without getting to much into the particulars of the argument, I must say that I find it convincing. In short, I believe that there are certain actions that are wrong and that God is the best ontological foundation for such a belief.
quote:.
Originally posted by Evensong:
Wtf?
Objectivity = truth.
God makes and sustains the world.
That is your opinion – you cannot demonstrate that it is truth.
Truth? What kind of truth? You cannot demonstrate that it is not true.
My position is more philosophically and logically sound however. The thing that creates, sustains and redeems the world is the source of objectivity precisely because it is creator, sustainer and redeemer. Without those things, there would be no life so objectivity is null and void.
Your position, as an atheist, is the weaker position as you have no logical source of objectivity. You have no source of truth
quote:But the cart doesn’t go very far when no-one can see, touch, taste, hear or sense the horse in any way other than via their imagination, does it? (Not much good for the roses either come to think of it).
The first three are the source of objectivity from which the others flow. Perfectly logical. One does not put the cart before the horse. The horse comes first.
quote:OK – it was your original point – it’s still an opinion rather than a truth.
Which was my original point. God first, then morality.
quote:Firstly – such an attitude (rape being made good), I think, fully deserves to be called horrific – irrespective of the god element – it would be the same if secular law were so amended..
Originally posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard:
Morality is objective. Good is good. I was horrified to encounter what turned out to be an even more horrifically common kind of 'thinking' on Churchnet and Premier Christian, in a person of otherwise lovely disposition, the actual proposition that if God declared rape good then it would be.
Love is objective. We ALL know it when we are subject to it - and not.
quote:I've recently been through the irrationality of atheism on another thread Hugh. I've realised I can't be arsed to go through it again.
Originally posted by HughWillRidmee:
My position (that I do not believe in a god or gods) does not require a logical source of objectivity – I’m not the one making the claims that God makes and sustains the world. and God saved the Israelites from slavery and oppression in Egypt If you can demonstrate any valid basis for your belief in these statements please do so – I’ve never found anyone offer such a thing yet. Similarly, how do you justify (other than my inability to prove a negative*) the world needing a creator, needing a sustainer or needing a redeemer because without those things there would be no life? Perhaps you could anthropomorphize the big bang (which was a start of something) and the laws of physics (which seem to encompass pretty much everything in, on and around our world) but you’ve lost me on the redeemer bit – and when last I thought about it I seemed to be alive OK.
*I presume you’re aware of Russell’s teapot.
Checking for later posts to respond to I see that Croesos got there first – great minds etc..
quote:But the cart doesn’t go very far when no-one can see, touch, taste, hear or sense the horse in any way other than via their imagination, does it? (Not much good for the roses either come to think of it).
The first three are the source of objectivity from which the others flow. Perfectly logical. One does not put the cart before the horse. The horse comes first.
quote:OK – it was your original point – it’s still an opinion rather than a truth.
Which was my original point. God first, then morality.
quote:But neither are they in isolation from one another. By "shared understanding" I really mean nothing more than "there is a certain level of morality on which we agree". That may be at as base a level as "it's bad for me to be killed", or it may be at as advanced a level as "we should love each other", but as long as it exists then other moralities can be discussed from it.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
What's a shared understanding got to do with it? On the hypothesis that morality is subjective, there's nothing there to understand. Moral judgements are nothing to do with understanding; they're expressions of emotions, or attempts to alter other people's behaviour, or something of that sort.
quote:That is only true if there is some kind of constraint upon moral judgements that means that one moral judgement can constrain other moral judgements.
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
By "shared understanding" I really mean nothing more than "there is a certain level of morality on which we agree". That may be at as base a level as "it's bad for me to be killed", or it may be at as advanced a level as "we should love each other", but as long as it exists then other moralities can be discussed from it.
quote:Better according to whom?
And once there's that bedrock of shared understanding it's possible to have the discussion, and perhaps for one of us to convince the other that their view is better.
quote:This all seems to be far more complicated than it needs to be.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:That is only true if there is some kind of constraint upon moral judgements that means that one moral judgement can constrain other moral judgements.
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
By "shared understanding" I really mean nothing more than "there is a certain level of morality on which we agree". That may be at as base a level as "it's bad for me to be killed", or it may be at as advanced a level as "we should love each other", but as long as it exists then other moralities can be discussed from it.
Someone thinks that it's wrong for Bigendians to wage war upon Littleendians. You can ask them to explain that this is a special case of it is wrong for anyone to wage war upon anyone. And therefore get them to conclude that it is also wrong for Littleendians to wage war upon Bigendians.
But there's no reason that any such constraint need exist if morality is subjective opinion. Subjective opinion just isn't required to recognise any such constraint.
quote:Better according to whom?
And once there's that bedrock of shared understanding it's possible to have the discussion, and perhaps for one of us to convince the other that their view is better.
quote:That depends on what you want the outcome to be. If you want to avoid starving during the winter then the code that says band together, farm land and build store houses is going to be demonstrably better than a code that says hit people with rocks to steal their pack lunch and burn buildings to the ground for warmth.
Originally posted by Russ:
Having a code isn't the point. The question is more whether one code is as good as another,
quote:Best code? I guess that would be up for debate in most circumstances.
or whether it is meaningful to talk about a "best code".
quote:Yes.
And most of the time people's codes include a whole lot of stuff that is cultural rather than moral. Whether it's which way up to eat one's egg or how old a child has to be before being considered an adult.
quote:You wish.
Originally posted by HughWillRidmee:
I’ll read it again but the impression I gained (quite possibly wrongly) was that you reject the idea because of its implications regarding your beliefs.
![[Biased]](wink.gif)
However, it is somewhat difficult to explain the problem, because most people have quite frankly a "magical" attitude to technology and in particular computers. It is easiest to explain it to someone who has programming experience (is a "magician"). But to keep it non-technical, ... take James Joyce' "Ulysses", well known for being a "stream of consciousness" novel. Is "Ulysses" conscious? No, of course not. It is a book. But doesn't it have all the necessary bits and pieces? All the required mental components, if you like? Setting aside any doubts one might have about Joyce' ability to capture the mind accurately, I would still say no to that. These mental components are recorded in the book as a sort of list of the actual mental processes of a real person, but no matter how accurate such a list may be, there is no life in a recorded value. A written thought is not the same as thought one actually has, even if the former is the most precise representation of the latter imaginable. But what if he made a Leopold Bloom puppet, that somehow acted out the book as we progress through it? Well, that's fun and if it's life-like enough it may even fool people into believing that the puppet is Bloom. But enacting some recorded value does give only a mechanical life to it, it does not supply the sort of life that this record is a record of. But what if the book was really not a static entity, but rather a dynamic one? What if the Bloom puppet had lots of sensors by which it detects the environment, databases against which to compare the input, massive compute power to drive an expert system that creates these values and then they are enacted as well? Wouldn't that be just like Bloom, wouldn't that be like a human being? (Now we have basically arrived where a discussion could start with a programmer). No, and mark this well Mr Turing, it still wouldn't be like Bloom or a human being at all. Because when all is said and done, all this incredible technology does is to create a kind of "Ulysses" book on the fly, calculating representative values of all kinds of mental components through complex processes, and then enacts them through a puppet body in conceivably highly convincing ways.quote:As you point out in your very next post, this may or may not be sufficient to determine which code to live by.
