Thread: "The Heresy of Modernism" Board: Oblivion / Ship of Fools.


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Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
Spinning out of a thread in Dead Horses...

quote:
Originally posted by IngoB:
quote:
Originally posted by Robert Armin:
With them, I have the feeling that we are talking about a common faith, a seeking after God in which we all share. IngoB, I hate to say it, but I do not have that feeling with you. When you post about Catholicism it seems to be a religion as remote to me as that of the ancient Aztecs.

Beats me why you are shy about saying this. The feeling is entirely mutual, and I consider this to be more praise than insult.

We seem to be living in a time where a particular heresy, let's call it modernism, has become so dominant and widespread that it actually starts to overcome prior divisions due to heresy and schism. I usually have little hope for Christian unity, but if there is one thing that could bring together RCs, Eastern Orthodox, Lutherans, Calvinists, ..., Copts, Syriac Orthodox, ..., heck, perhaps even Muslims (which might have been a strand of the Ebionite heresy) and Jews, then it is that. Seriously.

Given my beliefs where the Church is at, I think the most important showdown will happen within the RCC. But that does not mean that there isn't a bigger picture. These sure are interesting times in religion, and perhaps (perhaps!) even apocalyptic ones. Certainly one can argue that a new world religion is emerging, a new Westerndom, even if it is not identifiably monolithic as Christendom used to be. [/QB]

I'm awfully curious about this, IngoB, so: How would you define this heresy of modernism, and how do you see it overcoming other divisions between not only Christians but between Christians and non-Christians?
 
Posted by Ahleal V (# 8404) on :
 
Modernism has been around a while now.

x

AV
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
But modernism is dead in the water, isn't it? Its funeral rites were read a while ago. It seems odd to resurrect a corpse, in order to denounce it.
 
Posted by Mark Betts (# 17074) on :
 
I thought we were supposed to be living in a POST-modern age, modernism having died out in the 1980s or 90s. The new religious fad for post-modernism is (from what I can see) the "Emerging Church" or "Fresh Expressions".

I cannot speak from experience, but I understand doctrine, dogma and liturgy are very much a "do your own thing" - it doesn't seem to matter to them.
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
Well, of course the problem with calling something "modern" is that it will be passed by something later, so after "post-modern" we'll have "post-post-modern" in that sense with no end to it. [Ultra confused] But I mean what IngoB means by it here, since he seems to have something specific in mind (and I don't know if he means the New Advent definition linked above).
 
Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on :
 
I daresay that Ingo is too precise to call anything as recent as that "modern." Weren't popes lamenting "modernism" when they propounded indexes of forbidden books over a century ago? Post-modernism is probably an even greater threat in most respects, although I see a few silver linings in the cloud.
 
Posted by IngoB (# 8700) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
I'm awfully curious about this, IngoB, so: How would you define this heresy of modernism, and how do you see it overcoming other divisions between not only Christians but between Christians and non-Christians?

First, when I say modernism here, I would include "post-modernism" as a particular strand of it. That's because I don't intend to label something clearly defined, but more a fairly diffuse "spirit of the age". It's intended as a time & place-based label, something like post-enlightenment-ism or perhaps Western-ideology-after-the-18thC-ism.

It is also not just a single thing. Just like "rock" does not indicate just a single kind of music. But one can identify strong themes within it, that tend to get recombined and which re-emerge in ever new variations, just like there is punk rock and heavy metal and then grunge etc. Labels for major themes of modernism can be given, like humanism, materialism, positivism, utilitarianism, hedonism, ... and perhaps like we can say that all "rock" was born as "rock 'n' roll", so we can say that all modernism was born out of nominalism 'n' anti-teleology (sorry, note quite as catchy).

How does modernism unify Christians? Well, pretty much by stating that the old division do not really matter. Those sectarian concerns are mere labels (nominalism) which fade into obscurity against the need to help people (humanism) in an optimal way (utilitarianism) , where their well-being can be determined (positivism) in terms of how the get along in the world (materialism & anti-teleology) and how they feel about it (hedonism).

Perhaps most interestingly though, this does not only unify the modernists. It also unifies the opposition. It is the good, old "the enemy of my enemy is my fried" principle at work. Basically, traditionalists (and, if you wish, "fundamentalists") of all kinds start to notice that it is only their former sectarian enemies who share their growing unease with the modernist advance. I consider it quite possible, for example, that we will see both the RCC and the Eastern Orthodox suffer major schisms, with the "anti-modernist" parts formally reuniting into one Church. (The modernist parts probably wouldn't unite formally, because they don't have to. That's just not so important to them.)

Of course, if that is all too wishy-washy, you can return to Saint Pius X and his Errors of the Modernists and Oath Against Modernism. But I actually think that it is a mistake to be that concrete here. Being wishy-washy is a core characteristic of modernism, and if one tries to clamp down too hard on any one aspect, modernism will slip out of one's grasp.

[ 15. July 2014, 21:51: Message edited by: IngoB ]
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
So then... are you saying that there's no specific doctrine or philosophy per se in modernism that you're arguing against? [Confused]
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
(I mean, I can see specifically disagreeing with nominalism and positivism, for instance.)
 
Posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard (# 368) on :
 
The heresy of pre, non, un or anti modernism is that it legalistically freezes the trajectory of Christianity from Judaism back over 1900 years from when it just started and injects in all sorts of weird self-serving patriarchal stuff.
 
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on :
 
In one thing I agree with IngoB. In conversations I have with progressive Muslims, I often feel that I have more in common with them than with conservative Christians. I don't see why this would be a bad thing.

I don't feel that we're united by a common enemy though. Contrary to what IngoB may be thinking, we don't spend our time dissing the Catholic Church. Most of our discussions are about what (small) things we can do to promote peace in the Middle East.
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
It probably doesn't help (in terms of clarity on this issue) that here in the US (as I've been going on about ad nauseam on other threads on the Ship), we have this bizarre alliance between a certain type of "conservative" politics and "conservative" religion, with a lot of propaganda stating that "real" Christians wouldn't want to be anything other than extreme Republicans, who often seem to be advocating policies right out of Ayn Rand (not exactly a Christian in any sense of the word). Over in the UK and elsewhere it's not all like that. But in the US, from a lot of the same sorts of, bluntly, not very nice people, we get a lot of attacks on some of the things I think you may be characterizing as "modernist," in the name of being "traditional"/"conservative"/etc.--even if many theologically conservative/traditional/etc. Christians elsewhere believe those are good things to have, such as helping the poor. (Some of the people on the right wing--again, I'm speaking specifically of within the US--are positively shrieking at Pope Francis' statements about the need to do more to improve the lot of the weaker and poorer people in society.)
 
Posted by IngoB (# 8700) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
So then... are you saying that there's no specific doctrine or philosophy per se in modernism that you're arguing against? [Confused]

I can argue against the specific doctrines of an individual modernist, but modernism as such (in my sense) is not clearly defined enough to allow a general response. At best one can pick one of the more common modernist ideas and argue against that. But there inevitably will be some modernists who agree with your critique, and then turn around and be modernist about something else.

In short, "modernism" is not false in the sense of say Pelagianism, but rather in the sense of Greco-Roman paganism.
 
Posted by Gramps49 (# 16378) on :
 
This is a dead horse. Rebury it.
 
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by IngoB:
We seem to be living in a time where a particular heresy, let's call it modernism, has become so dominant and widespread that it actually starts to overcome prior divisions due to heresy and schism.

quote:
Originally posted by IngoB:
I can argue against the specific doctrines of an individual modernist, but modernism as such (in my sense) is not clearly defined enough to allow a general response.

Isn't that a bit contradictory? At first modernism is "a particular heresy", but then it's "not clearly defined enough", which seems odd for something so "particular". A dominant and widespread vagueness?

quote:
Originally posted by A. Modernist:
Down with stuff!
Up with other stuff!

[Big Grin]
 
Posted by Oscar the Grouch (# 1916) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:

quote:
Originally posted by A. Modernist:
Down with stuff!
Up with other stuff!

[Big Grin]
Now that's my kind of protest movement! Where do I sign up?
 
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Oscar the Grouch:
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
quote:
Originally posted by A. Modernist:
Down with stuff!
Up with other stuff!

[Big Grin]
Now that's my kind of protest movement! Where do I sign up?
At the place, near the thing.
 
Posted by StevHep (# 17198) on :
 
Modernism is a heresy which I think priests still take an oath to oppose. What it consists of is most clearly laid out in the encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis of Pius X. It is not so much a coherent philosophy or theology as it is the spirit of the age. Pope Benedict XVI identified its current dominant strain as Relativism. Essentially it denies the existence of an absolute truth which is knowable to man and makes personal individual truth the measure of everything. In some ways it is a continuation by other means of the Protestant notion that private judgement of Scripture takes precedence over Sacred Tradition and the consensus of the Church.
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
Isn't that a bit contradictory? At first modernism is "a particular heresy", but then it's "not clearly defined enough", which seems odd for something so "particular". A dominant and widespread vagueness?

quote:
Originally posted by A. Modernist:
Down with stuff!
Up with other stuff!

[Big Grin]
Yeah, I'm having trouble making sense of this. [Frown] I'm not sure I'd call something as vague as this a heresy.

quote:
Originally posted by IngoB:At best one can pick one of the more common modernist ideas and argue against that. But there inevitably will be some modernists who agree with your critique, and then turn around and be modernist about something else.
How exactly can we clarify "modernist" beyond "stuff I or my church doesn't agree with"? And I say this as someone who has gleefully and snarkily referred to things from the Enlightenment era as "modernist," and with (I am afraid, for which I must repent) self-righteous scorn. (Knowing that one's position is a rare and minority one can encourage a certain type of arrogance, regardless of whether one's position is, in fact, correct.) (Side note: I personally genuinely do think we started getting some terrible and false ideas during the Enlightenment period--and I have absolutely (and, as mentioned above, deliberately snarkily--referred to That Sort Of Thing as "modernist"--but I don't want to derail the thread.)

quote:
In short, "modernism" is not false in the sense of say Pelagianism, but rather in the sense of Greco-Roman paganism.
Then why call it a heresy--and why not just focus on the individual notions (positivism, etc.) rather than grouping them all together?

quote:
Originally posted by StevHep:
Modernism is a heresy which I think priests still take an oath to oppose. What it consists of is most clearly laid out in the encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis of Pius X. It is not so much a coherent philosophy or theology as it is the spirit of the age. Pope Benedict XVI identified its current dominant strain as Relativism. Essentially it denies the existence of an absolute truth which is knowable to man and makes personal individual truth the measure of everything.

This is a bit more helpful, though, um, honestly, I think the snark about Protestants is perhaps less helpful. I also think that the worldly "spirit of the age" is perhaps always going to have its own false notions, dangers, and problems--perhaps even swinging wildly from one extreme to another as people try to correct the mistakes of their forefathers, and the next generation does the same, and so on.

Looking at PASCENDI DOMINICI GREGIS, there seems to be a lot of... ah... direct accusation of conscious malice on the part of people who hold the notions Pius X is arguing against. Can't people who don't agree, who are even Very Very Wrong Indeed, just be, you know, honestly mistaken? [Confused]
 
Posted by StevHep (# 17198) on :
 
I think Pius X was focussing his ire mostly on those Catholics, particularly priests, who were continuing to promote modernist ideas within the Church as if they were compatible with orthodoxy. By the time of the encyclical it had been made pretty plain that modernism had no place in the Church and those who wished to propagate it should leave. It was fundamentally dishonest to stay within the Church as a priest with a vow of obedience while being consciously and deliberately disobedient. This irked the Holy Father. There is room for a civil reasoned debate between Catholicism and modernism but that would be on a basis of two groups each external to the other.
 
Posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider (# 76) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by IngoB:


How does modernism unify Christians? Well, pretty much by stating that the old division do not really matter. Those sectarian concerns are mere labels (nominalism) which fade into obscurity against the need to help people (humanism) in an optimal way (utilitarianism) , where their well-being can be determined (positivism) in terms of how the get along in the world (materialism & anti-teleology) and how they feel about it (hedonism).

Call me a heretic, but all the above sounds like a damned good thing to me that the world could do with more of. Happy people getting on with one another - I'm really struggling to find what's terrible about this. Sounds like heaven.
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by StevHep:
I think Pius X was focussing his ire mostly on those Catholics, particularly priests, who were continuing to promote modernist ideas within the Church as if they were compatible with orthodoxy. By the time of the encyclical it had been made pretty plain that modernism had no place in the Church and those who wished to propagate it should leave. It was fundamentally dishonest to stay within the Church as a priest with a vow of obedience while being consciously and deliberately disobedient. This irked the Holy Father. There is room for a civil reasoned debate between Catholicism and modernism but that would be on a basis of two groups each external to the other.

Doesn't this kind of beg the question of whether "modernism" is coherent enough to be a heresy--indeed, coherent enough to be mutually exclusive with orthodoxy?

And, again, there's a difference between being maliciously destructive and honestly mistaken. The kind of imagined desire on the part of the dissenting people (priests or otherwise) to damage the faith seems ... like something I hardly ever see in the real world.

Obviously, something like (again) positivism or various kinds of existentialism are clear enough that one can say, "This claims this; however, our Christian faith teaches this," but I'm still a tad confused by the whole "modernism as something coherent enough to be lumped together and attacked." And I've wrestled with this; I believe one has to be very wary of saying "this is modernism and therefore false" but meaning "this is anything comparatively recently historically that I don't personally like, or in some cases am not sure I fully understand."
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider:
Happy people getting on with one another - I'm really struggling to find what's terrible about this. Sounds like heaven.

I wholeheartedly agree with this part--less so with the positivism and such. But to me the whole idea that people should try to help one another and make the world a better place seems kind of central to acting like a Christian to me. [Smile]
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
Relativism, comparative religion and a general distain of tradition I think is a fair description of modernism. And if no one here thinks modernists never conspired against against a common enemy.....Vatican II.
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by StevHep:
Modernism is a heresy which I think priests still take an oath to oppose.

Not anymore. It was dropped with the introduction of the semi-Protestant Vactican II liturgy.
 
Posted by Mark Betts (# 17074) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by StevHep:
Modernism is a heresy which I think priests still take an oath to oppose. What it consists of is most clearly laid out in the encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis of Pius X. It is not so much a coherent philosophy or theology as it is the spirit of the age. Pope Benedict XVI identified its current dominant strain as Relativism. Essentially it denies the existence of an absolute truth which is knowable to man and makes personal individual truth the measure of everything. In some ways it is a continuation by other means of the Protestant notion that private judgement of Scripture takes precedence over Sacred Tradition and the consensus of the Church.

I liked Pope Benedict XVI - it is a pity some people wouldn't listen to him more. [Overused]
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Mark Betts:
quote:
Originally posted by StevHep:
Modernism is a heresy which I think priests still take an oath to oppose. What it consists of is most clearly laid out in the encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis of Pius X. It is not so much a coherent philosophy or theology as it is the spirit of the age. Pope Benedict XVI identified its current dominant strain as Relativism. Essentially it denies the existence of an absolute truth which is knowable to man and makes personal individual truth the measure of everything. In some ways it is a continuation by other means of the Protestant notion that private judgement of Scripture takes precedence over Sacred Tradition and the consensus of the Church.

