Thread: Why Christian apologists want atheists to read Nietzsche Board: Oblivion / Ship of Fools.
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Posted by anteater (# 11435) on
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Nietzche is rather beloved of Christian apologists because he at least hated christianity for what christians believe to be true of their faith, as opposed to "The new atheists" who dismiss christianity for what christians believe to be a mixture of some truth, a lot of over simplication a fair amount of nonsense.
Nietzsche hated christianity as the religion of slaves and the weak, that exalted pity and despised power. And that is true, despite the many instances of christian rulers being false to their faith.
Nietzsche poured a lot of scorn on those who gave up the faith but clung on to the morality, which was the morality of the underdog, and sickly.
Now I know his philosophy was perverted by his anti-semitic sister, and that Nietzsche had nothing but contempt for anti-semitism, or indeed nationalism (he himself choosing to remain stateless). And given the extent of his rift with Wagner after the latter's drift into reverence of german culture I have not the slightest doubt that he would have viewed Hitler and the Nazis with utter contempt.
All that said, however, I find his approach unsettling simply because it does respond to something in me, which I fear could appeal to many.
So the christian argument goes like this. Christianity brought into being a society in which God chooses the weak, even taking the form of a slave. Of course, none of this proves anything directly, but if you believe in your deepest intuition that this, and not Nietzsche's view of life is sane and good, that would be taken by many as some indication that revelation is taking place.
To which most atheists reply: Rubbish, pointing both to the imperfect history of christian institutions, and the great amount of good done by non-religious people and groups.
All of which is true.
But it is still relevant to state that these things follow from the nature of reality, if the christian view is accepted.
The challenge to atheists is to say whether they also believe that these things follow from the nature of reality, in which case the philosophy of Nietzsche can be viewed as wrong, and even be discriminated against, as indeed overt racism is.
Or do they believe that whilst they prefer themselves to be compassionate, philosophies such as Nietzsche's have an equally valid claim to be promoted and advocated, since neither side in the debate can claim to have right on their side?
How would they feel about a society in which his ideas held sway? Of course, most of them have no idea, because they have not read him. Which gets us back to where we started.
Posted by Stetson (# 9597) on
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quote:
So the christian argument goes like this. Christianity brought into being a society in which God chooses the weak, even taking the form of a slave. Of course, none of this proves anything directly, but if you believe in your deepest intuition that this, and not Nietzsche's view of life is sane and good, that would be taken by many as some indication that revelation is taking place.
I like to sum up Nietzsche's critique of Christian compassion like this...
Suppose you're sitting in church, and the pastor is going on about how we need to have compassion for the poor, the sick, the weak, etc.
Wonderful sentiments, you might think. But now imagine that the pastor says "Like, for example, this guy right over here!" And points directly at YOU.
If you would feel even a little bit uncomfortable at that, you might have some idea where Nietzsche, once you sweep away all the bombastic hyperbole, was getting at.
Essentially, his view of Christians in general was the same view that many cynics today would take of so-called champagne-socialists. "Oh sure, you love the little brown people in Africa because it allows you to feel like you're the Great Compassionate Westerner leading them out of their misery. But it's all just so much patronizing, self-aggrandizing rubbish".
Which is not to say that Nietzsche would neccessarily be opposed to acts of charity, just not undertaken for the usual Christian rationale.
[ 02. April 2013, 16:04: Message edited by: Stetson ]
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
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Is there any reason at all to suppose Nietzsche would support acts of charity to Untermenschen? His anthropology was based on a distinction between worthwhile people and scum who don't deserve anything but to be stepped upon by the worthwhile people.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
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quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
Nietzche is rather beloved of Christian apologists because he at least hated christianity for what christians believe to be true of their faith, as opposed to "The new atheists" who dismiss christianity for what christians believe to be a mixture of some truth, a lot of over simplication a fair amount of nonsense.
<snip>
So the christian argument goes like this. Christianity brought into being a society in which God chooses the weak, even taking the form of a slave. Of course, none of this proves anything directly, but if you believe in your deepest intuition that this, and not Nietzsche's view of life is sane and good, that would be taken by many as some indication that revelation is taking place.
To which most atheists reply: Rubbish, pointing both to the imperfect history of christian institutions, and the great amount of good done by non-religious people and groups.
All of which is true.
I can understand why a Christian would prefer to limit discussion to Chrisitianity-as-an-abstract-ideal without any reference to Christianity-as-it-exists (largely for the same reasons a Communist would prefer to discuss Communism-as-an-abstract-ideal instead of Communism-as-it-exists), but why do you consider it reasonable to expect that non-Christians likewise limit themselves?
Posted by Bostonman (# 17108) on
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quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
Is there any reason at all to suppose Nietzsche would support acts of charity to Untermenschen? His anthropology was based on a distinction between worthwhile people and scum who don't deserve anything but to be stepped upon by the worthwhile people.
I'm with Mousethief.
Nietzsche was quite explicitly opposed to any support given by the strong to the weak, as it inhibited their ability to flourish into their own greatness. He would deride even the desire to do good for the worse-off as a vestige of the Judeo-Christian slave morality.
The Nietzschean worldview is this: ninety-five percent of the people in the world are sheep, not real human beings. They exist to be used by the other five percent for the flourishing of the great and strong. Nietzsche's goal is not to liberate the ninety-five percent, but to wake up the five percent to their greatness and potential. The strong are seen as predators, and the weak their prey; it is actually, according to Nietzsche, as cruel to prevent the strong from taking advantage of the weak as it would be to prevent the lion from eating the lamb.
There is literally no moral system further from Christianity than what Nietzsche is discussing. That shouldn't be surprising, since it's contained entirely within a vicious criticism of Christianity.
I understand that Friedrich himself was vehemently opposed to anti-Semitism, and his sister Anna would literally wheel him out in a wheelchair while he was catatonically schizophrenic to somehow lend his magical aura to her anti-Semitic speeches. But the only thing separating Nietzsche's proposed transvaluation of good and evil from Nazi Germany is that the former is intended to rely on individual personal attributes, and the latter allowed a group who may have been individually and physically weak to massively amplify their power through technology and bureaucracy. Oh, what a difference a half-century makes.
Posted by anteater (# 11435) on
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Croesus
Sorry but I'm not clear what your getting at here. I see no more point than you do in Christianity, or anything else, just as an abstract idea.
What I'm getting at is that Christianity teaches, whether you believe it or not, that support for the vulnerable is an unqualified good. Nietzsche sees it as an unqualified bad.
Do you see no danger that the erosion of Christianity could lead to an erosion of compassion for the weak? Who. Else will champion them, and on what basis?
Posted by Enoch (# 14322) on
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The Nietzchean vision of the good life is so unpleasant, that it would make one wish Christianity were true even if one didn't already know that it is.
Posted by Mark Betts (# 17074) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Bostonman:
I'm with Mousethief.
Nietzsche was quite explicitly opposed to any support given by the strong to the weak, as it inhibited their ability to flourish into their own greatness. He would deride even the desire to do good for the worse-off as a vestige of the Judeo-Christian slave morality.
The Nietzschean worldview is this: ninety-five percent of the people in the world are sheep, not real human beings. They exist to be used by the other five percent for the flourishing of the great and strong. Nietzsche's goal is not to liberate the ninety-five percent, but to wake up the five percent to their greatness and potential. The strong are seen as predators, and the weak their prey; it is actually, according to Nietzsche, as cruel to prevent the strong from taking advantage of the weak as it would be to prevent the lion from eating the lamb.
There is literally no moral system further from Christianity than what Nietzsche is discussing. That shouldn't be surprising, since it's contained entirely within a vicious criticism of Christianity.
Good heavens! Seriously, this all sounds just like how British politicians talk about our education system.
Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Enoch:
The Nietzchean vision of the good life is so unpleasant, that it would make one wish Christianity were true even if one didn't already know that it is.
This dilemma probably tormented Thomas Carlyle as a precurser of Nietzsche, and partly explained his popularity as a writer in a generation whose readers already had a sense of the same disquiet. Likewise with Thomas Hardy when he wrote his poem God's Funeral. Unable any longer to believe in God, or at least Christ, they could not find a benign substitute. According to A.N. Wilson, Carlyle realized how easily the God-shaped hole in a human mind could be filled by the Uebermensch. This insight horrified him, but it must also have fascinated him: Goebbels chose Carlyle's biography of Frederick the Great to read aloud to his Fuehrer in the bunker.
I thank Christianity, in part, for our fairly democratic forms of government. But what becomes of the arts (for instance) in a democracy? Our race to the bottom in popular music is all-too-well explained by Robert Pattison as inevitable given democracy, pantheism, and romanticism. Even C.S. Lewis warned in "Screwtape proposes a toast" that democracy and equality under the law will inevitably tempt someone who is clearly inferior, and knows it, to whine "I'm as good as you," thus tending to undermine all standards of excellence, and ultimately the viability of the society.
I doubt that the essence of the Christian ethic is as simple as Anteater portrays it-- but if it is, then it needs a dose of Nietzsche for its own long-term good.
Posted by HughWillRidmee (# 15614) on
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quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
Do you see no danger that the erosion of Christianity could lead to an erosion of compassion for the weak? Who. Else will champion them, and on what basis?
Human beings – that’s who .
Over a million years ago a female Homo erectus died of vitamin A poisoning in Africa – a cast of her fossilised bones can be seen in the Hall of Human Origins at the Natural History Museum in Washington, DC. It’s likely that she took weeks or months to die, in incapacitating pain. Somehow she obtained food and water and was protected from carnivores during her terminal illness. The fairies or her relatives? (Alan Walker and Pat Shipman’s The Wisdom of the Bones: In Search of Human Origins New York: Knopf, 1996
Or do Homo erectus somehow qualify as Christians?
On what basis?
We have evolved what is known as the attachment system – we put kin first of course but we have the ability to react to others’ pains and pleasures. Mirror neurons may be part of the reason why we (some more than others) are inherently moved by the plight of our fellows – hence much of Christianity's tendency to concentrate on images and descriptions of torture (Crown of thorns, scourging, crucifixion etc. just as charities' marketing people have solid proof of the efficacy of using pictures of starving/injured children). (Superstitious people/ control freaks, as they so often do, ingest our evolutionary developments and divert them to produce a by-product known as religion. The most powerful attachments being Father {priest etc.}, Mother {abbess etc.}, Sister {nun}, Brother {monk} all inducing attachment based and kinship reinforced models of instinctive association and the acceptance of unquestionable authority. Watch some Christians praying/speaking-in-tongues – it’s the same pleading bodily action they undertook when two years old and wanted Daddy to pick them up and give them a cuddle.)
Do I see no danger that the erosion of Christianity could lead to an erosion of compassion for the weak?
No I don't - the old canard of no morality without Christianity is both ridiculous because the evidence is overwhelmingly contrary and self-defeating through simple observation of the behaviour of many Christians. Christians seem to be, on average, neither better nor worse than non-Christians. It’s like claiming that abuse is no worse inside a church hierarchy than anywhere else – it probably isn’t, and both non-religious and religious organisations have compounded their wickedness by striving to hide the evidence of wrongdoing that might harm the brand – but the point is that if a church is the route through which morality reaches the hoi-polloi some of it ought to stick en-route thereby producing lower rates of wickedness. As my old mother used to say – “You can’t have your cake and eat it”.
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
I can understand why a Christian would prefer to limit discussion to Chrisitianity-as-an-abstract-ideal without any reference to Christianity-as-it-exists (largely for the same reasons a Communist would prefer to discuss Communism-as-an-abstract-ideal instead of Communism-as-it-exists), but why do you consider it reasonable to expect that non-Christians likewise limit themselves?
It works like this.
Christian: We should take care of the weak.
Christian's deeds: doesn't take care of the weak.
Decent person's response: Grrrr.
Nietzschean: We should trample the weak.
Nietzschean's deeds: doesn't trample the weak.
Decent person's response: Hooray!
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
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I really like one of Nietzshe's one-liners; think of it quite often when I'm Hosting and posting here.
quote:
One often contradicts an opinion when what is uncongenial is really the tone in which it was conveyed.
A real pity he didn't apply that good thought to the often "uncongenial" expressions of his thoughts in his writing. Often he comes across as thoroughly nasty.
He had a sad life. But he didn't like pity. Here's one of his thoughts on that.
quote:
Christianity is called the religion of pity. Pity stands opposed to the tonic emotions which heighten our vitality: it has a depressing effect. We are deprived of strength when we feel pity. That loss of strength which suffering as such inflicts on life is still further increased and multiplied by pity. Pity makes suffering contagious.
A complex, often haunted man, whose writings seem to me to be full of hyperbole and contradiction. I think he wrestled a lot with his internal inconsistencies and in the end they got the better of him.
[ 03. April 2013, 06:44: Message edited by: Barnabas62 ]
Posted by anteater (# 11435) on
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quote:
No I don't - the old canard of no morality without Christianity is both ridiculous because the evidence is overwhelmingly contrary and self-defeating through simple observation of the behaviour of many Christians.
I don't think this argument works.
An analogy would be that the link between smoking and lung cancer is in doubt because people still smoke. When, as they often did, individuals and nations committed immoral acts, despite a claim to be christian, at no time could they justify those acts based on the christian belief.
Of course morality can exist without christianity, as it plainly did before. That is not the issue. The question is: What sort of morality?
Those who advocate eugenic programs are by no necessity nasty people. They simply have a different view of what is the best for the optimal happiness of the human race, and in their view, elimination of weaker strains is a positive move.
And apart from a view of humanity that goes beyond the purely physical, I cannot see any argument that could resist this idea. Maybe you can.
Has nobody noticed that with the decline of religion in the West, which really got going in the 17th century, the number of people slaughtered in wars and repressive regimes has got bigger and bigger.
And I know that correlation doesn't prove causation. But I suppose I'm just a tad irritated at the old idea that religion is a cause of war, which fits badly onto any analysis of patterns of warfare following the decline of religion in the west.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
Has nobody noticed that with the decline of religion in the West, which really got going in the 17th century, the number of people slaughtered in wars and repressive regimes has got bigger and bigger.
To be fair, the number of people slaughtered by repressive regimes correlates with the state's administrative ability. Had St Louis IX of France wanted to repress his subjects, the organisation of his state wouldn't really have been up to it.
Having said that, the evidence would also be that in Europe the kingdoms that successfully moved towards the modern absolute state strongly tended towards deism rather than Christianity. Revolutionary France is the most obvious example; Frederick the Great's Prussia is another.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by HughWillRidmee:
No I don't - the old canard of no morality without Christianity is both ridiculous because the evidence is overwhelmingly contrary and self-defeating through simple observation of the behaviour of many Christians.
Contrary to the observed behaviour of many atheists, the magic words 'old canard' do not suffice to turn a straw man defence into a cogent response.
That morality is an evolved response is neither here nor there. All human behaviour evolved. What justifies calling religion a by-product? Nothing. For that matter, if superstitious people and control freaks divert evolved morality, where do they come from? They evolved too. So if it's rational for atheists to treat non-kin morally on the grounds you give, it's equally rational for atheists to be superstitious control-freaks.
(A further problem: the above all supposes that the only pertinent question is, 'should I be moral?' Rather than, 'supposing I want to be moral, what is the moral thing to do?' The above Just So Story about mirror neurons is no help in answering that question whatsoever.)
