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Source: (consider it)
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Thread: How does stuff 'exist'? And does God exist the same way?
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Calleva Atrebatum
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# 14058
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Posted
I asked a friend at dinner last night if God existed: they said 'yes God does exist and no God doesn't exist.'
Now, to my mind, that seems silly: we have two options about ontology vis-a-vis God's existence:
A: God does exist
B: God does not exist
Both of these are ontological concerns. The position of everyone, surely, is that A *or* B must be true. There can't be a position where both A *and* B are true, or where there's some third category, a sneaky C, where God 'exists' in some other, uncommon way. Can there?
Now, the epistemological options, what we human beings know, seem to me to run as follows:
1: God exists, and I believe God exists (for reasons X, Y, Z etc.)
2: God does not exist, and I believe God exists (for reasons X, Y, Z, etc.)
3: God does not exist, and I believe God does not exist (for reasons Q, P, R etc.)
4: God exists, and I believe God does not exist (for reasons Q, P, R, etc.)
5: God exists, and I assert that knowledge of this is impossible (agnosticism).
6: God does not exist, and I assert that knowledge of this is impossible (agnosticism).
Now, the way we know that something is true - the only way - is that it corresponds to an external existing reality. And if it doesn't, then it's false. There's no way, is there, that some same proposition, P, can be simultaneously true and false....? So, the epistemology of persons 1 and 3 is correct, of persons 2 and 4 is false, and persons 5 and 6, although epistemologically they're choose agnosticism, they must, surely, agree that either A or B (above) is true, but not both.
Finally (sorry, this has been a long post) I remember studying and never understanding a guy called Tillich who said something along the lines of 'God doesn't exist, but is "existence itself."' Can anyone shed any light on what he meant?!
Many thanks, Ship.
[ 28. December 2013, 11:35: Message edited by: Calleva Atrebatum ]
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Offence is taken, it is not given.
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EtymologicalEvangelical
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# 15091
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Calleva Atrebatum
Now, the way we know that something is true - the only way - is that it corresponds to an external existing reality. And if it doesn't, then it's false.
But if this is so, then what about the coherence theory of truth, which stands in contrast to the correspondence theory that you have outlined?
Furthermore, what do you mean by external existing reality? What about the self that is accessed through consciousness? Am I external to myself? And if not, do I then not exist, or rather is my existence not true?
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You can argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome': but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome, but I'm not saying this is true'. CS Lewis
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Calleva Atrebatum
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# 14058
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
quote:
But if this is so, then what about the coherence theory of truth, which stands in contrast to the correspondence theory that you have outlined?
Hmmm... well, if I've understood the 'coherence' theory described here, my initial instinct is to say: it's wrong. That's not what 'true' and 'false' mean, and not what any person commonly accepts them to be. True statements are those which have their correspondence in reality.
[ 28. December 2013, 15:40: Message edited by: Calleva Atrebatum ]
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Offence is taken, it is not given.
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Martin60
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# 368
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Posted
God thinks it. He doesn't think Himself.
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Love wins
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Honest Ron Bacardi
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# 38
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Posted
Calleva Atrebatum - it seems quite likely that your friend may have been referring to the apophatic tradition of what we cannot say about God.
Trying to put it in a nutshell, the POV is that strictly speaking we cannot say that God exists because existence is a property of created things, and God is not that.
But try The Mighty Oracle™ for more details. It is a tradition going back at least to the Cappadocian fathers.
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Anglo-Cthulhic
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Palimpsest
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# 16772
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Posted
You left out
God may or may not exist and I do not assert I know.
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Dafyd
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# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Calleva Atrebatum:
A: God does exist
B: God does not exist
Both of these are ontological concerns. The position of everyone, surely, is that A *or* B must be true. There can't be a position where both A *and* B are true, or where there's some third category, a sneaky C, where God 'exists' in some other, uncommon way. Can there?
Yes and no. There are a number of ways in which the phrase 'God exists' works differently from the kinds of things we think about when we otherwise use the word 'exists'. For example, about for anything we say exists it is possible to say 'X exists but X might not have existed'. That's not true for God. For things that exist it's possible to count them - that's not true for God either. There couldn't be more than one of God. Creation exists because God creates it; it exists because God loves it. God doesn't create God. God is the source of God's own existence; all other things have their source in God.