Originally posted by George Spigot:
You could start by asking someone "Do you want to try and avoid hardshp, starvation and death. The majority of people will answer yes. From there you can make a very convincing case for "these things are good to do, these things aren't good to do" that pave the way to people banding together into societys to farm, keep warm and keep the bandits out.
Wham bam you get a code to live by.
Next.
quote:I think people keep putting the cart before the horse when talking about morality. I don't think that God embodies concepts of good and bad and that some humans perceived objective goodness and decided to shape their lives accordingly so that they could be good.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:As you point out in your very next post, this may or may not be sufficient to determine which code to live by.
Originally posted by George Spigot:
You could start by asking someone "Do you want to try and avoid hardshp, starvation and death. The majority of people will answer yes. From there you can make a very convincing case for "these things are good to do, these things aren't good to do" that pave the way to people banding together into societys to farm, keep warm and keep the bandits out.
Wham bam you get a code to live by.
Next.
If you believe that given enough thought the above method is sufficient to produce a single code to live by, then you're claiming morality is objective.
If you believe that it isn't, then we run into a problem, which is that some people stand to benefit more under code A than code B and other people stand to benefit under code B than code A. This means that if anything the discussion is less complicated than it needs to be.
quote:Unless, of course, you are a bandit.
Originally posted by George Spigot:
You could start by asking someone "Do you want to try and avoid hardshp, starvation and death. The majority of people will answer yes. From there you can make a very convincing case for "these things are good to do, these things aren't good to do" that pave the way to people banding together into societys to farm, keep warm and keep the bandits out.
Wham bam you get a code to live by.
Next.
quote:The trouble is George, that the argument is too parochial. In comparing those who co-operate to the bandit that seeks to prey on others you are painting a scenario of a functioning society and those who sit of the edge of that society. But what of those societies who may be living quite happy and contented lives but who, nonetheless, decide to expand their boundaries and power by conquest of other co-operating societies? If the driver of the good is what makes our society successful, then why shouldn't we maximise the prospect of long-term sustainability by conquering or wiping out other societies to ensure we retain a monopoly on the available resources? From our point of view that could be considered good. On the basis of your naturalistic evolutionary approach, how could you argue otherwise?
Originally posted by George Spigot:
quote:I think people keep putting the cart before the horse when talking about morality. I don't think that God embodies concepts of good and bad and that some humans perceived objective goodness and decided to shape their lives accordingly so that they could be good.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:As you point out in your very next post, this may or may not be sufficient to determine which code to live by.
Originally posted by George Spigot:
You could start by asking someone "Do you want to try and avoid hardshp, starvation and death. The majority of people will answer yes. From there you can make a very convincing case for "these things are good to do, these things aren't good to do" that pave the way to people banding together into societys to farm, keep warm and keep the bandits out.
Wham bam you get a code to live by.
Next.
If you believe that given enough thought the above method is sufficient to produce a single code to live by, then you're claiming morality is objective.
If you believe that it isn't, then we run into a problem, which is that some people stand to benefit more under code A than code B and other people stand to benefit under code B than code A. This means that if anything the discussion is less complicated than it needs to be.
I think that there are basic modes of behaviour that are going to be more sucessful than others such as forming a group as stated above. When people saw that the results of co-operation meant that they were warmer, had a store of food and lived longer they then had proof that, "These things are good". When the loan bandit is caught trying to murder and steel by the newly formed guards who agreed to work together and protect the farmers....well all could look upon the body of the bandit and have very good reason to proclaim that "His way of life was bad".
So to recap I dont think good and bad existed as such at the dawn of time and then people discovered them and thought how do we live so that we can echo these godly concepts. I think people observed that some behaviours were beneficial and some weren't and invented the labels "good" and "bad".
quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
quote:The trouble is George, that the argument is too parochial. In comparing those who co-operate to the bandit that seeks to prey on others you are painting a scenario of a functioning society and those who sit of the edge of that society. But what of those societies who may be living quite happy and contented lives but who, nonetheless, decide to expand their boundaries and power by conquest of other co-operating societies? If the driver of the good is what makes our society successful, then why shouldn't we maximise the prospect of long-term sustainability by conquering or wiping out other societies to ensure we retain a monopoly on the available resources? From our point of view that could be considered good. On the basis of your naturalistic evolutionary approach, how could you argue otherwise?
Originally posted by George Spigot:
quote:I think people keep putting the cart before the horse when talking about morality. I don't think that God embodies concepts of good and bad and that some humans perceived objective goodness and decided to shape their lives accordingly so that they could be good.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:As you point out in your very next post, this may or may not be sufficient to determine which code to live by.
Originally posted by George Spigot:
You could start by asking someone "Do you want to try and avoid hardshp, starvation and death. The majority of people will answer yes. From there you can make a very convincing case for "these things are good to do, these things aren't good to do" that pave the way to people banding together into societys to farm, keep warm and keep the bandits out.
Wham bam you get a code to live by.
Next.
If you believe that given enough thought the above method is sufficient to produce a single code to live by, then you're claiming morality is objective.
If you believe that it isn't, then we run into a problem, which is that some people stand to benefit more under code A than code B and other people stand to benefit under code B than code A. This means that if anything the discussion is less complicated than it needs to be.
I think that there are basic modes of behaviour that are going to be more sucessful than others such as forming a group as stated above. When people saw that the results of co-operation meant that they were warmer, had a store of food and lived longer they then had proof that, "These things are good". When the loan bandit is caught trying to murder and steel by the newly formed guards who agreed to work together and protect the farmers....well all could look upon the body of the bandit and have very good reason to proclaim that "His way of life was bad".