[ 03. April 2013, 11:02: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
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quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
Of course morality can exist without christianity, as it plainly did before. That is not the issue. The question is: What sort of morality?
Given that the laws of hospitality, the Golden Rule, and a positive opinion of charity seem to be some of the most widespread and common beliefs in human culture, including non-Christian and pre-Christian societies, the notion that these things are peculiarly unique to Christianity doesn't withstand scrutiny. In other words, your concern that Christianity alone is concerned with the treatment of the weak is just plain wrong. A lot of people seem to have been able to work out a similar system independently, and on a variety of different bases.
quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
Has nobody noticed that with the decline of religion in the West, which really got going in the 17th century, the number of people slaughtered in wars and repressive regimes has got bigger and bigger.
Have you noticed that "the number of people slaughtered in wars and repressive regimes" has gotten bigger as world population has gotten bigger? (Total world population at the dawn of the 17th century is estimated at about 550 million, roughly the same as the present population of the EU's 27 member nations.) It's been argued that on a per capita basis, the twentieth century was actually the least violent on record, despite containing the Holocaust and two world wars.
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
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quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
quote:
No I don't - the old canard of no morality without Christianity is both ridiculous because the evidence is overwhelmingly contrary and self-defeating through simple observation of the behaviour of many Christians.
I don't think this argument works.
It's a logical fallacy. Citing the existence of immoral Christians in this context is a species of denying the antecedent, which is not a valid argument.
(Note: this doesn't mean I think there cannot be morality without Christianity, so anyone thinking of attacking me on that point can can it.)
Posted by anteater (# 11435) on
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Croesus:
quote:
A lot of people seem to have been able to work out a similar system independently, and on a variety of different bases.
Well I certainly do not think that is true of classical antiquity, but the discussion is a long one. The main point of my post is to ask whether you believe that compassion for the weak follows from the nature of reality, so that a view like Nietzsche's could be shown to be against reality and provably detrimental. Or does his view of life have equal right to be believed since neither can be shown to be based on anything remotely provable?
As to your point about population, this is interesting and I may do some digging. But my initial trawl of sites purporting to list deaths by state violence gives:
C20: ~200 m dead. Average population 4.25 bn
C19: ~1.5 m dead. Average population 1.32 bn
Do you have any better figures? I agree mine are very preiminary. But I see little sign that the demise of religion has led to peace for all.
Posted by Hawk (# 14289) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
Has nobody noticed that with the decline of religion in the West, which really got going in the 17th century, the number of people slaughtered in wars and repressive regimes has got bigger and bigger.
Have you noticed that "the number of people slaughtered in wars and repressive regimes" has gotten bigger as world population has gotten bigger? (Total world population at the dawn of the 17th century is estimated at about 550 million, roughly the same as the present population of the EU's 27 member nations.) It's been argued that on a per capita basis, the twentieth century was actually the least violent on record, despite containing the Holocaust and two world wars.
I doubt it can be claimed as least violent. If you look at this page which calculates deaths as a percentage of world population, you can see it was pretty violent. If you take a rough sum of all the deaths by war, genocide and induced famine in the C20 it's about 13% of the world died. The only century that beats it is the C14 which contained the Mongol invasions of Asia and Europe, the violent transition to the Ming dynasty in China, and Tamerlaine's conquests. All together this was probably around 17% as a rough guess. The C18 had around 11% and C17 had about 7.5%.
Obviously these numbers are hardly complete or precise, but they give a rough estimate. No matter the precise figures, the twentieth century was certainly one of the most violent centuries.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
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quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
Croesus:
quote:
A lot of people seem to have been able to work out a similar system independently, and on a variety of different bases.
Well I certainly do not think that is true of classical antiquity, but the discussion is a long one.
The mere existence of something like the laws of hospitality argue that classical antiquity was fairly concerned with protecting the weak an vulnerable. I'd even go so far as to argue that the portrayal of Thrasymachos in Plato's Republic is kind of a proto-Nietzche. Most of the book is devoted to picking apart the argument of Thrasymachos and explaining in excruciating detail why he's wrong.
quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
As to your point about population, this is interesting and I may do some digging. But my initial trawl of sites purporting to list deaths by state violence gives:
C20: ~200 m dead. Average population 4.25 bn
C19: ~1.5 m dead. Average population 1.32 bn
Do you have any better figures? I agree mine are very preiminary. But I see little sign that the demise of religion has led to peace for all.
I've got no comprehensive figures presently at hand, but the figure for the nineteenth century seems drastically understated. Just the military deaths from the Napoleonic Wars total about 2.5 million (estimates vary), and that was just at the start of the 19th century.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Hawk:
I doubt it can be claimed as least violent. If you look at this page which calculates deaths as a percentage of world population, you can see it was pretty violent. If you take a rough sum of all the deaths by war, genocide and induced famine in the C20 it's about 13% of the world died. The only century that beats it is the C14 which contained the Mongol invasions of Asia and Europe, the violent transition to the Ming dynasty in China, and Tamerlaine's conquests. All together this was probably around 17% as a rough guess. The C18 had around 11% and C17 had about 7.5%.
Obviously these numbers are hardly complete or precise, but they give a rough estimate. No matter the precise figures, the twentieth century was certainly one of the most violent centuries.
Part of the problem with this methodology is that it is, in part, based on classification. For instance, if the broad conflict we refer to as "the Napoleonic Wars" (to continue from the previous example) were split into individual conflicts (The War of the Third Coalition, the Invasion of Russia, the Hundred Days, etc.) a lot of them would drop off the linked list altogether. In other words, it's not at all clear that a few really big wars necessarily kill more people than a larger number of small, poorly documented wars.
In other words, it's similar to the leap of logic that goes from "more Americans live in New York than any other city" to "the majority of Americans live in New York City".
[ 03. April 2013, 17:45: Message edited by: Crœsos ]
Posted by Lawrence (# 4913) on
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quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
Croesus:
quote:
A lot of people seem to have been able to work out a similar system independently, and on a variety of different bases.
Well I certainly do not think that is true of classical antiquity, but the discussion is a long one...
Does not Christianity come from classical antiquity?
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
As to your point about population, this is interesting and I may do some digging. But my initial trawl of sites purporting to list deaths by state violence gives:
C20: ~200 m dead. Average population 4.25 bn
C19: ~1.5 m dead. Average population 1.32 bn
This is the first list I found on wikipedia. If you proportion it to world population, the Mongols come out far ahead of anything else. But they're not really relevant to a discussion of Christianity, unless you're going to blame them on Genghis Khan's mummy issues. Most of the rest of the top ten are in China. China was until recently not noted for its Christian piety; though Christianity was a major factor in the Taiping Rebellion. If we confine ourselves to Europe, I think the question of whether the 20th Century was proportionally more violent depends on whether you take low or high estimates for the numbers killed in the Thirty Years War and the total population of Europe at the time.
Of course, the wikipedia list I'm using only cites definable wars. Continual skirmishes between non-state or small-state actors don't come into it.
Reviews of Steven Pinker's book arguing Croesos' case (that proportionally violence is declining over time) suggest that its reliability on any given subject is in inverse proportion to the reviewer's knowledge of that subject.
[ 03. April 2013, 18:34: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
The mere existence of something like the laws of hospitality argue that classical antiquity was fairly concerned with protecting the weak an vulnerable.
As I understand it, the laws of hospitality care for the weak and vulnerable in the same sense that diplomatic immunity does. They're largely aimed at guests of the same social class.
quote:
I'd even go so far as to argue that the portrayal of Thrasymachos in Plato's Republic is kind of a proto-Nietzche. Most of the book is devoted to picking apart the argument of Thrasymachos and explaining in excruciating detail why he's wrong.
Three points to make: it's arguable that Thrasymachos is in the Republic because Plato considers him representative of the considerations guiding Athenian foreign policy. He was known at the time as a teacher of rhetoric. Plato and Socrates were not representative of Athenian society. Secondly, Plato's virtues in the Republic notably do not include care for the weak and vulnerable. He doesn't even consider that as part of morality. Thirdly, Plato's counterargument depends heavily on the existence of non-naturalistic entities. He's not really a good ally if you want to argue that morality can have a naturalistic basis.
Posted by Drewthealexander (# 16660) on
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On the question of statistics, we might also consider violent deaths in states influenced by philosophies other than Christianity. Taking state sponsored atheism, for example there were 66 million under Lenin, Stalin and Kruschev between 32 and 61 million killed by Chinese regime since 1949, and 1/3 of the 8 million Khmers - 2.7 million were killed between 1975 and 1975 by the Khmer Rouge (Guinness book of world records 1992).
Whilst no state can claim anything like a perfect record when it comes to human rights, I don't see how it could be argued that there is no difference between modern cultures heavily influenced by Christianity, and those heavily influenced by other philosophies.
[ 03. April 2013, 18:55: Message edited by: Drewthealexander ]
Posted by anteater (# 11435) on
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Attempting to get the thread back on track . . .
Of course, I cannot force anyone to answer my question, but it'd be sort of nice if they did, even if with a "dunno".
So my thesis is that if christianity is true, then it means the God, who has made public the fact that he is on the side of the dispossessed will triumph. Which means any actions designed to oppress and enslave the weak will be be met with His judgement.
Now that may not be enough to stop people doing that, even those who would claim to believe. But it does make their actions irrational.
Is there anything deriveable from a totally materialistic view of reality that makes such actions irrational? The fact that some simply prefer to act so is irrelevant, because many others do not, and the question is whether there is any compelling reason why they should?
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
Whilst no state can claim anything like a perfect record when it comes to human rights, I don't see how it could be argued that there is no difference between modern cultures heavily influenced by Christianity, and those heavily influenced by other philosophies.
Those aren't exclusive. Marxism is heavily influenced by Christianity, just as liberal humanism is.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
On the question of statistics, we might also consider violent deaths in states influenced by philosophies other than Christianity. Taking state sponsored atheism, for example there were 66 million under Lenin, Stalin and Kruschev between 32 and 61 million killed by Chinese regime since 1949, and 1/3 of the 8 million Khmers - 2.7 million were killed between 1975 and 1975 by the Khmer Rouge (Guinness book of world records 1992).
One of the most common dishonesties associated with Communist death statistics, particularly in regard to the PRC, is that they often include deaths better attributed to incompetence or failed policies in addition to deaths from purges or revolts. For instance, the Great Leap Forward was an honest attempt at industrialization and the widespread famine that followed its collapse was a truly unintended consequence. (Unlike Stalin's artificial famines.) It makes as much sense to count this as "deliberate killing" as it does to blame Christian missionaries for "murdering" Native Americans by spreading smallpox and swine flu.
quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
Whilst no state can claim anything like a perfect record when it comes to human rights, I don't see how it could be argued that there is no difference between modern cultures heavily influenced by Christianity, and those heavily influenced by other philosophies.
Christianity has a two millennium history. Why restrict analysis of it to modern times? That seems a bit like cherry picking.
quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
So my thesis is that if christianity is true, then it means the God, who has made public the fact that he is on the side of the dispossessed will triumph. Which means any actions designed to oppress and enslave the weak will be be met with His judgement.
This seems like "argument by wishful thinking". In short, you seem to be arguing that it would be good if someone dispensed justice to oppressors, therefore the Christian God (or similar entity) must exist. Preferring something be true is not evidence that it is true.
Posted by Drewthealexander (# 16660) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
Whilst no state can claim anything like a perfect record when it comes to human rights, I don't see how it could be argued that there is no difference between modern cultures heavily influenced by Christianity, and those heavily influenced by other philosophies.
Those aren't exclusive. Marxism is heavily influenced by Christianity, just as liberal humanism is.
But not, I think we would agree, in the way the Stalinist and post-Stalinist Communists regarded human life.
Anteater asked
Is there anything deriveable from a totally materialistic view of reality that makes such actions irrational? The fact that some simply prefer to act so is irrelevant, because many others do not, and the question is whether there is any compelling reason why they should?
From a purely materialistic viewpoint I would say that Neitzche had a good argument. If weakness is detrimental to wider human flourishing, then expending limited resources on the weak would seem to be counter-productive.
Happily most of humanity does not live its whole existence in the material realm.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Those aren't exclusive. Marxism is heavily influenced by Christianity, just as liberal humanism is.
But not, I think we would agree, in the way the Stalinist and post-Stalinist Communists regarded human life.
We're back to that abstract ideal vs. as-exists distinction I mentioned earlier, aren't we?
quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
Is there anything deriveable from a totally materialistic view of reality that makes such actions irrational?
John Harsanyi veil of ignorance seems like a fairly decent jumping off point that doesn't rely on supernatural revelation.
Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
The mere existence of something like the laws of hospitality argue that classical antiquity was fairly concerned with protecting the weak an vulnerable.
When traveling in a sparsely populated desert, everyone is weak and vulnerable. I'd guess that the laws of hospitality arose particularly out of those conditions.
Posted by mdijon (# 8520) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
For instance, the Great Leap Forward was an honest attempt at industrialization and the widespread famine that followed its collapse was a truly unintended consequence.
This was run by a brutally repressive regime with a dictatorial madman at the helm, which imprisoned and executed any dissenters, either repressed, exterminated or ignored the engineers and skilled members of society that could have potentially made the attempt a success, and ran something akin to concentration camps in the villages to force the process along.
Calling it an "honest attempt at industrialization" is a bit of a gloss.
Posted by Squibs (# 14408) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
Given that the laws of hospitality, the Golden Rule, and a positive opinion of charity seem to be some of the most widespread and common beliefs in human culture, including non-Christian and pre-Christian societies, the notion that these things are peculiarly unique to Christianity doesn't withstand scrutiny. In other words, your concern that Christianity alone is concerned with the treatment of the weak is just plain wrong. A lot of people seem to have been able to work out a similar system independently, and on a variety of different bases.
I may have missed it. Can you point out where it was claimed that non-Christians can not be moral? What exactly is the connection between your post and the post you are responding to?
quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
Have you noticed that "the number of people slaughtered in wars and repressive regimes" has gotten bigger as world population has gotten bigger? (Total world population at the dawn of the 17th century is estimated at about 550 million, roughly the same as the present population of the EU's 27 member nations.) It's been argued that on a per capita basis, the twentieth century was actually the least violent on record, despite containing the Holocaust and two world wars.
It's a triumph then! A boon for humanity. No doubt they will be smuggling
The Better Angels of Our Nature across Syrian borders any day now.
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mdijon:
This was run by a brutally repressive regime with a dictatorial madman at the helm, which imprisoned and executed any dissenters, either repressed, exterminated or ignored the engineers and skilled members of society that could have potentially made the attempt a success, and ran something akin to concentration camps in the villages to force the process along.
Calling it an "honest attempt at industrialization" is a bit of a gloss.
No, the "gloss" is trying to conflate victims of unintentional famine with victims of deliberate murder by a standard that wouldn't be applied to Chiang Kai-shek or Lord John Russell because you're worried people will think Mao Zedong is okay if they find out he deliberately killed "only" twelve million* people.
quote:
Originally posted by Squibs:
I may have missed it. Can you point out where it was claimed that non-Christians can not be moral? What exactly is the connection between your post and the post you are responding to?
