Ship of Fools: ‘Platonism good, Aristotelianism bad’?

Thread: ‘Platonism good, Aristotelianism bad’? Board: Oblivion / Ship of Fools.

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Posted by k-mann (# 8490) on :

As a Lutheran, I often hear that Transubstantiation should be rejected because it’s ‘only philosophy’ and/or because it’s an ‘unbiblical term.’ The word ‘philosophising’ is also thrown around, together with claims that the categories of substance and accident aren’t helpful and that we should embrace ‘mystery.’ But the same arguments are completely forgotten the second they defend the Nicene Creed. Why are none of these people saying that the category of homousios is ‘unhelpful’? Why is it all of a sudden OK to use philosophy when a Nicean Father does it? And why is the category of substance all of a sudden ‘helpful’ (since they acknowledge that Christ is of ‘one substance with the Father’)?

Is it just a case of ‘Platonism good, Aristotelianism bad’? Why is it that using philosophy is wrong, in principle, when it comes to the Scholastics and the Eucharist, while it is of utmost importance when it comes to Church Fathers and Christology? Have any of you wondered the same? (I am Lutheran, btw.)

Posted by chris stiles (# 12641) on :

quote:
Originally posted by k-mann:
As a Lutheran, I often hear that Transubstantiation should be rejected because it’s ‘only philosophy’ and/or because it’s an ‘unbiblical term.’

Because (at least in the Lutheran scheme), transubstantiation is an attempt to explain 'how' rather than 'what'.

Posted by stonespring (# 15530) on :

Wasn't there a period in Lutheran theology in the 1600's or so called Lutheran Scholasticism?

Posted by Yonatan (# 11091) on :

Personally, I find a lot of Aristotle's philosophy more helpful than Plato's. As to the wider question, over the ages, many different types of philosophy have been used to articulate Christian truths to people e.g. Existentialism or Idealism. If you are going to discuss, justify, articulate and explore Christianity, it's virtually impossible confine youself to Christian ideas or language, since these are the very things which are being explored. There is precedent for this in the use of the term 'Logos' by John in his prologue.

If people find the use of philosophy good in some cases and bad in others, I think that is probably due to whether they approve of the ideas which are being justified or explored.

[ 15. April 2014, 17:52: Message edited by: Yonatan ]

Posted by StevHep (# 17198) on :

It might be the case that suspicion of philosophy is an expression of a suspicion of reason as a helpful instrument to help us know and understand God. In that context the philosophy of Plato can be seen as a lesser object of suspicion because it involves a level of intuitive understanding whereas Aristotle is much more strictly systematic.

It might also be the case that since Augustine is closely associated with Christian neo-Platonism and Aquinas with neo-Aristotleanism then certain traditions are more comfortable with the one than the other as being less obviously associated with the form of Catholicism which these traditions emphatically reject.

Posted by k-mann (# 8490) on :

quote:
Originally posted by chris stiles:

quote:
Originally posted by k-mann:
As a Lutheran, I often hear that Transubstantiation should be rejected because it’s ‘only philosophy’ and/or because it’s an ‘unbiblical term.’
Because (at least in the Lutheran scheme), transubstantiation is an attempt to explain 'how' rather than 'what'.

And 'homousios' isn't?

Posted by mousethief (# 953) on :

quote:
Originally posted by k-mann:

quote:
Originally posted by chris stiles:

quote:
Originally posted by k-mann:
As a Lutheran, I often hear that Transubstantiation should be rejected because it’s ‘only philosophy’ and/or because it’s an ‘unbiblical term.’
Because (at least in the Lutheran scheme), transubstantiation is an attempt to explain 'how' rather than 'what'.
And 'homousios' isn't?

No, most obviously not. 'homoousios' is about what God *IS* not what God *DOES*. Thus, it's about WHAT and not HOW.

Posted by Zach82 (# 3208) on :

The standard account of transubstantiation isn't very good Aristotelian metaphysics, if it makes you feel better.

Posted by ken (# 2460) on :

From a biologists point of view, Plato crap, Aristotle ambiguous.

Posted by mdijon (# 8520) on :

quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
No, most obviously not. 'homoousios' is about what God *IS* not what God *DOES*. Thus, it's about WHAT and not HOW.

True, but on the original question I'm missing the moral blue water between WHAT and HOW.

Posted by cliffdweller (# 13338) on :

I don't think it's a matter of any one particular philosopher is good or bad. Rather, it's simply that traditionally Christians consider neither Aristotle nor Plato divinely inspired, so feel free to now disagree with aspects of Christian doctrine which seems to be based more on one or the other (in Open Theism you'll find objections to both) rather than on biblical revelation. The feeling/suspicion is that Christian thought has at times been unduly influenced by Greek philosophy for cultural, rather than theological, reasons. It's not that we can't or shouldn't learn anything from voices outside the Bible or Christian tradition, it's simply that they don't hold the same authority. This is particularly helpful as we strive to understand Christianity in non-Western cultures.