So there are a number of ways in which God does not exist in the usual manner.
quote:
Now, the way we know that something is true - the only way - is that it corresponds to an external existing reality. And if it doesn't, then it's false. There's no way, is there, that some same proposition, P, can be simultaneously true and false....?
The Duke of Wellington defeated Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo. True, surely? But if you look at it in more detail, the Prussians had a role. And of course the ordinary soldiers on both sides took part. So that our starting sentence might be true enough for purpose in a school essay, but true enough to be part of a history of the Napoleonic Wars.
Do your ideas of God correspond to the reality of God? No - God is infinitely other than anything we can think. We can only draw our ideas about God from God's creation. So there's no statement we can make about God's existence that will be absolutely true - our ideas about God are always signs pointing us deeper into the mystery. In that sense too we can never say that what we mean by God is adequate to correspond to God.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
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HCH
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# 14313
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Posted
I have two reactions to this. I do not claim to be a philosopher.
One reaction is this. It may be true that a statement cannot simultaneously be both true and false, but is it necessarily true that every statement is classifiable? I suspect Kurt Godel might have something to say about this. I recall the old saying "a deep truth is a statement whose logical negation is a deep truth".
My other reaction is that this ignores the concept of faith as a choice. I think there are people who would agree that we cannot "know" whether God does/does not exist, but who nonetheless choose to believe in God. This may not be rational, that is, not a behavior available to a computer, but it is eminently human. A common way to sabotage the faith of such a person is to insist on "rational" behavior.
In graduate school, I remember studying topos theory, in which one can have truth values much more varied than just true and false. (I have not kept up to date with it.)
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que sais-je
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# 17185
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Calleva Atrebatum:
I asked a friend at dinner last night if God existed: they said 'yes God does exist and no God doesn't exist.'
Now, to my mind, that seems silly: we have two options about ontology vis-a-vis God's existence:
One example that occurs to me is a computer game. Suppose some super programmer designed a new game. It has simulated players in a simulated world. Maybe the players are nothing like their creator and the world nothing like the world of their creator.
She sets up the game so the players can think, gives them free will, lets them interact with the simulated world.
The players develop, discover that throwing a stone into the air causes it to behave in a particular way and begin to discover a science of their world. Probably in time they wonder if their world has always existed. They argue, fight, die and so on.
At least that is what happens from their point of view. They can make claims like "That mountain exists" and confirm it with impeccable philosophical/scientific arguments.
Does their world 'exist'? Does it exist in the same way the programmer's world exists? Remember the simulation world seems entirely real to the beings in it, as real as ours seems to us. But they can never discover they are a program in a computer, or that they are just a pattern of electrical charges or whatever.
The programmer's world may be very different, obey different laws, have a different sort of time, maybe 1000 years in the computer is like a day to the programmer.
But the game runs as long as the programmer chooses - the players never know what really causes them to continue to exist.
One day the programmer wonders if she is a simulation in someone else's computer. Oh well, time to do the washing up. Turn off the computer ...
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"controversies, disputes, and argumentations, both in philosophy and in divinity, if they meet with discreet and peaceable natures, do not infringe the laws of charity" (Thomas Browne)
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EtymologicalEvangelical
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# 15091
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Calleva Atrebatum
Hmmm... well, if I've understood the 'coherence' theory described here, my initial instinct is to say: it's wrong. That's not what 'true' and 'false' mean, and not what any person commonly accepts them to be. True statements are those which have their correspondence in reality.
It's interesting that you declare the coherence theory to be 'wrong' while employing that very same theory to draw that conclusion. The reason you say that this theory is false is not because it fails to correspond to an "external reality", as if there ever could be an external 'thing' called "the coherence theory of truth" (or "the correspondence theory" for that matter), but because you believe it to be logically incoherent. If this is not the way you have drawn your conclusion then perhaps you could point me to an external reality (in the same epistemic category as tree, dishwasher and donkey, for example) called "the correspondence theory of truth". After all, you are claiming that that theory is 'true'; but in what sense is it true according to your theory?
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You can argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome': but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome, but I'm not saying this is true'. CS Lewis
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chris stiles
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# 12641
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Furthermore, what do you mean by external existing reality? What about the self that is accessed through consciousness? Am I external to myself? And if not, do I then not exist, or rather is my existence not true?