Always glad to oblige. The point wasn't that non-Christians couldn't be moral, but rather than non-Christians would never be interested in helping "the weak", however defined. It seemed to genuinely perplex our thread opener:
quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
What I'm getting at is that Christianity teaches, whether you believe it or not, that support for the vulnerable is an unqualified good. Nietzsche sees it as an unqualified bad.
Do you see no danger that the erosion of Christianity could lead to an erosion of compassion for the weak? Who. Else will champion them, and on what basis?
The underlying premise here is that absent Christianity, no one would feel compassion for "the vulnerable".
And could you please not attribute my posts to anteater. Thanks.
--------------------
*Not an actual body count, just a rhetorical "for instance".
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
John Harsanyi veil of ignorance seems like a fairly decent jumping off point that doesn't rely on supernatural revelation.
Shall we go through some of the standard undergraduate criticisms?
1) The results depend largely on unmotivated stipulations about risk-aversion. Rawls requires that people are very risk averse: he needs this to be true to get his maximin policy. (Choose that society in which the worst-off person is least worst-off.) But game theory would normally go for mean expected payout, in which case you'd end up with a utilitarian ethic. In economic terms, that translates to maximise the wealth of a society without regard to the distribution.
The results also depend on unmotivated stipulations about inequality-aversion. That is, Rawls thinks people behind the veil of ignorance will not care at all about inequality. Therefore, they'll choose a distribution with wealth-creators rather than a communist distribution.
2) Rawls' approach shares the basic weakness of all utility/welfarist approaches to justice, which is that there's no measure of happiness/welfare/utility other than the monetary distribution. (I didn't know the veil of ignorance was first proposed by an economist. I am not surprised.) And so by treating money as merely a measure of happiness, it supposes that wealthy people are merely happier than other people, and not also more powerful.
3) It's not a value-neutral jumping off point. It presupposes the liberal humanism that it's trying for. (Rawls conceded this in his follow-up book.) More seriously, he's effectively endorsing the viewpoint that the good life is that of homo economicus: one of maximal satisfaction of consumer desires.
4) Let's suppose that it can be made into a genuine jumping off point. Why jump off from there, rather than from some other philosopher's proposed jumping off point that supports a different position?
5) The veil of ignorance is in any way not coherent. The idea of people who don't know who they are, and don't know what they believe, or what the good life is, or even whether they will be altruistic or selfish, but are nevertheless able to deliberate about what prerequisites they would like for the good life is incoherent. One can't genuinely imagine how such people would reason.
See Skidelsky and Skidelsky's book, How Much is Enough? for further argument to the effect that neutrality about the good life, whether in the veil of ignorance version or any other, merely endorses neo-liberal economics. And that is such a success at the moment.
If you leave out Rawls' stipulations about risk-aversion, you're basically getting teh morality of right-wing neo-liberal economics. If you add the stipulation of risk-aversion, you get the Clinton/New Labour economic project: the hope that if government messes about the edges you can pull an egalitarian rabbit out of a neo-liberal hat. That turned out well for the left.
Posted by Bullfrog. (# 11014) on
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IIRC, Bonhoeffer seemed to like Nietzsche, or at least quoted him favorably. He wasn't so kind of Kant.
Posted by HughWillRidmee (# 15614) on
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quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
An analogy would be that the link between smoking and lung cancer is in doubt because people still smoke.
I disagree - I suspect that people who believe that smoking leads to lung cancer are less likely to smoke than those who do not (though some will ignore the knowledge). Belief in christian teaching seems not to show a similar reduction.
quote:
When, as they often did, individuals and nations committed immoral acts, despite a claim to be christian, at no time could they justify those acts based on the christian belief.
What do you mean by “the christian belief” – one of the problems of talking with christian believers is that they all seem to have their own version of “the christian belief” – and sometimes believe that their superior belief justifies killing another person who claims to be a christian. (Cathars for example?)
quote:
Of course morality can exist without christianity, as it plainly did before. That is not the issue. The question is: What sort of morality?
Back to defining morality. Many would choose to include altruism, others would say doing what is right despite contrary pressure. Some even think it something that justifies mass murder (relevant bit starts at 8:40). "If you can justify this as good is there anything left to call evil"
I'm sure you are as revolted by this as I - but many who claim to be Christian look to such men as embodying "the Christian belief".
quote:
Those who advocate eugenic programs are by no necessity nasty people. They simply have a different view of what is the best for the optimal happiness of the human race, and in their view, elimination of weaker strains is a positive move.
And apart from a view of humanity that goes beyond the purely physical, I cannot see any argument that could resist this idea. Maybe you can.
a) Do you consider compassion to be physical?
b) Who are you going to allow to choose what is the best for the optimal happiness of the human race - an atheist perhaps?
FWIW I don’t think that religion is a cause of war – though I suspect it provides an excuse which may make starting and continuing wars easier. Having said that – the creation of the modern state of Israel was based on (historically inaccurate) religious belief and a lot of war (over territory) has predictably flowed from that.
Posted by mdijon (# 8520) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
unintentional famine
I don't think that what is described regarding the concentration-camp-like conditions under the great leap forward and the wanton destruction of society can be described as unintentional famine.
Posted by Hawk (# 14289) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
On the question of statistics, we might also consider violent deaths in states influenced by philosophies other than Christianity. Taking state sponsored atheism, for example there were 66 million under Lenin, Stalin and Kruschev between 32 and 61 million killed by Chinese regime since 1949, and 1/3 of the 8 million Khmers - 2.7 million were killed between 1975 and 1975 by the Khmer Rouge (Guinness book of world records 1992).
One of the most common dishonesties associated with Communist death statistics, particularly in regard to the PRC, is that they often include deaths better attributed to incompetence or failed policies in addition to deaths from purges or revolts. For instance, the Great Leap Forward was an honest attempt at industrialization and the widespread famine that followed its collapse was a truly unintended consequence. (Unlike Stalin's artificial famines.)
This used to be assumed by historians. Based on recent evidence coming to light, and particularly the outstanding work by the historians Jung Chang and Jon Halliday (I'd highly recommend their book Mao: The Untold Story), it's being revised. I believe it's now widely accepted that Mao both expected and planned for mass deaths as a result of his policies, yet continued with them anyway. He recieved many reports of the mass deaths yet pushed ahead with his policies, considering that the deaths were a price he was willing to pay. In fact, he expected even more deaths than occured.
The Communist party has afterwards tried to hide their complicity by blaming the weather, or pretending it was due to failed policies. But in fact it was caused and maintained in full knowledge of the resulting slaughter. Mao's instructions were key, such as one that took one third of the grain produced to give to foreign clients (often as a 'revolutionary gift' to other communist regimes to improve his personal international prestige, rather than as part of a trade deal). Those who were classed as enemies of the regime had the worst effects of the famine specifically targeted against them. The group that fared worst were the Tibetans, with one in five dying.
Should the Great Leap Forward be included among Mao's murder tally? He may not have committed democide for it's own sake, but knowing mass deaths will occur as a result of your policies and doing them anyway? I would argue it would be a crime to exclude them. It was one of the worst atrocities of his regime and should not be hidden or argued away as just another famine.
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
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I've got a lot of sympathy with the "veil of ignorance" argument, Hawk, which Croesos cited in one direction and you are I think trying to dispel in another.
There is a "veil of ignorance" over the extent to which values traditionally associated with the Christian community are exclusive. Personally, I think our distinctive is grace, which is much more about application of values and beliefs (shared or not) and what you do when they are different. But it's potty to claim exclusivity for a whole load of Christian values which are not at all exclusive. There's a value in lifting the veil on that.
There is also a "veil of ignorance" about Nietzche, which to some extent he is responsible for by his uncongenial, often shocking, observations and also his inconsistencies. TBH, it's certainly affected me for a lot of my life, but I've been influenced by some of the information brought to life by previous discussions on the Ship. I think I'd swallowed relatively uncritically the cultural notions (certainly not just Christian notions) that the thought worlds of Nietzsche (and Wagner) had had a baleful influence on the German psyche in general and some key National Socialists in particular. But I now think there's a lot more to the story than any kind of simplistic connection.
At any rate, I'm not sure there is much educational value (or any other value) in seeing Nietsche as a kind of "negative advertisement" in favour of Christianity. That seems likely to support veils of ignorance both about Nietzsche and about Christianity (both within and without).
There is a kind of general value to be drawn from this example which is "don't rush to judgement". That is a Christian value (Sermon on the Mount) but by no means an exclusively Christian value.
[ 04. April 2013, 11:36: Message edited by: Barnabas62 ]
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by mdijon:
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
unintentional famine
I don't think that what is described regarding the concentration-camp-like conditions under the great leap forward and the wanton destruction of society can be described as unintentional famine.
It's the same question as whether killing civilians when you bomb infrastructure is morally equivalent to killing civilians by bombing them directly. Stalin and Mao were either wilfully ignorant or completely careless about deaths caused, but mass starvation was probably not the intention of their policies. The intention of both was probably to secure food supply to the cities. (People in the countryside who are short of food lie down and die; people in the cities start rioting and overthrowing the government.) For that matter, Winston Churchill's policies in India in the Second World War equally resulted in famine. Neither is quite the same as Hitler, who was pursuing policies with the intention of killing Jews.
Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on
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I reckon I'd be a lot more likely to agree with Nietzsche if I could be sure I was in the 5%...
Posted by mdijon (# 8520) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Stalin and Mao were either wilfully ignorant or completely careless about deaths caused, but mass starvation was probably not the intention of their policies.
I don't read it like that. Mao wasn't just wilfully ignorant, he ordered a policy of brutal repression of anyone who tried to point out there was a problem with his policies. He either killed, imprisoned or forced into hiding the engineers who might have told him how to make iron that was useful as opposed to the useless lumps that he oversaw the production of. He did the same to those who might have been able to irrigate the fields for him.
He presided over a policy of torture and execution to keep the population on the mad course he had set out.
To say his primary aim was to feed the cities and it was a mistake seems to blur the lines between genuine error and moral failing.
I think there is an argument that Stalin really did want to starve the Ukraine in order to suppress nationalism. Even if that wasn't the motivation, similar moral failings as Mao's can be ascribed to him.
The bombing civilian parallel is perhaps a good one. At the extremes one might take every care to avoid "collateral damage" but nevertheless encounter it - or deliberately bomb civilians as a primary aim. But there are some positions in between.
One might bomb roughly in the area of troop movements, knowing that quite a lot of civilians will be caught. Or one might believe for no good reason that troops are in a particular area and bomb it intensively, describing the schools and hospitals as unfortunate unintended collateral damage.
To say that these cases were simply unintended consequences of war would be an economy of truth.
Posted by George Spigot (# 253) on
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My experience is with Christians who seem to want me to take a degree in philosophy.
Posted by anteater (# 11435) on
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Croesus:
quote:
The underlying premise here is that absent Christianity, no one would feel compassion for "the vulnerable".
No it's not, at least not in my book. It is a plain fact that non-religious people feel compassion, and I would never deny that. So can we put that canard to rest?
What I say is that absent some believable context (e.g. christianity) which make compassion for the weak a central and ultimately victorious cause, it is not irrational to withold it, and it my well be irrational to campaign for it.
Look at it this way. Dawkins said in an interview that nature provides him no raw material for building a case for compassion, but that doesn't stop him adopting it. Fine.
And so long as he doesn't seek to impose his non evidence-based beliefs on others, he is doing nothing inconsistent with his basic position.
But if he were to strongly advocate his non evidence based views as Right (TM) and strive to ensure that a Nietzschian view of reality does not gain the upper hand, then I wonder on what basis he does this?
Posted by mdijon (# 8520) on
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I don't understand how you draw the dichotomy, anteater.
If it is rational to be compassionate, then it is rational to ensure society runs on a compassionate basis.
It is not rational to value your right to be free of my compassionate values over the right of your intended victim to live in a compassionate world.
If we accept that atheists have a basis for compassion it follows that they have a basis for intervening to prevent harm resulting to the objects of their compassion.
Posted by Drewthealexander (# 16660) on
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quote:
Originally posted by mdijon:
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
unintentional famine
I don't think that what is described regarding the concentration-camp-like conditions under the great leap forward and the wanton destruction of society can be described as unintentional famine.
Well quite - remembering also that a number of countries have condemned Stalin's policies in Ukraine as crimes against humanity. For a popular introduction to the issue see here or Google Holdomor for more references.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by mdijon:
If we accept that atheists have a basis for compassion it follows that they have a basis for intervening to prevent harm resulting to the objects of their compassion.
You don't need (much of) a basis for your personal wishes. So if you want to spend your money on donkey sanctuaries, and seeing the happy donkeys in their sanctuaries makes you happy, then all the justification you need for that is that it makes you happy. If you want to convince somebody else to give to donkey sanctuaries, let alone get donkey sanctuaries funded out of public spending, then you need to offer other people reasons that they can accept.
Posted by mdijon (# 8520) on
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On the other hand if you find that enough people agree with your preference that donkeys are well treated you have a democratic mandate for a law protecting donkeys from ill-treatment and for some public funding for donkey sanctuaries.
You don't have to feel that because you can't argue from a priori first principles to your preference in favour of animal welfare that you can't enact any legislation.
The alternative is to argue that God is the right and proper basis for coercive legislation, irrespective of everyone else's views on him/her/it.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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It seems very odd to argue that compassion is rational, since it seems to be a feeling. Can feelings be rational? On the other hand, I would not describe it as irrational, as that is pejorative.
I'm not sure either that you have to get bogged down in arguments about what is right - you can argue for what you want. That is clearly not rational, but then it would be useful to bear Hume's dictum on one's banner - reason is the slave of the passions.
Of course, then it's possible, even likely, that non-compassion may also win support - see the British government!
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
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Compassion, NT language meaning, is literally a twisting of the guts, or gut-wrenching response to someone else's suffering. A lot more than a kind of intellectualised "I really must do something about that" ..
Here's the word. It characterises a very strong reaction.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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But even 'I really must do something about that' is not a rational position. But that's not a problem, is it? I don't see why political positions need to be based on reason, in fact, I would argue that many of them are not intended to be.
It depends on whether you think that someone saying that society should be ordered in such and such a way is genuinely making a rational position, or just being partial to one group or other, e.g. the rich or the poor.
But then economic arguments have the semblance of rationality. I suppose currently one such argument is that austerity tends not to promote economic growth. But even these arguments are ideological.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by mdijon:
On the other hand if you find that enough people agree with your preference that donkeys are well treated you have a democratic mandate for a law protecting donkeys from ill-treatment and for some public funding for donkey sanctuaries.
And if I find that enough people agree with me that red-headed people are disgusting and shouldn't be allowed to marry each other?
What's the difference between imposing on other people a personal preference, and imposing on other people a preference derived from religious belief? If the one is legitimate, then the other is. The problem with treating God as the right and proper basis of coercive legislation isn't that it's different from treating my personal preferences as the right and proper basis; it's that as far as non-believers are concerned it's the exact same thing.
Posted by mdijon (# 8520) on
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I think you are making the classic argument against democracy. And the classic response is that it isn't perfect, simply better than all the alternatives.
Posted by mark_in_manchester (# 15978) on
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Anteater, Dafyd, you make sense to me.