I liked Pope Benedict XVI - it is a pity some people wouldn't listen to him more. [Overused]
So true.
 
Posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard (# 368) on :
 
Ah, the Golden Age of the law over ethics. So sad its passing.
 
Posted by Gildas (# 525) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider:
quote:
Originally posted by IngoB:


How does modernism unify Christians? Well, pretty much by stating that the old division do not really matter. Those sectarian concerns are mere labels (nominalism) which fade into obscurity against the need to help people (humanism) in an optimal way (utilitarianism) , where their well-being can be determined (positivism) in terms of how the get along in the world (materialism & anti-teleology) and how they feel about it (hedonism).

Call me a heretic, but all the above sounds like a damned good thing to me that the world could do with more of. Happy people getting on with one another - I'm really struggling to find what's terrible about this. Sounds like heaven.
Broadly speaking anti-modernists stress authority, hierarchy, tradition and nature and modernists stress reason, democracy, innovation and nurture. Outwith the SSPX and the Tendence Vladimir Putin wing of Orthodoxy most anti-modernists have come to some terms with the latter and, for that matter, most thoughtful modernists acknowledge some kind of place for the former. (The usual caveats about ideological legitimisation apply, of course, no-one on either side is immune to the charm of sloganeering or of watering down their doctrines when they become inconvenient). So when you come across someone claiming that the condition of modernity is a manichean clash betwixt the two, unless they have fallen through a space-time wormhole at the Battle of Stalingrad, they are probably indulging in a penchant for self-dramatisation.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Gildas:
quote:
Originally posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider:
quote:
Originally posted by IngoB:


How does modernism unify Christians? Well, pretty much by stating that the old division do not really matter. Those sectarian concerns are mere labels (nominalism) which fade into obscurity against the need to help people (humanism) in an optimal way (utilitarianism) , where their well-being can be determined (positivism) in terms of how the get along in the world (materialism & anti-teleology) and how they feel about it (hedonism).

Call me a heretic, but all the above sounds like a damned good thing to me that the world could do with more of. Happy people getting on with one another - I'm really struggling to find what's terrible about this. Sounds like heaven.
Broadly speaking anti-modernists stress authority, hierarchy, tradition and nature and modernists stress reason, democracy, innovation and nurture. Outwith the SSPX and the Tendence Vladimir Putin wing of Orthodoxy most anti-modernists have come to some terms with the latter and, for that matter, most thoughtful modernists acknowledge some kind of place for the former. (The usual caveats about ideological legitimisation apply, of course, no-one on either side is immune to the charm of sloganeering or of watering down their doctrines when they become inconvenient). So when you come across someone claiming that the condition of modernity is a manichean clash betwixt the two, unless they have fallen through a space-time wormhole at the Battle of Stalingrad, they are probably indulging in a penchant for self-dramatisation.
Nicely put, especially the comment about a manichean clash. It's often said that we're all postmodernists now, which I think is often correct. In fact, some postmodernists seem to rehabilitate religion, since although pm has criticized 'grand narratives', it has also argued for a plurality of narratives, which in some ways, discombobulates the new atheists, who would prefer religious narratives to go into the dustbin of history. That seems unlikely.

I suppose the simplest tool of postmodernism is deconstruction, and it's difficult to see how some disciplines would proceed today, without that in their armoury. Ironically, modernism (although not in the theological sense) was pulverized by these developments. Frameworks bleed!
 
Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider:
Happy people getting on with one another - I'm really struggling to find what's terrible about this.

It's more understandable when you consider that the anti-modernist churches don't have even a single fuck to give about whether people are happy or getting along with one another. All they care about is whether people are under their authority or not.
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:
Originally posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider:
Happy people getting on with one another - I'm really struggling to find what's terrible about this.

It's more understandable when you consider that the anti-modernist churches don't have even a single fuck to give about whether people are happy or getting along with one another. All they care about is whether people are under their authority or not.
Bollocks! But that's another modernist error, that if something makes us feel happy it must therefore be good and right. But then modernists are some of the most smug people you'll ever meet who love the smell of their own farts.
 
Posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard (# 368) on :
 
Indeed q on G. MtM, cruel but fair [Smile] The trouble is Christianity can only survive as a brand as long as it's Traditional AKA frozen in legalism. The cockeyed plus side is that we need these old apostate shoals to swim in.
 
Posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider (# 76) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:
Originally posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider:
Happy people getting on with one another - I'm really struggling to find what's terrible about this.

It's more understandable when you consider that the anti-modernist churches don't have even a single fuck to give about whether people are happy or getting along with one another. All they care about is whether people are under their authority or not.
Bollocks! But that's another modernist error, that if something makes us feel happy it must therefore be good and right. But then modernists are some of the most smug people you'll ever meet who love the smell of their own farts.
Nothing like a bit of generalised ad hom when all else fails. But authoritarianism is all about declaring this group or that group to be irredeemably bad; it's how it justifies putting the frighteners on anyone who steps out of line - "carry on like that and you'll end up like one of those evil people so we're doing this for your own good."
 
Posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard (# 368) on :
 
Dang K:LS, how are we to embrace the unembracable? Us raving pomo pinko affirming libruls to embrace the not?
 
Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :
 
We can't embrace them if they don't want us to. An unwanted embrace is technically assault.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
I would think that this forum itself is an expression of postmodernism. It sets out to disturb, to ruffle feathers, to lift up fences, to see what's underneath them, to interrogate, and so on. AmIrite?

As to the relation between modern and postmodernism, it's too complicated to discuss, since in art and literature, modernism was considered defunct, but has been resurrected as new modernism, but clearly in theological terms, this is quite different. Art is the art of the undead.
.
"modernism returns ghostlike, trailing philosophic counsel about how things slip inexorably in and out of style, looking bruised but unbeaten by the ravages of transit and offering instruction in disharmonious sentiment: nostalgia, threat, loss, revivification." (Martin Herbert)

#Gopussycatsgo
 
Posted by Adeodatus (# 4992) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
But that's another modernist error, that if something makes us feel happy it must therefore be good and right.

Goodness. I had no idea Aristotle was a modernist.

For me, the basic problem with anti-modernists is that they appeal to an absolute (usually revealed) truth, which - oh my! - they just happen to be the sole custodians of, right down to the last semicolon. What a coincidence! It comes back to the depressing old equation "Orthodoxy = my doxy; heterodoxy = your doxy".

I suppose 'twas ever thus and ever will be, but I'd pay a lot more attention if someone actually said, "Yes, I believe in an absolute truth, but I don't think I know what it is. Let's go and find it together."
 
Posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider (# 76) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Adeodatus:
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
But that's another modernist error, that if something makes us feel happy it must therefore be good and right.

Goodness. I had no idea Aristotle was a modernist.

For me, the basic problem with anti-modernists is that they appeal to an absolute (usually revealed) truth, which - oh my! - they just happen to be the sole custodians of, right down to the last semicolon. What a coincidence! It comes back to the depressing old equation "Orthodoxy = my doxy; heterodoxy = your doxy".

I suppose 'twas ever thus and ever will be, but I'd pay a lot more attention if someone actually said, "Yes, I believe in an absolute truth, but I don't think I know what it is. Let's go and find it together."

Would "I believe in an absolute truth, but I don't think I know what it is, and I don't think we'll ever really know, but let's see what we can find." do?
 
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on :
 
quote:
Ad Orientem: Relativism, comparative religion and a general distain of tradition I think is a fair description of modernism.
I guess I'm theologically as far removed from you as they come but I love tradition, also within my religion.

In the Netherlands it's to a large degree the alt.worship groups (like the one I'm part of) that have brought certain traditions back within the liturgy, something that has been taken over later by the more mainstream churches.

[ 16. July 2014, 11:04: Message edited by: LeRoc ]
 
Posted by Adeodatus (# 4992) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider:
Would "I believe in an absolute truth, but I don't think I know what it is, and I don't think we'll ever really know, but let's see what we can find." do?

Plenty of room for that in my doxy.
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Adeodatus:
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
But that's another modernist error, that if something makes us feel happy it must therefore be good and right.

Goodness. I had no idea Aristotle was a modernist.

For me, the basic problem with anti-modernists is that they appeal to an absolute (usually revealed) truth, which - oh my! - they just happen to be the sole custodians of, right down to the last semicolon. What a coincidence! It comes back to the depressing old equation "Orthodoxy = my doxy; heterodoxy = your doxy".

I suppose 'twas ever thus and ever will be, but I'd pay a lot more attention if someone actually said, "Yes, I believe in an absolute truth, but I don't think I know what it is. Let's go and find it together."

But Christ promises his Church that the Holy Spirit will lead it into all truth. The modernists, I suppose, just don't believe that? Of course they don't because they choose relativism and syncretism; there is no revelation, God does not reveal anything to us.
 
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on :
 
quote:
Ad Orientem: But Christ promises his Church that the Holy Spirit will lead it into all truth. The modernists, I suppose, just don't believe that?
I'm not sure if I'm a modernist, but I do.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider:
quote:
Originally posted by IngoB:


How does modernism unify Christians? Well, pretty much by stating that the old division do not really matter. Those sectarian concerns are mere labels (nominalism) which fade into obscurity against the need to help people (humanism) in an optimal way (utilitarianism) , where their well-being can be determined (positivism) in terms of how the get along in the world (materialism & anti-teleology) and how they feel about it (hedonism).

Call me a heretic, but all the above sounds like a damned good thing to me that the world could do with more of. Happy people getting on with one another - I'm really struggling to find what's terrible about this. Sounds like heaven.
As put like that it's a capitalist consumerist paradise. Which is all very well, until you realise that capitalism doesn't deliver on its promises.

Actually I'd always thought that the similarities between utilitarianism and free market stuff the poor capitalism were simply structural parallels. Now I find that Bentham and James Mill, the most prominent early utilitarians, really did think that government action to relieve poverty and boost wages was contrary to the general good, and therefore morally wrong.

So, what's wrong with all of the above is that it leads to Cameron and Osborne stamping on a human face forever.

Still I'd agree that it's preferable to conservative Roman Catholicism; if only because conservative Roman Catholicism has found itself strangely able to make bedfellows with consumer capitalism from time to time.

As an aside, Charles Taylor's book A Secular Age? is a description of how the emphasis on this-worldly ordinary life fulfilment is a development out of themes in Christian theology.

I think the problems that I'd see with what IngoB calls modernism are more what I'd call economicism - the belief that all human goods are of a sort that can be handled within an economic framework. The reason IngoB's enemy is so diffuse is because he hasn't addressed it correctly. And therefore he's seeing where it isn't and not seeing it where it is.
 
Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
But Christ promises his Church that the Holy Spirit will lead it into all truth. The modernists, I suppose, just don't believe that?

Say rather that they believe the process is still ongoing. Whereas the anti-modernist churches appear to believe that the Holy Spirit has already lead the church into all truth, and no further exploration or examination is required.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
But Christ promises his Church that the Holy Spirit will lead it into all truth. The modernists, I suppose, just don't believe that? Of course they don't because they choose relativism and syncretism; there is no revelation, God does not reveal anything to us.

Other way around. Conservatives believe that the Holy Spirit had led the church into all truth by the time of Jesus' arrest, and after that there's been no leading done.
The contrary position, that the Holy Spirit is still leading and will continue to lead us into all truth, not just those bits of truth that were settled by the speaker's adolescence, is more commonly associated with theological liberalism.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
I think accusations of heresy often flow from a loss of power and control. Those who had it, think of a heresy which the usurpers can be accused of; a kind of fatal flaw which has (because of a quirk of history) given them more power.

Cue Koestler (rough paraphrase): "Comrade, we are just saying that you have deviated from the objective road described by the party, and you are in fact facilitating the rehabilitation of a degenerate and revanchist imperialism. But comrade! It is not too late to return to the objective path mapped out by the party, under the firm leadership of comrade X. Take care!"
 
Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider:
quote:
Originally posted by IngoB:


How does modernism unify Christians? Well, pretty much by stating that the old division do not really matter. Those sectarian concerns are mere labels (nominalism) which fade into obscurity against the need to help people (humanism) in an optimal way (utilitarianism) , where their well-being can be determined (positivism) in terms of how the get along in the world (materialism & anti-teleology) and how they feel about it (hedonism).

Call me a heretic, but all the above sounds like a damned good thing to me that the world could do with more of. Happy people getting on with one another - I'm really struggling to find what's terrible about this. Sounds like heaven.
As put like that it's a capitalist consumerist paradise.
How on earth did you get that from what you quoted?
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
But Christ promises his Church that the Holy Spirit will lead it into all truth. The modernists, I suppose, just don't believe that? Of course they don't because they choose relativism and syncretism; there is no revelation, God does not reveal anything to us.

Other way around. Conservatives believe that the Holy Spirit had led the church into all truth by the time of Jesus' arrest, and after that there's been no leading done.
The contrary position, that the Holy Spirit is still leading and will continue to lead us into all truth, not just those bits of truth that were settled by the speaker's adolescence, is more commonly associated with theological liberalism.

Surely not, otherwise the Holy Spirit got it terribly wrong for two thousand years, not leading into truth but creating confusion. Either what God has revealed is true for all time or he is s liar and not God at all, for the faith was delivered once to the saints, to quote the scriptures.
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I think accusations of heresy often flow from a loss of power and control. Those who had it, think of a heresy which the usurpers can be accused of; a kind of fatal flaw which has (because of a quirk of history) given them more power.

Cue Koestler (rough paraphrase): "Comrade, we are just saying that you have deviated from the objective road described by the party, and you are in fact facilitating the rehabilitation of a degenerate and revanchist imperialism. But comrade! It is not too late to return to the objective path mapped out by the party, under the firm leadership of comrade X. Take care!"

In that case the relativism of the modernist is designed to create its own dictatorship, where we are forced to know nothing so that we can believe anything, that bad is good etc.
 
Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
Surely not, otherwise the Holy Spirit got it terribly wrong for two thousand years

Or the church did. Two different things.
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
Surely not, otherwise the Holy Spirit got it terribly wrong for two thousand years

Or the church did. Two different things.
False dichotomy. The Church is defined by the Holy Spirit. No Spirit no Church.
 
Posted by Adeodatus (# 4992) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
But Christ promises his Church that the Holy Spirit will lead it into all truth. The modernists, I suppose, just don't believe that?

Yes; we're just rather more careful about parsing the future tense.
 
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on :
 
quote:
Ad Orientem: False dichotomy. The Church is defined by the Holy Spirit. No Spirit no Church.
Are you saying that everything the church does and has done over the last 2000 years has automatically been in accordance with the Holy Spirit? Otherwise, there's very much a true dichotomy here.
 
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
But Christ promises his Church that the Holy Spirit will lead it into all truth.

All truth? Doesn't that make the Church's centuries-long battle against heliocentrism a little hard to explain?
 