So to recap I dont think good and bad existed as such at the dawn of time and then people discovered them and thought how do we live so that we can echo these godly concepts. I think people observed that some behaviours were beneficial and some weren't and invented the labels "good" and "bad".
quote:That's not what I'm arguing. I'm saying that the idea of Good and Bad are a human invention and don't need there to be a God to jump start or embody them. The fact that different groups have different views on what is good and bad doesn't change that fact.
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
The trouble is George, that the argument is too parochial. In comparing those who co-operate to the bandit that seeks to prey on others you are painting a scenario of a functioning society and those who sit of the edge of that society. But what of those societies who may be living quite happy and contented lives but who, nonetheless, decide to expand their boundaries and power by conquest of other co-operating societies? If the driver of the good is what makes our society successful, then why shouldn't we maximise the prospect of long-term sustainability by conquering or wiping out other societies to ensure we retain a monopoly on the available resources? From our point of view that could be considered good. On the basis of your naturalistic evolutionary approach, how could you argue otherwise?
quote:And the difference between 'good' and 'beneficial' is more than merely semantic because...?
Originally posted by George Spigot:
So to recap I dont think good and bad existed as such at the dawn of time and then people discovered them and thought how do we live so that we can echo these godly concepts. I think people observed that some behaviours were beneficial and some weren't and invented the labels "good" and "bad".
quote:Thank you - I misunderstood your point. I'll be interested in your answer to Dafyd's question to you.
That's not what I'm arguing. I'm saying that the idea of Good and Bad are a human invention and don't need there to be a God to jump start or embody them. The fact that different groups have different views on what is good and bad doesn't change that fact.
The fact that the peaceful society, the war like society and the lone bandit all have different modes of behaviour doesn't change the fact that their motives all spring from the same basic wish. I want to have food, warmth and stay alive.
Your objection paints a picture of a society with subjective morality. Which seems to fit with reality. When you make the point that people can do "bad" things and call them "good" what exactly are you arguing against.
quote:Thank you Grokesx. I'll see if the engaging Mr Spigot has time to return to this before commenting further.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
@Drew
A discussion of biological altruism.
The interesting part is at the end: "But is it 'Real' Altruism?"
quote:Good question. I'm not sure I can see any meaningful difference between good and beneficial. How would you define them?
Originally posted by Dafyd:
And the difference between 'good' and 'beneficial' is more than merely semantic because...?
quote:You appeared to be using 'good' to mean something subjective, a label created by human beings. But you also appeared to be using 'beneficial' to mean something objective: something that promotes getting food, warmth and safety.
Originally posted by George Spigot:
quote:Good question. I'm not sure I can see any meaningful difference between good and beneficial. How would you define them?
Originally posted by Dafyd:
And the difference between 'good' and 'beneficial' is more than merely semantic because...?
quote:
Originally posted by Evensong:
I've recently been through the irrationality of atheism on another thread Hugh. I've realised I can't be arsed to go through it again.
quote:One unsupported statement followed by another. Did you know that ostrichs don’t actually bury their heads in the sand?
Needles sic too sic say Russell's teapot is a load of rubbish. Theism is philosophically and logically the most rational position to explain the world.
quote:Oh dear! Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence – but it can be very strongly indicative. Atheism of course doesn’t have to do anything just because you say it must. May I suggest you repeat the following until it sticks – Atheism is the absence of belief in a god or gods. Atheists do not have to prove anything (and asking for the impossible – the proof of a negative – comes across as rather desperate doesn’t it?). You’re making specific claims (which you have not attempted to justify) so the requirement for evidence is with you.
Atheism has no evidence to say God does not exist.
quote:Nothing came from nothing? Do you mean something came from nothing – it's probably down to my being thick but I find it’s getting very difficult to know what you think words mean.
Indeed, they would have to prove nothing came from nothing and it all just happened randomly and we exist for nothing and it's all about nothing. Which is highly irrational.
quote:No – the most reasonable conclusion is that there just might be some sort of supernature but that there is no solid basis for thinking that there is and a very good reason for thinking that it either does not exist or that, if it does, it has no interaction with our natural world. “We cannot live simultaneously in a world of natural causation and of miracles, for if one miracle can occur, there is no limit.” biologist Richard Lewontin The best evidence for the lack of an interacting supernature is that the universe works without it. Imperfectly of course – I have to look in a mirror occasionally – but work it does.
As for God being my opinion? Sure. But it's the most reasonable conclusion to come to based on the evidence of our existence.
quote:Quantity certainly, quality – I wish
Originally posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard:
HughWillRidmee, like many here, you are a VERY clever chap. Which means far more than I and able to do quality AND quantity.
quote:I confess that sometimes I’d like to be able to stop at annoying unsound bites.
I just do annoying sound bites.
quote:As in Everything You Never Wanted to Know About Sex But Have Been Forced to Find Out?
Your teachers were obviously absurdly wrong. It's like the 'reasoning' of Oolon Colluphid.
quote:Seeking clarity only - Are you saying that, in your understanding, God is bound by a concept (morality() that cannot be changed, that God is, in some way, a concept used to anthropomorphize (sort of) morality, that morality is a vital element of Godishness – I fear that your answer wasn’t simple enough for me. How do you know what is perfectly moral – is perfect morality immutable – and if so what is it? As I understand it current revelations about the way our brains work are providing experimental evidence that we have little (certainly much less than we imagine), and perhaps no, freedom to make conscious decisions. If demonstrated to be unarguably true would (could) that impinge on morality, goodness, love etc..
Whatever is objectively, perfectly moral, good, loving is eternally subjectified ontologically in God.
quote:I think I pretty much agree with on this although my programming experience started and ended with key words on rubber keys and saving the result to an audio tape.
Originally posted by IngoB:
Anyway, I come to this simply from having experience with programming. My contention is basically that one cannot program a person. One can possibly program something that acts just like a person, to the point where absolutely everybody is fooled. But then everybody would be fooled indeed, because this would still not be the same as programming a person.
quote:That's a really good point. You've made me go back and look at my definitions again.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:You appeared to be using 'good' to mean something subjective, a label created by human beings. But you also appeared to be using 'beneficial' to mean something objective: something that promotes getting food, warmth and safety.
Originally posted by George Spigot:
quote:Good question. I'm not sure I can see any meaningful difference between good and beneficial. How would you define them?
Originally posted by Dafyd:
And the difference between 'good' and 'beneficial' is more than merely semantic because...?