There a number of Theories of Everything (Tegmark, Deutsch etc) in which there would be no practical difference between coherence and correspondence.
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EtymologicalEvangelical
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# 15091
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by chris stiles
There a number of Theories of Everything (Tegmark, Deutsch etc) in which there would be no practical difference between coherence and correspondence.
Whether that is the case or not, it doesn't change the fact that the correspondence theory of truth is self-refuting, in that the idea which is being promoted as 'true' - namely the theory in question - does not fulfil its own criterion for verification. This idea is not an external object in reality, in the same way that a donkey, tree and planet is.
Does the "correspondence theory of truth" correspond with anything in reality? If so, what is the object to which it corresponds?
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You can argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome': but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome, but I'm not saying this is true'. CS Lewis
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Dafyd
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# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
quote:
Originally posted by Calleva Atrebatum
Hmmm... well, if I've understood the 'coherence' theory described here, my initial instinct is to say: it's wrong. That's not what 'true' and 'false' mean, and not what any person commonly accepts them to be. True statements are those which have their correspondence in reality.
It's interesting that you declare the coherence theory to be 'wrong' while employing that very same theory to draw that conclusion. The reason you say that this theory is false is not because it fails to correspond to an "external reality", as if there ever could be an external 'thing' called "the coherence theory of truth" (or "the correspondence theory" for that matter), but because you believe it to be logically incoherent. If this is not the way you have drawn your conclusion then perhaps you could point me to an external reality (in the same epistemic category as tree, dishwasher and donkey, for example) called "the correspondence theory of truth". After all, you are claiming that that theory is 'true'; but in what sense is it true according to your theory?
Er... are you really meaning to defend the coherence theory of truth?
The correspondence theory does not require that the reality that a true statement corresponds to is knowable or empirically accessible or in the same epistemic category as trees. All it requires is that the reality is there independently of the linguistic usage of the speaker.
Strictly the correspondence theory of truth properly so called requires there to be exactly one fact that corresponds to any true proposition, which is clearly rubbish. But that's not sufficient to establish the truth of the coherence theory.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
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Dafyd
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# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Whether that is the case or not, it doesn't change the fact that the correspondence theory of truth is self-refuting, in that the idea which is being promoted as 'true' - namely the theory in question - does not fulfil its own criterion for verification.
The correspondence theory of truth is not a theory of verification. It has no criterion for verification. Verification is irrelevant. It is a theory of truth. The clue is in the name.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
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Tortuf
Ship's fisherman
# 3784
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Posted
Calleva Atrebatum, have you considered that God might just be Schrodinger's God?
It does not seem to me that God, and the existence of God, can be described by a binary equation. Even one such as yours.
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Martin60
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# 368
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Posted
Does the thinker think themself?
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Love wins
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Evensong
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# 14696
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Calleva Atrebatum:
Now, the way we know that something is true - the only way - is that it corresponds to an external existing reality.
<SNIP>
Finally (sorry, this has been a long post) I remember studying and never understanding a guy called Tillich who said something along the lines of 'God doesn't exist, but is "existence itself."' Can anyone shed any light on what he meant?!
Somewhere around the 16th or 17th century (? - Decarte? ) God became a bit of a watchmaker in European theology. She made the watch to work and then left it. The existence of the world was separate from God. It could survive on its own.
God (according to Tillich) is the "ground of our being".
I would wager ( though I do not definitely know - I have not studied the man's philosophy much ) he was harping back to the time when creation, existence and God were not separate things.
We (creation) only exist because God willed it so and continues to will it so.
Personally this is what I still believe. If God did not exist, we would not exist.
It's a bit like this picture.
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a theological scrapbook
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Tortuf
Ship's fisherman
# 3784
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard:
Does the thinker think themself?
Martin,
Cogito ergo sum. Rene Descartes, looking to prove his existence, came up with that. It doesn't mean he created himself, it just proves he is.
The questions in the OP remind me of the debate going on (and on and on) at Nicaea. Was Jesus part of creation, or uncreate? How could you ever prove your answer and why do you care?
It also reminds me of this.
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chris stiles
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# 12641
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Does the "correspondence theory of truth" correspond with anything in reality? If so, what is the object to which it corresponds?