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on :
 
I believe that the Holy Spirit will lead the Church into truth. I also believe that the church leaders have been (and still are) often rather terrible in listening to Her. My faith —and admittedly it's a faith against all odds sometimes— is that eventually they will.
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by LeRoc:
quote:
Ad Orientem: False dichotomy. The Church is defined by the Holy Spirit. No Spirit no Church.
Are you saying that everything the church does and has done over the last 2000 years has automatically been in accordance with the Holy Spirit? Otherwise, there's very much a true dichotomy here.
Depends what you mean by "done". The Holy Spirit certainly has led the Church into all truth via tradition, that is, the faith handed down from the Apostles as expressed in the scriptures, the holy councils, the ancient liturgies, the fathers and the lives of the saints etc.
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
But Christ promises his Church that the Holy Spirit will lead it into all truth.

All truth? Doesn't that make the Church's centuries-long battle against heliocentrism a little hard to explain?
I don't know. You'll have to ask a Roman Catholic about that.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I think accusations of heresy often flow from a loss of power and control. Those who had it, think of a heresy which the usurpers can be accused of; a kind of fatal flaw which has (because of a quirk of history) given them more power.

Cue Koestler (rough paraphrase): "Comrade, we are just saying that you have deviated from the objective road described by the party, and you are in fact facilitating the rehabilitation of a degenerate and revanchist imperialism. But comrade! It is not too late to return to the objective path mapped out by the party, under the firm leadership of comrade X. Take care!"

In that case the relativism of the modernist is designed to create its own dictatorship, where we are forced to know nothing so that we can believe anything, that bad is good etc.
That sounds odd to me, since relativism promotes pluralism. You are not forced to know nothing - how could that work? This forum - in fact, this thread - demonstrates how pluralism works quite well. You are perfectly entitled to put forward your point of view, and so am I.
 
Posted by Gildas (# 525) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I think accusations of heresy often flow from a loss of power and control. Those who had it, think of a heresy which the usurpers can be accused of; a kind of fatal flaw which has (because of a quirk of history) given them more power.

Cue Koestler (rough paraphrase): "Comrade, we are just saying that you have deviated from the objective road described by the party, and you are in fact facilitating the rehabilitation of a degenerate and revanchist imperialism. But comrade! It is not too late to return to the objective path mapped out by the party, under the firm leadership of comrade X. Take care!"

In that case the relativism of the modernist is designed to create its own dictatorship, where we are forced to know nothing so that we can believe anything, that bad is good etc.
That sounds odd to me, since relativism promotes pluralism. You are not forced to know nothing - how could that work? This forum - in fact, this thread - demonstrates how pluralism works quite well. You are perfectly entitled to put forward your point of view, and so am I.
Pluralism isn't the same as relativism. Relativism is the belief that there is no such thing as absolute truth. Pluralism is based on the belief that there may be an absolute truth but none of us are it's sole possessor. You can hold, for example, quite sincerely that Mr Cameron is the best thing since sliced custard and that Mr Miliband would be a disaster as Prime Minister whilst accepting that persons of sincerity and intelligence can hold the contrary view and that the best way of resolving the issue is to debate it extensively and then to put it to the popular vote.

Relativism is a kind of intellectual bug-a-boo in these debates as very few people are actually relativists. People who support, say, inter-faith dialogue don't do so because they think that there is nothing to choose between inter-faith dialogue and burning down mosques. They do so because they think that inter-faith dialogue is a good thing in itself. They might be wrong about this but they are not, thereby, relativists.
 
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on :
 
quote:
Ad Orientem: The Holy Spirit certainly has led the Church into all truth via tradition, that is, the faith handed down from the Apostles as expressed in the scriptures, the holy councils, the ancient liturgies, the fathers and the lives of the saints etc.
Like others have said on this thread, I believe that the Holy Spirit will lead the Church into all truth. I don't believe that She has already done so.
 
Posted by Robert Armin (# 182) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
Surely not, otherwise the Holy Spirit got it terribly wrong for two thousand years

Or the church did. Two different things.
False dichotomy. The Church is defined by the Holy Spirit. No Spirit no Church.
AO - I believe you are Orthodox, possibly of the Greek variety? Please forgive me if I am mistaken. Many years ago, when I was taught Patristics by an Orthodox priest, he said that the Church is always right, when acting as the Church. When the Church has made mistakes it was not being the Church. While this position does throw up other problems, it does recognize that the Church has been wrong at times in the past, and may well be so again in the future.
 
Posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider (# 76) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by LeRoc:
quote:
Ad Orientem: The Holy Spirit certainly has led the Church into all truth via tradition, that is, the faith handed down from the Apostles as expressed in the scriptures, the holy councils, the ancient liturgies, the fathers and the lives of the saints etc.
Like others have said on this thread, I believe that the Holy Spirit will lead the Church into all truth. I don't believe that She has already done so.
I'm forced to think this really. 500 years ago the Church thought that torturing heretics and autos da fé were a Good Thing. She no longer does; I like to think the Holy Spirit's personal position on the matter is closer to the latter than the former, so he has indeed led the Church into a truer truth since the 1500s, "Good morning Team, my name's Edmund Blackadder, and I'm the new Minister in charge of Religious Genocide."
 
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on :
 
quote:
Karl: Liberal Backslider: 500 years ago the Church thought that torturing heretics and autos da fé were a Good Thing. She no longer does; I like to think the Holy Spirit's personal position on the matter is closer to the latter than the former, so he has indeed led the Church into a truer truth since the 1500s
I think I'm being caught up in semantics here. I do believe that the Holy Spirit is trying to lead the church. Sometimes we listen to Her, but often we don't. What I don't believe is that She has finished in leading the Church to all truth.
 
Posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard (# 368) on :
 
This modernist knows that the Holy Spirit is leading us in to more truth than ever before. That is the error of the pre-ante-non-ante-un, they assume liberals reject tradition and orthodoxy. We ARE the orthodox.
 
Posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider (# 76) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by LeRoc:
quote:
Karl: Liberal Backslider: 500 years ago the Church thought that torturing heretics and autos da fé were a Good Thing. She no longer does; I like to think the Holy Spirit's personal position on the matter is closer to the latter than the former, so he has indeed led the Church into a truer truth since the 1500s
I think I'm being caught up in semantics here. I do believe that the Holy Spirit is trying to lead the church. Sometimes we listen to Her, but often we don't. What I don't believe is that She has finished in leading the Church to all truth.
I think we're broadly in agreement. I think there are errors we thought were truth hundreds of years ago (torturing heretics for example) which we no longer do.
 
Posted by IngoB (# 8700) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
Isn't that a bit contradictory? At first modernism is "a particular heresy", but then it's "not clearly defined enough", which seems odd for something so "particular". A dominant and widespread vagueness?

Call it a world view and a source of heresies then. It is particular in the sense of being fairly localisable in (cultural) space and time. As I've said, it's basically the Western mindset after the Enlightenment. But that mindset just is a mixture of various ideas and influences, and cannot really be captured in a couple of tightly defined sentences. And to repeat what I've said earlier, I do not believe that we have moved on to something else now. There have been developments, sure, not in the least because of the strenuous efforts of the West to kill itself off in two massive wars. But it is still recognisably the same intellectual mode. I consider postmodernism, for example, mostly as a cynical / skeptical form of modernism.

quote:
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
How exactly can we clarify "modernist" beyond "stuff I or my church doesn't agree with"?

I don't think that we can, at least certainly not in a few lines of text. Perhaps a book or two would do. It's like wanting a snappy characterisation of Greco-Roman paganism. But that we do not have a clear target does not mean that we do not have a problem. (Let me state clearly that I do not see my "modernism" as limited to what Pius X considered as "modernism".)

quote:
Originally posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider:
Call me a heretic, but all the above sounds like a damned good thing to me that the world could do with more of. Happy people getting on with one another - I'm really struggling to find what's terrible about this. Sounds like heaven.

I know. I deliberately phrased this in the way that modernist present their utopia.

Utopias have this nasty habit of turning into dystopias when on tries to realise them. Perhaps we have seen some of that already. At any rate, time will tell.

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
It's more understandable when you consider that the anti-modernist churches don't have even a single fuck to give about whether people are happy or getting along with one another. All they care about is whether people are under their authority or not.

That's just trash talk.

quote:
Originally posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard:
We ARE the orthodox.

Everybody is orthodox to those who share their beliefs, and heretic to those who don't. That's just what those words mean.

Well, here's a bit of scripture:

quote:
John 18:37-39
Pilate said to him, "So you are a king?" Jesus answered, "You say that I am a king. For this I was born, and for this I have come into the world, to bear witness to the truth. Every one who is of the truth hears my voice." Pilate said to him, "What is truth?" After he had said this, he went out to the Jews again, and told them, "I find no crime in him. But you have a custom that I should release one man for you at the Passover; will you have me release for you the King of the Jews?"

So there we find a man who was close to two millennia ahead of his time, and thanks to him perhaps a more concrete name for a more particular heresy that is spreading from the modern West: Pilatism. [Smile]
 
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Robert Armin:
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
False dichotomy. The Church is defined by the Holy Spirit. No Spirit no Church.

AO - I believe you are Orthodox, possibly of the Greek variety? Please forgive me if I am mistaken. Many years ago, when I was taught Patristics by an Orthodox priest, he said that the Church is always right, when acting as the Church. When the Church has made mistakes it was not being the Church. While this position does throw up other problems, it does recognize that the Church has been wrong at times in the past, and may well be so again in the future.
Pretty neat trick. Sort of like saying "I'm always right. When I'm wrong I'm not me." In a person the inability to admit mistakes is a symptom of borderline personality disorder. I'm not sure what it's called in an institution.
 
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on :
 
quote:
Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard: That is the error of the pre-ante-non-ante-un
Somehow I haven't found this one on Wikipedia's list of logical fallacies [Biased]

quote:
Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard: they assume liberals reject tradition and orthodoxy.
I've always been puzzled by this assumption. My church group is very respectful of tradition. We'll chant Psalms, we'll discuss medieval Catholic philosophers... These things aren't done that often in more traditional churches.

quote:
Karl: Liberal Backslider: I think we're broadly in agreement.
So do I.

quote:
Karl: Liberal Backslider: I think there are errors we thought were truth hundreds of years ago (torturing heretics for example) which we no longer do.
Likewise, it's safe to assume there are errors we think are truth now which we (hopefully) no longer will hundreds of years from now.
 
Posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard (# 368) on :
 
I know what the truth is IngoB. Just like you do. And yes it is His word. So no, I don't suffer from Pilatism any more than you ... we orthodox can't. Admittedly I am more orthodox than you.

[ 16. July 2014, 14:06: Message edited by: Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard ]
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Gildas:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I think accusations of heresy often flow from a loss of power and control. Those who had it, think of a heresy which the usurpers can be accused of; a kind of fatal flaw which has (because of a quirk of history) given them more power.

Cue Koestler (rough paraphrase): "Comrade, we are just saying that you have deviated from the objective road described by the party, and you are in fact facilitating the rehabilitation of a degenerate and revanchist imperialism. But comrade! It is not too late to return to the objective path mapped out by the party, under the firm leadership of comrade X. Take care!"

In that case the relativism of the modernist is designed to create its own dictatorship, where we are forced to know nothing so that we can believe anything, that bad is good etc.
That sounds odd to me, since relativism promotes pluralism. You are not forced to know nothing - how could that work? This forum - in fact, this thread - demonstrates how pluralism works quite well. You are perfectly entitled to put forward your point of view, and so am I.
Pluralism isn't the same as relativism. Relativism is the belief that there is no such thing as absolute truth. Pluralism is based on the belief that there may be an absolute truth but none of us are it's sole possessor. You can hold, for example, quite sincerely that Mr Cameron is the best thing since sliced custard and that Mr Miliband would be a disaster as Prime Minister whilst accepting that persons of sincerity and intelligence can hold the contrary view and that the best way of resolving the issue is to debate it extensively and then to put it to the popular vote.

Relativism is a kind of intellectual bug-a-boo in these debates as very few people are actually relativists. People who support, say, inter-faith dialogue don't do so because they think that there is nothing to choose between inter-faith dialogue and burning down mosques. They do so because they think that inter-faith dialogue is a good thing in itself. They might be wrong about this but they are not, thereby, relativists.

Well, I'm not saying that relativism is the same thing as pluralism. But surely, the relativist will disagree that there are absolute truths, but s/he will tend to argue with the absolutist, and will not construct a dictatorship over him, as Ad Orientem suggested. Hence, many relativists are fans of pluralism. How about anti-modernists?
 
Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :
 
Equating "modernism" with "stuff-I-don't-like-ism" (essentially a catch-all that implies that everything you don't like is part of the same grand, unified conspiracy against you) reminds me of the tendency of mid-twentieth century American conservatives to consider everything they didn't like "communism".

Labor unions? Communism.
Race mixing? Communism!
Rock 'n Roll? Definitely Communism!!!

When you use the same word to mean everything, it eventually means nothing.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
Yes, if it's everything that flowed from the Enlightenment, then we're all modernists, and in fact, probably we're all postmodernists. I see this forum as a splendid flowering of postmodernism, not because it rejects absolutes, but because it facilitates both people who accept absolutes and those who reject them, and people who don't know - to engage in sensible and mainly friendly conversation. Or as Deleuze said, in a rare moment of clarity, 'you never walk alone'.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
I just realized that I don't know if I'm a relativist or not. Ha!
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Robert Armin:
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
Surely not, otherwise the Holy Spirit got it terribly wrong for two thousand years

Or the church did. Two different things.
False dichotomy. The Church is defined by the Holy Spirit. No Spirit no Church.
AO - I believe you are Orthodox, possibly of the Greek variety? Please forgive me if I am mistaken. Many years ago, when I was taught Patristics by an Orthodox priest, he said that the Church is always right, when acting as the Church. When the Church has made mistakes it was not being the Church. While this position does throw up other problems, it does recognize that the Church has been wrong at times in the past, and may well be so again in the future.
I'm not saying that the Church cannot overstep its bounds, if that's what you mean, but it cannot err in matters concerning the faith.
 
Posted by Adeodatus (# 4992) on :
 
The problem with this, and many similar issues, is that the central theme is a circular argument -

"I'm the sole custodian of God's Truth."
"Why should I believe you?"
"Because I'm the sole custodian of God's Truth."

Those of us who see these arguments as the (at least potential) fakes that they are, are left somewhat bemused. Unless, of course, we appeal to such counsels as "by their fruits shall ye know them," at which point so many cans of worms present themselves that we really need to buy a new tin opener.
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by LeRoc:
[QUOTE]I've always been puzzled by this assumption. My church group is very respectful of tradition. We'll chant Psalms, we'll discuss medieval Catholic philosophers

But that's not tradition or necessarily respectful of it.
 
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on :
 
quote:
Ad Orientem: I'm not saying that the Church cannot overstep its bounds, if that's what you mean, but it cannot err in matters concerning the faith.
You have the right to believe that. But what you've been saying is that anyone who doesn't believe this "doesn't respect tradition" or "doesn't believe the Holy Spirit will guide the church to all truth". Now, that's a false dichotomy.
 
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on :
 
quote:
Ad Orientem: But that's not tradition or necessarily respectful of it.
Care to explain why not?
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Adeodatus:
The problem with this, and many similar issues, is that the central theme is a circular argument -

"I'm the sole custodian of God's Truth."
"Why should I believe you?"
"Because I'm the sole custodian of God's Truth."