You denied that people discovered that some things were good; you said people observed that some things were beneficial. But if good and beneficial mean the same thing, then that's simply contradicting yourself. Or else you're using 'beneficial' when it suits you to treat morality as objective and 'good' when it suits you not to.
quote:I'd say that's not what subjective means. 'Subjective' would mean that the moral judgement depends upon the person making the judgement. It doesn't mean that the judgement depends upon the circumstances. You'd have to be a very strange kind of moral ultra-absolutist to think that giving a glass of water is always right or always wrong - it's got nothing to do with the subjective/objective distinction.
Originally posted by George Spigot:
If I gave a person in the desert dieing of thirst a glass of water we can see the proof that it's beneficial. And we could add the label "good" onto the action. But offer a glass of water to a drowning person isn't beneficial at all so could we then claim that whether a physical act was beneficial or not is a subjective thing?
quote:I've never thought of it that way before. One of my objections to objective morality was the idea that the morality of an action depends on the circumstances. For example there are times when it could be right to lie. Or times when it could be right to steal. Are you saying that objective morality isn’t fixed in stone in the sense that actions are either always right or always wrong?
Originally posted by Dafyd:
[QUOTE]I'd say that's not what subjective means. 'Subjective' would mean that the moral judgement depends upon the person making the judgement. It doesn't mean that the judgement depends upon the circumstances.
quote:It depends.
Originally posted by George Spigot:
For example there are times when it could be right to lie. Or times when it could be right to steal. Are you saying that objective morality isn’t fixed in stone in the sense that actions are either always right or always wrong?
quote:This third is obvious fiction. The archaeological evidence provides no support for the tale of slavery in Egypt and indeed quite a lot against.
Originally posted by Evensong:
Wtf?
Objectivity = truth.
God makes and sustains the world.
God saved the Israelites from slavery and oppression in Egypt.
quote:According to the fictional record, the Ten Commandments were given to Moses - the same person who led the Exodus. I'd hardly describe that as "quite a bit later". And it's still a part of the bible we know to be fiction.
Only quite a bit later did God give the Ten Commandments.
quote:Or rather God is amoral to the point of drowning the world, even in his own fictional PR document mind controls Pharaoh to give himself an excuse to show off, and generally is a moral example of what not to do. If morality is objectively the right thing to do then God would be the most moral entity going and would automatically follow his own rules.
2: God has no morality. God has no need of morality. God loves and saves humanity before God suggested morality to humans so they could live better together.
quote:You're saying that limited information makes our moral judgements infallible? Surely if a consequentialist, for example, thinks her moral judgements are fallible she won't think they suddenly become infallible should she lose information.
Originally posted by Justinian:
And onto more interesting matters, my belief is that the difference between subjective and non-deontological objective morality is like the difference between theory and practice. Even if you have a supposedly objective morality you yourself have limited information under any given circumstance so the moral reasoning you can do has the subjective strand of the information you have available and thus the outcome is subjective.
quote:I don't quite follow. You could have an objective and therefore fallibilist deontological ethics. In fact, fallibists are more likely to be deontologists, since an ethical infallibilist is more likely to see ethics as about ends not means.
The only exception is deontological ethics - in which the ethical thing to do is to follow the rules to the letter and then wash your hands of the outcome no matter how many people you kill.
quote:Deontological ethics is any ethics in which there are certain things you must never use as means to your ends. For example, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights is an example of deontological ethic: it declares that nobody may ever hurt or torture anybody else without their consent.
Originally posted by Truman White:
Non dentological objective morality? What's that when it's at home? How can you have objective morality with no moral duties?
quote:Cheers Dafyd. Glad you cleared that one up.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:Deontological ethics is any ethics in which there are certain things you must never use as means to your ends. For example, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights is an example of deontological ethic: it declares that nobody may ever hurt or torture anybody else without their consent.
Originally posted by Truman White:
Non dentological objective morality? What's that when it's at home? How can you have objective morality with no moral duties?
There are plenty of examples of ethics that are not deontological. Aristotle held a mixed ethics: there are some things you must not ever do, such as unlawful killing or adultery. But much of his ethics is about the cultivation of virtues, such as courage or generosity. You can believe that an act is objectively courageous or generous (and therefore good) without thinking that it is therefore done as conforming to an exceptionless injunction. Likewise, classical utilitarianism believes that an act is objectively good or bad according to whether it results in a greater amount of pleasure or suffering. It therefore rejects the idea that there's anything you should never do regardless of the consequences.
quote:Backwards. I'm saying that limited information makes all our judgements falliable and therefore we need to cross-check whatever we do.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
You're saying that limited information makes our moral judgements infallible? Surely if a consequentialist, for example, thinks her moral judgements are fallible she won't think they suddenly become infallible should she lose information.
quote:How does that make it like ethical subjectivism? Under ethical subjectivism, by definition our judgements can't be wrong.
Originally posted by Justinian:
I'm saying that limited information makes all our judgements falliable and therefore we need to cross-check whatever we do.
quote:Not in the way I'm familiar with it. And I don't think Wikipedia agrees with you either. There is nothing in ethical subjectivism saying that you can't be wrong, merely that you can not know that you are right.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:How does that make it like ethical subjectivism? Under ethical subjectivism, by definition our judgements can't be wrong.
Originally posted by Justinian:
I'm saying that limited information makes all our judgements falliable and therefore we need to cross-check whatever we do.
quote:I don't think wikipedia agrees with you either.
Originally posted by Justinian:
quote:Not in the way I'm familiar with it. And I don't think Wikipedia agrees with you either. There is nothing in ethical subjectivism saying that you can't be wrong, merely that you can not know that you are right.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
How does that make it like ethical subjectivism? Under ethical subjectivism, by definition our judgements can't be wrong.
quote:The frame of reference of the person or persons acted upon because you are only in your frame of reference. You're equating subjective with solipsistic.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
What would it mean for a subjective judgement to be wrong? What could it be wrong about?
quote:Could you expand please? Suppose I judge that battery farming is cruel. How is that about the frames of reference of any other person or person's acted upon? Surely it is about the treatment of chickens? To say that the frames of reference of the farmers or consumers ought to be taken into account is perhaps to miss the point of condemning battery farming on the grounds of cruelty.
Originally posted by Justinian:
quote:The frame of reference of the person or persons acted upon because you are only in your frame of reference. You're equating subjective with solipsistic.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
What would it mean for a subjective judgement to be wrong? What could it be wrong about?
quote:Doesn't this contradict the premise of the OP? After all, if morality is objective your judgement is irrelevant.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Suppose I judge that battery farming is cruel.
quote:It's possible that someone could believe that there's an objective moral principle that your moral beliefs are binding upon you, but that you're not at fault for violating moral principles that you don't believe in. It's a bit of minimal moral priniciple, but it's possible. You'd call it objective moral relativism if you like. Certainly, a believer in objective morality can hold that sincere belief is an excuse.