It's not that the materialist's (evident) morality is disallowed by his lack of a God; it's that his materialism is disallowed by his uncritical morality. I can see why that's offensive, but hey ho.
Posted by Drewthealexander (# 16660) on
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quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
It seems very odd to argue that compassion is rational, since it seems to be a feeling. Can feelings be rational? On the other hand, I would not describe it as irrational, as that is pejorative.
Well you could argue that compassion is rational inasmuch as the person displaying compassion today, could be the same person who needs to receive it next year. It's about creating a certain cultural norm which recognises the vissitudes of life.
Posted by anteater (# 11435) on
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mdijon:
quote:
I don't understand how you draw the dichotomy, anteater.
If it is rational to be compassionate, then it is rational to ensure society runs on a compassionate basis.
Well of course I agree with that. But there's a big "if" in there. How do you show it to be rational given a secular view of life? How do you demonstrate that Nietzsche's view is not just different to yours but wrong, in the sense of being wrongly aligned with reality as it is.
Of course, one could campaign for a view which you admit is simply a preference, with no grounding in science. If you have that much confidence in your view.
quote:
It is not rational to value your right to be free of my compassionate values over the right of your intended victim to live in a compassionate world.
Why not? What is it about the reality of the universe which makes this irrational? Who decides?
Of course, we are fortunate enough to live in a world where most governments set laws in this area. And I hope they continue to do so. But unless there is a sound philosophy at the back of it, this could change.
Posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard (# 368) on
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@Alogon - is there any excellence other than (in) love?
[ 06. April 2013, 09:45: Message edited by: Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard ]
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
It seems very odd to argue that compassion is rational, since it seems to be a feeling. Can feelings be rational? On the other hand, I would not describe it as irrational, as that is pejorative.
Well you could argue that compassion is rational inasmuch as the person displaying compassion today, could be the same person who needs to receive it next year. It's about creating a certain cultural norm which recognises the vissitudes of life.
I would call that a life strategy, as in game theory. But I don't think compassion can be summonsed up like that.
Posted by Squibs (# 14408) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
It seems very odd to argue that compassion is rational, since it seems to be a feeling. Can feelings be rational? On the other hand, I would not describe it as irrational, as that is pejorative.
Well you could argue that compassion is rational inasmuch as the person displaying compassion today, could be the same person who needs to receive it next year. It's about creating a certain cultural norm which recognises the vissitudes of life.
That sound more like practicality, not rationality. It might be practical for me to engage in some social convention like shaking hands but that doesn't make it a rational act, at least not to my mind.
Posted by Truman White (# 17290) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
It seems very odd to argue that compassion is rational, since it seems to be a feeling. Can feelings be rational? On the other hand, I would not describe it as irrational, as that is pejorative.
Well you could argue that compassion is rational inasmuch as the person displaying compassion today, could be the same person who needs to receive it next year. It's about creating a certain cultural norm which recognises the vissitudes of life.
Ay ay Mr Drewman. Problem with this idea is that compassion - "suffering with" implies a starting point of self-sacrifice and self-lessness. Kind of runs counter to the idea of having an attitude with utilitarian motivations.
Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Squibs:
That sound more like practicality, not rationality.
It's all about practicality.
Posted by Squibs (# 14408) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:
Originally posted by Squibs:
That sound more like practicality, not rationality.
It's all about practicality.
Can you expand on that please?
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on
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@Anteater
quote:
How do you show it to be rational given a secular view of life? How do you demonstrate that Nietzsche's view is not just different to yours but wrong, in the sense of being wrongly aligned with reality as it is.
But this just takes us back to the question discussed in the "You're False, I'm true" thread. If you fail to demonstrate that your particular brand of Christianity (as against, for eg Prosperity Theology) is correctly aligned to reality, the rationality or otherwise of a secular anti-Nietzschean view is moot.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
If you fail to demonstrate that your particular brand of Christianity (as against, for eg Prosperity Theology) is correctly aligned to reality, the rationality or otherwise of a secular anti-Nietzschean view is moot.
That's a blatant bit of special pleading, isn't it?
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on
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quote:
That's a blatant bit of special pleading, isn't it?
So someone with a "secular view of life" has to demonstrate how his anti-Nietzschean view is aligned to reality, whereas the Christian merely needs to refer to Jesus without having to bother about any such alignment? That's barking.
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
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Internal incoherence is a common enough test. Nietzche kind of fails that, by general consent on the part of those who have subjected his writings to serious analytical study.
Mind you, so do the purely intellectual expressions of Christianity. There's always some sacrifice of intellect involved at some stage.
I think it's a bowing to mystery myself, a recognition of the limits to human exploration and understanding of the Divine. We say we know sufficient but we know in part. YMMV. Anyone may belong to the group that believe, quite sincerely, that "If only for this life we have hope in Christ, we are of all people most to be pitied." Or maybe a group less kind than that.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:
That's a blatant bit of special pleading, isn't it?
So someone with a "secular view of life" has to demonstrate how his anti-Nietzschean view is aligned to reality, whereas the Christian merely needs to refer to Jesus without having to bother about any such alignment? That's barking.
That would be barking. Perhaps you could explain to me why, 'special pleading for Christians is ok,' follows from, 'special pleading for atheists is wrong'?
Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard:
@Alogon - is there any excellence other than (in) love?
You're not thinking that artistic excellence is loveless, are you?
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on
:
quote:
Perhaps you could explain to me why, 'special pleading for Christians is ok,' follows from, 'special pleading for atheists is wrong
Dunno - you pulled me up but didn't pull Anteater up on his own special pleading. I just assumed you were fine with his argument.
Anyway, I didn't word my post very well, as I probably haven't in the past when it has come up in objective morality discussions. It's simple enough - non theist asserts an opinion on morality and a certain type of theist decides it is all important that s/he demonstrate how this aligns to reality as it is. Said theist asserts Jesus's opinion about morality, but apparently doesn't have to demonstrate how their theistic belief aligns to reality other than some variant of the hymn, "Jesus loves me—this I know,
For the Bible tells me so."
Posted by anteater (# 11435) on
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Grokesx:
quote:
But this just takes us back to the question discussed in the "You're False, I'm true" thread. If you fail to demonstrate that your particular brand of Christianity (as against, for eg Prosperity Theology) is correctly aligned to reality, the rationality or otherwise of a secular anti-Nietzschean view is moot.
There are a few issues here.
1. Prosperity Gospel is a bit of a red herring, as it has never gained acceptance in mainstream christianity.
2. You're main point is, of course, well made. If I say that GIVEN Christianity compassion is rational whereas it is not GIVEN materialism, you can obviously say I am no more rational since I am relying on an unproven premise.
But it doesn't work like that with many people. For those of us who do find faith problematic, and feel that the arguments of secularism are quite strong, what will often decide it is which is more worth believing. To some this will always be an invalid idea, but if the evidence is finely balanced, which I believe it is, I think it is quite a reasonable consideration.
I imagine you don't think the evidence is at all finely balanced, in which case, fair enough.
3. It'd still be nice for you to have a try, or at least state whether your own view of life leads you to the conclusion that the weak and vulnerable should be a high priority and what basis, if any, you have for campaigning for this view.
Posted by mark_in_manchester (# 15978) on
:
quote:
...If I say that GIVEN Christianity compassion is rational whereas it is not GIVEN materialism, you can obviously say I am no more rational...
Something here seems backwards.
Christianity commands and defines (it's own kind of) compassion. Christianity might have elements which look sensible enough, but it is not, ultimately, rational. Therefore the apparently irrational nature of compassion is (internally) fine, and no more or less nutty than any other of our irrational beliefs.
Materialism condemns Christianity (and others) for its declared non-base in rationality. But now the apparently irrational nature of compassion is not fine, since it must either be ditched in the same trash as all the other irrational Gods, or admitted via an irrational bit of special pleading into a special category of retained wisdom which, lacking a rational basis, rather mocks the whole materialistic project...
Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
Nietzche is rather beloved of Christian apologists because he at least hated christianity for what christians believe to be true of their faith, as opposed to "The new atheists" who dismiss christianity for what christians believe to be a mixture of some truth, a lot of over simplication a fair amount of nonsense.
In short Nietzche is beloved of Christian apologists because he allows them to keep their theoretical abstractions and not have to pay attention to the real world and what actually happens whenever Christians get temporal power?
He is also beloved of Christian apologists because his philosophy is very distinctively Christian in origin. Christian apologists tend to say "Without God this would happen". Nietzche says "There is no God therefore what the Christian apologists said would happen will happen." Which puts him squarely in the Christian philosophical tradition in the same way that a Black Mass is squarely within Christian traditions.
quote:
Nietzsche hated christianity as the religion of slaves and the weak, that exalted pity and despised power. And that is true, despite the many instances of christian rulers being false to their faith.
Which speaks louder? Actions or words?
Christianity is a religion that encourages people to forgive their tormentors - this can be used in one of two ways. Either it's empowering when it comes from below or it means that people are too busy forgiving oppressors to bother to deal with them, and it therefore supports and enables oppression. Christianity can easily be and historically has been a tool of the powerful.
quote:
All that said, however, I find his approach unsettling simply because it does respond to something in me, which I fear could appeal to many.
It tends to appeal to two groups of people:
Right Wing Authoritarians who have no inherent moral centre and are out for what they can grab.
Broken Christians who have had their moral reasoning corrupted by one of many forms of Christianity to believe that all good flows from God rather than that we see reciprocity in nature, in game theory, and that the Golden Rule crops up in almost all known non-aberrant moral systems. It is a consequence of the Christian floccinaucinihilipilification (I've wanted to use that word seriously for some time) of the natural world by claiming that this is a fallen world and that goodness flows from outside it rather than is inherent to the world itself. Thereby rejecting the beauty and the goodness of this world in favour of some imaginary alternative - and when you take away the imaginary alternative for being imaginary but still consider this world to be worthless rather than beautiful, fascinating, and wonderful you end up roughly where Nietzche did. A version of ethics that accepts faulty Christian premises and rejects the observably wrong parts to end up in the worst of both worlds.
quote:
The challenge to atheists is to say whether they also believe that these things follow from the nature of reality, in which case the philosophy of Nietzsche can be viewed as wrong, and even be discriminated against, as indeed overt racism is.
I will say very simply that if humans had followed Nietzchean philosophy when we were living in caves we'd have been wiped out. Humans are a social animal, and one thing being a social animal allows us to do is to specialise - which means that we can afford areas of weakness that are covered by others.
Humans are also, when you look at us, pretty weak physically. We aren't strong. We don't have sharp teeth or claws. We aren't great at climbing. We're good at precisely four things - endurance, flexibility (which isn't much good unless we know how to handle new situations), opposable thumbs (99% of the uses of which must be taught), and communication (which needs to be learned from others). Notice that word 'taught'? The people with most to teach are those who've been places and done things - not those in the prime of life, but the old who are now weak because they are old. It is precisely by supporting those who would otherwise be weak to enable them to pass their hard earned knowledge on to the young that is what enabled humanity to become the dominant species on this planet. It is by respecting all people, weak or strong, and by encouraging everyone to learn skills that play to their strengths and to teach others what they have learned that makes humanity stronger than the sum of its parts.
So yes, I reject the philosophy of Nietzche. I believe that it stands as a denial of reality - and it stands as a denial of reality that is perfectly in line with older traditions of bad philosophy whether the Christian rejection of this world as fallen or Plato's cave (which amounts to the same thing).
quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
Of course morality can exist without christianity, as it plainly did before. That is not the issue. The question is: What sort of morality?
Morality based on reciprocity and adding to this civilisation we are a part of.
quote:
Those who advocate eugenic programs are by no necessity nasty people. They simply have a different view of what is the best for the optimal happiness of the human race, and in their view, elimination of weaker strains is a positive move.
On the contrary they are necessarily nasty - which isn't the same thing as either good or evil. Because their means are nasty. And you might as well say "Those who advocate The Inquisition and auto-da-fe are not necessarily nasty people. They are merely more concerned with someone's fate in the next life than this and may be acting in the best interests of those they force to recant or burn."
Same chain of logic. Same pile of crap.
quote:
And apart from a view of humanity that goes beyond the purely physical, I cannot see any argument that could resist this idea. Maybe you can.
Reciprocity. "You must be the change you would see in the world." Thinking of yourself as a human being and a part of humanity rather than as an isolated individual - I didn't make the clothes I wear, I didn't invent the language I use or the computers I type on. In fact I'm responsible for very few of the things that give me a nice life - but can pay some of them forward.
quote:
Has nobody noticed that with the decline of religion in the West, which really got going in the 17th century, the number of people slaughtered in wars and repressive regimes has got bigger and bigger.
Not really. Europe is at its longest period of peace in history. And homicide rates appear to be plummeting. About the only death rate that has increased (other than from old age) is due to industrialisation and when you already have scum in charge they can do things more efficiently.
And has nobody noticed that with the decline of religion in the West, we've actually learned to cure the sick and make the lame walk - and eliminated smallpox (and but for a few preachers we'd have eliminated Polio as well). We not only visit people in prison but we treat them better than ever before. We've set up a welfare state so the hungry get fed.
quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
So my thesis is that if christianity is true, then it means the God, who has made public the fact that he is on the side of the dispossessed will triumph. Which means any actions designed to oppress and enslave the weak will be be met with His judgement.
And yet the God of the bible has a long track record of wiping out those weaker than he is, of punishing his chosen people by sending them into exile, of toying with those weaker than he is - whether mind controlling Pharaoh in order to give himself an excuse to show off or torturing Job and treating his family as colateral damage.
quote:
Is there anything deriveable from a totally materialistic view of reality that makes such actions irrational?
See above. It is not irrational to trample on the weak if you think you can get away with it. But it is bad for you and your species to allow others to trample on the weak even if you are not one of those being trampled on. And it is therefore good to make sure others can't - humanity rose to the top by listening to the weak and using us to cover for each others' weaknesses rather than eating the weak.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
In short Nietzche is beloved of Christian apologists because he allows them to keep their theoretical abstractions and not have to pay attention to the real world and what actually happens whenever Christians get temporal power?
What happens when Christians get temporal power is no worse than when secular humanists get temporal power. (We'll put aside the distracting analogy with communism. The French Revolution was based on the values espoused by secular humanists. It was not all peace and light.)
quote:
He is also beloved of Christian apologists because his philosophy is very distinctively Christian in origin. Christian apologists tend to say "Without God this would happen". Nietzche says "There is no God therefore what the Christian apologists said would happen will happen." Which puts him squarely in the Christian philosophical tradition in the same way that a Black Mass is squarely within Christian traditions.
And which of Nietzsche's works is this paragraph based upon?
Nietzsche is Christian in origin in the same way that Locke and Kant and J S Mill and Russell etc are Christian in origin. His direct intellectual antecedents are Schopenhauer (in metaphysics) and Goethe, and German Romanticism more generally. (Schopenhauer's philosophy is its own thing, but Goethe was, during the middle period of his life at least, an Epicurean atheist. Nietzsche moved away from Schopenhauer and towards Goethe's Epicureanism as his thought developed and he rejected Wagner.) Nietzsche's thought is an intensification of early German romanticism's admiration for the Greeks and concurrent rejection of Christianity.
quote:
Christianity can easily be and historically has been a tool of the powerful.