Those of us who see these arguments as the (at least potential) fakes that they are, are left somewhat bemused. Unless, of course, we appeal to such counsels as "by their fruits shall ye know them," at which point so many cans of worms present themselves that we really need to buy a new tin opener.

The other odd angle to this, is that if you demur from the 'sole custodian' idea, you might be accused a la Ad Orientem of wanting to establish a relativist dictatorship! Eh?
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by LeRoc:
quote:
Ad Orientem: But that's not tradition or necessarily respectful of it.
Care to explain why not?
Because singing a few Psalms or discussing Aquinas isn't tradition. Neither does one have to be respectful of it per se to do so. Tradition is much larger thang signing the Psalms nor is it idle scholastic speculation.
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by LeRoc:
quote:
Ad Orientem: I'm not saying that the Church cannot overstep its bounds, if that's what you mean, but it cannot err in matters concerning the faith.
You have the right to believe that. But what you've been saying is that anyone who doesn't believe this "doesn't respect tradition" or "doesn't believe the Holy Spirit will guide the church to all truth". Now, that's a false dichotomy.
Then we must mean two completely different things by "lead into all truth", because I would also insist on that meaning that the Holy Spirit cannot contradict himself. The dead horse issues are a good example, though of course examples aren't limited to them.
 
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on :
 
quote:
Ad Orientem: Because singing a few Psalms or discussing Aquinas isn't tradition. Neither does one have to be respectful of it per se to do so.
Oh, I perfectly agree that tradition is larger than this. We can't do the whole of tradition in a church service.

I also guess that chanting Psalms or discussing Aquinas can be done in disrespectful ways. I can't prove that we're doing it in a respectful way to you of course, but I find it a bit weird that you already assume that we don't. Or that you'd call it "idle scholastic speculation".

What I also don't understand is when you say that these things aren't tradition. You probably have your own definition of what 'tradition' means. If I'm allowed to guess, it probably means something in the lines of "agreeing with me that the church cannot err in matters of faith". Well, I don't subscribe to that definition of 'tradition'.

quote:
Ad Orientem: I would also insist on that meaning that the Holy Spirit cannot contradict himself.
Men can contradict Her though. Including men in the church.

[ 16. July 2014, 15:10: Message edited by: LeRoc ]
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
And how do you differentiate between the two?
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
One of the interesting distinctions between modernism and postmodernism (according to some postmodernists!), is that modernism still accepted the existence of facts and also the ideas of progress and rationality. (I'm not convinced by this, since the early 20th century saw a deep disillusionment in such things, but anyway).

But Nietzsche, the godfather of postmodernism, argued that there are no facts, just interpretations. He called this the fabling of the world.

This has also been called 'weak thought', but of course, it can become nihilist, since everything is undermined. What do we go home to after this?
 
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on :
 
quote:
Ad Orientem: And how do you differentiate between the two?
Differentiate between men following Her and men contradicting Her, you mean?

I admit that this is more difficult for me than for someone who just believes "whatever a bearded man in a funny robe says about faith is right". But I guess I do it in the usual way: a mix between the Bible, tradition, church community and experience.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
The contrary position, that the Holy Spirit is still leading and will continue to lead us into all truth, not just those bits of truth that were settled by the speaker's adolescence, is more commonly associated with theological liberalism.

Surely not, otherwise the Holy Spirit got it terribly wrong for two thousand years, not leading into truth but creating confusion. Either what God has revealed is true for all time or he is s liar and not God at all, for the faith was delivered once to the saints, to quote the scriptures.
That's like saying that because your post contains neither the truth that 2+2=4, nor the truth that the atomic number of hydrogen is 1, your post is therefore leading people into error.

Merely because one has not told the truth does not mean one has lied. One might have been silent.

What God has revealed as true for all time is true for all time. It does not follow that everything that is true for all time has yet been revealed by God. God may have revealed some things and not revealed other things yet. Hence the future tense in 'will lead you into all truth'.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Well, I'm not saying that relativism is the same thing as pluralism. But surely, the relativist will disagree that there are absolute truths, but s/he will tend to argue with the absolutist, and will not construct a dictatorship over him, as Ad Orientem suggested.

Relativism is the belief that what I, or we, hold to be true cannot be proved by rational argument to people holding sufficiently different views. A relativist holds that the only ways to change other people's minds are by emotional rhetoric or by force.
There is therefore nothing in relativism that requires one to rule out force as an option. One might say that the archetypically relativist position is, those fundamentalist Taliban over there can't be convinced using reason (relativism), therefore we have to bomb them until they are no longer a threat.

Samuel Huntingdon's neoliberal Clash of Civilizations is a relativist work.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Well, I'm not saying that relativism is the same thing as pluralism. But surely, the relativist will disagree that there are absolute truths, but s/he will tend to argue with the absolutist, and will not construct a dictatorship over him, as Ad Orientem suggested.

Relativism is the belief that what I, or we, hold to be true cannot be proved by rational argument to people holding sufficiently different views. A relativist holds that the only ways to change other people's minds are by emotional rhetoric or by force.
There is therefore nothing in relativism that requires one to rule out force as an option. One might say that the archetypically relativist position is, those fundamentalist Taliban over there can't be convinced using reason (relativism), therefore we have to bomb them until they are no longer a threat.

Samuel Huntingdon's neoliberal Clash of Civilizations is a relativist work.

Very good reply. I agree that relativism does not rule out force; I'm not sure about ruling out arguing with other people. The Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo is a kind of nihilist, and appears to reject any kind of 'foundation for knowledge' in the modern age. Well, he spends a lot of time writing about this!

But someone like Vattimo is a paradox, since he must be using rational means to an extent in order to write books. However, I don't know whether this is bad faith, cognitive dissonance, or what. Curiously, Vattimo has returned to Christianity, but not in a straightforward way, but as an example of the 'dissolving of strong structure'. Hmm. (material taken from IEP).

But postmodernism will talk about multiplicities, chaos, emptying out, the lack of an ending, the surface, and so on. I find this very attractive, so I suppose you are right that this works via emotion and intuition, not reason. Yet I have to describe this to an extent via reason, I can't just present a chaotic blob, and say there it is.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by IngoB:
Those sectarian concerns are mere labels (nominalism) which fade into obscurity against the need to help people (humanism) in an optimal way (utilitarianism) , where their well-being can be determined (positivism) in terms of how the get along in the world (materialism & anti-teleology) and how they feel about it (hedonism).

As put like that it's a capitalist consumerist paradise.
How on earth did you get that from what you quoted?
Let's see: hedonism is the belief that there are no goods beyond desire-satisfaction. Utilitarianism is the belief that all desires are qualitatively identical - the only essential difference between enjoying reading poetry or a novel, enjoying seeing the Taj Mahal, and enjoying eating chocolate is which one gives you more enjoyment. This is effectively the claim that money can serve as an effective measure of desire. Positivism, in this context, is the belief that I can't be meaningfully said to have any goods or desires beyond those that I'm actually willing to pay for.

That looks pretty much like the basics of neoclassical economics to me.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Dafyd:
[qb] I agree that relativism does not rule out force; I'm not sure about ruling out arguing with other people.

The idea goes that you can only argue with people if you share sufficient premises / principles of argument. Relativism says that truth is relative to some X, e.g. cultures, so that having different e.g. cultures means having different premises / principles of argument. Therefore, you can't argue with someone who has a different culture. Well - you can go through the motions of arguing, but if either of you is convinced it's not for any reasons the other person put forward.

quote:
The Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo is a kind of nihilist, and appears to reject any kind of 'foundation for knowledge' in the modern age. Well, he spends a lot of time writing about this!

But someone like Vattimo is a paradox, since he must be using rational means to an extent in order to write books.

One can always use rational means with people with whom one shares sufficient premises, even if those premises are underdetermined by any rational method.
Also, one can always use emotional methods to persuade people.

quote:
But postmodernism will talk about multiplicities, chaos, emptying out, the lack of an ending, the surface, and so on. I find this very attractive, so I suppose you are right that this works via emotion and intuition, not reason. Yet I have to describe this to an extent via reason, I can't just present a chaotic blob, and say there it is.
I don't think one can make those kinds of generalisations about postmodernism. Mostly postmodernism is defined negatively - not enlightenment rationalism, not grand narratives, etc. The slogans and methods of one postmodernist thinker will be different from those of another.
 
Posted by Gildas (# 525) on :
 
Originally posted by Dafyd:

quote:
Utilitarianism is the belief that all desires are qualitatively identical - the only essential difference between enjoying reading poetry or a novel, enjoying seeing the Taj Mahal, and enjoying eating chocolate is which one gives you more enjoyment. This is effectively the claim that money can serve as an effective measure of desire. Positivism, in this context, is the belief that I can't be meaningfully said to have any goods or desires beyond those that I'm actually willing to pay for.
That was certainly Bentham's take but one doesn't have to hold that view to be a utilitarian. Better Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied and all that jazz.
 
Posted by Russ (# 120) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Ad Orientem:
not saying that the Church cannot overstep its bounds, if that's what you mean, but it cannot err in matters concerning the faith.

What the heliocentrism issue demonstrates is that the Church can err in deciding whether a particular issue is a matter of faith or not.

Calling that "overstepping its bounds" seems a fair description.

But it removes any certainty about whether the Church is right on any particular issue...

Best wishes,

Russ
 
Posted by Ad Orientem (# 17574) on :
 
Then we shall just have to agree to disagree. It is possible to discern whether or not the Church is overstepping its bounds.
 
Posted by IngoB (# 8700) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
But it removes any certainty about whether the Church is right on any particular issue...

That's just polemical spreading of FUD.

Even at the time the matter was judged to be uncomfortably at the interface between religion and science (or natural philosophy). Cardinal Bellarmine stated "I say that if a real proof be found that the sun is fixed and does not revolve round the earth, but the earth round the sun, then it will be necessary, very carefully, to proceed to the explanation of the passages of Scripture which appear to be contrary, and we should rather say that we have misunderstood these than pronounce that to be false which is demonstrated." The official decree in of the Congregation of the Index in 1616, which prohibited Copernican works did so "donec corrigatur", namely with the requirement for correction that heliocentrism be presented as hypothesis, not as established fact. And that's pretty much it as far as official interference with the scientific process itself goes. Yes, Galileo was put under house arrest. But that's because he violated the terms of his parole, and publicly and fairly openly called the pope - who had been financially supporting him - an idiot over sticking with geocentrism. But that's a matter of Church discipline, and perhaps undue secular power, not doctrine. And yes, in the wake of this some scientists spend too much time trying to make some form of geocentrism work. But that's a social knock-on effect, not a doctrinal matter.

Arguably, at the time of issue it wasn't even factually wrong to demand that heliocentrism be flagged as hypothesis. Though this prohibition certainly was kept on the books for too long. At any rate, the doctrinal scope of this is pretty damn minimal. It certainly was no dogmatic declaration that geocentrism is true, and arguably it wasn't even really a doctrinal statement about that. It was a ring-fence against claiming that available data already forced an update of biblical exegesis. It was hardly the brightest hour of what actually was an ongoing success story of the RCC supporting scientific inquiry. But it wasn't some doctrinal disaster either.

To claim from this specific incident that now all the dogmas and doctrines of the RCC are questionable is just bullshit. There was no definitive declaration of faith and morals. This says nothing about RC dogma. There was not even really an explicit doctrinal teaching about this, merely an overreacting defence against potential implications. No RC document declared geocentrism to be proven by faith This says little to nothing about actual RC doctrine. What this does tell us is that a powerful Church can end up messing around unnecessarily in areas where she better shouldn't be messing around. If tomorrow some Cardinal declares that epigenetics is the work of the devil, then the Galileo case tells us to be skeptical. But that's about it. This simply is not the king's road to dismissing all RC authority on faith and morals.
 
Posted by Russ (# 120) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by IngoB:

Even at the time the matter was judged to be uncomfortably at the interface between religion and science (or natural philosophy). Cardinal Bellarmine stated "I say that if a real proof be found that the sun is fixed and does not revolve round the earth, but the earth round the sun, then it will be necessary, very carefully, to proceed to the explanation of the passages of Scripture which appear to be contrary, and we should rather say that we have misunderstood these than pronounce that to be false which is demonstrated." The official decree in of the Congregation of the Index in 1616, which prohibited Copernican works did so "donec corrigatur", namely with the requirement for correction that heliocentrism be presented as hypothesis, not as established fact.

And that's pretty much it as far as official interference with the scientific process itself goes.

I guess you don't count the inclusion of astronomical beliefs amongst the heresy charges against Giordano Bruno a few years earlier, which led to his execution...

But the point is not how repressive or reasonable the official decrees and acts of the Church were. The point is that the subject matter of those decrees and acts demonstrably strayed beyond what today we would recognise as issues of faith into matters of scientific fact.

Whatever guidance from the Holy Spirit the Church may have received, it did not include any insight into the boundaries of its sphere of competence.

So whatever authority the Church claims, it obviously does not include authority to determine what the boundaries of its authority and competence are.

Put another way, it is entirely possible that over the next century a science of human well-being will be developed, and some of the topics on which the Church currently defends its pronouncements will turn out to be matters susceptible to Bellarmine's "real proof".

Best wishes,

Russ
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
quote:
One might say that the archetypically relativist position is, those fundamentalist Taliban over there can't be convinced using reason (relativism), therefore we have to bomb them until they are no longer a threat.
One might say that, but one would be seriously fucked up if one did.

If someone is a normative relativist, surely they are required to tolerate the behaviour of others since there is no absolute sense of right, wrong, good or bad. From a moral perspective, there are no grounds for action against the Taliban. Indeed, the commonest complaint against relativistic morals is that they allow perceived evil to go about its business unchallenged.

I'm pretty sure someone starting out with a relativist position and ending up advocating bombing will have jettisoned normative relativism somewhere along the line. That would be hardly surprising, since advocating actually doing anything at all from that position requires wriggling up ones own fundament at least a couple of times.
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
...I can't just present a chaotic blob, and say there it is.

Yes, this is giving me trouble in trying to make sense of this. If something isn't clearly defined as to be a clear statement, then it's not easy to say that/how/why it's false--or, for that matter, true.

Presumably in the mass of semi-defined notions there are things within modernism that are also good and true, and one should try to divide the contemporary wheat from the chaff?

[Confused]
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by IngoB:
That's just polemical spreading of FUD.

[Confused] What's FUD? [Confused]

[Help]

surely not Elmer?
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
...I can't just present a chaotic blob, and say there it is.

Yes, this is giving me trouble in trying to make sense of this. If something isn't clearly defined as to be a clear statement, then it's not easy to say that/how/why it's false--or, for that matter, true.

Presumably in the mass of semi-defined notions there are things within modernism that are also good and true, and one should try to divide the contemporary wheat from the chaff?