Originally posted by Russ:
There's a position that says that if you believe that battery farming is cruel then it's wrong for you to eat battery farmed chicken, but if I believe that battery farming is the least-bad alternative then I can eat chicken with a clear conscience.
Whereas an objectivist would insist that it has to be either OK or not-OK, but can't be morally licit for me and not for you.
quote:No.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
quote:Doesn't this contradict the premise of the OP? After all, if morality is objective your judgement is irrelevant.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Suppose I judge that battery farming is cruel.
quote:But it rather raises the question: "If morality is objective, and our moral judgments are necessarily at least partially subjective, how does it all pan out when the believer in objective morality actually makes those moral judgements? Does his/her judgement become objective by virtue of believing it to be so?
No.
(If morality is objective then my judgement doesn't affect the truth of the matter, but I was hardly arguing that it was.)
quote:I wonder if this confuses moral ontology (where one grounds morality) with moral epistemology (where one finds it). If we say that moral values and responsibilities are objective we are saying that they have a source which remains unaltered regardless whether I follow it, believe in it, or even am aware of it. This is moral ontology. Now how we discover the grounds of these virtues and responsibilities is another matter.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:But it rather raises the question: "If morality is objective, and our moral judgments are necessarily at least partially subjective, how does it all pan out when the believer in objective morality actually makes those moral judgements? Does his/her judgement become objective by virtue of believing it to be so?
No.
(If morality is objective then my judgement doesn't affect the truth of the matter, but I was hardly arguing that it was.)
quote:Your second question only makes sense if 'objective' there means 'unbiased'. But 'believer in objective morality' only makes sense if 'objective' means 'the case or not independent of judgements made about it'. A believer in objective morality does not therefore believe that his or her moral judgement is unbiased. Quite the contrary: it only makes sense for me to say that my moral judgement may be biased if I believe in objective morality for it to be biased about. Your question is therefore a non-sequitur arising from a fallacy of equivocation.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
But it rather raises the question: "If morality is objective, and our moral judgments are necessarily at least partially subjective, how does it all pan out when the believer in objective morality actually makes those moral judgements? Does his/her judgement become objective by virtue of believing it to be so?
quote:Of course it does. That's the whole point. Most moral objectivists of the theistic kind I have argued with seek to downplay the role of subjectivity, but the actual working out of moral questions involve it. (I would say it involves nothing else.)
I wonder if this confuses moral ontology (where one grounds morality) with moral epistemology (where one finds it).
quote:The same arguments could be used to claim that any method of getting in touch with anything objective uses subjective processes. Especially if you're prepared to use the word 'intersubjective', whatever 'intersubjective' means in this context.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
If we look at the common modes of getting in touch with objective morality, they are subjective processes: Working to some sort of utilitarian standard - intersubjective. What would Jesus do/looking into the heart/asking for Allah's or God's or Whoever's guidance - subjective. Consulting sacred texts - since there is no agreement which texts if any are genuinely God's words or inspiration, at least some of it is delusion or wonky subjectivity. Consulting priest/iman/Pope - ditto.
ISTM that no matter what the ontology is, the realities of the epistemology make subjectivity the only game in town.
quote:Actually, I didn't. I said at least some of it is delusion or wonkily subjective. That's because there is no intersubjective consensus - even among people of the same faith ffs - on the matter of authority regarding moral matters.
And choosing which sacred text has authority is not a purely individual matter. But you don't use the word 'intersubjective' for that one, but merely 'subjective'
quote:Quite. And we have ways of addressing this conundrum when it comes to things like electrons and sound waves and light and atoms and molecules and cells and such and such.
The same arguments could be used to claim that any method of getting in touch with anything objective uses subjective processes. Especially if you're prepared to use the word 'intersubjective.
quote:I suspect that you can maintain this only by bringing the circumstantial detail into the definition of the act or attitude.
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
certain actions and attitudes are always right, and always wrong regardless of time, place, custom
quote:I'm not sure that directly addresses Drewthealexander's point. The circumstantial variables that affect whether most people think pulling a trigger is right or wrong are not the kinds of thing that would naturally be included under 'time, place, custom'.
Originally posted by Russ:
quote:I suspect that you can maintain this only by bringing the circumstantial detail into the definition of the act or attitude.
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
certain actions and attitudes are always right, and always wrong regardless of time, place, custom
For example, pulling a trigger is an act which may be right or wrong, given the circumstances. In the particular circumstances in which you think it is very wrong, you lump the act and the circumstances into a "compound concept" called "murder".
quote:That's a poor definition of objective, since 'objective' has two relevant senses and it's not clear which one you mean. When someone says morality is objective they mean it is a thing in itself as distinct from as it is known in the mind. Ok. But when you ask whether a judgement is objective they don't mean the judgement is distinct from as it is known in the mind - that would be nonsense since judgement is a mental activity with no mind-independent existence. But if you say that the judgement is objective because it relates to something distinct from the mind, then that's not what's meant by saying morality is objective.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
OK, to get all the equivocation stuff out of the way, here are some definitions I have in mind in these discussions:
Subjective: relating to or of the nature of an object as it is known in the mind as distinct from a thing in itself.
Objective: relating to or of the nature of an object as a thing in itself as distinct from as it is known in the mind.
Intersubjective: The sharing of subjective states by two or more individuals. Shared cognition and consensus.
quote:The first sentence is only true in so far as any practical attempt to adopt anything is intersubjective.
I'd say that any practical attempt to adopt utilitarianism is an intersubjective undertaking. Secular democratic government is nothing more than utilitarianism writ large. On a personal level, it can be described as merely subjective, I suppose.
quote:'Delusion or wonkily subjective' is merely a rude way of saying 'subjective'.
quote:Actually, I didn't. I said at least some of it is delusion or wonkily subjective. That's because there is no intersubjective consensus - even among people of the same faith ffs - on the matter of authority regarding moral matters.
And choosing which sacred text has authority is not a purely individual matter. But you don't use the word 'intersubjective' for that one, but merely 'subjective'
quote:We have ways of addressing the problem when it comes to historical events as well. They aren't as effective as they are when they come to matters that can be quantified and addressed with mathematical tools, but they can still be used. It's an open question whether they apply to economics. Some of the same methods - rational argument - can also be used in philosophy and hermeneutics.
quote:Quite. And we have ways of addressing this conundrum when it comes to things like electrons and sound waves and light and atoms and molecules and cells and such and such.