This is the 'can God make a rock so heavy that he can't lift it' level of philosophy.
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EtymologicalEvangelical
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# 15091
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by chris stiles
This is the 'can God make a rock so heavy that he can't lift it' level of philosophy.
Maybe so. But it is not as low as the level of 'philosophy' that makes statements (usually of the "throw away one liner" variety) without being able to support them with any kind of argument, as in the case of the one I am responding to now.
Do try again...
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You can argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome': but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome, but I'm not saying this is true'. CS Lewis
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Martin60
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# 368
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Posted
Hmmmm Tortuf. As Russell 'proved' all Descartes demonstrated was thought exists.
Rock doesn't think, therefore it isn't?
Hmmmmmmmmm. I'm not being helpful here am I?
Can it be helped. My question above was Russell's barber paradox. If God thinks everything (nice Evensong), does He think Himself?
Only in the sense the Jesus is the eternally begotten uncreated Son made created flesh.
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Love wins
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chris stiles
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# 12641
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Maybe so. But it is not as low as the level of 'philosophy' that makes statements (usually of the "throw away one liner" variety) without being able to support them with any kind of argument, as in the case of the one I am responding to now.
Do try again...
Dafyd already pointed out the problem above, you are committing a category error which is sophistry - in the strictest meaning of the term.
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que sais-je
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# 17185
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Whether that is the case or not, it doesn't change the fact that the correspondence theory of truth is self-refuting, in that the idea which is being promoted as 'true' - namely the theory in question - does not fulfil its own criterion for verification. This idea is not an external object in reality, in the same way that a donkey, tree and planet is.
Does the "correspondence theory of truth" correspond with anything in reality? If so, what is the object to which it corresponds?
I'd say the correspondence theory of truth is a definition of how some people use the words 'true' and 'false'. Not every statement is a proposition (i.e. having the property of being true or false). Definitions are 'meta-philosophical' they tell us how we are going to do our philosophy.
The most famous example of this is probably Ayer's Verification Criteria: "Statements are either a priori, verifiable or meaningless". Is the Verification Criteria a priori, verifiable or meaningless? None, it is what Ayer considers a criteria for meaningfulness, not a statement. If you have a different criteria you'll get a different philosophy.
What Ayer doesn't do is explain what he is doing (though in the introduction to the second edition he weasels around a bit). Use any theory of truth you like - just tell us which one.
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"controversies, disputes, and argumentations, both in philosophy and in divinity, if they meet with discreet and peaceable natures, do not infringe the laws of charity" (Thomas Browne)
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que sais-je
Shipmate
# 17185
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard:
My question above was Russell's barber paradox. If God thinks everything, does He think Himself?
Kant (I think) argued that thought implied change (after thinking you know something new - if only that you just had a thought). A God who thinks is therefore not omniscient, because she learns new things, and so not God. So if God is omniscient She has always already thought everything which can be thought.
I don't understand it either.
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"controversies, disputes, and argumentations, both in philosophy and in divinity, if they meet with discreet and peaceable natures, do not infringe the laws of charity" (Thomas Browne)
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Garasu
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# 17152
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by que sais-je:
The most famous example of this is probably Ayer's Verification Criteria: "Statements are either a priori, verifiable or meaningless". Is the Verification Criteria a priori, verifiable or meaningless? None, it is what Ayer considers a criteria for meaningfulness, not a statement. If you have a different criteria you'll get a different philosophy.
I can't see how that saves him. He's saying that any statement must be either a priori, or verifiable, or meaningless. What he's said is clearly a statement (calling it a criterion doesn't change that) so, if he's right it's one of them.
If it's not one of them, he's not right.
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"Could I believe in the doctrine without believing in the deity?". - Modesitt, L. E., Jr., 1943- Imager.
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Dafyd
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# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Garasu:
I can't see how that saves him. He's saying that any statement must be either a priori, or verifiable, or meaningless. What he's said is clearly a statement (calling it a criterion doesn't change that) so, if he's right it's one of them.
If it's not one of them, he's not right.
I think que sais-je is claiming that it's a procedural rule. That is, Ayer is stipulating how he is going to use the words 'verifiable' and 'meaningless'. That's not in violation of his formula. I'm not convinced that que sais-je is right as an exegesis of Ayer. But que sais-je's interpretation is certainly coherent in its own right.