Anything has historically been a tool of the powerful. Anti-religion, as in Hitchens, was just as useful in justifying the War in Iraq as anything Christian. In fact, among otherwise intelligent people, probably more so.
quote:
we see reciprocity in nature, in game theory, and that the Golden Rule crops up in almost all known non-aberrant moral systems.
If only it were that easy.
Game theory: what were you saying about theoretical abstractions? Game theory gives egalitarian answers if you feed in egalitarian starting conditions. Perhaps it can deal with imbalances of power - but most game theorists don't seem to.
'non-aberrant moral systems': presumably what makes a moral system aberrant is that the Golden Rule doesn't crop up in it. In other words, the Golden Rule crops up in almost all known moral systems that accept the Golden Rule.
Golden Rule: The Golden Rule, being a purely formal criterion, is empty. That said, given a conflict between how I want to treat other people and how I want other people to treat me, it gives no guidance as to which want to adjust.
Game theory requires that everything can be expressed in terms of quantified payoffs. As I said in response to Croesos, if you think you can express human goods in terms of quantified payoffs you're basically buying into neo-liberalism. Stressing mutuality and so on just means you're buying into the Clinton/ New Labour version of neo-liberalism: it's still neo-liberalism at bottom. And we've seen that left-wing houses built on neo-liberal sands fall down.
The fundamental problem with stressing reciprocity and so on in human nature is that human nature is a complicated thing. After all, human nature evolved: there's no a priori reason to think that you can get a coherent ethic out of it any more than you can get a method of giving birth without medical intervention that is risk-free to mother and baby. If you want to argue against strict amorality you can compare human child-raising practices with chimpanzee child-raising practices, and so on. But the amoralist can cite features of human nature that argue against your case. You can't get an ethic out of a value-free account of human nature.
quote:
(Nietzsche) tends to appeal to two groups of people:
You appear not to know that Nietzsche is a major influence on most left-wing French postmodernism.
quote:
when you take away the imaginary alternative for being imaginary but still consider this world to be worthless rather than beautiful, fascinating, and wonderful you end up roughly where Nietzche did.
You do realise that's Nietzsche's critique of nihilism and Dover Beach style atheism? Nietzsche's whole project is to rescue the wonder and fascination of life from the slanders of Christianity.
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on
:
@ Anteater
quote:
Prosperity Gospel is a bit of a red herring, as it has never gained acceptance in mainstream christianity.
Not really. The fact it has gained little acceptance has no bearing on how well it is "aligned to reality".
quote:
It'd still be nice for you to have a try, or at least state whether your own view of life leads you to the conclusion that the weak and vulnerable should be a high priority and what basis, if any, you have for campaigning for this view.
Pretty much what Justinian said, really, but then again sort of not. While I believe all he says is true, I don't favour compassion over Nietzschean values for those reasons, nor yet does my view of life lead me to the conclusion that the weak and vulnerable should be a priority. If I said it did I would be lying, or at least mistaking a post hoc rationalization for my real motivation. I wouldn't be alone in that, mind.
You see, it's just the way I am, just as the fact that my compassion is a sight more theoretical than actual is just the way I am. And I'd be prepared to bet that it's the same for you, too (not the theoretical bit, I hasten to add). I reckon you choose Christianity because what you see as the core message strikes a chord with you, not because you really believe it aligns to reality, because, come on, all the stuff that's not about loving your neighbour is just a crock of shite.
And if all this sounds irrational and contradictory, it is. But hey ho, rationalist philosophizing - fun that it is - is a crock of shite too.
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
:
This recent book is pertinent to the discussion.
The Bonobo and the Atheist
In it Frans de Waal argues that human morality comes from our evolutionary ancestors. Not religion. Instead of just arguing about it, he actually uses evidence from recent primate studies to back up his arguments.
I agree with Justinian that our species clearly would not be as successful as it is without a degree of empathy and compassion.
Those who argue that materialists HAVE to be in favor of a dog eat dog morality,or somehow are not real materialists are mistaken.
Just observing nature we have learned that evolutionary survival strategies include cooperation, empathy and compassion.
Also I find it strange that common human traits like compassion and empathy seem to be exclusive of Christianity for some people.
And somehow would never have appeared otherwise.
I guess that the claim is that the only good in the world comes from active intervention of "god" and it can't be explained otherwise.
As an example of non-christian empathy a quote I like from the Dhammapada
quote:
All beings tremble before violence.
All fear death.
All love life.
See yourself in others.
Then whom can you hurt?
What harm can you do?
He who seeks happiness
By hurting those who seek happiness
Will never find happiness.
For your brother is like you.
He wants to be happy.
Posted by Squibs (# 14408) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
This recent book is pertinent to the discussion.
The Bonobo and the Atheist
In it Frans de Waal argues that human morality comes from our evolutionary ancestors. Not religion. Instead of just arguing about it, he actually uses evidence from recent primate studies to back up his arguments.
I agree with Justinian that our species clearly would not be as successful as it is without a degree of empathy and compassion.
Those who argue that materialists HAVE to be in favor of a dog eat dog morality,or somehow are not real materialists are mistaken.
Just observing nature we have learned that evolutionary survival strategies include cooperation, empathy and compassion.
Also I find it strange that common human traits like compassion and empathy seem to be exclusive of Christianity for some people.
And somehow would never have appeared otherwise.
I guess that the claim is that the only good in the world comes from active intervention of "god" and it can't be explained otherwise.
As an example of non-christian empathy a quote I like from the Dhammapada
Who here has argued that morality came from religion? Correct me if I'm wrong but I don't think anyone has.
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Squibs:
Who here has argued that morality came from religion? Correct me if I'm wrong but I don't think anyone has.
Basically the same question was asked before by you in this thread and was answered by Crœsos.
And it was not religion it was Christianity in particular.
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
quote:
Originally posted by Squibs:
I may have missed it. Can you point out where it was claimed that non-Christians can not be moral? What exactly is the connection between your post and the post you are responding to?
Always glad to oblige. The point wasn't that non-Christians couldn't be moral, but rather than non-Christians would never be interested in helping "the weak", however defined. It seemed to genuinely perplex our thread opener:
quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
What I'm getting at is that Christianity teaches, whether you believe it or not, that support for the vulnerable is an unqualified good. Nietzsche sees it as an unqualified bad.
Do you see no danger that the erosion of Christianity could lead to an erosion of compassion for the weak? Who. Else will champion them, and on what basis?
The underlying premise here is that absent Christianity, no one would feel compassion for "the vulnerable".
So I was just commenting on that previous exchange. My main point is in support of the idea that there are rational non-christian grounds for compassion.
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
I reckon you choose Christianity because what you see as the core message strikes a chord with you, not because you really believe it aligns to reality, because, come on, all the stuff that's not about loving your neighbour is just a crock of shite.
And if all this sounds irrational and contradictory, it is. But hey ho, rationalist philosophizing - fun that it is - is a crock of shite too.
It read like a request to join.
"I think Christianity apart from neighbour-loving, is a crock of shite
I reckon you only chose it for the neighbour-loving anyway.
So, come on, all this non-neighbour-loving stuff really is a crock of shite!"
I can almost hear the you playing the tambourines! "Come and join us, come and join us!" The world looks so much better once you accept the crock of shite argument! Why, you can even see rationalist philosophising as a crock of shite!
Mind you, I give you high honesty marks for recognising the crock-of-shite-iness in your own post. That's pretty rare.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
In it Frans de Waal argues that human morality comes from our evolutionary ancestors. Not religion.
This is trivially true though. Religion comes from our evolutionary ancestors. Language comes from our evolutionary ancestors. Aggression comes from our evolutionary ancestors. Ambition comes from our evolutionary ancestors. Cruelty comes from our evolutionary ancestors.
So nothing follows that makes it rational to choose morality over aggression in cases where they conflict.
There's a further problem. I just said language comes from our evolutionary ancestors. Which obviously it does. But the choice between English and Japanese does not; that's cultural. Likewise, while the capacity for moral judgements comes from our evolutionary ancestors, the content of those judgements varies with culture. And while nothing about language requires us to think one language is better than another, morality is essentially normative.
quote:
As an example of non-christian empathy a quote I like from the Dhammapada
I do not believe A.C.Grayling is about to shave off his hair, don a saffron robe, and become a monk.
Whether Platonism and Buddhism justify non-aggression or empathy is neither here nor there for those who reject the metaphysics or anthropology of Platonism or Buddhism.
Posted by anteater (# 11435) on
:
Justinian:
quote:
Morality based on reciprocity
is not what Jesus taught. "If you give to those from whom you hope to receive, what good is that" (paraphrase). Christ's morality was based on giving with no expectation of reciprocity.
Now you may say he is wrong, but I'm not so sure.
Posted by anteater (# 11435) on
:
Grokesx:
quote:
I reckon you choose Christianity because what you see as the core message strikes a chord with you, not because you really believe it aligns to reality
Well the first part is true, although it's not just that alignment to ethics. I think it gives a better account of why the world is and why human experience, including religious experience is that way it is. Better, though not conclusive, and I have never suggested that the case against is unworthy of respect.
quote:
on, all the stuff that's not about loving your neighbour is just a crock of shite.
Unfortunately you do appear to think that case against is unworthy of respect.
Which just shows a narrow mind, and which is why some people like to use the term Atheist Fundamentalist, using Fundamentalist to mean closed-mindedly dogmatic.
Nobody can dismiss your refusal to believe. Many great people, including "secular saints" are on your side.
But them again, many are on mine, including great scientists, as I expect you know.
Bertrand Russell, himself quite anti-religious, in his discussion of the thought of Augustine said that he holds it as a principle that when clearly brilliant thinkers hold to a view, and he thinks it plain stupid, then the fault is in him. I think that is wise. Respect for other people militates against a closed mind.
Maybe you cannot understand that.
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
So nothing follows that makes it rational to choose morality over aggression in cases where they conflict. [snip]
And while nothing about language requires us to think one language is better than another, morality is essentially normative.
Since you already admitted that Religion comes from our ancestors what makes the norms derived from religion any more rational? And my point was that empathy is a product of evolution because of its survival value. So when human cultures create our moral codes, it is not surprising that compassion and empathy make an appearance. What specific form those moral codes take of course depends on the culture.
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Whether Platonism and Buddhism justify non-aggression or empathy is neither here nor there for those who reject the metaphysics or anthropology of Platonism or Buddhism.
What were the metaphysics of that Dhammapada quote? For me its a good description of the motivation given by empathy. Of course Buddhism has a lot of metaphysical baggage. But the
point was against presenting Christianity as the only proponent of empathy, and the only alternative to nihilism.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
Since you already admitted that Religion comes from our ancestors what makes the norms derived from religion any more rational? And my point was that empathy is a product of evolution because of its survival value. So when human cultures create our moral codes, it is not surprising that compassion and empathy make an appearance. What specific form those moral codes take of course depends on the culture.
Values derived from Christianity or Buddhism stand a chance of being more rational in so far as they stand a chance of being true.
Limits on empathy, eg hatred of outsiders and people who are different, are also products of human evolution because of their survival value. Survival value provides no reason to exalt compassion and reject xenophobia as elements of a moral system.
To put it another way, to say that it doesn't matter what specific form a moral code takes so long as compassion and empathy are some sort of element ducks the question. I'm sure compassion is an element in even George Osbourne's moral system.
quote:
What were the metaphysics of that Dhammapada quote? For me its a good description of the motivation given by empathy. Of course Buddhism has a lot of metaphysical baggage. But the point was against presenting Christianity as the only proponent of empathy, and the only alternative to nihilism.
Shorn of the Buddhist metaphysical anthropology, is there any reason to suppose that:
quote:
He who seeks happiness
By hurting those who seek happiness
Will never find happiness
is anything other than a pious thought of the sort sewn on samplers in cross-stitch?
Also, 'all beings' does not mean 'all human beings' - the quote is radically anti-humanist.
As an aside, the quote as a whole is expressive of a tendency in Buddhism to cast the practical expression of empathy as abstaining from harm, where Christianity is more likely to cast it, for better or worse, as actively aiding others.
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on
:
@ Anteater
Ha. On balance I'm probably ahead in the respect stakes. At max I've offended around 2 billion people with my intolerant, dogmatic view that those parts of Christianity that aren't expressing ethical views similar to mine are all a crock of shite. BTW, lurking in there is the hardly earth shattering observation that all but
the most devout disregard the parts that don't chime with them - you know, the OT stuff like killing your kids for disobeying, the ban on mixed fabrics - even if they don't express themselves in quite the same way as I do. But anyway, as has already been observed, with this:
quote:
Do you see no danger that the erosion of Christianity could lead to an erosion of compassion for the weak? Who. Else will champion them, and on what basis?
you potentially offend all the other 5 billion people on the planet with the implication that not only can they not be compassionate without god, but it has to be the Christian flavour.
And yes, I know that's a bit tu quoque-ey.
Posted by Squibs (# 14408) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
Basically the same question was asked before by you in this thread and was answered by Crœsos.
I'm aware of that. But it looks to me like you have both missed the point. For arguments sake I'll propose the following:
1) Non-religious people do care for the poor and are quite capable of being morally outstanding people and all round good eggs.
2) People are motivated to do good because of their religious convictions.
If tomorrow the wheels fell of Christianity, Islam, Judaism etc. the contention, at least as I read it, is that a proportion of these erstwhile believers might begin to question whether their charitable involvement with the poor is something that they feel the need to continue. Some might conclude that the answer is no.
So if we grant that non-religious people can be wonderfully compassionate it seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that if religion suddenly fell apart there would in some measure be an erosion in the quality and the amount of care given towards the poor.
[ 10. April 2013, 23:07: Message edited by: Squibs ]
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Values derived from Christianity or Buddhism stand a chance of being more rational in so far as they stand a chance of being true.
There we agree.
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Limits on empathy, eg hatred of outsiders and people who are different, are also products of human evolution because of their survival value. Survival value provides no reason to exalt compassion and reject xenophobia as elements of a moral system.
Maybe that is why there is nothing like that in the Bible? For example
Matthew 10:5-15 ?
Christianity has not been among the most tolerant religions.
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Shorn of the Buddhist metaphysical anthropology, is there any reason to suppose that:
quote:
He who seeks happiness
By hurting those who seek happiness
Will never find happiness
is anything other than a pious thought of the sort sewn on samplers in cross-stitch?
You conveniently left out the next verse:
quote:
For your brother is like you. He wants to be happy.
The reason is empathy. How can you be happy hurting other people if you have empathy?
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Also, 'all beings' does not mean 'all human beings' - the quote is radically anti-humanist.
Why? As our knowledge has increased the notion of Humans as totally other and separate from
the other “beings” makes less and less sense.
If Humanism is according to the
American Humanist Association.
quote:
American Humanist
“Humanism is a progressive philosophy of life that, without theism and other supernatural beliefs, affirms our ability and responsibility to lead ethical lives of personal fulfillment that aspire to the greater good of humanity.”
Is the greater good of Humanity totally separate from the good of other “beings”. In which way does Humanity benefit from the suffering and extinction of other beings?
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
As an aside, the quote as a whole is expressive of a tendency in Buddhism to cast the practical expression of empathy as abstaining from harm, where Christianity is more likely to cast it, for better or worse, as actively aiding others.