Posted by mdijon (# 8520) on :

quote:
Originally posted by ken:
From a biologists point of view, Plato crap, Aristotle ambiguous.

I've occasionally thought that the concept of ideal forms is quite useful for someone doing the biological equivalent of phenomenology (which is often where we start). In biology at least this carries the possibility that at some point we will be able to look away from the wall and back at the fire to see the real definition of the thing we've been describing when we sequence something or identify a causal pathway.

Posted by ken (# 2460) on :

But the "real thing" is, say, the gene sequence itself, not some ideal from which it varies.

Ernst Mayr was big on this. And in his very different way Willi Hennig. A biological species is a hypothesis about a population of organisms. Each organism is unique. It is misleading to think of the differences between them as somehow variations from a typical or normal or ideal "wild type". The organisms themselves, or our observations of them, are the real thing.

Posted by chris stiles (# 12641) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Zach82:
The standard account of transubstantiation isn't very good Aristotelian metaphysics, if it makes you feel better.

Well, you could argue that it was a bodge job to try and reconcile largely incompatible positions (Radbertus and Ratramnus)

Posted by goperryrevs (# 13504) on :

quote:
Originally posted by cliffdweller:
I don't think it's a matter of any one particular philosopher is good or bad. Rather, it's simply that traditionally Christians consider neither Aristotle nor Plato divinely inspired, so feel free to now disagree with aspects of Christian doctrine which seems to be based more on one or the other (in Open Theism you'll find objections to both) rather than on biblical revelation. The feeling/suspicion is that Christian thought has at times been unduly influenced by Greek philosophy for cultural, rather than theological, reasons. It's not that we can't or shouldn't learn anything from voices outside the Bible or Christian tradition, it's simply that they don't hold the same authority. This is particularly helpful as we strive to understand Christianity in non-Western cultures.

Yeah. Platonic dualism has permeated cultures and therefore Christianity for a long time, and I think that our images of heaven/perfection come out of the real-of-forms philosophy, rather than an earthy Jewish concept of goodness.

Philosophy is neutral, which is fine. But often certain philosophical perspectives permeate our worldviews, and we don't realise it. We're not aware that we're seeing the world through a philosophical lens, and we don't always step back to be aware of that. So we think that certain things are solid Christian truth, rather than solid Christian truth, as seen through certain philosophical frameworks.

That's why postmodernism is such an exciting, but challenging new philosophy (or philosophies) for Christianity. People are discarding the lens of modernity for a new lens. This is neither good nor bad, but it is something that the church (which is, by and large, still in a modernist paradigm) needs to engage with.

Posted by stonespring (# 15530) on :

kmann

Do you know more about what "Lutheran Scholasticism" was, how much it had to do with Aristotelianism, and whether or not it has any influence today?

Posted by k-mann (# 8490) on :

quote:
Originally posted by stonespring:
kmann

Do you know more about what "Lutheran Scholasticism" was, how much it had to do with Aristotelianism, and whether or not it has any influence today?

I'm not especially familiar with that, I'm afraid.

Posted by Ricardus (# 8757) on :

quote:
Originally posted by chris stiles:

quote:
Originally posted by k-mann:
As a Lutheran, I often hear that Transubstantiation should be rejected because it’s ‘only philosophy’ and/or because it’s an ‘unbiblical term.’
Because (at least in the Lutheran scheme), transubstantiation is an attempt to explain 'how' rather than 'what'.

I have a feeling that transubstantiation as a Catholic doctrine only commits you to believing that the elements are really the body and blood of Christ. There is a common Thomist explanation of how this comes about, but you are not actually committed to following this. I may be wrong though.

(Also I suspect that people who complain about transubstantiation over-philosophising the faith are objecting to the Thomist version.)

Posted by stonespring (# 15530) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Ricardus:

quote:
Originally posted by chris stiles:

quote:
Originally posted by k-mann:
As a Lutheran, I often hear that Transubstantiation should be rejected because it’s ‘only philosophy’ and/or because it’s an ‘unbiblical term.’
Because (at least in the Lutheran scheme), transubstantiation is an attempt to explain 'how' rather than 'what'.
I have a feeling that transubstantiation as a Catholic doctrine only commits you to believing that the elements are really the body and blood of Christ. There is a common Thomist explanation of how this comes about, but you are not actually committed to following this. I may be wrong though.

(Also I suspect that people who complain about transubstantiation over-philosophising the faith are objecting to the Thomist version.)