A problem would come when someone, maybe Ayer himself, supposes that what Ayer means by 'meaningless' is the same with the same consequences as what ordinary English means by 'meaningless'. Such a supposition would be a fallacy of equivocation. But without such a supposition, logical positivism becomes far less interesting as a philosophy than its advocates proclaimed.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
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Garasu
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# 17152
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Posted
In that case, doesn't it become a form of a priori statement?
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"Could I believe in the doctrine without believing in the deity?". - Modesitt, L. E., Jr., 1943- Imager.
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Grokesx
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# 17221
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Posted
quote:
But without such a supposition, logical positivism becomes far less interesting as a philosophy than its advocates proclaimed.
A point which Ayer himself would not have disagreed with. When asked in the seventies what were the main problems with logical positivism, he said something like nearly all of it was false.
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For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
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que sais-je
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# 17185
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Garasu:
In that case, doesn't it become a form of a priori statement?
Not in Ayer's terms. He says an a priori statement is one which is true "solely in virtue of the meaning of it's constituent symbols" [p21]. So "Every even number >= 4" can be written as the sum of two primes" is a priori because once you know the meanings of the words you know it is in theory knowable whether it's true without any empirical evidence being gathered - it's the sort of problem maths deals with even if we can't actually prove it at the moment (or maybe ever).
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
I think que sais-je is claiming that it's a procedural rule. That is, Ayer is stipulating how he is going to use the words 'verifiable' and 'meaningless'. That's not in violation of his formula. I'm not convinced that que sais-je is right as an exegesis of Ayer. But que sais-je's interpretation is certainly coherent in its own right.
And I can't find where Ayer says it so maybe I invented that! I really don't like LTL - maybe I put words into Ayer's mouth. Too late at night to search for it.
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
A problem would come when someone, maybe Ayer himself, supposes that what Ayer means by 'meaningless' is the same with the same consequences as what ordinary English means by 'meaningless'. Such a supposition would be a fallacy of equivocation. But without such a supposition, logical positivism becomes far less interesting as a philosophy than its advocates proclaimed.
Ayer uses 'meaningless', 'not factually significant' and 'nonsense' at various times. The claim that what cannot be verified is without meaning appears in various forms. Elsewhere Logical Positivists defined 'meaning' in various ways. And the Criteria change within the Logical Positivist movement (of which - outside of England - LTL was not very important). The Stanford Enc. of Philosophy has all the gory details.
I was only using it as an example, my point was that Coherence or Correspondence theories of truth are attempts to define what we are talking about. They are no more provable or disprovable than Euclid's "A line is length without breadth" (which he gives as a definition). It is true if you are doing Euclid's Geometry.
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"controversies, disputes, and argumentations, both in philosophy and in divinity, if they meet with discreet and peaceable natures, do not infringe the laws of charity" (Thomas Browne)
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Dafyd
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# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Garasu:
In that case, doesn't it become a form of a priori statement?
I think some philosophers would argue that all a priori statements are stipulations about meaning. I suppose you might say the difference is that between propositions and axioms in an axiomatic system. A proposition can be false or not yet proven; an axiom cannot be false.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
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Dafyd
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# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by que sais-je:
I was only using it as an example, my point was that Coherence or Correspondence theories of truth are attempts to define what we are talking about. They are no more provable or disprovable than Euclid's "A line is length without breadth" (which he gives as a definition). It is true if you are doing Euclid's Geometry.
That would be ok if philosophy was merely engaged in constructing axiomatic systems with no relevance to lived practice. But usually we become interested in philosophy because we're interested in questions such as 'what can I know?', or more particularly, how to resolve ethical disagreements or disagreements about, say, the status of religious or political or economic truth claims. It won't do merely to say that economics defines truth in economics by stipulation as it pleases, since people base decisions upon economic theory. (The idea that a theory can stipulate its definition of truth seems to me implicitly coherentist.) What we're trying to elucidate in theories of truth is the uses of 'true' in all the contexts above.