Ill have to concede that point to some extent. But it is a matter of what is emphasized in the texts. Practices such as Metta if actually taken
seriously will produce people who act on their compassion.
Metta
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
:
Ikkyu
That Metta link doesn't work for me. This does. Does it say what you wanted to say?
A point about proof texting (e.g. your Matt 10 example). Presumably you're aware that you can use texts to demonstrate both pro-jewish and antisemitic sentiment, pro-women and anti-women sentiments, pro-slavery and anti-slavery sentiments, pro-equality and anti-equality sentiments etc etc? That's a game anyone can play and lots of people do.
There are serious legitimate questions to be raised about the overall content of the Christian Holy Book and the extent to which passages should carry a "health warning" about the need to consider both original context and present relevance. I'm not knocking that, ask those questions myself. I've been a serious student of the Bible for close on 40 years, know a lot about theological variations within Christianity.
So I think serious discussion isn't helped by throwaway proof texting to make a tolerance point, (even though it may be OK as a bit of rhetoric). That's a criticism you'll read Christians making to one another here. Christians have been, and still are, proponents and opponents of various tolerances and we haven't always agreed about what we should be tolerant about. Can we take that as a given?
I've already said here that folks who look for negative proof texts from Nietzsche can find plenty of ammunition but that doesn't necessarily show any in-depth understanding of the complex writings of this complex man. It's necessary to do some work to grasp that.
I suggest you cut a similar amount of slack for serious students of other writings. Like the Bible for example. You won't find many literalists hereabouts.
Posted by LaviniaB (# 17639) on
:
Interesting discussion! I just read Prof. Janaway's thoughts on Nietzsche in Richard Holloway's eBook "Honest Doubt: The History of an Epic Struggle" - the transcripts of the Radio 4 series last year. They are now available on Amazon Nietzsche appears in Chap 14. He says that Nietzsche suggested the end of morality would happen within 200 years of writing (1870s) which brings us to around now!
PS I hear the audio of the series is going to be published in May by BBC AudioBooks - exciting stuff.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Limits on empathy, eg hatred of outsiders and people who are different, are also products of human evolution because of their survival value. Survival value provides no reason to exalt compassion and reject xenophobia as elements of a moral system.
Maybe that is why there is nothing like that in the Bible? For example Matthew 10:5-15 ?
Christianity has not been among the most tolerant religions.
The record of Christianity is poor. But not as bad as often painted.
I'm not an inerrantist Protestant about the Bible. Although you might like to compare Luke 10. (12 is the number of the tribes of Israel; 70 is the traditional number of the gentile nations.)
quote:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Shorn of the Buddhist metaphysical anthropology, is there any reason to suppose that:
quote:
He who seeks happiness
By hurting those who seek happiness
Will never find happiness
is anything other than a pious thought of the sort sewn on samplers in cross-stitch?
You conveniently left out the next verse:
quote:
For your brother is like you. He wants to be happy.
The reason is empathy. How can you be happy hurting other people if you have empathy?
Ah, there's my problem. You see I thought the passage was an exhortation to empathy, rather than a warning of the dangers of empathy.
quote:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Also, 'all beings' does not mean 'all human beings' - the quote is radically anti-humanist.
Why? As our knowledge has increased the notion of Humans as totally other and separate from the other “beings” makes less and less sense.
If Humanism is according to the American Humanist Association. “Humanism is a progressive philosophy of life that, without theism and other supernatural beliefs, affirms our ability and responsibility to lead ethical lives of personal fulfillment that aspire to the greater good of humanity.”
Is the greater good of Humanity totally separate from the good of other “beings”. In which way does Humanity benefit from the suffering and extinction of other beings?
Are there many members of the American Humanist Association who walk around with brooms so they don't accidentally step on an ant? No? Probably there's a difference between Humanism and Buddhism then.
Buddhists are, I believe, enjoined not to engage in practices like farming animals. Does the American Humanist Association enjoin its members to desist from even factory farming?
Asking whether humanity benefits from the suffering and extinction of other beings is still treating the welfare of other beings as a means to the benefit of humanity. (Why the capital H?)
The problem with humanism as an ideology is that it's big on affirming woolly platitudes about reason and the greater good of humanity, and poor on attempts to use reason to find out what the greater good of humanity is. In so far as it has an intellectual justification, it is based upon the value of some aspect of humanity. (There are radical utilitarians who can call themselves humanists; but that has its own problems.) No doubt most humanists give lip service to environmental concerns, but not in a kind of way that can function in public reason.
quote:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
As an aside, the quote as a whole is expressive of a tendency in Buddhism to cast the practical expression of empathy as abstaining from harm, where Christianity is more likely to cast it, for better or worse, as actively aiding others.
Ill have to concede that point to some extent. But it is a matter of what is emphasized in the texts. Practices such as Metta if actually taken seriously will produce people who act on their compassion.
If I were to say that practices such as the Daily Office if actually taken seriously will produce people who don't engage in resentment, would you let that one pass?
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Barnabas62:
Ikkyu
That Metta link doesn't work for me. This does. Does it say what you wanted to say?
Thanks for the link, that one is ok. I believe this one is a bit better. I hope it works now.
Acces to insight Metta
As for proof texting. You have a good point.
I was trying to respond to:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Limits on empathy, eg hatred of outsiders and people who are different, are also products of human evolution because of their survival value. Survival value provides no reason to exalt compassion and reject xenophobia as elements of a moral system.
I was trying to say that a moral system is not based on only one argument. The fact that empathy has survival value is only a starting point.
I was just establishing the fact that some components of our moral code have origins in our Biology. Not that that is PROOF that empathy is rational.
So when you say that most Christians (At least here) have a more nuanced view of scripture than inerrantists. I can only agree.
But my example was that just as there being a biological explanation for Xenofobia does not mean you have to include it in your moral code,
the fact that there are passages in the bible in favour of Slavery or intolerance does not mean that they need to be included in the moral code of all Christians. You have to put those in context just as you put Xenophobic tendencies in out biology in context.
So if Christians are allowed to add nuance and context to their arguments naturalist accounts of morality deserve the same chance.
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Are there many members of the American Humanist Association who walk around with brooms so they don't accidentally step on an ant? No? Probably there's a difference between Humanism and Buddhism then.
There also are no Buddhists who do that unless they convert to Jainism first.
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Buddhists are, I believe, enjoined not to engage in practices like farming animals. Does the American Humanist Association enjoin its members to desist from even factory farming?
Was your point that all Humanists are not Buddhists? I think that is trivially true.
About Buddhism being "radically anti-humanist."
I just not see that as a convincing argument.
And I am sure there are plenty of Humanists against factory farming.
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Asking whether humanity benefits from the suffering and extinction of other beings is still treating the welfare of other beings as a means to the benefit of humanity.
That is not the only argument in favor of that idea just one possible argument that happens to be true, the suffering and extinction of animals is bad for humans. Also having empathy for animals for other than selfish reasons is anti humanist because?
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
The problem with humanism as an ideology is that it's big on affirming woolly platitudes about reason and the greater good of humanity, and poor on attempts to use reason to find out what the greater good of humanity is. In so far as it has an intellectual justification, it is based upon the value of some aspect of humanity. (There are radical utilitarians who can call themselves humanists; but that has its own problems.) No doubt most humanists give lip service to environmental concerns, but not in a kind of way that can function in public reason.
You seem to define humanists as somehow only been able to care about humans and any humanist argument trying to justify caring about anything else as non-rational and incompatible with humanism. This is a straw man argument.
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
If I were to say that practices such as the Daily Office if actually taken seriously will produce people who don't engage in resentment, would you let that one pass?
I have known and know many practicing Christians.
I used to be Catholic until my senior year in High School. So of course I have seen Christians who practice what they preach, and who benefit from it. Of course, I also have met the other kind of Christian, but that is irrelevant.
I would concede that there are positive effects to be gained from the Daily Office properly done.
Why not?
So what is so strange about thinking that people who properly practice Metta might actually benefit from it? Or decide to put compassion in practice?
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
I was trying to say that a moral system is not based on only one argument. The fact that empathy has survival value is only a starting point.
I was just establishing the fact that some components of our moral code have origins in our Biology. Not that that is PROOF that empathy is rational.
But my example was that just as there being a biological explanation for Xenofobia does not mean you have to include it in your moral code,
the fact that there are passages in the bible in favour of Slavery or intolerance does not mean that they need to be included in the moral code of all Christians. You have to put those in context just as you put Xenophobic tendencies in out biology in context.
So if Christians are allowed to add nuance and context to their arguments naturalist accounts of morality deserve the same chance.
Firstly, it's fine to say that the argument you gave is only one argument, or only one component of the argument. But if it's the only component of the argument that you've presented then it's a bit unfair to object when someone criticises it as a standalone argument.
I don't think your comparison between using the Bible as a basis for morality and using biology as a basis for morality works. At least, as far as you've presented it. It's not a matter of nuance and context.
How ought a divine command theorist who believes all the Bible is inerrant react to conflicting passages in the Bible? (I'm neither a divine command theorist or an inerrantist; but that's the best case for your analogy.) They ought to observe that the Bible contains a number of programmatic statements about how to summarise it or statements of general principles and so on. And that means that in case of conflict you ought to go with the interpretations that best fit with the general principles. So if faced with a dilemma over loving their neighbour or persecuting them they ought to notice that the general statements favour the loving option.
No such general principles of interpretation are available from biology.
quote:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Are there many members of the American Humanist Association who walk around with brooms so they don't accidentally step on an ant? No? Probably there's a difference between Humanism and Buddhism then.
There also are no Buddhists who do that unless they convert to Jainism first.
I stand corrected.
quote:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Buddhists are, I believe, enjoined not to engage in practices like farming animals. Does the American Humanist Association enjoin its members to desist from even factory farming?
Was your point that all Humanists are not Buddhists? I think that is trivially true.
About Buddhism being "radically anti-humanist."
I just not see that as a convincing argument.
And I am sure there are plenty of Humanists against factory farming.
My point is that humanists who are not Buddhists can't merely cherry pick bits of Buddhism out of context in order to make up for their inability to justify their moral positions from their own resources.
I'm sure there are plenty of humanists against factory farming too. It's just that it's hard to justify a prohibition on factory farming from a metaphysics-free standpoint. It's equally hard to do so from any standpoint that takes as its basis the value and importance of the human being. And if you're not starting from the value and importance of the human being, why are you calling yourself a humanist?
Let me put it another way: is there any reason at all why a humanist can't support factory farming?
quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Asking whether humanity benefits from the suffering and extinction of other beings is still treating the welfare of other beings as a means to the benefit of humanity.
That is not the only argument in favor of that idea just one possible argument that happens to be true, the suffering and extinction of animals is bad for humans. Also having empathy for animals for other than selfish reasons is anti humanist because?
As I said earlier, it's not really fair to object that it's not the only argument when it is the only argument that you've presented.
Is there any reason why a humanist has to agree with you that the suffering and extinction of animals is bad for humans?
If humanism doesn't mean treating humans as the source of value, then what does it mean? Suppose someone proposes painlessly sterilising humanity because the planet would be better off without us: is that anti-humanist because?
quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu: You seem to define humanists as somehow only been able to care about humans and any humanist argument trying to justify caring about anything else as non-rational and incompatible with humanism. This is a straw man argument.
It would be a straw man argument if that was what I was arguing.
Definition of humanism:
quote:
Humanism is a progressive philosophy of life that, without theism and other supernatural beliefs, affirms our ability and responsibility to lead ethical lives of personal fulfillment that aspire to the greater good of humanity.
Now if someone cares about something that isn't the greater good of humanity, they're not doing it because they aspire to the greater good of humanity. Yes? Aspiring to the greater good of humanity only gives you reason to care about something if it is a means to the greater good of humanity. If you care about something that isn't a means to the greater good of humanity, it is for some other reason or no reason at all.
If someone cares about animal welfare for reasons other than that they aspire to the greater good of humanity, then it's not because they're a humanist. It's for other reasons. And those reasons might well come into conflict with their aspiration to the greater good of humanity.
Is that clearer?
quote:
So what is so strange about thinking that people who properly practice Metta might actually benefit from it? Or decide to put compassion in practice?
Up the thread you said Christianity is not the most tolerant of religions. Now, I could have replied that Christians who properly practice prayer aren't intolerant. But you would quite rightly object that was a no-true Christian argument. Saying that Buddhists who properly practice meditation are compassionate in practice is much the same sort of argument.
[ 11. April 2013, 20:04: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
:
@Dafyd
This is why I keep coming back to the Ship. You find people who disagree with you but
actually take time to read what you post (even my limited contributions) and
help you think more deeply about what you believe and why instead of just scoring cheap points.
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
They ought to observe that the Bible contains a number of programmatic statements about how to summarise it or statements of general principles and so on. And that means that in case of conflict you ought to go with the interpretations that best fit with the general principles.
So if faced with a dilemma over loving their neighbour or persecuting them they ought to notice that the general statements favour the loving option.
No such general principles of interpretation are available from biology.
Unfortunately I have not presented my arguments in a very coherent fashion so far.
I think morality cannot be deduced from biology.
(Here is an example of a person that holds similar views)
But I don't think scientific information is irrelevant to morality. Scientific discoveries
that bear on DH topics for example have to be taken into account. Of course any attempt to do a secular
morality has to face the fact that you have to start from some assumptions that are subjective.
A test for a good secular morality has to be that it fits reality and it helps in attaining its intended goals.
And it always has to remain a work in progress subjected to constant revision form experience.
I do not believe that this subjective part of any secular morality is a problem that it does not share with its
religious counterparts. Arriving at those "general principles" from the bible is a subjective enterprise.
If not, everyone would agree on what they are.
So for me the claim that the absence of Christianity means nihilism unless naturalists can produce absolute
morality out of thin air, makes no sense. Because the "absolute morality" of Christianity is subjective.
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Let me put it another way: is there any reason at all why a humanist can't support factory farming?
Because it damages the environment and contributes to global warming? Because its cruel? You would need to persuade him not tell him that he can't.
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
If someone cares about animal welfare for reasons other than that they aspire to the greater good of humanity, then it's not because they're a humanist. It's for other reasons. And those reasons might well come into conflict
with their aspiration to the greater good of humanity.
Is that clearer?
From a Buddhist perspective the greater good of humanity cannot be separated at all from the good of our environment. Does humanity even exist separately from the air we breathe the food we eat and the history of life that precedes us? What does it mean to be human without air? If your definition of the grater good of humanity is narrower than this I believe it is deficient.
There are probably humanists whose definition of the greater good of humanity may be like you describe.
But there are Christians that don't hold many of the values that you hold either.
[ 11. April 2013, 21:34: Message edited by: Ikkyu ]
Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
is there any reason at all why a humanist can't support factory farming?
I'd suggest that it's a horror of homicide which naturally extends to a horror of killing other life to the extent that it resembles human life.
Almost everyone would be sorry or angry to see a chimpanzee killed or cruelly treated, but hardly anyone would give a second thought to swatting a fly. Cattle would be somewhere in the middle. So, naturally again, would a human fetus, by the way: we should expect to consider killing it increasingly repellent the older it is, without necessarily calling it murder.