[Confused]

I'm channeling a floating signifier here; yes, is there anyone here with an uncle Bob, he is trying to tell you to avoid floating signifiers, and anything yellow. Well, that's enough from uncle Bob. And I believe auntie Doris is coming through with a message about empty signifiers, well, that's all for tonight, folks, the bandwidth is very crowded.
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
Well, I was thinking more that... honestly, look, doesn't every era have its own characteristic vices and also virtues? Vices perhaps that are so endemic we have to make extra sure not to fall into them, but also we need to embrace the virtues at hand? That's what I meant about wheat and chaff.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
One might say that the archetypically relativist position is, those fundamentalist Taliban over there can't be convinced using reason (relativism), therefore we have to bomb them until they are no longer a threat.
One might say that, but one would be seriously fucked up if one did.

If someone is a normative relativist, surely they are required to tolerate the behaviour of others since there is no absolute sense of right, wrong, good or bad.

Are you saying that normative relativists are absolutely required to tolerate the behaviour of others?

A relativist cannot believe intolerance is absolutely wrong. A consistent relativist therefore cannot believe relativism requires tolerance, since if relativism requires tolerance then the position-independent normative truth of 'tolerance is required' would follow from the position-independent truth of relativism, and a relativist believes there are no position-independent normative truths.

A relativist could be a pacifist. A relativist could be a nationalist. A relativist could believe that different civilizations or ideologies are locked in a life-and-death struggle for the survival of their culture and values, and that therefore all is fair in a struggle for survival.
Given what people have done in the name of nationalism and patriotism, the latter seems more likely.

quote:
From a moral perspective, there are no grounds for action against the Taliban. Indeed, the commonest complaint against relativistic morals is that they allow perceived evil to go about its business unchallenged.
The reason that's the commonest complaint is that most people who are against 'relativistic morals' are using 'relativistic' as a boo-word. And contrariwise, people who are for it are using it to mean 'warmy fuzzy liberal feelings'. Most people who talk about relativism don't think of something like nationalism (where right and wrong are relative to which nation you belong to).

Relativism is not nihilism. A relativist believes there are moral grounds for action which are true for the relativist. Relativism is simply the belief that normativity is not grounded in anything that is universally applicable to all human beings.
 
Posted by Kaplan Corday (# 16119) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:


So, what's wrong with all of the above is that it leads to Cameron and Osborne stamping on a human face forever.


Anyone who trivializes totalitarianism by applying an Orwell quote about it to domestic party politics in a liberal democracy either knows nothing about totalitarianism, or else is a graduate from a course in Marxism-Leninism 101 in East Germany in the 1950s which taught that capitalism=fascism.
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
I think we can apply it aptly, and quite seriously, to the direction of corporate-run US politics.
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
(Note that I said direction, not that it's like that at this point.)
 
Posted by IngoB (# 8700) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
[Confused] What's FUD? [Confused] [Help] surely not Elmer?

Spreading fear, uncertainty and doubt, an ancient disinformation tactic which was given this catchy modern name thanks to IBM and then Microsoft using it consciously to push competitors out of the market.
 
Posted by Kaplan Corday (# 16119) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
(Note that I said direction, not that it's like that at this point.)

Yes, yes, important distinction.

So how long do you give it, then, until the US is indistinguishable from Nineteen Eighty-Four?

When's the "point"?

Six months? A year? Two years?
 
Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Let's see: hedonism is the belief that there are no goods beyond desire-satisfaction. Utilitarianism is the belief that all desires are qualitatively identical - the only essential difference between enjoying reading poetry or a novel, enjoying seeing the Taj Mahal, and enjoying eating chocolate is which one gives you more enjoyment.

Fine so far.

quote:
This is effectively the claim that money can serve as an effective measure of desire.
That's where you lose me. If the only essential difference between watching a sunset and eating chocolate is the amount of enjoyment they give to the individual, then why does money factor into it? For that matter, why does any independent "measure of desire" feature at all?
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Kaplan Corday:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:


So, what's wrong with all of the above is that it leads to Cameron and Osborne stamping on a human face forever.


Anyone who trivializes totalitarianism by applying an Orwell quote about it to domestic party politics in a liberal democracy either knows nothing about totalitarianism, or else is a graduate from a course in Marxism-Leninism 101 in East Germany in the 1950s which taught that capitalism=fascism.
Only if they're left-wing. It's alright for someone like you to invoke Stalin while criticising left-wing politicians, or even centre-left politicians; or for you to compare criticism of right-wing politicians to government propaganda from 1950s East Germany.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
This is effectively the claim that money can serve as an effective measure of desire.

That's where you lose me. If the only essential difference between watching a sunset and eating chocolate is the amount of enjoyment they give to the individual, then why does money factor into it? For that matter, why does any independent "measure of desire" feature at all?
1. Ok - the only essential difference between one and the other is that the one desire is stronger or gives you more of the same satisfaction or utility.

2. If the only difference in desires is strength it could be possible to quantify the strength. (This is crucial for utilitarian ethics: the ethical thing to do is that which maximises the utility created - that obviously requires that you're able to add together the strength of different desires.)

3. The stronger a desire the more you're willing to pay for it. (Seems reasonable. If you're willing to pay more for pork sausages than you are for vegetarian sausages then you must want pork sausages more.)

4. The amount you're willing to pay for something is a direct measure of how much you desire it. (From the fact that prices operate according to linear arithmetic. If you pass up the pork sausages for cheaper vegetarian sausages and spend the extra money, or time, driving out to watch the sunset, you must value vegetarian sausages and sunset more than you value pork sausages.)

Does that spell out the reasoning a bit more clearly?

[ 17. July 2014, 11:34: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
 
Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
1. Ok - the only essential difference between one and the other is that the one desire is stronger or gives you more of the same satisfaction or utility.

Yes.

quote:
2. If the only difference in desires is strength it could be possible to quantify the strength. (This is crucial for utilitarian ethics: the ethical thing to do is that which maximises the utility created - that obviously requires that you're able to add together the strength of different desires.)
But it's only possible to quantify the strength at the level of the individual. Just because one person highly rates something doesn't mean everyone will.

quote:
3. The stronger a desire the more you're willing to pay for it. (Seems reasonable. If you're willing to pay more for pork sausages than you are for vegetarian sausages then you must want pork sausages more.)
Yes, but again only at the level of the individual. You can't extrapolate from that that certain things are objectively more valuable than others.

quote:
4. The amount you're willing to pay for something is a direct measure of how much you desire it. (From the fact that prices operate according to linear arithmetic. If you pass up the pork sausages for cheaper vegetarian sausages and spend the extra money, or time, driving out to watch the sunset, you must value vegetarian sausages and sunset more than you value pork sausages.)
True, but only because you've added in "drive out to see" as a key part of "sunset". Not everything is amenable to economic valuation, and sunsets can be enjoyed without spendign a penny.

quote:
Does that spell out the reasoning a bit more clearly?
In a way, but it also reveals your presuppositions. Not least that everything we enjoy has to be paid for.
 
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on :
 
quote:
Marvin the Martian: Not least that everything we enjoy has to be paid for.
The way I see things moving, I fear that this will become more and more true in the future.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
2. If the only difference in desires is strength it could be possible to quantify the strength. (This is crucial for utilitarian ethics: the ethical thing to do is that which maximises the utility created - that obviously requires that you're able to add together the strength of different desires.)

But it's only possible to quantify the strength at the level of the individual. Just because one person highly rates something doesn't mean everyone will.
Of course. Why do you think that is an objection?

quote:
quote:
3. The stronger a desire the more you're willing to pay for it. (Seems reasonable. If you're willing to pay more for pork sausages than you are for vegetarian sausages then you must want pork sausages more.)
Yes, but again only at the level of the individual. You can't extrapolate from that that certain things are objectively more valuable than others.
Again - of course. That is the whole bloody point. We are presupposing positivism: and positivism denies that there is any objective value beyond what people are willing to pay for things. That's the point of free market economics. You can't say that potatoes are objectively worth such and such. You can't say Tesco are paying too little to the farmer if the prices are so low that the farmer can't make a profit, as long as the farmer has no other way to make a living; you can't say Tesco are charging too much as long as enough people buy the potatoes for Tesco to make a profit. That is the point. There is no room here for objective value beyond what people actually charge and what people actually pay.

quote:
quote:
4. The amount you're willing to pay for something is a direct measure of how much you desire it. (From the fact that prices operate according to linear arithmetic. If you pass up the pork sausages for cheaper vegetarian sausages and spend the extra money, or time, driving out to watch the sunset, you must value vegetarian sausages and sunset more than you value pork sausages.)
True, but only because you've added in "drive out to see" as a key part of "sunset". Not everything is amenable to economic valuation, and sunsets can be enjoyed without spendign a penny.
On a positivist utilitarian framework, the reason that sunsets can be enjoyed without spending a penny is supply-side rather than demand-side. When a sunset comes along, the supply heavily outweighs demand to the point that the price is pushed down to zero. However, one can still, in this framework, measure the desire to see a sunset by considering what other activities one forgoes in order to do so.

quote:
quote:
Does that spell out the reasoning a bit more clearly?
In a way, but it also reveals your presuppositions. Not least that everything we enjoy has to be paid for.
They're not my presuppositions. I am neither a utilitarian nor a positivist nor a hedonist. They are however the presuppositions of the theory of free market capitalism. According to neoclassical economists, if you excluded government interference by planning departments, the value of a sunset would be set at the premium you get on apartments and houses that are high enough to see enough of the western sky.
 
Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
We are presupposing positivism: and positivism denies that there is any objective value beyond what people are willing to pay for things.

See, I was thinking that it denies any objective value at all.

quote:
On a positivist utilitarian framework, the reason that sunsets can be enjoyed without spending a penny is supply-side rather than demand-side. When a sunset comes along, the supply heavily outweighs demand to the point that the price is pushed down to zero.
That's nonsense, because it assumes that if sunsets were rare we'd have to pay to enjoy them. That can be disproved merely by pointing to solar eclipses - they are extremely rare, and yet when one comes along it costs absolutely nothing to enjoy the spectacle.

Where price comes in to the equation here is purely and simply when one's desire to enjoy an activity requires someone else to provide or facilitate that activity. Of course, that person may well choose to give their effort for nothing on the grounds that they themselves enjoy doing it (or are otherwise motivated) - as seen in the many activities that are provided solely by volunteers at no cost to the user. But when they would not freely choose to do so, they must be compensated to a sufficient degree that they will choose to provide the activity that gives you enjoyment in return.

But - and this is a key point - the cost of their facilitation of your enjoyment is not directly related to the level of enjoyment you gain from doing the activity, or indeed to the activity itself. It is rather a measure of their willingness to facilitate it in the first place.

[ 17. July 2014, 13:45: Message edited by: Marvin the Martian ]
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
We are presupposing positivism: and positivism denies that there is any objective value beyond what people are willing to pay for things.

See, I was thinking that it denies any objective value at all.
Beyond in the sense of 'underlying', not in the sense of 'other than'. I agree that positivism denies any objective value. Although positivism does say that what people are willing to pay for something is an objective fact.

quote:
quote:
On a positivist utilitarian framework, the reason that sunsets can be enjoyed without spending a penny is supply-side rather than demand-side. When a sunset comes along, the supply heavily outweighs demand to the point that the price is pushed down to zero.
That's nonsense, because it assumes that if sunsets were rare we'd have to pay to enjoy them. That can be disproved merely by pointing to solar eclipses - they are extremely rare, and yet when one comes along it costs absolutely nothing to enjoy the spectacle.
When one comes along everyone who wants to see one can do so.

quote:
Where price comes in to the equation here is purely and simply when one's desire to enjoy an activity requires someone else to provide or facilitate that activity.
At a first approximation. At a second approximation, one has to factor in opportunity cost (I can't watch a sunset if I want to earn money indoors at the relevant time). In addition, other people's ability to restrict my access to a good increases the price. If somebody buys a plot of land with a waterfall on it, and charges money to see that waterfall, then I have to pay to see even though I don't need that person to provide the waterfall.

quote:
Of course, that person may well choose to give their effort for nothing on the grounds that they themselves enjoy doing it (or are otherwise motivated) - as seen in the many activities that are provided solely by volunteers at no cost to the user.
A utilitarian has to suppose that volunteering is giving them a measurable amount of enjoyment. The volunteer could have spent their time earning money at some other activity. So the enjoyment they get from the activity is equal to or greater than whatever they could have spent the money they could have otherwise earned on.

But arguably volunteering is a behaviour that doesn't really fit into free market capitalist theory.

quote:
But when they would not freely choose to do so, they must be compensated to a sufficient degree that they will choose to provide the activity that gives you enjoyment in return.

But - and this is a key point - the cost of their facilitation of your enjoyment is not directly related to the level of enjoyment you gain from doing the activity, or indeed to the activity itself. It is rather a measure of their willingness to facilitate it in the first place.

The cost of their facilitation is affected by demand as well as by supply. You charge for your services not what you're willing to charge but what the market will bear. If demand outstrips supply you can charge more for your services. If supply outstrips demand then people have to charge less than they'd like to receive, or find some other line of work. That is why street sweepers get paid less money than professional footballers, even though I'm sure most people would be more willing to be a professional footballer.
 
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on :
 
quote:
Marvin the Martian: That can be disproved merely by pointing to solar eclipses - they are extremely rare, and yet when one comes along it costs absolutely nothing to enjoy the spectacle.
Eclipses are rare in the sense that they don't happen often. They aren't rare in the sense that only a few people can have them. It's the latter meaning of rarity that matters for economics.
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
quote:
Are you saying that normative relativists are absolutely required to tolerate the behaviour of others?
Nope. I'm saying they have a serious problem when it comes to deciding whether to do do stuff like tolerating or not tolerating. When I said "...advocating actually doing anything at all from that position requires wriggling up ones own fundament at least a couple of times" it was for precisely the reasons you lay out here:
quote:
A relativist cannot believe intolerance is absolutely wrong. A consistent relativist therefore cannot believe relativism requires tolerance, since if relativism requires tolerance then the position-independent normative truth of 'tolerance is required' would follow from the position-independent truth of relativism, and a relativist believes there are no position-independent normative truths.
quote:
A relativist could be a pacifist. A relativist could be a nationalist. A relativist could believe that different civilizations or ideologies are locked in a life-and-death struggle for the survival of their culture and values, and that therefore all is fair in a struggle for survival.
Given what people have done in the name of nationalism and patriotism, the latter seems more likely

This is just muddled. Someone might see that different civilizations or ideologies are locked in a life-and-death struggle for the survival of their culture and values and there is nothing to choose between them because relativism. They might believe relativism is a component of an adequate description of the world. But normatively speaking, a relativist can't find any justification in getting involved in the struggle without making some compromises or without ignoring the moral dimension completely. Nationalism and patriotism require a belief that one's own in-group is superior to those foreign bastards which an out and out relativist can't have without considerable cognitive dissonance.

Your Taliban bombing archetype is way off. The archetype is nearer to the hand wringing helplessness of the wimpy liberal who can't decide how to react to honour killing.

[ 17. July 2014, 22:16: Message edited by: Grokesx ]
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Kaplan Corday:
So how long do you give it, then, until the US is indistinguishable from Nineteen Eighty-Four?

I don't think there's a timetable for it. And happily, I don't think Orwell's depiction of absolute universal mind control are quite possible in the real world either.

Re the main thrust of the thread... I haven't seen anything clear enough about "modernism" (as a monolithic philosophy) to be refutable or supportable here. I really think it's better to argue against, say, positivism and the like.
 