I don't think Euclid's definitions can be said to be either true or false. Statements that such is the definition within Euclid's geometry are true, but those are statements about Euclidean geometry, not statements within Euclidean geometry.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
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que sais-je
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# 17185
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
That would be ok if philosophy was merely engaged in constructing axiomatic systems with no relevance to lived practice.
Increasingly that seems to be what academic philosophy is about.
quote:
or more particularly, how to resolve ethical disagreements or disagreements about, say, the status of religious or political or economic truth claims.
I would say that philosophy gives you tools to spot the flaws in systems, I can't think of a case where it has given an indubitable answer.
Have you come across Hamann? One of the few philosophers to really take on board Hume's scepticism about induction. Where Ayer (and most modern philosophers) have to pretend that induction works without our really knowing why, and Russell says it is an independent logical principle, neither provable nor falsifiable. Hamann would say something like "You mean it's an act of faith - so how is that acceptable but my act of religious faith isn't?". He's a weird and wonderful figure - he accepts as Hume said that most of what we call knowledge is just belief often inspired by emotional attitudes, often rationalising rather than rational. Hamann seems to find that liberating.
quote:
I don't think Euclid's definitions can be said to be either true or false. Statements that such is the definition within Euclid's geometry are true, but those are statements about Euclidean geometry, not statements within Euclidean geometry
Which is a much better way of putting what I was trying to say. And the same for the Criteria of Verification.
Calleva Atrebatum: apologies for getting off the subject. The Tillich book you mentioned may be "The Courage to Be". He's influenced by existentialism so focuses on things like choice and authenticity. I liked the book but the weakest part for me was his trying to link a kind of Christian existentialism and 'the Ground of Being' (Heidigger-ish?).
[ 30. December 2013, 12:38: Message edited by: que sais-je ]
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"controversies, disputes, and argumentations, both in philosophy and in divinity, if they meet with discreet and peaceable natures, do not infringe the laws of charity" (Thomas Browne)
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que sais-je
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# 17185
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by leo:
quote:
Originally posted by que sais-je:
"The Courage to Be". He's influenced by existentialism so focuses on things like choice and authenticity. I liked the book but the weakest part for me was his trying to link a kind of Christian existentialism and 'the Ground of Being' (Heidigger-ish?).
That was the best bit of the book for me.
De gustibus non est disputandum.
[ 30. December 2013, 15:07: Message edited by: que sais-je ]
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"controversies, disputes, and argumentations, both in philosophy and in divinity, if they meet with discreet and peaceable natures, do not infringe the laws of charity" (Thomas Browne)
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Gwai
Shipmate
# 11076
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by que sais-je:
quote:
Originally posted by leo:
quote:
Originally posted by que sais-je:
"The Courage to Be". He's influenced by existentialism so focuses on things like choice and authenticity. I liked the book but the weakest part for me was his trying to link a kind of Christian existentialism and 'the Ground of Being' (Heidigger-ish?).
That was the best bit of the book for me.
De gustibus non est disputandum.
Please provide a translation.
Gwai,
Purgatory Host
[ 30. December 2013, 15:32: Message edited by: Gwai ]
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A master of men was the Goodly Fere,
A mate of the wind and sea.
If they think they ha’ slain our Goodly Fere
They are fools eternally.
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EtymologicalEvangelical
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# 15091
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by chris stiles
Dafyd already pointed out the problem above, you are committing a category error which is sophistry - in the strictest meaning of the term.
Not at all.
I suppose you might have a point if you could come up with a definition of 'truth' in the absence of the reality of mind and the content of mind. And you might like to explain how inference works (on which all knowledge is based) without the coherence theory of truth.
Good luck with that.
(BTW... funny how you call this 'sophistry', when, in fact, this subject is at the very heart of philosophy.)
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You can argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome': but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome, but I'm not saying this is true'. CS Lewis
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Dafyd
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# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by que sais-je:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
That would be ok if philosophy was merely engaged in constructing axiomatic systems with no relevance to lived practice.
Increasingly that seems to be what academic philosophy is about.
I would have said that the high point of that approach was the nineteen seventies. Since then I think the tide has been turning.
quote:
quote:
or more particularly, how to resolve ethical disagreements or disagreements about, say, the status of religious or political or economic truth claims.
I would say that philosophy gives you tools to spot the flaws in systems, I can't think of a case where it has given an indubitable answer.