There's also the growing realization that factory farming is usually deleterious to the environment because it is overspecialized. Environmental damage will make life more difficult for the human race in the long run. The old family farm model, with a place for a little bit of everything, everything in its place, and everything on a human scale, shows much more ecological wisdom.
Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
What happens when Christians get temporal power is no worse than when secular humanists get temporal power. (We'll put aside the distracting analogy with communism. The French Revolution was based on the values espoused by secular humanists. It was not all peace and light.)
I could quibble with the example and point out that one of the biggest PR problems the French Revolution had was that the people being executed by them mostly were literate, connected, and many were capable of writing. Unlike the peasantry that had been killed before. But that's only a minor quibble. From what I can tell any group that thinks it has The Answer is going to be a bad thing in power - humans are more complex than one human mind can embrace. (And fear any regime that says that humans aren't good enough - see the New Soviet Man or Homo Economicus). So point basically accepted.
quote:
Anything has historically been a tool of the powerful. Anti-religion, as in Hitchens, was just as useful in justifying the War in Iraq as anything Christian. In fact, among otherwise intelligent people, probably more so.
Most intelligent people I knew at the time weren't buying what Hitchens was selling back then. But some tools are easier to turn to the use of the powerful - Monotheism being the belief that there is one central most important figure of the universe is a particularly easy one.
quote:
'non-aberrant moral systems': presumably what makes a moral system aberrant is that the Golden Rule doesn't crop up in it.
I'd have said that you know them by their fruits - but there is possibly circular reasoning in there.
quote:
Game theory requires that everything can be expressed in terms of quantified payoffs. As I said in response to Croesos, if you think you can express human goods in terms of quantified payoffs you're basically buying into neo-liberalism. Stressing mutuality and so on just means you're buying into the Clinton/ New Labour version of neo-liberalism: it's still neo-liberalism at bottom. And we've seen that left-wing houses built on neo-liberal sands fall down.
You are confusing the map with the territory. Game Theory is a tool that can be used to investigate the real world and for which you need to attempt to take account of unquantifiables - if you fail to do so then the map doesn't match the territory. In which case what's wrong is the map.
quote:
The fundamental problem with stressing reciprocity and so on in human nature is that human nature is a complicated thing.
The problem is that human nature is a complicated thing - and that the human brain is not large enough to model the interactions involving itself - it's not a step larger than itself. Any consistent ethic large enough to take the whole range of human behaviour and motivation into account is too large to understand. Any consistent ethic that is comprehensible is too small to cover the range of humanity and most are an attempt to fit humanity on a Procrustean bed. Like so many things the best you can do is take approximations while being aware they are approximations.
If it's a choice between a coherent ethical system that doesn't match up to humans and a set of useful ethical guidelines that do I'll take the guidelines every time.
quote:
quote:
(Nietzsche) tends to appeal to two groups of people:
You appear not to know that Nietzsche is a major influence on most left-wing French postmodernism.
Given that my experiences of left-wing French postmodernism (including teaching my dyslexic and highly non-academic little sister to read Barthes to the point that her tutor said she understood him better than he himself did by the simple expedient of showing her how to translate each deliberately obfuscated sentence into something clear) have lead me to the conclusion that French post-modernism is a movement based round trying to obscure that the Emperor is merely wearing boxer shorts. It had a few good points to make initially as a reaction against the excesses of the modernism even the name 'post-modernism' shows it to be reacting to. (Most notably the taking account of different viewpoints being essential). But, like many revolutionaries (including topically Thatcher) the bits that needed breaking were the easy part. That they look to Nietzche for inspiration doesn't surprise me.
quote:
You do realise that's Nietzsche's critique of nihilism and Dover Beach style atheism? Nietzsche's whole project is to rescue the wonder and fascination of life from the slanders of Christianity.
Indeed. By modern standards Lincoln was a flaming racist despite being a visionary for his day. Nietzche saw the trap and struggled to extracate himself but didn't entirely succeed.
Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Asking whether humanity benefits from the suffering and extinction of other beings is still treating the welfare of other beings as a means to the benefit of humanity. (Why the capital H?)
Oh, we can ask. No one is saying we can't ask. We then get answers.
1: Extinction is depriving the world of a potentially vital resource. Lessening the world in which we live is inherently a bad thing.
2: Be careful the things you say. Children will listen. And as you said the gap between humans and animals isn't large. Cruelty to animals teaches cruelty to humans.
Both are therefore inherently bad things for humanity. Which isn't the same as saying that they are categorical imperatives not to do.
quote:
The problem with humanism as an ideology is that it's big on affirming woolly platitudes about reason and the greater good of humanity, and poor on attempts to use reason to find out what the greater good of humanity is.
Reminds me a lot of the Sermon on the Mount that way. Are you really saying you want something like the Levitical laws as your basis for morality?
quote:
In so far as it has an intellectual justification, it is based upon the value of some aspect of humanity.
In so far as religious morality has an intellectual justification, it is based upon the value of some aspect of God. Therefore no morality has an underlying intellectual justification of the sort you want. Why are you singling out Humanism?
Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
Justinian:
quote:
Morality based on reciprocity
is not what Jesus taught. "If you give to those from whom you hope to receive, what good is that" (paraphrase). Christ's morality was based on giving with no expectation of reciprocity.
Now you may say he is wrong, but I'm not so sure.
And what does that have to do with anything? You asked what sort of morality you can have without Christianity. I gave an answer - which you are now using as an out of context proof text (I think to avoid engaging with the fact I demolished your entire case). That it is not the same as morality backed by the threat of hellfire and the potential of heaven (as most Christian morality historically has been) is irrelevant. It is a direct answer to your question.
Posted by Squibs (# 14408) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
Indeed. By modern standards Lincoln was a flaming racist despite being a visionary for his day.
Lincoln did not exist.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Ikkyu:
Of course any attempt to do a secular morality has to face the fact that you have to start from some assumptions that are subjective.
A test for a good secular morality has to be that it fits reality and it helps in attaining its intended goals.
And it always has to remain a work in progress subjected to constant revision form experience.
I do not believe that this subjective part of any secular morality is a problem that it does not share with its religious counterparts. Arriving at those "general principles" from the bible is a subjective enterprise.
If not, everyone would agree on what they are.
So for me the claim that the absence of Christianity means nihilism unless naturalists can produce absolute morality out of thin air, makes no sense. Because the "absolute morality" of Christianity is subjective.
Nine times out of ten, when a Christian apologist starts going on about subjective morality and absolute morality, they're talking rubbish. The words 'subjective' and 'absolute' are great generators of confusion - nine times out of ten the person using them doesn't know what they're trying to say.
So, I'm not sure what you're trying to say here. Let's take an example of a subjective assumption: my daughter is the most special baby in the whole wide world. That's subjective: I cannot expect anyone to agree with me who doesn't already. But at the same time, it's not open to challenge. There's no way anyone is ever going to persuade me to abandon.
Is that the case for any reasonable moral system? Not really. A moral system has be able to persuade people who don't agree with it, and also has to be open to challenge.
I don't think 'subjective' is the right word for what you're trying to say about secular morality. I don't think it's the right word for what you're trying to say about Biblical interpretation either. Because someone can argue about Biblical interpretation.
quote:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Let me put it another way: is there any reason at all why a humanist can't support factory farming?
Because it damages the environment and contributes to global warming? Because its cruel? You would need to persuade him not tell him that he can't.
I was using 'can't' in a 'persuade he oughtn't' kind of way.
I've set out my question poorly. I'm not looking for reasons that a humanist, or anyone else, might give for arguing against factory farming. What I'm saying is, suppose another humanist disagrees. They could put forward arguments about human freedom, and making meat more affordable for a wider range of people, and probably arguments about confidence in human reason being able to overcome the challenges posed by environmental damage.
How would a humanist even begin to resolve the dispute? I need to avoid being categorical here, because it's obvious that there are lots of cases where argument doesn't resolve things, even where one side is clearly right. (Darwinism vs creationism, for instance.) But at least there, there are things that the Darwinist can say that the creationist can't dismiss without special pleading.
Or to put it another way, can a humanist construct a roughly coherent moral structure in such a way that he or she would be able to address moral dilemmas without rationalising what he or she would have done anyway?
One of the humanist arguments against religion in public life is that arguments appealing to private revelation cannot be challenged by people who disagree. But how can humanists avoid the charge that their moral arguments are similarly based in private conviction and cannot be challenged?
quote:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
If someone cares about animal welfare for reasons other than that they aspire to the greater good of humanity, then it's not because they're a humanist.
From a Buddhist perspective the greater good of humanity cannot be separated at all from the good of our environment.
Firstly, I don't think the Buddhist perspective is relevant to humanists who aren't Buddhists, unless it persuades them to become Buddhists. Secondly, at least one Buddhist on these boards (I can't remember who) recently said that Buddhists think all goods are illusory - the greater good of humanity presumably being included in that.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Alogon:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
is there any reason at all why a humanist can't support factory farming?
I'd suggest that it's a horror of homicide which naturally extends to a horror of killing other life to the extent that it resembles human life.
Almost everyone would be sorry or angry to see a chimpanzee killed or cruelly treated, but hardly anyone would give a second thought to swatting a fly. Cattle would be somewhere in the middle. So, naturally again, would a human fetus, by the way: we should expect to consider killing it increasingly repellent the older it is, without necessarily calling it murder.
The majority of humanists probably support the right to abort fetus, even at late stages of pregnancy. They could dismiss the argument that the late stage fetus resembles independent human life as sentimental - wittering on about its sweet fingers and toes to paraphrase one humanist.
However, if they then dismiss the argument against late abortion on the grounds that it's sentimental do you then have any grounds for a comeback when someone defends factory farming by saying that your objections to that are sentimental?
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Asking whether humanity benefits from the suffering and extinction of other beings is still treating the welfare of other beings as a means to the benefit of humanity.
Both are therefore inherently bad things for humanity. Which isn't the same as saying that they are categorical imperatives not to do.
I'm sorry: I really don't know whether what you mean by 'categorical imperative' is the same as what everyone else means.
(Eta: that sounds more dismissive than I mean. But I don't know what you mean by 'categorical imperative'.)
quote:
quote:
The problem with humanism as an ideology is that it's big on affirming woolly platitudes about reason and the greater good of humanity, and poor on attempts to use reason to find out what the greater good of humanity is.
Reminds me a lot of the Sermon on the Mount that way. Are you really saying you want something like the Levitical laws as your basis for morality?
At least, with the Sermon on the Mount you can rule some things out altogether. (Retaliation for wrongs done to oneself is pretty hard to square away.)
There are some things that just cannot count as loving your neighbour. Dropping napalm on them can't. Does 'aspiring to the general good of humanity' mean enough that anything can't count as that? Napalming villagers might be taken as justified by the greater good.
(Is a future in which a small population of humans living blissfully in harmony with the environment a greater good than one in which many humans live on a planet just barely able to sustain them? There is in fact a coherent argument that the second is better.(*))
quote:
In so far as it has an intellectual justification, it is based upon the value of some aspect of humanity.
In so far as religious morality has an intellectual justification, it is based upon the value of some aspect of God. Therefore no morality has an underlying intellectual justification of the sort you want. Why are you singling out Humanism? [/QB][/QUOTE]
The concept of God doesn't work like that. (God doesn't have value; God confers value. For that matter, God doesn't have aspects.) You can't say x is doing that because he loves God rather than because x loves his neighbour. Loving your neighbour is what loving God amounts to in practice.
(*) Take the small number of blissful people. Add some extra people, with no contact with the blissful people, who are not quite as blissful but are still living lives they judge worth living. Does this make the situation better or worse for humanity? It's hard to say that it doesn't make it better. Now give the extra people contact with the blissful people and adjust the situation to equalise the happiness of the blissful people and the extra people. Again, hard to say it doesn't make the situation better for humanity. Repeat the two steps until we reach the many humans on the planet barely able to sustain them. Argument by Derek Parfitt, who really didn't like the conclusion but couldn't see a way around it. (The answer I think is abandon the concept of the greater good as incoherent.)
[ 13. April 2013, 11:43: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Squibs:
Lincoln did not exist.
Nice, thanks.
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Nine times out of ten, when a Christian apologist starts going on about subjective morality and absolute morality, they're talking rubbish. The words 'subjective' and 'absolute' are great generators of confusion - nine times out of ten the person using them doesn't know what they're trying to say.
Agreed.
quote:
Or to put it another way, can a humanist construct a roughly coherent moral structure in such a way that he or she would be able to address moral dilemmas without rationalising what he or she would have done anyway?
Yes. Golden rule vs raw selfishness. And before you say that's such an edge case, I'm going to point out that this is no different from Christianity where through biblical exegesis and finding reasons to support what they were already doing a lot of Christians and a lot of Christian thought came down pro-slavery.
quote:
One of the humanist arguments against religion in public life is that arguments appealing to private revelation cannot be challenged by people who disagree. But how can humanists avoid the charge that their moral arguments are similarly based in private conviction and cannot be challenged?
Because humanists don't fall back on The Bible and God Says. They merely fall back on "My understanding is..." You might not be able to challenge a humanist successfully but there is no reason in principle why you can't. There is no humanist equivalent to "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." Or to Leviticus 20:9-16 (for some reason people only ever cite Leviticus 20:13).
Christians in my experience break into two groups - one sort looks to Christianity for guidance, and these are not inherently different from humanists in how you reason with them. The other sort looks to the bible for Answers. And it's those that you can't challenge - the so-called biblical literalists or those who can say "The Church says it, I believe it, that settles it." If the Bible (or the Catechism or the teachings of Whoever, or Personal Revelation) are where you start, there's no fundamental difference from humanists. If they are where you finish, it's almost impossible to challenge without challenging the whole belief structure.
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Originally posted by Dafyd:
I'm sorry: I really don't know whether what you mean by 'categorical imperative' is the same as what everyone else means.
Thing you must take into account first, overriding all other constraints.
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At least, with the Sermon on the Mount you can rule some things out altogether. (Retaliation for wrongs done to oneself is pretty hard to square away.)
There are some things that just cannot count as loving your neighbour. Dropping napalm on them can't. Does 'aspiring to the general good of humanity' mean enough that anything can't count as that? Napalming villagers might be taken as justified by the greater good.
Auto-da-fe (both punishment and penance) on the other hand actually works under Christian morality. This is admittedly because the concept of Hell is addinga huge flaw to the whole of Christian morality.
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(Is a future in which a small population of humans living blissfully in harmony with the environment a greater good than one in which many humans live on a planet just barely able to sustain them? There is in fact a coherent argument that the second is better.(*))
There is - and as long as you make your axioms clear and say they are just as far as you have reached they can be argued with.
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The concept of God doesn't work like that. (God doesn't have value; God confers value. For that matter, God doesn't have aspects.)
God confers value because God's value is off the scale. And as for not having aspects, that depends in part on your understanding of the Trinity, and in part on your understanding of aspects.
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You can't say x is doing that because he loves God rather than because x loves his neighbour. Loving your neighbour is what loving God amounts to in practice.
You're making a leap of logic there. Loving your neighbour is only the second commandment in Christianity - and there are plenty of ways people think they can show their love for God without loving their neighbour (see building ridiculously extravagant churches) or love their neighbour in ways that are harmful to them because it will save their neighbour from hell.