The same arguments could be used to claim that any method of getting in touch with anything objective uses subjective processes. Especially if you're prepared to use the word 'intersubjective.
quote:The most obvious thing wrong with Mackie's argument is that only intuitionists take moral facts to be the kinds of thing that Mackie is dismissing as queer.
This all boils down to Mackie's idea of the "queerness" of moral facts. If they exist, they are of such a character that the normal methods of investigation of objective reality and intersubjective consensus don't apply. So to use the language of "objectivity" without setting out how it actually works in the working out of moral judgements is incoherent.
quote:OK, I've shown you mine, you show me yours. Otherwise wibbling on about equivocations and definitions is just a version of that well known logical fallacy - avoiding the question.
That's a poor definition of objective...
quote:That may be so. But the important thing is that it is seen for what it is - a bunch of people trying to alter other people's subjective opinions to reach some sort of er, intersubjective consensus.
In fact, you'll find as much or more disagreement over what secular democratic government entails, or even how to implement utilitarianism, as you will among religious believers
quote:You've overlooked the key phrase - "...at least some of it." Do you dispute that at least some claimed authority is deluded? Does God hate fags? Should Muslim apostates be killed? Are there 72 virgins waiting in heaven for suicide bombers? When you die, will you be re-incarnated in a form determined by the law of Karma? If your answer to any of these questions is no, how did you come to that answer?
'Delusion or wonkily subjective' is merely a rude way of saying 'subjective'.
As I said above, claiming that secular democratic government is based on a shared consensus while dismissing religious believers as not having any intersubjective consensus is laughable.
quote:Scientism alert. And tested, how?
Some of the same methods - rational argument - can also be used in philosophy and hermeneutics.
quote:OK, then. What kind of thing do you take a moral fact to be?
The most obvious thing wrong with Mackie's argument is that only intuitionists take moral facts to be the kinds of thing that Mackie is dismissing as queer.
quote:I don't see how it can be - not to the nuts and bolts of making moral judgements anyway. Usually, if there are ontological questions that we can't get an epistemic handle on, we hold up our hands and say, "I don't know" or, "We're working on that one."
The question as to whether morality is ontologically objective or subjective is still, however, relevant.
quote:I showed you mine twice - once when explaining why you were committing a fallacy of equivocation and once when explaining why your definition wasn't up to the job.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:OK, I've shown you mine, you show me yours. Otherwise wibbling on about equivocations and definitions is just a version of that well known logical fallacy - avoiding the question.
That's a poor definition of objective...
quote:Every secular democrat agrees with you about the subjective nature of morality?
quote:That may be so. But the important thing is that it is seen for what it is - a bunch of people trying to alter other people's subjective opinions to reach some sort of er, intersubjective consensus.
In fact, you'll find as much or more disagreement over what secular democratic government entails, or even how to implement utilitarianism, as you will among religious believers
quote:Taking 'at least some of it' seriously would have meant the entire paragraph irrelevant to the discussion. I therefore ignored 'at least some of it' as a get out clause to be used to evade challenge.
quote:You've overlooked the key phrase - "...at least some of it." Do you dispute that at least some claimed authority is deluded? Does God hate fags? Should Muslim apostates be killed? Are there 72 virgins waiting in heaven for suicide bombers? When you die, will you be re-incarnated in a form determined by the law of Karma? If your answer to any of these questions is no, how did you come to that answer?
'Delusion or wonkily subjective' is merely a rude way of saying 'subjective'.
As I said above, claiming that secular democratic government is based on a shared consensus while dismissing religious believers as not having any intersubjective consensus is laughable.
quote:The same way mathematics is tested: by other people following the reasoning.
quote:Scientism alert. And tested, how?
Some of the same methods - rational argument - can also be used in philosophy and hermeneutics.
quote:A moral fact is a fact about what promotes human flourishing.
quote:OK, then. What kind of thing do you take a moral fact to be?
The most obvious thing wrong with Mackie's argument is that only intuitionists take moral facts to be the kinds of thing that Mackie is dismissing as queer.
quote:Best wishes accepted Russ. Please accept mine.
Originally posted by Russ:
quote:I suspect that you can maintain this only by bringing the circumstantial detail into the definition of the act or attitude.
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
certain actions and attitudes are always right, and always wrong regardless of time, place, custom
For example, pulling a trigger is an act which may be right or wrong, given the circumstances. In the particular circumstances in which you think it is very wrong, you lump the act and the circumstances into a "compound concept" called "murder".
In one sense there's nothing wrong with that approach. But you're deceiving yourself if you think you've removed any of the inherent complexity thereby or any of the dependence of morality on circumstances. You've just shifted the frame of the question from "in what circumstances is this act wrong ?" to "what is the domain of circumstances over which this concept - murder - is applicable ?"
Best wishes,
Russ
quote:That puts anyone promoting ideas of objective morality on the same footing as I am with my predilection for the many worlds interpretation of quantum physics on the grounds that I like its implications. Anyone with sufficient knowledge and aptitude could follow the reasoning, do the maths and see that it is internally consistent and consistent with what we know so far. But they could also do the same with the Copenhagen Interpretation, the de Broglie–Bohm theory and many others. "Objectively", they can't all be right, and we can't as yet - if ever - test them. If I say to someone who holds to the Copenhagen Interpretation, "You're wrong and I'm right," there is not one shred of "objective" - in any sense of the word - meaning in the statement.
The same way mathematics is tested: by other people following the reasoning.
quote:No, but it doesn't matter. Secular democrats, whatever their metaphysical views, can only argue about moral matters in terms that can be intersubjectively shared by all. If they don't do that, they cease to be secular democrats. How secular particular societies are in practice, obviously, differs widely.
Every secular democrat agrees with you about the subjective nature of morality?
quote:I'm not going to go off on another tangent about definitions nor yet respond to your tiresome habit of putting words in my mouth. Suffice to say if we take delusion in this context to mean something that is falsely believed, the point I am making is that the plethora of moral assertions made by - most usually religious - people who hold that morality is objective cannot all be true. This then raises the question of how the believer in objective morality distinguishes the true from the false. My question to you is how do you do that non-subjectively?
By 'delusion' all you mean is 'subjective opinion that I wish to be rude about'.
quote:I'm sorry, all you've done is shove the word "objectively" into the sentence a couple of times and called it justification. Fred Phelps believes "God hates fags" is objectively true and that tolerating homosexual behaviour is objectively harmful. How do you propose justifying your beliefs over his non-subjectively?