There's the point that, contrary to people's usual assumptions, moral relativism enables moral condemnation rather than the reverse.
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Have you come across Hamann?
I've read Berlin's book on Hamann. Berlin expounds a number of areas where Hamann puts forward fruitful arguments. But he does point out that in the end if you claim all reason is rationalisation you are going to end up legitimising force or ideology as ways of settling disagreement.
quote:
quote:
I don't think Euclid's definitions can be said to be either true or false. Statements that such is the definition within Euclid's geometry are true, but those are statements about Euclidean geometry, not statements within Euclidean geometry
Which is a much better way of putting what I was trying to say. And the same for the Criteria of Verification.
Euclidean Geometry is a tightly defined and demarcated system. By contrast, I don't think one can tightly demarcate formal systems to which the Criteria of Verification can be taken to apply.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
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Martin60
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# 368
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Posted
There is no disputing of tastes: the subjective cannot be argued as right or wrong.
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Love wins
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chris stiles
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# 12641
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Posted
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Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
And you might like to explain how inference works (on which all knowledge is based) without the coherence theory of truth.
Inference requires (much more limited) forms of local coherence, it doesn't require a full blown coherence theory of truth.
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Chorister
Completely Frocked
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Posted
My first thought was that God is like Schroedinger's Cat. But I see that Tortuf has already addressed this possibility. So my second thought is that maybe human beings can (collectively) think God into existence? (i.e. turning Evensong's suggestion on its head.) Sounds rather Peter Pan-ish, but maybe also contains a grain of truth.
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Retired, sitting back and watching others for a change.
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Tortuf
Ship's fisherman
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Chorister:
My first thought was that God is like Schroedinger's Cat.
Don't worry too much that we sometimes think alike. Even the best people slip from time to time.
There are no pills for it though.
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Dafyd
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# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
I suppose you might have a point if you could come up with a definition of 'truth' in the absence of the reality of mind and the content of mind. And you might like to explain how inference works (on which all knowledge is based) without the coherence theory of truth.
I'm surprised to find you on the side of logical positivism against classical theism. Indeed, eliminative materialism can make use of the coherence theory of truth since it can relegate all the awkward knowledge claims to a second-order metalanguage which need have no grounding in reality.
What coherence theory cannot admit is the existence of God independent of human belief about God. The closest it can get is either Nobodaddy or else Fichtean idealism, neither of which is any ally for theism.
Both of your claims for the coherence theory of truth depend upon a false opposition. Just because the coherence theory of truth has it that truth only occurs in mind or in language does not mean that rejection requires that truth has no relation to mind or to language. Truth is the right relation of the mind or of language to things. The problem with coherence is not that it includes the mind pole; it's that it rejects the relation to things. Likewise, just because inference can be made where coherence is necessary for truth, does not mean that coherence is sufficient for truth.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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que sais-je
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# 17185
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
I've read Berlin's book on Hamann. Berlin expounds a number of areas where Hamann puts forward fruitful arguments. But he does point out that in the end if you claim all reason is rationalisation you are going to end up legitimising force or ideology as ways of settling disagreement.
The SEP entry, which is much more modern, has a different take on Hamann (but who's to say which is more accurate). Russell says similar things to Berlin about giving up on reason. I'm not convinced. People who believe in objective truth, attainable by reason, also fight wars and oppress others. In fact they are better able to justify their actions: there is one truth, we know it, you don't and in your own best interest we have to correct you. Wars and massacres follow.
But suppose someone believes all reason is rationalisation, should they be discouraged from saying so? Isn't that the implication of Russell's and Berlin's viewpoint?
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"controversies, disputes, and argumentations, both in philosophy and in divinity, if they meet with discreet and peaceable natures, do not infringe the laws of charity" (Thomas Browne)
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by que sais-je:
People who believe in objective truth, attainable by reason, also fight wars and oppress others. In fact they are better able to justify their actions: there is one truth, we know it, you don't and in your own best interest we have to correct you. Wars and massacres follow.
They can't be better able to justify their actions. Someone who believe reason is rationalisation can equally say that there is one truth, we know it, you don't, and in your own best interest we have to correct you. Merely believing reason is rationalisation cannot prevent you from saying that. It can allow you to dismiss criticism.