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Argument by Derek Parfitt, who really didn't like the conclusion but couldn't see a way around it. (The answer I think is abandon the concept of the greater good as incoherent.)
The first way round it is margin-of-error. If we have as many humans as the planet is able to sustain at a given time we have nothing when something goes wrong. The second is how do we assess the greater good. He's obviously decided to do it additively rather than multiplicitavely or for those already there. The third is that he's obviously defining happiness as goodness - which as your only axis leads to drugging the water supply.
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
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Its nice to have Justinian around since I mostly agree with him and he writes more clearly than I can.
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Originally posted by Dafyd:
Is that the case for any reasonable moral system? Not really. A moral system has be able to persuade people who don't agree with it, and also has to be open to challenge.
I don't think 'subjective' is the right word for what you're trying to say about secular morality. I don't think it's the right word for what you're trying to say about Biblical interpretation either. Because someone can argue about Biblical interpretation.
If a moral system is open to challenge and relies on persuasion, and will actually change when its shown to be ineffective, for example when confronted with facts about nature, it sounds very good to me. What I mean by subjective is that you have to start from a point of view, and you can't use science and logic to prove once and for all and to all people that your assumptions are correct. Those assumptions have to feel right to you and hopefully to many people. But you can't never forget that that is what they are and as such may be subject to change. About Biblical interpretation, the fact that you can argue does not mean that you will ever stop arguing. Each person will bring their own point of view or that of their sect and that means to me that the conclusions that they reach that way are subjective.
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Originally posted by Dafyd:
Or to put it another way, can a humanist construct a roughly coherent moral structure in such a way that he or she would be able to address moral dilemmas without rationalizing what he or she would have done anyway?
As Justinian said, Christians rationalize that way all the time. Its a very human thing to do. Even we Buddhists do that too.
And its also very human to hope for a moral system that is free from that. But this is what I mean about moral systems being subjective. You can't really do that. Not perfectly not for all time. You can get closer to the ideal. But nobody without "perfect" self knowledge is aware of all their blind spots and prejudices. And whole cultures are not exempt from that either as history clearly shows.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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Originally posted by Justinian:
I could quibble with the example and point out that one of the biggest PR problems the French Revolution had was that the people being executed by them mostly were literate, connected, and many were capable of writing.
That applies to the people killed in the Terror in Paris, many of whom had been part of the Revolution before they got caught up in the violence. Most of the violence occurred outside Paris to people in the provinces, often before the Terror proper.
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But some tools are easier to turn to the use of the powerful - Monotheism being the belief that there is one central most important figure of the universe is a particularly easy one.
For a broad sense of monotheism, broad enough to include systems where the theism is merely analogical, I might agree. Call such systems monologic. So that it is structured round a single source of value, such as the people, or reason, or humanity or so on. Of course, the same features make such systems available for the use of the powerless as well.
(Non-monologic systems in such terminology would include pre-philosophical paganism on the one hand, and post-Nietzschean postmodernism on the other.)
As such values go, the practical evidence is that Christianity is relatively resistant to the powerful. Come the Enlightenment, despots largely abandoned Christianity for deism. The ruling classes in China and Japan have never taken much to Christianity.
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You are confusing the map with the territory. Game Theory is a tool that can be used to investigate the real world and for which you need to attempt to take account of unquantifiables - if you fail to do so then the map doesn't match the territory. In which case what's wrong is the map.
Doesn't that amount to what I was saying: game theory is a map that doesn't match the territory? It's not just that game theory cannot take account of things that aren't quantifiable under the rules of the game; it's that it quantifies them anyway.
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If it's a choice between a coherent ethical system that doesn't match up to humans and a set of useful ethical guidelines that do I'll take the guidelines every time.
I feel that the choice is being presented as too stark, in such a way as to justify a set of approximations that are far too loose. To be useful a set of ethical guidelines must be sufficiently coherent that you can launch a critique from them without incurring the charge of special pleading.
Posted by Truman White (# 17290) on
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Ikkuyu. You said
What I mean by subjective is that you have to start from a point of view, and you can't use science and logic to prove once and for all and to all people that your assumptions are correct.
Isn't that most things in the universe? How much does 'science and logic... prove once and for all' anyway? Notwithstanding all those issues that are outside the remit of science, science itself only gives us a current view based on existing knowledge. Even in areas that are properly the preserve of the scientific method, the degree of disagreement between scientists is evidence enough of its inability to prove very much 'once and for all'.
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
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Originally posted by Truman White:
Isn't that most things in the universe? How much does 'science and logic... prove once and for all' anyway? Notwithstanding all those issues that are outside the remit of science, science itself only gives us a current view based on existing knowledge. Even in areas that are properly the preserve of the scientific method, the degree of disagreement between scientists is evidence enough of its inability to prove very much 'once and for all'.
I agree with this.
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Originally posted by Dafyd:
Firstly, I don't think the Buddhist perspective is relevant to humanists who aren't Buddhists,unless it persuades them to become Buddhists.
Its at least as relevant as the Christian perspective. I think humanists enjoy being well informed.
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Originally posted by Dafyd:
Secondly, at least one Buddhist on these boards
(I can't remember who) recently said that Buddhists think all goods are illusory -
the greater good of humanity presumably being included in that.
I don't presume to speak for all Buddhists as I am sure you don't claim to speak for all Christians, that being said, as far as I can tell without reading what that other Buddhist said, the notion of all "goods" being illusory is based on the idea of non-attachment to views.
This, in my limited understanding means that notions such as the common good,
justice etc. can be usefull as far as they go but no further.
If you make an Idol of them, make them into fixed notions. They become
less an less usefull as they move further away from reality.
If your idea of the common good becomes unable to fit with what is realy going on, you change it.
One of the causes of suffering according to Buddhism is clinging to fixed ideas about things. If you cling to an idea long after it ceased being usefull, suffering is bound to happen. Of course this does not mean that you can't have ideas or opinions about things if you are Buddhist, you are just expected to hold them lightly.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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Originally posted by Ikkyu:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Firstly, I don't think the Buddhist perspective is relevant to humanists who aren't Buddhists,unless it persuades them to become Buddhists.
Its at least as relevant as the Christian perspective. I think humanists enjoy being well informed.
I enjoy being well-informed too. But I couldn't lift a quote from the Dhammapada and claim it for Christianity unless I could show that it fitted into Christian tradition.
Being informed about Christianity is one thing; saying in one breath that one doesn't need religious values to be good and then quoting the sermon on the mount in the next would be another.
Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on
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Originally posted by Dafyd:
]That applies to the people killed in the Terror in Paris, many of whom had been part of the Revolution before they got caught up in the violence. Most of the violence occurred outside Paris to people in the provinces, often before the Terror proper.
You're missing the point. The Ancien Regime was based on violence to keep the serfs down. I'm questioning whether the Revolution was more violent or was simply violent against the people who bought ink by the barrel.
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Doesn't that amount to what I was saying: game theory is a map that doesn't match the territory? It's not just that game theory cannot take account of things that aren't quantifiable under the rules of the game; it's that it quantifies them anyway.
No map, in order to be comprehensible, is able to both fully match the territory and be comprehensible by a human mind. You seem to think that admitting something is a map is a flaw. Me, I think any "Coherent system of ethics" is inherently hubristic as humans are simply not capable of understanding all the interactions they can have due to not being more complex than their own minds.
You basically have three choices.
- Do the best you can using maps you know to be imperfect and interpolating with what you know to be best estimates while accepting and accounting for the fact it is flawed.
- Con yourself that you really do have a coherent ethical system that is both simple enough to understand and apply and comprehensive enough to be generally applicable.
- Throw the baby out with the bathwater.
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I feel that the choice is being presented as too stark, in such a way as to justify a set of approximations that are far too loose. To be useful a set of ethical guidelines must be sufficiently coherent that you can launch a critique from them without incurring the charge of special pleading.
The trouble here is that you're jumping in at the SMBC Porpoise costume critique level of the Golden Rule. The sort created from semantic games that miss the point rather than trying to grasp the whole intent.
Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on
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Originally posted by Dafyd:
They could dismiss the argument that the late stage fetus resembles independent human life as sentimental - wittering on about its sweet fingers and toes to paraphrase one humanist.
However, if they then dismiss the argument against late abortion on the grounds that it's sentimental do you then have any grounds for a comeback when someone defends factory farming by saying that your objections to that are sentimental?
I'm not much of a philosopher, but in either case, my answer would be the same. First, could not one just as easily dismiss an aversion to homicide itself as sentimentality? Second, whether we call it sentimentality or not, it strikes me as sound psychology to suppose that cultivating an aversion to killing animals or beings reminiscent of humanity will prevent actual homicides. I can't cite any studies to that effect offhand, other than to recall how dramatically the simple step of superimposing an image of a man over the bull's eye for target practice reduced the inhibitions of soldiers against shooting actual enemies in battle.
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
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Originally posted by Dafyd:
I enjoy being well-informed too. But I couldn't lift a quote from the Dhammapada and claim it for Christianity unless I could show that it fitted into Christian tradition.
Being informed about Christianity is one thing; saying in one breath that one doesn't need religious values to be good and then quoting the sermon on the mount in the next would be another.
When I quoted the Dhammapada my point was that claiming that the choice is only between Christian values and Nihilism ignores many alternative viewpoints. And I am not claiming the Dhammapada for humanists since I am a Buddhist and I cited the source. But I would not mind if an argument from Buddhism helped a humanist live better.
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Originally posted by Justinian:
No map, in order to be comprehensible, is able to both fully match the territory
and be comprehensible by a human mind. You seem to think that admitting something
is a map is a flaw. Me, I think any "Coherent system of ethics" is inherently hubristic
as humans are simply not capable of understanding all the interactions they can have due
to not being more complex than their own minds.
I love this. Don't confuse the map for the territory, don't confuse the finger pointing at the Moon for the Moon.
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Originally posted by Justinian:
Do the best you can using maps you know to be imperfect and interpolating with what
you know to be best estimates while accepting and accounting for the fact it is flawed.
This approach makes perfect sense to me. I would add that taking a critical look at the maps
that have been used for millenia by many people can be a part of that approach. You can find inspiration and cautionary tales on your way to creating your own map.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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Originally posted by Justinian:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Doesn't that amount to what I was saying: game theory is a map that doesn't match the territory? It's not just that game theory cannot take account of things that aren't quantifiable under the rules of the game; it's that it quantifies them anyway.
No map, in order to be comprehensible, is able to both fully match the territory and be comprehensible by a human mind. You seem to think that admitting something is a map is a flaw.
I think that not matching the territory is a flaw. You can be abstract from the territory, but if you start marking terrain as smooth going when it's an impassable bog you're beginning to be less than useful.
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Me, I think any "Coherent system of ethics" is inherently hubristic as humans are simply not capable of understanding all the interactions they can have due to not being more complex than their own minds.
Complete is not the same as coherent.
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You basically have three choices.
- Do the best you can using maps you know to be imperfect and interpolating with what you know to be best estimates while accepting and accounting for the fact it is flawed.
- Con yourself that you really do have a coherent ethical system that is both simple enough to understand and apply and comprehensive enough to be generally applicable.
- Throw the baby out with the bathwater.
We can go along with that. The difference between us is you think you're going for option one, while I think you're going for an amalgam of two and three.
Two, because you react to criticism by dismissing it as semantic stuff about porpoise games.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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Originally posted by Ikkyu:
Don't confuse the map for the territory, don't confuse the finger pointing at the Moon for the Moon.
In the case of human nature, the map is part of the territory.
An example, due to Michael Sandel: a nursery in Israel was having a problem that a few parents left their children there for longer than nursery hours so that the staff had to stay on. The nursery decided to introduce a fine to discourage them. The result was that the problem got worse: more parents left their children more often.
What had happened is that by introducing the fine the nursery had changed the nature of the transaction. Instead of asking parents to show consideration for the staff, the nursery had turned the relationship into one governed by game theory. And under game theory the payoff of leaving children minus fine was greater for many parents than the payoff of picking up children on time.
Justifying morality using game theory changes the nature of the morality that you're trying to justify.
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
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Originally posted by Dafyd:
What had happened is that by introducing the fine the nursery had changed the nature of the transaction. Instead of asking parents to show consideration for the staff, the nursery had turned the relationship into one governed by game theory.
Are those parents really using game theory to decide? In my view the change was from a system based on empathy to a system based on Capitalism.
It changed from "do I care about the employees?" to "Can we afford this?", from "we are providing for your children because we care" to "we are a business".
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Originally posted by Dafyd:
Justifying morality using game theory changes the nature of the morality that you're trying to justify.
This actually gives Justinian more ammunition.
We are trying do describe ourselves. Any position we take is inherently subjective and will affect what we are trying to describe.
Also we need to first agree on what is the territory we are trying to map.
There are at least three different problems here. Explaining what people do in real life? Something like game theory could be useful of course you need more.
Finding a way to motivate them to do what you want? Of course, the reason why people do what they do will have an effect on their real actions. But probably less than what they think If you were to ask them. We find reasons for a lot of what we do after we do it. This has been mentioned before in more than one thread.
In the nursery case. The problem of the admins was to motivate people to do what they wanted.
Inserting money into the mix clearly did not help.
Appealing to their compassion towards the workers might have been better. Or perhaps understanding better why the parents were late. Maybe their work schedules?
Finding an Objective moral theory that covers every conceivable situation in the best possible way? Doubtful, since we can't even agree on what's best.
Which leaves us with Justinian's choice 1.
Posted by anteater (# 11435) on
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Justinian:
I've appreciated your posts and have only not replied because I was away, with only an iPad. YMMD but I can't get on with the iPAd for content generation. Still . .
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Because humanists don't fall back on The Bible and God Says. They merely fall back on "My understanding is..." You might not be able to challenge a humanist successfully but there is no reason in principle why you can't. There is no humanist equivalent to "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." Or to Leviticus 20:9-16 (for some reason people only ever cite Leviticus 20:13).
Can I just mount a complaint first that once again you are having to dig into texts of over 2,000+ years antiquity to quote a principle that no mainstream christian would take as present guidance.
But still if all you are trying to establish is that Christians would seek to persecute some opinions then you are correct and don't need to delve into the past.
But one of the concerns that I have is that although non-believers may have genuine personal beliefs, they will not seek to impose them, due to a felt lack of justification, due to the idea that any form of repression is wrong or at least very suspect. So we drift into Brave New World.
Given that we now no longer believe that witches exist then to get back to that mindset we would need to think of, say, people to give free drugs to kids to get them hooked. Of course witches don't exist, unscrupulous drug dealers do, and whilst I assume you would not impose capital punishment, you presumably would not permit such a person to be at large, plying their trade. Same with many pimps.
The issue only becomes an issue when you have a viewpoint, which you do not believe can be proved scientifically AND you seeks to impose it.
Quite probably, in the example I chose, you could mount a good enough argument, although the scientific argument against sex as a business is not clear to me.
But the issue becomes trickier went it comes to allowing groups to organise for the promotion of view you thinks are vile. Would you allow, for example, an openly anti-semitic and racist political party to exist? Many would because of the idea that free speech is an inalienable right. I don't believe that.
BTW the one point you made that did surprise me was your view that all advocates of eugenics are necessarily nasty. That is not my experience of such people I have known.
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