I can distinguish between 'treat every human being as an end not a means' and 'God hates fags' since I believe the one is objectively true and the other is objectively harmful. ('Deluded' is not my word.) But you don't have that justification.
quote:I disagree. 'The many worlds interpretation is objectively wrong' or 'the many worlds interpretation is objectively right' are meaningful and can be understood by anyone who understands the many worlds interpretation. If someone can't understand what it means to say that the many worlds interpretation is right, then they don't understand what the many worlds interpretation means in the first place.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
If I say to someone who holds to the Copenhagen Interpretation, "You're wrong and I'm right," there is not one shred of "objective" - in any sense of the word - meaning in the statement.
quote:How do we test the above statement that it's of interest to philosophers and no one else? Suppose we find someone who isn't a philosopher who finds it interesting? (Over Christmas my parents were talking about a play they'd been to about the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. They aren't philosophers. But maybe they're No True noone else?)
So, as far as actually doing anything with quantum theory, such as developing things like transistors, quantum computers, tunnelling microscopes and the like, these theories are useless, of interest to philosophers and no one else.
quote:I suppose by a process of rational argument such as you're trying to use now.
This then raises the question of how the believer in objective morality distinguishes the true from the false. My question to you is how do you do that non-subjectively?
quote:'Morality' is most similar to concepts such as 'health' and 'rationality'.
quote:Okay, give us an example. And, bearing in mind you don't think moral facts are metaphysically queer, to which family of facts is it similar to? What can you tell us about its properties and how do you know it?
A moral fact is a fact about what promotes human flourishing.
quote:Meaningful but irrelevant. I have no "objective" way of choosing the many worlds interpretation over the Copenhagen one because they are equally rational and neither are empirically testable.
I disagree. 'The many worlds interpretation is objectively wrong' or 'the many worlds interpretation is objectively right' are meaningful and can be understood by anyone who understands the many worlds interpretation.
quote:No, I'm saying a statement cannot be known to be objective if it is not yet testable. "I don't know" is a perfectly reasonable position to take, whereas "I do know blah" where blah is untestable is not. At best it is a subjective opinion.
You claim that a statement cannot be objective if it is not yet testable. But that means that objective facts only become objective once someone thinks up a way to test them. But that's a contradiction: if they're dependent upon someone thinking of a way to test them, they're not objective even after someone has tested them.
quote:OK, it is only philosophically interesting. I'll allow your parents to be interested if they want to be.
How do we test the above statement that it's of interest to philosophers and no one else? Suppose we find someone who isn't a philosopher who finds it interesting? (Over Christmas my parents were talking about a play they'd been to about the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. They aren't philosophers. But maybe they're No True noone else?)
quote:I'm not sure you're grasping what I'm trying to say, which is probably my fault. All of the things listed are practical applications that have arisen out of what we understand and observe about quantum mechanics, which are independent of the interpretations such as Copenhagen and many worlds. One could spend a lifetime developing quantum cryptology, quantum teleportation etc without ever having to consider those interpretations. One would just shut up and calculate. Anybody who wibbles on about quantum healing or quantum consciousness or anything else that depends on a particular interpretation is overreaching or having a laugh.
And why does the above statement have anything to do with anything? Consider 'Julius Caesar led an army across the Rubicon'. How does that help anyone develop electron microscopes? Is it therefore a subjective opinion?
quote:Well, clearly we have different opinions on how far rational argument can take us in establishing objectivity. All I would add on that score is that if rational argument could get us to objective truth on its own, there would be no need for science and there would be no open philosophical questions. It's necessary but not sufficient. I don't think I'm going out on a scientismistic limb in thinking that.
I suppose by a process of rational argument such as you're trying to use now.
quote:Hm, that embraces a wide spectrum, since I don't think health and rationality are very similar. But it is interesting you choose health, as that is the example Sam Harris uses as analogous to his concept of the science of morality. I believe the last time we talked about this I said your position reminds me of Harris's, notwithstanding your evident dislike of the man.
Morality' is most similar to concepts such as 'health' and 'rationality'.
quote:Well, that's an argument that you've used on another person here and to no-one's surprise, I should imagine, they weren't very impressed with it either, seeing as it combines insult with bare assertion. Just because someone doesn't believe you can get a truly objective handle on moral matters means they have no reason to use rational argument? That's egregious, unsupported bollocks.
On the other hand, if we take morality to have no objective existence, then there's no reason why we shouldn't embrace logical fallacies in our argument if they're persuasive. If someone points out a flaw in our argument we ignore them. We happily reuse the argument on other people. And so on.
quote:If you had a way of choosing one interpretation over the other it wouldn't be objective. A method of choosing belongs to the object as known in the mind of the person choosing rather to the nature of the object in itself. By definition testability is a subjective property.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:Meaningful but irrelevant. I have no "objective" way of choosing the many worlds interpretation over the Copenhagen one because they are equally rational and neither are empirically testable.
I disagree. 'The many worlds interpretation is objectively wrong' or 'the many worlds interpretation is objectively right' are meaningful and can be understood by anyone who understands the many worlds interpretation.
quote:Again, whether or not something can be known is a fact about the object as it is known, or not, in the mind, and not about the object as it is in itself. It's a subjective matter. That's irrelevant to whether the object itself is objectively there or not.
No, I'm saying a statement cannot be known to be objective if it is not yet testable. "I don't know" is a perfectly reasonable position to take, whereas "I do know blah" where blah is untestable is not. At best it is a subjective opinion.
quote:No, I was grasping you perfectly well. Electron microscopes are a practical application that have arisen out of quantum mechanic yes? That was why I mentioned them. We don't know whether the people who developed the electron microscope held the Copenhagen interpretation or the many worlds interpretation; it didn't matter to what they were doing.
quote:I'm not sure you're grasping what I'm trying to say, which is probably my fault. All of the things listed are practical applications that have arisen out of what we understand and observe about quantum mechanics, which are independent of the interpretations such as Copenhagen and many worlds. One could spend a lifetime developing quantum cryptology, quantum teleportation etc without ever having to consider those interpretations. One would just shut up and calculate. Anybody who wibbles on about quantum healing or quantum consciousness or anything else that depends on a particular interpretation is overreaching or having a laugh.
And why does the above statement have anything to do with anything? Consider 'Julius Caesar led an army across the Rubicon'. How does that help anyone develop electron microscopes? Is it therefore a subjective opinion?
quote:I think this sort of argument needs a name, and I propose to call it the 'Suddenly Fred Phelps is an Authority' argument.