(It's easier to be a rational absolutist if you have a foundationalist-axiomatic conception of reason, rather than a dialogic conception. But even there you have to be at least in theory open to the idea that someone could offer rational criticism of your position.)
quote:
But suppose someone believes all reason is rationalisation, should they be discouraged from saying so? Isn't that the implication of Russell's and Berlin's viewpoint?
Either all reason is rationalisation or it isn't. If they're wrong, then the idea is open to criticism. If they're right, then any discouragement of the idea can be rationalised. Either way, the idea can be criticised.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
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leo
Shipmate
# 1458
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Gwai:
quote:
Originally posted by que sais-je:
quote:
Originally posted by leo:
quote:
Originally posted by que sais-je:
"The Courage to Be". He's influenced by existentialism so focuses on things like choice and authenticity. I liked the book but the weakest part for me was his trying to link a kind of Christian existentialism and 'the Ground of Being' (Heidigger-ish?).
That was the best bit of the book for me.
De gustibus non est disputandum.
Please provide a translation.
Gwai,
Purgatory Host
Since s/he hasn't, it seems to mean that you can't/shouldn't argue over matters of taste.
I think you can - Bach is more complex than Lady Gaga (musically if not psychologically).
However, when i said that the 'ground of being' was the 'best bit for me', I wasn't merely saying that I 'liked' it but that it spoke to my condition as it does for many other people.
Without Tillich, the notion of 'God' is meaningless for most people. Hence John Robinson's 'Honest to God' sold in its millions.
[ 31. December 2013, 13:25: Message edited by: leo ]
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My Jewish-positive lectionary blog is at http://recognisingjewishrootsinthelectionary.wordpress.com/
My reviews at http://layreadersbookreviews.wordpress.com
Posts: 23198 | From: Bristol | Registered: Oct 2001
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que sais-je
Shipmate
# 17185
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Gwai:
Please provide a translation.
My apologies, I didn't see your post. And thanks to leo for the translation; Bristolians stick together!
quote:
Originally posted by leo:
I think you can - Bach is more complex than Lady Gaga (musically if not psychologically).
I see, your taste is for the more complex, mine for the less, but as they say "To each, his/her own"
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"controversies, disputes, and argumentations, both in philosophy and in divinity, if they meet with discreet and peaceable natures, do not infringe the laws of charity" (Thomas Browne)
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que sais-je
Shipmate
# 17185
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by leo:
Which seems to say that everything is relative and there is nothing objective.
You've prompted me to pick up "The Courage to Be" again. I've had it since I was the sort of person who adds the date bought: 1975. I think I read it about 20 years ago as well. I will read it again on the basis of your comments. I may well change my opinion of it.
It didn't make me believe, but I've hung onto it for for nearly 40 years so it must have something ....
Not sure we've contributed to the OP's question but I've enjoyed it and been reminded of a good book.
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"controversies, disputes, and argumentations, both in philosophy and in divinity, if they meet with discreet and peaceable natures, do not infringe the laws of charity" (Thomas Browne)
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Calleva Atrebatum
Shipmate
# 14058
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by leo:
However, when i said that the 'ground of being' was the 'best bit for me', I wasn't merely saying that I 'liked' it but that it spoke to my condition as it does for many other people.
Ummm, I'm not sure I understand. Does this mean that if I say God is the 'Ground Of Our Being' then that means that God is just a word we humans use to describe the things of supreme value, significance or importance...?
So, if I value, say, my son or my girlfriend above all and everything else, then those people are, effectively, God, and when I value and esteem and love and care for them, I'm worshipping God?
Have I understood rightly what Tillich et. al. are getting at with the 'ground of our being' notion?
And, if I have, then are there not two major problems with this notion of God:
1) All people radically value different things differently - there's no collective, shared human 'valuing' of the same stuff in the same ways. If I value, say, gambling and pornography more deeply and profoundly than anything else, then these things are indeed God.
2) The God that's just a word-for-stuff-we-value isn't a God who is worthy of worship in any way! The only God worthy of worship is the supra-existent Being (he doesn't have to be omni-everything to be worthy of worship, I'm happy with some of the thoughts of process theology, but if he doesn't BE in a very real and objective way, she's not a Being we could ever worship or pray to or hope for salvation from.
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Offence is taken, it is not given.
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