Posted by Dave W. (# 8765) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Kaplan Corday:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:


So, what's wrong with all of the above is that it leads to Cameron and Osborne stamping on a human face forever.


Anyone who trivializes totalitarianism by applying an Orwell quote about it to domestic party politics in a liberal democracy either knows nothing about totalitarianism, or else is a graduate from a course in Marxism-Leninism 101 in East Germany in the 1950s which taught that capitalism=fascism.
So the correct punishment for someone who writes a hyperbolic sentence that "trivializes totalitarianism" is ... to be compared to a communist apparatchik?

Hmmm...
 
Posted by Kaplan Corday (# 16119) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by Kaplan Corday:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:


So, what's wrong with all of the above is that it leads to Cameron and Osborne stamping on a human face forever.


Anyone who trivializes totalitarianism by applying an Orwell quote about it to domestic party politics in a liberal democracy either knows nothing about totalitarianism, or else is a graduate from a course in Marxism-Leninism 101 in East Germany in the 1950s which taught that capitalism=fascism.
Only if they're left-wing. It's alright for someone like you to invoke Stalin while criticising left-wing politicians, or even centre-left politicians; or for you to compare criticism of right-wing politicians to government propaganda from 1950s East Germany.
The point is that you made the comment in the context of criticizing capitalism and the Conservative Party.

It would be just as silly and melodramatic for someone to invoke Orwell and the spectre of 1984 while criticizing equally mainstream elements such as the welfare state and the Labour Party.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Kaplan Corday:
The point is that you made the comment in the context of criticizing capitalism and the Conservative Party.

It would be just as silly and melodramatic for someone to invoke Orwell and the spectre of 1984 while criticizing equally mainstream elements such as the welfare state and the Labour Party.

Do you remember the first argument we had on this site? Do you remember what you did in it?
I do.
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
I don't! [Smile] His name makes me think of Al Stewart's song "The Ghost of Charlotte Corday" from his excellent Famous Last Words album, though. [Smile] If you hear a step upon the stair tonight...
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:
A relativist could be a pacifist. A relativist could be a nationalist. A relativist could believe that different civilizations or ideologies are locked in a life-and-death struggle for the survival of their culture and values, and that therefore all is fair in a struggle for survival.
Given what people have done in the name of nationalism and patriotism, the latter seems more likely

This is just muddled. Someone might see that different civilizations or ideologies are locked in a life-and-death struggle for the survival of their culture and values and there is nothing to choose between them because relativism. They might believe relativism is a component of an adequate description of the world.

Nihilist: there are no normative truths.
Relativist: there are normative truths that hold for some people (relative to culture or that person's private moral commitments or that persons' family), but no normative truths that hold universally.
Universalist: there are normative truths that hold universally.

So a relativist believes that there are moral statements that are true for the relativist and people like the relativist. So, a relativist nationalist thinks, 'the English, the English, the English are best,' is true for the English. It's not true for the Germans. But if the relativist is English then the relativist thinks 'the English are best' is true for the relativist. The English relativist would agree that 'the Germans are best' is true for a German relativist. But that's irrelevant to an English relativist.

Relativists agree that there is nothing to choose between them for somebody who belongs to no country whatever. But as nobody belongs to no country, that does not matter.

(Contrast Einstein's relativity. Distance and time and matter are relative to the frame of reference the speaker is in. But that doesn't mean that there's no such thing as distance and time and matter. It just means that there are no truths about time and matter that are independent of frame of reference.)

quote:
But normatively speaking, a relativist can't find any justification in getting involved in the struggle without making some compromises or without ignoring the moral dimension completely.
Now, this is muddled.
"Normatively speaking" - from which point of view? The relativist's culture, or absolutely? It must be relativist's culture, since a relativist cannot speak normatively from an absolute point of view.
"Can't find any justification" - from which point of view? The relativist's culture, or absolutely? The relativist's culture gives plenty of justification, so this must be from the absolute point of view. But no justification is required from the absolute point of view.
"Without making some compromises" - from which point of view? From the absolute point of view, there's nothing to compromise. From the relativists' culture point of view no compromises are made.
"ignoring the moral dimension completely" - this must be from the point of view of the relativist's culture. From the absolute point of view, there is no moral dimension to ignore. But the moral dimension of the relativist's culture says it's the duty of the relativist to get involved in the struggle.

quote:
Nationalism and patriotism require a belief that one's own in-group is superior to those foreign bastards which an out and out relativist can't have without considerable cognitive dissonance.
Not true. An out-and-out relativist believes '"my own in-group is superior" is true for the members of my own in-group', and not true for members of other in-groups. Since the relativist is a member of their own in-group, they believe it's true for them.

[ 18. July 2014, 13:15: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
quote:
So a relativist believes that there are moral statements that are true for the relativist and people like the relativist. So, a relativist nationalist thinks, 'the English, the English, the English are best,' is true for the English. It's not true for the Germans. But if the relativist is English then the relativist thinks 'the English are best' is true for the relativist. The English relativist would agree that 'the Germans are best' is true for a German relativist. But that's irrelevant to an English relativist.
But relativists have to accept that there is nothing to choose between the English and the Germans. They needs the ability, at least in the safety of their armchair to accept that when they say the "English are best" they are making no sense, since to them, good, bad, better or worse have no meaning in the context of inter-cultural relations. If they have some ethical or moral disagreement with the Germans, they must accept that there is no way to adjudicate it that applies to both parties.

In practice, given all this the tortured logical bollocks, the upshot is that normative relativists tend to think we should tolerate the bad behaviour of other cultures rather than bomb the fuck out of them.

quote:
Not true. An out-and-out relativist believes '"my own in-group is superior" is true for the members of my own in-group',
Again, no they don't, since they deny the very idea of moral superiority.

We could go on forever without getting anywhere. Partly because there has been no culture ever consisting solely of relativists, and it is a rare relativist indeed that is relativist about everything.

And, there is only one thing to be said for moral relativism, and that is it is probably preferable to have a bunch of civilisations living side by side who by and large think the others are deserving of being left in peace, rather than a bunch who think the others are all moral reprobates who need a good dose of bombing simply because they have a different way of life and a different flag.

[ 18. July 2014, 23:36: Message edited by: Grokesx ]
 
Posted by Timothy the Obscure (# 292) on :
 
I'm not sure I've ever met an actual relativist over the age of 18--at least as defined by the anti-relativist crowd, who seem to me to be frantically attacking straw men with pitchforks and torches. But most of what I might have to say about that has been said better by Clifford Geertz in his excellent essay "Anti-Anti-Relativism" which, amazingly, is available for free online as a pdf.

Returning to the matter of the OP, I do think there is a central organizing principle to "modernism," which is pretty clearly signified in the term itself, whether used in the laudatory or condemnatory senses: it's the idea of progress. That is, the belief that human understanding naturally changes over time, and that this is a good thing, leading to greater knowledge, technical skill, and prosperity, but also to superior moral insight, more refined manners, more sophisticated and sublime art, etc. Positivism and all the other facets of modernism seem to me to be subordinate to this (or means to that end). Post-modernism continues the idea of the necessity of change, but not the idea that it necessarily involves things getting better--they're just different.

The contrary tendency, what we might call traditionalism, whether Christian, Confucian, or whatever ("anti-modernism" casts it in wholly reactionary terms, and though that is indeed a large part of it it's not the whole thing), tends to see changes in understanding as decline from a Golden Age in which eternal truths were universally recognized as such (and children respected and obeyed their parents, the trains ran on time, and you could get a decent cup of coffee for two bits).

Traditionalists have, since the 16th century, grudgingly--and it was grudgingly, in large part--acknowledged the idea of progress in science and technology (with some last-ditch resistance in areas that seem to directly implicate human nature or religion and morality, such as evolution and scientific understandings of gender and sexuality).

The idea of modernism as heresy seems to arise from horror at the idea that one can have progress in spiritual understanding, or in moral thinking and behavior (beyond a firmer adherence to received truths). The modernist Christian would say that we (the Church) can grow into a broader and deeper understanding of God, while the traditionalist would insist that this is at best an illusion and that all we can do (or should try to do) is to preserve what has been handed down. This has implications for different conceptions of authority (modernism is implicitly democratic while traditionalism is implicitly monarchical) and epistemology (empiricist vs. rationalist).
 
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
I don't! [Smile] His name makes me think of Al Stewart's song "The Ghost of Charlotte Corday" from his excellent Famous Last Words album, though. [Smile] If you hear a step upon the stair tonight...

Paisano!
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
Timothy the Obscure wrote:

Returning to the matter of the OP, I do think there is a central organizing principle to "modernism," which is pretty clearly signified in the term itself, whether used in the laudatory or condemnatory senses: it's the idea of progress. That is, the belief that human understanding naturally changes over time, and that this is a good thing, leading to greater knowledge, technical skill, and prosperity, but also to superior moral insight, more refined manners, more sophisticated and sublime art, etc. Positivism and all the other facets of modernism seem to me to be subordinate to this (or means to that end). Post-modernism continues the idea of the necessity of change, but not the idea that it necessarily involves things getting better--they're just different.

This idea of progress seems quite common among Gnu atheists, and I suppose they envisage the fading away of religion as a sign of human progress!

Good post, by the way. It's striking how many postmodern thinkers have got interested in Christianity again, for example, Gianni Vattimo, Derrida, and Zizek, although the latter seems quite abusive about postmodernism and relativism, and states, 'today we believe more than ever'. But Zizek's real target is 'hyper-capitalism'.
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
quote:
I'm not sure I've ever met an actual relativist over the age of 18--at least as defined by the anti-relativist crowd, who seem to me to be frantically attacking straw men with pitchforks and torches. But most of what I might have to say about that has been said better by Clifford Geertz in his excellent essay "Anti-Anti-Relativism" which, amazingly, is available for free online as a pdf.
Thank you for the link - very interesting. I'm pretty sure out and out relativists don't really exist either and not only because of the logical knots it entails. More that our actual behaviour is hardly influenced at all by proclaimed adherence to a particular ethical stance. But Dafyd's idea of the archetype relativist position was sufficiently strange to warrant comment.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
I was just thinking that people are not at all consistent. They may proclaim some kind of relativist position in one area, and then contradict it in another or at another time. I suppose that many people exhibit a patchwork of relativist and absolutist views. If you want consistency, Angel Delight is your best bet.
 
Posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard (# 368) on :
 
TtO, what a superb article. Damn why have I come to all this 40 years too late? Ah well, everything is redeemed. Not just everyone. No relativism there!

I wonder what absolute truths we are the worse for being invincibly ignorant of? Heterosexual marriage for life except if the marriage was bogus in the first place as revealed by some change in a partner years down the line apart from being a lying, whoring, treacherous, feckless, gambling, drinking, child and spouse abusing bastard? Bread and wine are and are not the body and blood of Jesus? Jesus' Mum was conceived without something called original sin? Quo Vadis isn't a self-serving patriarchal, placist myth? Or that we are not Orthodox even if everything we believe is which it can't be because we're not Orthodox?

I think I'll change my sig at the next amnesty to The Happy Heretic.
 
Posted by Russ (# 120) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Timothy the Obscure:
, I do think there is a central organizing principle to "modernism," which is pretty clearly signified in the term itself, whether used in the laudatory or condemnatory senses: it's the idea of progress. That is, the belief that human understanding naturally changes over time, and that this is a good thing, leading to greater knowledge, technical skill, and prosperity, but also to superior moral insight...

...Post-modernism continues the idea of the necessity of change, but not the idea that it necessarily involves things getting better--they're just different.

The contrary tendency, what we might call traditionalism, whether Christian, Confucian, or whatever ("anti-modernism" casts it in wholly reactionary terms, and though that is indeed a large part of it it's not the whole thing), tends to see changes in understanding as decline...

...The idea of modernism as heresy seems to arise from horror at the idea that one can have progress in spiritual understanding, or in moral thinking and behavior (beyond a firmer adherence to received truths).

This seems to approach the essence of it. Three ways of looking at the history of the church:

Traditionalist / authoritarian-conservative = the Church declared that transubstantiation (to take a random example) is the answer, and therefore it is the answer that we must believe and pass on to the next generation.

Modernist / progressive = the Church declared that transubstantiation is the answer, but philosophy has moved on since then and now we know better

Postmodern / relativist = the Church declared that transubstantiation is the answer, but that was in another time and culture; here and now our culture takes a different view which is an equally-valid way of looking at it.

And the thing is that all three models or approaches have something to be said for them. Most people will have experienced areas of life (connected with science and technology) where there has been real advance, real progress. And areas of life (connected with foreign travel) where they have experienced a different culture that is overall neither better nor worse but just different. And areas of life (connected with personal relationships or achievement) where something good has been gained or won, that needs to be defended or upheld against subsequent mood swings or doubts.

None of the three is adequate as a Rule of Life - the whole person uses all three modes as appropriate.

Best wishes,

Russ
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:
So a relativist believes that there are moral statements that are true for the relativist and people like the relativist. So, a relativist nationalist thinks, 'the English, the English, the English are best,' is true for the English. It's not true for the Germans. But if the relativist is English then the relativist thinks 'the English are best' is true for the relativist. The English relativist would agree that 'the Germans are best' is true for a German relativist. But that's irrelevant to an English relativist.
But relativists have to accept that there is nothing to choose between the English and the Germans. They needs the ability, at least in the safety of their armchair to accept that when they say the "English are best" they are making no sense, since to them, good, bad, better or worse have no meaning in the context of inter-cultural relations. If they have some ethical or moral disagreement with the Germans, they must accept that there is no way to adjudicate it that applies to both parties.
This isn't true. They have two ways to adjudicate it - a German way, and an English way. It is true that they have no way that both parties will accept. But the idea that you don't have any way to adjudicate the dispute unless both parties accept that way of adjudicating it depends on universalist premises. A relativist does not believe in universalist premises.(*)

The fact that the Germans accept a different standard from the English does not mean that moral judgements relative to the English standard are false for the English. Any judgement made according to the English standard is true for the English. This is irrespective of whether that judgement includes people who don't accept that standard. (A rapist may not agree with our moral standards about consent, but that doesn't stop us imposing our moral standards on them if we get the chance.) If 'The English are better than the Germans' is true by the English standard, then it is true for the English, even if the Germans don't accept the standard and therefore it isn't true for the Germans.

quote:
In practice, given all this the tortured logical bollocks, the upshot is that normative relativists tend to think we should tolerate the bad behaviour of other cultures rather than bomb the fuck out of them.
(Better tortured logical bollocks than illogical bollocks.)

If they think we ought not to bomb the fuck out of other cultures, because there is no way to judge between cultures, then they're not relativists. If they think they can argue the case for that, then they accept at least one moral universal (i.e. tolerate other cultures and don't bomb the fuck out of them), and therefore they are not a relativist.

(A relativist can certainly think that we ought not to bomb the fuck out of other cultures because our culture thinks we ought not to. But our culture seems generally to think there are circumstances under which it is alright.)