Fred Phelps believes "God hates fags" is objectively true and that tolerating homosexual behaviour is objectively harmful. How do you propose justifying your beliefs over his non-subjectively?
quote:That's no reason to give up trying.
All I would add on that score is that if rational argument could get us to objective truth on its own, there would be no need for science and there would be no open philosophical questions. It's necessary but not sufficient.
quote:I'd like to think that I'm open to arguments that there are no moral facts should any good arguments come along. That precludes me saying that I know there are moral facts. And I also think that without some kind of God-like concept it's hard to have any normative objective concepts at all (including health and rationality), and there are enough atheists that I respect that I can't say I know there's a God. So on the whole I decline to answer your challenge in your terms.
The thing is, though, I asked you for an example of a single moral fact, what you know about it and how you know it. Specifics, man, specifics.
quote:Why is it insulting? Compared to say, asking you to explain why you're more rational than Fred Phelps.
quote:Well, that's an argument that you've used on another person here and to no-one's surprise, I should imagine, they weren't very impressed with it either, seeing as it combines insult with bare assertion. Just because someone doesn't believe you can get a truly objective handle on moral matters means they have no reason to use rational argument?
On the other hand, if we take morality to have no objective existence, then there's no reason why we shouldn't embrace logical fallacies in our argument if they're persuasive. If someone points out a flaw in our argument we ignore them. We happily reuse the argument on other people. And so on.
quote:I don't know how you come to the conclusion that what quantum theory describes is only a set of probabilities which upon measurement immediately and randomly assumes only one of the possible values, and before that is in a state that is neither a wave nor a particle, and that the reality we live in is dependent on this process, is simpler than the idea that all the possibilities are real with separate existences; other than by subjective means. Both are equally mainstream interpretations, equally supported and equally mathematically sound. Your reasons for preferring one over the other are of no greater consequence than my fanciful one. I don't see the relevance of Russell's teapot, since both interpretations are currently unfalsifiable claims. All I am saying is we are firmly in "I don't know" territory and to claim more is just opinion. It may be opinion influenced by rational thought, reason, logic or whatever, but it is mistaken to call it anything other than what it is.
As it happens, I can think of a reason for choosing, namely Occam's razor.
quote:I don't see how the difficulty of testing makes any difference to the principle. The Higgs boson is in the process of being tested - or rather the predictions of the Standard Model about it are being tested. If the expected results are found - as tentatively seem to be the case - over time, the Higgs will take its place in the Standard Model as - to use Stephen Jay Gould's phrase - something which is confirmed to such a degree it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent, which is the closest thing science can get to saying "objective fact".
Anyway, time to interrogate this concept of something being testable. It's rarely a matter of finding a simple test that returns a yes-no answer...
quote:And this reflected in the status of the theory. AFAIK, the specific details of the evolution of birds is the subject of much dispute and although many scientists will have their own opinions on the matter, the details are not claimed as known.
Tests for whether birds are descended from the most recent common ancestor of diplodocus and triceratops basically consist of people looking at bones and arguing about whether they think this bone looks more like that bone than the other bone.
quote:A continuum has extremities. I'm saying the claim that morality is objective lies at one extremity.
But there's a continuum. There's no clear cut line on one side of which things are testable and on the other side of which things aren't
quote:I am not aware I suggested that.
But why should that be a reason to give up trying?
quote:That is not what I am saying at all. I am saying:
We might state it as being that a proposition can only be objectively true or false if it has some practical application of a certain sort. (I think that's a fair statement of the position: let me know if you think the precise wording matters.)
quote:Thing is, it thus a pointless argument. As far as I can see, you are not proposing a way of establishing the proposition or utilising the argument in any way to arrive at objective moral conclusions. So the idea of moral objectivity is just left hanging. Interesting - at present – as a philosophical curiosity. But actually you are not saying that at all, because you also say the person who believes objective morality to be true is in a better rational position to make moral judgements, notwithstanding the fact that you are not claiming to access any properties of the objective reality of morality in the actual act of making moral judgements. So somehow, according to you, the subjective state of belief has the objective result of making the moral objectivist more prone to rational moral decision making. This is the problem I am having, and the one you are, it seems to me, avoiding by claims of equivocation. You claim to be saying that all you are arguing is for the existence of morality in sense 2b while denying that you are saying anything at all about sense 3a. On the other hand, according to you there are implications after all for sense 3a, in that believing the 2b sense puts one in a better position rationally than not when it comes to moral decision making.
The thing is, my argument doesn't depend upon my being able to answer your challenge. Because I'm arguing that moral facts are objective. That is, I'm arguing that they're true independent of whether or not I know them. And all arguments to the contrary are unconvincing; and the contrary positions all require biting bigger and harder bullets than the bullets that my position requires me to bite
quote:I can't see how any of this is different for the moral anti realist. Throw me a bone, I'm struggling.
With that proviso, I'm pretty sure that kindness is good and cruelty is bad. Because a society in which people are kind is going to work better than a society in which people are cruel. And because all things being equal, it seems that kind people are more interesting, less philistine, nicer in other ways, and happier, than cruel people. And it seems a lot easier to get a consistent moral system that doesn't require special pleading in which kindness is a virtue than it is to get one in which cruelty is a virtue.
quote:I'm unlikely to convince you of the former and you haven't even tried doing the latter.
The main problem they (philosophers holding to moral relativism) face is to show how the denial of objective moral truth need not entail a subjectivism that drains the rationality out of moral discourse. Their critics, on the other hand, face the possibly even more challenging task of justifying the claim that there is such a thing as objective moral truth.
quote:You asked me whether I knew, rather than whether I was 'accessing properties'.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
you are not claiming to access any properties of the objective reality of morality in the actual act of making moral judgements.
quote:The moral anti realist doesn't think any of this amounts to evidence justifying a belief? They don't think any of this amounts to access to moral 'properties'?
quote:I can't see how any of this is different for the moral anti realist.
With that proviso, I'm pretty sure that kindness is good and cruelty is bad. Because a society in which people are kind is going to work better than a society in which people are cruel. And because all things being equal, it seems that kind people are more interesting, less philistine, nicer in other ways, and happier, than cruel people. And it seems a lot easier to get a consistent moral system that doesn't require special pleading in which kindness is a virtue than it is to get one in which cruelty is a virtue.
quote:How about you throw me some of the bones that I've been asking for?
Throw me a bone, I'm struggling.
quote:If this study is anything to go by, it depends entirely on who you ask and when you ask them.
So what's God's morality again?