RC's not only need to believe that the consecrated elements are really Christ's Body and Blood (and soul, divinity, and humanity), but also that they are no longer bread and wine, that Christ's Body and Blood are both fully present in any piece or drop of the elements (concatenation), that the consecrated elements do not go back to being bread and wine at any time until they fully disintegrate, decompose, are digested, burned, etc. I think some RC general council said that Transubstantiation is a correct term for calling what happens at consecration. However, the details of what transubstantiation means are not, as far as I know, requirements for RCs to believe.

Posted by stonespring (# 15530) on :

quote:
Originally posted by k-mann:

quote:
Originally posted by stonespring:
kmann

Do you know more about what "Lutheran Scholasticism" was, how much it had to do with Aristotelianism, and whether or not it has any influence today?
I'm not especially familiar with that, I'm afraid.

Here's the Wikipedia article on it:

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lutheran_scholasticism

It seems that mainstream Lutheran theologians of the 1600s (before Pietism changed a lot of things) were very accepting of Aristotelian logic and methods (hence the term scholasticism), even if they did not accept Roman Catholic scholastic theology.

Posted by mdijon (# 8520) on :

quote:
Originally posted by ken:
The organisms themselves, or our observations of them, are the real thing.

The organisms themselves *or* our observations?
Surely our observations are the shadows in the cave, there is a "real thing" that casts those shadows (i.e. the species we are trying to describe), and we get a better and better image of that by turning to sequence data, for instance, on top of the phenotyping observations.

Posted by ken (# 2460) on :

I was writing fast and sloppily. Yes, but remember sequences are also observations. And the reality underlying a set of observations on individuals of a species is not the species, it is the individuals. There is no such thing as "the rabbit" just lots of animals which we believe may be related in such a way as to count as a species. The species is a hypothesis made on top of observations, an interpretation of observations.

Hennig tried to make everything he said about taxonomy rigorous. If you were making a family tree of fossils you can't start by assigning them to species and giving them names and then joining the dots to make the tree. He'd want to code them for characters and make the tree of individual fossils. Phylogeny first, taxonomy later. So if someone finds fossil footprints, and teeth, no assuming they are the same species as the nice hipbone round the corner.

Of course in a world where we can dredge up literally billions of conodont teeth, you sometimes have to sort first.

Posted by Ricardus (# 8757) on :

Isn't the issue that there are multiple interpretations of Plato, the Republic being a distinctly slippery text?

I think mdijon is describing Kantianism - you can never know with certainty anything about even an individual rabbit, only about the impressions an individual rabbit makes on our sensory apparatus.

Scotism I think believes there exists in some sense an ideal rabbit that is somehow independent of any individual rabbit.

Bertrand Russel argued for a non-mystical version of this which I think started from the premise that any statements we make about rabbits in general will be true of an idealised or generic rabbit rather than of a specific rabbit.

Posted by mdijon (# 8520) on :

quote:
Originally posted by ken:
The species is a hypothesis made on top of observations, an interpretation of observations.

Which is another aspect that seems very reminiscent of the cave to me. We have hypotheses that we can test by observation and interpretation, and sometimes reject, but never actually prove. And we know that these hypotheses are only ever models of what is real, approximations that may or may not be useful. (All models are false, some are useful as Box said).

(PS I've no idea how this fits with Kantianism by the way).

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Ricardus:
I think mdijon is describing Kantianism - you can never know with certainty anything about even an individual rabbit, only about the impressions an individual rabbit makes on our sensory apparatus.

Scotism I think believes there exists in some sense an ideal rabbit that is somehow independent of any individual rabbit.

I do not know a lot about Duns Scotus. What you describe sounds like what is usually called Platonism, but has been held in various forms by a lot of philosophers.

Kantianism on the other hand claims not merely that we can't know with certainty, but that we can be certain that we can't know. Kant would also argue that we can't know what impressions are made on our sensory apparatus either. What we think we are directly aware of is an intellectual and rational construction out of the raw data. (Such trivial things as time and space are our sensory apparatus's way of sorting the data it receives. Such trivial things as number are our intellect's way of sorting the data further.)

Posted by k-mann (# 8490) on :

quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:

quote:
Originally posted by k-mann:

quote:
Originally posted by chris stiles:

quote:
Originally posted by k-mann:
As a Lutheran, I often hear that Transubstantiation should be rejected because it’s ‘only philosophy’ and/or because it’s an ‘unbiblical term.’
Because (at least in the Lutheran scheme), transubstantiation is an attempt to explain 'how' rather than 'what'.
And 'homousios' isn't?
No, most obviously not. 'homoousios' is about what God *IS* not what God *DOES*. Thus, it's about WHAT and not HOW.

'Transsubstantiatio,' if true, explains HOW the elements of the Eucharist are the body and blood of Christ. 'Homousios', if true, explains HOW the Son and the Father relates.

[ 18. April 2014, 10:13: Message edited by: k-mann ]

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