A relativist believes eating children is wrong for a person if and only if that person's culture believes eating people is wrong.
A relativist believes incest is wrong for a person if and only if that person's culture believes incest is wrong.
A relativist believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong for a person if and only if that person's culture believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong.

quote:
quote:
Not true. An out-and-out relativist believes '"my own in-group is superior" is true for the members of my own in-group',
Again, no they don't, since they deny the very idea of moral superiority.
Wrong. They deny the very idea of culture-independent or absolute moral superiority. They deny moral superiority as it is understood by moral universalists. But they're perfectly happy to say that judgements of moral superiority by the standards of a particular culture are true for members of that particular culture. The whole point of being a relativist, rather than a nihilist, is that you don't think the inability to make universal moral judgements stops you from making any moral judgements.

quote:
And, there is only one thing to be said for moral relativism, and that is it is probably preferable to have a bunch of civilisations living side by side who by and large think the others are deserving of being left in peace, rather than a bunch who think the others are all moral reprobates who need a good dose of bombing simply because they have a different way of life and a different flag.
If moral relativists cannot think they have any grounds for judging that another culture deserves to be bombed, they equally cannot have any grounds for judging that another culture deserves to live in peace. "That culture deserves to live in peace" is just as much a moral judgement on the other culture as "that culture deserves not to live in peace".

Either the whole range of moral judgements are possible, or none are.

(*) Definition: a moral relativist believes that moral judgements are true or false relative to some standard (they aren't nihilists) but that the standard can be different from person to person (they aren't universalists).
For simplicitly, this discussion assumes that the standard is the person's culture or country.
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
And the thing is that all three models or approaches have something to be said for them. Most people will have experienced areas of life (connected with science and technology) where there has been real advance, real progress. And areas of life (connected with foreign travel) where they have experienced a different culture that is overall neither better nor worse but just different. And areas of life (connected with personal relationships or achievement) where something good has been gained or won, that needs to be defended or upheld against subsequent mood swings or doubts.

None of the three is adequate as a Rule of Life - the whole person uses all three modes as appropriate.

That... makes sense to me.

Indeed, perhaps any one -ism of that type is, arguably, an especially "modern" kind of thing--in a sense, for example, Fundamentalism (of various kinds, Christian, Muslim, etc.) is itself kind of a modern phenomenon, and often an overreaction to contemporary things the people don't like.
 
Posted by Kaplan Corday (# 16119) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
I don't! [Smile] His name makes me think of Al Stewart's song "The Ghost of Charlotte Corday" from his excellent Famous Last Words album, though. [Smile] If you hear a step upon the stair tonight...

My Ship name is a tribute to two public-spirited women: Charlotte Corday, who stabbed Marat in his bath (don't know whether Al Stewart's song is about her), and Fanny Kaplan, who was imprisoned and flogged by the Romanovs, and executed by the Bolsheviks for trying to assassinate Lenin.
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
Yes, that is the same person. Al Stewart likes to write songs about historical figures, which I think is very cool. [Smile]
 
Posted by hatless (# 3365) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Kaplan Corday:
quote:
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
I don't! [Smile] His name makes me think of Al Stewart's song "The Ghost of Charlotte Corday" from his excellent Famous Last Words album, though. [Smile] If you hear a step upon the stair tonight...

My Ship name is a tribute to two public-spirited women: Charlotte Corday, who stabbed Marat in his bath (don't know whether Al Stewart's song is about her), and Fanny Kaplan, who was imprisoned and flogged by the Romanovs, and executed by the Bolsheviks for trying to assassinate Lenin.
If you ever want a middle name consider Violet Gibson who shot Mussolini and is buried a few hundred yards from where I write.
 
Posted by Russ (# 120) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
In practice, given all this the tortured logical bollocks, the upshot is that normative relativists tend to think we should tolerate the bad behaviour of other cultures rather than bomb the fuck out of them.

(Better tortured logical bollocks than illogical bollocks.)

If they think we ought not to bomb the fuck out of other cultures, because there is no way to judge between cultures, then they're not relativists. If they think they can argue the case for that, then they accept at least one moral universal (i.e. tolerate other cultures and don't bomb the fuck out of them), and therefore they are not a relativist.

(A relativist can certainly think that we ought not to bomb the fuck out of other cultures because our culture thinks we ought not to. But our culture seems generally to think there are circumstances under which it is permissible

The difficulty for the relativist is that our culture says it's wrong to attack people unless you thereby prevent them doing something that's objectively evil. Something that you happen to dislike doesn't count.

War to save peaceful neighbouring state from being invaded (for example) is OK. War to protect the profits of US companies (for example) is not-OK. So says Western culture (*)

So the belief that there is no such distinction - that all morality is culture - implies the logically contradictory belief that our culture has got it wrong...

What one can believe without contradiction is that human nature is such that we tend to be biased in our judgments - too quick to assign things that belong in the "culturally disapproved" category to the "objectively evil" category.

But Western philosophy seems so full of these extreme positions ("everything is relative") when a truer statement would be something more like "lots of things turn out to be pretty much relative quite a lot of the time".

Best wishes,

Russ

* - I know that not everyone in every recent US government would agree. That's why there's a thread of anti-USgovt feeling in contemporary Western culture...
 
Posted by Gildas (# 525) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by hatless:
quote:
Originally posted by Kaplan Corday:
quote:
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
I don't! [Smile] His name makes me think of Al Stewart's song "The Ghost of Charlotte Corday" from his excellent Famous Last Words album, though. [Smile] If you hear a step upon the stair tonight...

My Ship name is a tribute to two public-spirited women: Charlotte Corday, who stabbed Marat in his bath (don't know whether Al Stewart's song is about her), and Fanny Kaplan, who was imprisoned and flogged by the Romanovs, and executed by the Bolsheviks for trying to assassinate Lenin.
If you ever want a middle name consider Violet Gibson who shot Mussolini and is buried a few hundred yards from where I write.
Next time there is a Hosts and Admins day can I respectfully petition the Powers That Be to rename him Harmodius Aristogeiton.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
But Dafyd's idea of the archetype relativist position was sufficiently strange to warrant comment.

The reason it's strange is that 'relativist' is used as a boo-word by conservatives, who don't care what the real implications are and then liberals say they're relativists, without thinking through the implications, on the principle that anything that shocks the conservatives that much must be a good thing.
But neither of them have actually thought it through.

On the other hand, if you do a philosophy course this stuff is basic first-year ethics.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
The difficulty for the relativist is that our culture says it's wrong to attack people unless you thereby prevent them doing something that's objectively evil. Something that you happen to dislike doesn't count.

A lot of our culture thinks that you can't be moral unless you're objectively moral. The relativist thinks that's a mistake, based on confusing an erroneous meta-ethical position (moral universalism) with culture-dependent substantive ethical norms. For 'objectively moral' read 'moral' throughout. And for 'objectively wrong' read 'wrong' throughout.

A relativist would agree that in our culture we can't go to war over causes that we just happen to dislike. We do have to justify going to war by reasons that are valid in our culture. However, the argument that those people are a threat to us and our values, therefore we need to strike preemptively against them, does seem to be more widely accepted than we might like.

[the heresy of bad code]

[ 20. July 2014, 15:38: Message edited by: Eutychus ]
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
quote:
If moral relativists cannot think they have any grounds for judging that another culture deserves to be bombed, they equally cannot have any grounds for judging that another culture deserves to live in peace. "That culture deserves to live in peace" is just as much a moral judgement on the other culture as "that culture deserves not to live in peace".
Quite. "Deserve" is the wrong word. Moral relativists decline to judge on such issues because it is inconsistent to do so. They accept that any feeling of moral superiority they or their culture hold cannot cross cultural boundaries. In a Taliban bombing ballot, the moral relativist abstains. Besides, there are always moral objectivitists on hand to do the dirty work. As has been noted, out and out morally relativist individuals are rare, and morally relativist cultures unheard of.

quote:
On the other hand, if you do a philosophy course this stuff is basic first-year ethics.
And of course all the first year ethics text books state that the archetypal relativist position is "those fundamentalist Taliban over there can't be convinced using reason (relativism), therefore we have to bomb them until they are no longer a threat."

quote:
Either the whole range of moral judgements are possible, or none are.
I'm not a philosophy graduate or anything, unlike, I presume, your good self, but I imagine they get on to this stuff in the second year.
 
Posted by deano (# 12063) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I would think that this forum itself is an expression of postmodernism. It sets out to disturb, to ruffle feathers, to lift up fences, to see what's underneath them, to interrogate, and so on. AmIrite?

Nah. It's simply a place that gathers up the last of the worlds lefty oddballs, peace-first tossers and the odd lonely Marxist.

It's mainly a zoo of ageing hippies, economic illiterates and communists-who-still-believe. It's a harmless way to keep them together, and to keep them off the streets where they might get hurt.

And of course some people like me who like to poke them with sticks through the bars.
 
Posted by Kaplan Corday (# 16119) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Gildas:
Next time there is a Hosts and Admins day can I respectfully petition the Powers That Be to rename him Harmodius Aristogeiton.

Orsini Cadoudal von Stauffenberg has a nice ring to it.
 
Posted by Kaplan Corday (# 16119) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
The reason it's strange is that 'relativist' is used as a boo-word by conservatives, who don't care what the real implications are and then liberals say they're relativists, without thinking through the implications, on the principle that anything that shocks the conservatives that much must be a good thing.

Let's face it, in practice everyone, right across the spectrum, consciously or unconsciously, jumps between relativism and absolutism all the time as it suits us.

Often it's tangled up with other concepts such as "lesser of two evils" and "means justifying ends".

[ 20. July 2014, 21:40: Message edited by: Kaplan Corday ]
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Kaplan Corday:
in practice everyone, right across the spectrum, consciously or unconsciously, jumps between relativism and absolutism all the time as it suits us.

Or as it is merited. Some things are relative, some things are absolute, etc.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:
If moral relativists cannot think they have any grounds for judging that another culture deserves to be bombed, they equally cannot have any grounds for judging that another culture deserves to live in peace. "That culture deserves to live in peace" is just as much a moral judgement on the other culture as "that culture deserves not to live in peace".
Quite. "Deserve" is the wrong word. Moral relativists decline to judge on such issues because it is inconsistent to do so. They accept that any feeling of moral superiority they or their culture hold cannot cross cultural boundaries. In a Taliban bombing ballot, the moral relativist abstains.
'Any feeling of moral superiority cannot cross cultural boundaries.' - the relativist holds that as stated that sentence is nonsense. For the relativist, that statement must mean 'According to the relativist's culture, any feeling of moral superiority they or their culture hold cannot cross cultural boundaries'. That might be true; it is far more likely to be false.

Where on relativist premises is the inconsistency? Spell it out logically.
Remember all normative premises with ethical implications must be prefaced with 'According to the relativist's culture...' or the relativist doesn't accept them. Assume that the standards of the relativist's culture allow for resorting to force if and only if reasoning won't work. (Relativism obviously predicts that reasoning with them won't work.)

quote:
As has been noted, out and out morally relativist individuals are rare, and morally relativist cultures unheard of.
If I'm right that nationalism is effectively a form of relativism, then there have been plenty of relativist cultures.

quote:
And of course all the first year ethics text books state that the archetypal relativist position is "those fundamentalist Taliban over there can't be convinced using reason (relativism), therefore we have to bomb them until they are no longer a threat."
It is somewhat depressing how many professional philosophers who espouse some form of relativism are eager to refute the idea that they cannot condemn other cultures. But they regularly do. And they're right: they have validly refuted the idea.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Kaplan Corday:
Let's face it, in practice everyone, right across the spectrum, consciously or unconsciously, jumps between relativism and absolutism all the time as it suits us.

Often it's tangled up with other concepts such as "lesser of two evils" and "means justifying ends".

One of the reasons for being rigourous about these things is to catch ourselves and other people when we or they rationalise like that.
Moral relativism, in the sense under discussion, has little to nothing to do with 'lesser of two evils' or 'means justifying ends'.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Where on relativist premises is the inconsistency? Spell it out logically.

Let's flesh this out. Here's an explanation of morality that a relativist might plausibly hold.

All human societies have to hold themselves together and regulate conflict, both explicitly and by subtly heading it off before it happens. So societies get together and agree to develop moral rules and values, and etiquette, and rituals to work off steam, and other customs to keep themselves going. But because humans are pretty flexible creatures, no two societies are going to hit on exactly the same set of rules. Any set of rules that keeps a society going is valid for that society. (It doesn't even matter if the rules are rationally inconsistent so long as they're consistent in practice.) Moral rules that apply in one society are true for the society that came up with them, but not true for other societies.

Now, any society is going to deal with outsiders. They have to defend themselves against outsiders that want to take their stuff. Some members of their society may want to take stuff from outsiders. They may want to trade with outsiders. They will need to defend themselves from outsiders in a more subtle sense: you don't want the outsider society undermining the rules that are keeping your society going. If your society passes all the property onto the eldest child, you don't want the second son saying, hang on, why don't we do like that society that distributes inheritance equally among all male children; and vice versa. You don't want people with lots of land and nobody to work it looking over at the society over there which practices slavery and getting ideas; and vice versa.
So clearly you need to have morals and rules and customs that govern interactions with outsiders. And you need to fend off outsider values that undermine your values. One efficient way of fending off outsider values is by judging them to be inferior to your values, by the standards of your society; that's efficient because you don't need any new standards then.

Now assuming that's all in place, what is irrational about it? Why can't a member of society who explains morality in that way use that morality to judge other cultures inferior?
 
Posted by Dogwalker (# 14135) on :
 
Isn't this whole argument like the emperor's new clothes?

I'd be perfectly willing to accept there are moral absolutes, if I could see an example.

Please express one useful morally absolute statement, accepted by all societies on earth, at all times, without exception.

Nothing I can think of* fits that simple criterion, so it seems to me that in reality we must be relativists.

(Now I'm probably going to get my head handed to me, but I've wanted to ask this for years.)

*Except, perhaps, "Might makes right."
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dogwalker:
Please express one useful morally absolute statement, accepted by all societies on earth, at all times, without exception.

Nothing I can think of* fits that simple criterion, so it seems to me that in reality we must be relativists.

I'm sorry, but that just doesn't follow. A moral law being absolute doesn't hinge on whether everyone knows about it; and saying that "we" must be relativists as a result of that doesn't follow either.
 
Posted by Lamb Chopped (# 5528) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dogwalker:
Isn't this whole argument like the emperor's new clothes?

I'd be perfectly willing to accept there are moral absolutes, if I could see an example.

Please express one useful morally absolute statement, accepted by all societies on earth, at all times, without exception.

Nothing I can think of* fits that simple criterion, so it seems to me that in reality we must be relativists.

(Now I'm probably going to get my head handed to me, but I've wanted to ask this for years.)

*Except, perhaps, "Might makes right."

Heheheheheheh.

How about "You are responsible to others beside yourself"? The particular "others" may vary from culture to culture, but no culture agrees that it's okay to do whatever the hell you personally want without regard to anyone else, ever.

There are actually quite a few of these, if you state them as general principles and allow the details to vary from culture to culture.
 
Posted by Dogwalker (# 14135) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Lamb Chopped:
How about "You are responsible to others beside yourself"? The particular "others" may vary from culture to culture, but no culture agrees that it's okay to do whatever the hell you personally want without regard to anyone else, ever.

Thank you. That really helps me quite a lot. And gives me something to think about.

ChastMaster, two things: I realized that "must" could have been better expressed after I had posted. I meant it in the sense of "are forced to be". If I can't work from absolutes, my only choice is to make the best relative decisions I can.

I don't intend to steal, to take one commandment as an example. But if I were in Jean Valjean's shoes, would I steal to feed a starving child? Would it be wrong if I did? How is that not a relativistic decision?

For all the philosophical hot air, I see darn few absolute moral laws I can use to build my life choices, or can teach to my kids. I'd like some; hidden absolutes seem useless to me.
 
Posted by Kaplan Corday (# 16119) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by Kaplan Corday:
Let's face it, in practice everyone, right across the spectrum, consciously or unconsciously, jumps between relativism and absolutism all the time as it suits us.

Often it's tangled up with other concepts such as "lesser of two evils" and "means justifying ends".

One of the reasons for being rigourous about these things is to catch ourselves and other people when we or they rationalise like that.

It's certainly important to be aware of it in ourselves and others because it can be harmful, but that is not invariably the case.

It is not so much a matter of "rationalising" something which is always unacceptable, but recognising that it is inevitable, and that it is sometimes necessary and beneficial.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dogwalker:
I'd be perfectly willing to accept there are moral absolutes, if I could see an example.

Please express one useful morally absolute statement, accepted by all societies on earth, at all times, without exception.

Nothing I can think of* fits that simple criterion, so it seems to me that in reality we must be relativists.

To Lamb Chopped's example, I'd add that courage is better than cowardice.

Why, though, should a universalist accept that the challenge is relevant? Even within one society there are people who commit murder and aren't caught. Does that mean that our society thinks murder is sometimes ok? It doesn't. So why should a universalist accept that an example of a society that thinks murder is ok shows that 'don't commit murder' is not a universal rule?

quote:
I don't intend to steal, to take one commandment as an example. But if I were in Jean Valjean's shoes, would I steal to feed a starving child? Would it be wrong if I did? How is that not a relativistic decision?
I believe you're confusing two separate questions here, and it's as well to keep them distinct.
One is, are there any rules within Jean Valjean's society that he may never break under any circumstances.
The other is, is there a higher standard by which Valjean's society can be judged?

Now obviously Jean Valjean's society thinks it is always wrong to steal a loaf of bread, since it locks him up for it and then persecutes him once he's released. Victor Hugo, the author, thinks Valjean's society is wrong by a higher standard.

There's a variety of possibilities here:
Higher standard, rules with no exceptions: Kant.
Higher standard, some rules with exceptions: Aquinas(*)
Higher standard, all rules with exceptions: Bentham(*)
No higher standard, rules with no exceptions: Hume.
No higher standard, rules with exceptions: I can't think of anyone well known.

(*) Strictly speaking, Aquinas thinks there are principles that tell you when certain rules have exceptions, and Bentham thinks there are no rules, only a single principle.

[ 21. July 2014, 13:21: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
quote:
Where on relativist premises is the inconsistency? Spell it out logically.
OK, let's go through it step by step. I can't guarantee that it will hold up completely because I ain't no philosopher.

Here goes. The phrase "moral relativism" can be broken down into three distinct positions. Descriptive, meta ethical and normative. To be a normative moral relativist, one must subscribe to meta ethical moral relativism(MMR), to embrace MMR one would most likely take descriptive moral relativism (DMR)to be true.

DMR is simply the empirical observation that different cultures have different moral standards.

MMR is, according to theStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,the view that "the truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons."

Now, at his point it is important to remember that embracing MMR puts no prescriptive burdens on the adherent. But it is, if you like, an absolute truth claim. And that truth claim is that all claims to absolute moral truths are false. Within societies, that is not a problem, members of that society can happily justify their morality within that society. But it has implications for trans cultural relations.

According to the flawed but useful fount of some knowledge, an influential proponent of this idea was William Sumner in his 1906 work Folkways. He argued that since there is no higher moral standard than the local mores of a culture, no trans-cultural judgement about the rightness or wrongness of a culture's mores can be justified.

At this level we are not concerned with different points of view. The English can think they are superior and the Germans can think they are superior. To the meta ethical relativist they are both mistaken, because there is no such thing as superior and inferior morality across cultures.

So far, so uncontroversial, I hope, but here it gets perplexing. The normative moral relativist thinks that this knowledge of how the world is puts an ethical imperative on us. If there is no justification for the perceived moral rightness of our own culture, there is no reason for us to take any action against other cultures simply because they have different morality to ours. MMR implies tolerance of other cultures. Most philosophers disagree, though, because of the issues you highlight. According to Stanford, MMR cannot very well imply that it is an objective moral truth that we should be tolerant: MMR denies that there are such truths. Equally, though, MMR can't imply we should bomb other cultures because they are different. So when you say...
quote:
So clearly you need to have morals and rules and customs that govern interactions with outsiders. And you need to fend off outsider values that undermine your values. One efficient way of fending off outsider values is by judging them to be inferior to your values, by the standards of your society; that's efficient because you don't need any new standards then.
... it might be efficient, but it clashes with MMR. Individuals who accept MMR, accept MMR regardless of what their culture finds efficient. They can't judge their values superior because there is no standard by which they can do the judging. They cannot advocate tolerance or intolerance from a relativist position alone. This is pretty much what I meant in my first post when I said moral relativists have to disappear up their own arses to to take any sort of action in this area.

There are relativists, apparently, such as Wong, who try to finesse all this to advocate tolerance. And that seems to make sense: even though MMR doesn't strictly imply tolerance, it's a bit weird to commit to the position that there are no grounds to judge other cultures' values and then go on to argue that we should. Possibly that's why there are so few people advocating the relativist case for cultural imperialism.

quote:
Why can't a member of society who explains morality in that way use that morality to judge other cultures inferior?
Nothing to stop 'em. But moral relativism it ain't.

quote:
If I'm right that nationalism is effectively a form of relativism, then there have been plenty of relativist cultures.
And if my aunty had bollocks she'd be my uncle.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
MMR is, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,the view that "the truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons."

Now, at his point it is important to remember that embracing MMR puts no prescriptive burdens on the adherent. But it is, if you like, an absolute truth claim. And that truth claim is that all claims to absolute moral truths are false.

All perfectly valid up to this point.

quote:
Within societies, that is not a problem, members of that society can happily justify their morality within that society. But it has implications for trans cultural relations.

According to the flawed but useful fount of some knowledge, an influential proponent of this idea was William Sumner in his 1906 work Folkways. He argued that since there is no higher moral standard than the local mores of a culture, no trans-cultural judgement about the rightness or wrongness of a culture's mores can be justified.

Sumner might have argued that, but was his argument sound?
A relativist believes that they don't have to claim absolute truth for their intra-cultural moral judgements in order for those to be justified. Now, the relativist believes they cannot claim absolute truth for their trans-cultural moral judgements. But why, on the relativist's terms, should the relativist need to claim absolute truth for their trans-cultural moral judgements? The relativist can justify their judgements about other cultures to themselves or to members of their own society using the standards of their own society.

quote:
To the meta ethical relativist they are both mistaken, because there is no such thing as superior and inferior morality across cultures.
Here you're trading on an ambiguity. 'Across cultures' could mean 'using an absolute standard belonging to neither culture'. Or it could mean 'making a judgement about one culture from within another culture'. The relativist thinks the first is impossible. But - and this is the crucial bit - the second has no logical dependence on the first and therefore the relativist can do it.


quote:
quote:
So clearly you need to have morals and rules and customs that govern interactions with outsiders. And you need to fend off outsider values that undermine your values. One efficient way of fending off outsider values is by judging them to be inferior to your values, by the standards of your society; that's efficient because you don't need any new standards then.
... it might be efficient, but it clashes with MMR. Individuals who accept MMR, accept MMR regardless of what their culture finds efficient. They can't judge their values superior because there is no standard by which they can do the judging.
Yes there is. There's the standards of their culture.
Sure, there's no absolute standard. But the whole point of being a relativist is you do not need an absolute standard to make judgements.

quote:
They cannot advocate tolerance or intolerance from a relativist position alone.
They can't do so from a relativist position alone. But the whole point of being a relativist is that you also accept the moral standards of your culture. If your culture tells you to be tolerant, relativism cannot advocate intolerance. But if your culture tells you to be intolerant, relativism cannot advocate tolerance.
Suppose we get a little more complicated: suppose your culture is a bit more nuanced, and advocates tolerance, until rational negotiation fails, and then if rational negotiation fails, resorting to force. At that point MMR does make a substantive contribution, it predicts that rational negotiation will always fail, and therefore implies that the culture should resort to force straightaway.
I suggest that cultures falling into that third nuanced camp are more common than one's falling into either of the other two.

quote:
quote:
Why can't a member of society who explains morality in that way use that morality to judge other cultures inferior?
Nothing to stop 'em. But moral relativism it ain't.
And at what step of the argument was moral relativism abandoned, or a premise introduced that was incompatible with moral relativism?
 
Posted by Russ (# 120) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
A lot of our culture thinks that you can't be moral unless you're objectively moral. The relativist thinks that's a mistake, based on confusing an erroneous meta-ethical position (moral universalism) with culture-dependent substantive ethical norms.

Does moral relativism as you describe it imply that there is upon each individual an absolute moral obligation to follow the rules of their culture or society ?

If there is no "higher" universal principle by which a society's morality can be judged, doesn't that mean that there is no principle by which an individual can judge that this social rule is good and that bad, or this morally obligatory and that optional ? No appeal from the tyranny of the majority ? Or of the dictator if that's the way one's society organises itself ?

Or are you saying that substantive content cannot be judged, but meta-ethical philosophical truth or coherence can be ? And does such a judgment have ethical implications ? Are you claiming that a cultural moral imperative that is derived from a faulty philosophical meta-ethic is thereby not morally binding ? Even though the culture holds it to be true ?

And what's to stop your moral relativist from getting together with a few like-minded friends to form a sub-culture or sub-society... ?

I'm struggling to see how this version of relativism is a viable ethical position at all. Maybe I'm just confused...

I would have said that the common-usage meaning of "moral relativism " is something like "drawing the line between universal moral imperatives and culture-specific customs in a way that results in more of life being described as customs and less as moral rules". But then I never studied philosophy.

Best wishes,

Russ
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
A lot of our culture thinks that you can't be moral unless you're objectively moral. The relativist thinks that's a mistake, based on confusing an erroneous meta-ethical position (moral universalism) with culture-dependent substantive ethical norms.

Does moral relativism as you describe it imply that there is upon each individual an absolute moral obligation to follow the rules of their culture or society ?
Helpful question. No it doesn't.
It implies that for each individual there is upon everybody an obligation to obey the values of that individual's culture or society.

So, consider an Athenian relativist looking at a Spartan society. The Athenian relativist believes:
It is true for an Athenian that they must obey the values of Athens.
It is true for an Spartan that they must obey the values of Sparta.
But...
It is true for an Spartan that Athenians must obey the values of Sparta.
It is true for an Athenian that Spartans must obey the values of Athens.

quote:
If there is no "higher" universal principle by which a society's morality can be judged, doesn't that mean that there is no principle by which an individual can judge that this social rule is good and that bad, or this morally obligatory and that optional ? No appeal from the tyranny of the majority ? Or of the dictator if that's the way one's society organises itself ?
Well, a moral relativist(*) could argue that most societies and cultures have internal differences. A moral relativist thinks you can appeal to the premises of your society against a particular rule. (If your society says that all people are created equal, and allows slavery, a moral relativist says that you can argue that the two are incompatible.) What a moral relativist thinks you cannot do is appeal to a standard which is independent of your society, or which isn't ultimately arbitrary.

(*) strictly speaking, somebody who thinks everybody must be true to their own values whatever they are is also a moral relativist. And the same structure applies. But the culture/ society moral relativist is the more plausible, since individuals get their own values from their society, and since the culture/society moral relativist has a better story of how morality comes about.
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
quote:
Sumner might have argued that, but was his argument sound?
I'm not really qualified to say. All I can say is that if the wiki is correct, and Sumner's view is indeed influential in relativist circles, and if your argument rests on that view being false, then you are at odds with many people, philosophers included, arguing from a relativist position. That would make your description of the "archetypal" relativist position somewhat wide of the mark, regardless of disagreements among philosophers on the soundness of Sumner's view and other aspects of MMR. Philosophy ain't physics. It's value lies more in the questions it raises rather than the answers its individual practitioners propose.

From my perspective as a non philosopher inclined towards MMR but accepting that it has limited to negligible practical value, the non Dafyd interpretation is to be favoured because it just makes more sense. The Dafyd interpretation smacks of a moral absolutist looking for a novel take down of a straw bogyman. I mean, nationalism, seriously? You don't think the psychological and sociological explanations of the phenomenon are so deficient that we need to mangle a philosophically dodgy meta ethical position usually associated with cross cultural tolerance to explain it?
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:
Sumner might have argued that, but was his argument sound?
All I can say is that if the wiki is correct, and Sumner's view is indeed influential in relativist circles, and if your argument rests on that view being false, then you are at odds with many people, philosophers included, arguing from a relativist position. That would make your description of the "archetypal" relativist position somewhat wide of the mark, regardless of disagreements among philosophers on the soundness of Sumner's view and other aspects of MMR.
Let me quote from the wiki article you cited:

quote:
(Normative relativists) argue that meta-ethical relativism implies that we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when it runs counter to our personal or cultural moral standards. Most philosophers do not agree, partially because of the challenges of arriving at an "ought" from relativistic premises. Meta-ethical relativism seems to eliminate the normative relativist's ability to make prescriptive claims. In other words, normative relativism may find it difficult to make a statement like "we think it is moral to tolerate behaviour" without always adding "other people think intolerance of certain behaviours is moral". Philosophers like Russell Blackford even argue that intolerance is, to some degree, important. As he puts it, "we need not adopt a quietism about moral traditions that cause hardship and suffering. Nor need we passively accept the moral norms of our own respective societies, to the extent that they are ineffective or counterproductive or simply unnecessary." That is, it is perfectly reasonable (and practical) for a person or group to defend their subjective values against others, even if there is no universal prescription or morality. We can also criticize other cultures for failing to pursue even their own goals effectively.
The wiki article does not, as you misrepresent it, link Sumner to normative relativism.
The wiki article does state that normative relativism is rejected by most philosophers.
The wiki article does give an example of a meta-ethical relativist who not only rejects normative relativism but defends some intolerance.

quote:
It's value lies more in the questions it raises rather than the answers its individual practitioners propose.
Certainly when the answers it gives you are not the answers you want.
 
Posted by Gildas (# 525) on :
 
Originally posted by Grosex:

quote:
I mean, nationalism, seriously? You don't think the psychological and sociological explanations of the phenomenon are so deficient that we need to mangle a philosophically dodgy meta ethical position usually associated with cross cultural tolerance to explain it?
Depends which version of nationalism you are working with. The liberal version associated with people like Mazzini and Masaryk wasn't relativist but it's not, currently, difficult to find examples of people who think that bombing civilians is morally neutral when carried out by representatives of one national movement and morally deplorable when carried out by it's enemies. That's a kind of relativism, albeit not the one associated with, say, the anthropological school.
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
quote:
The wiki article does not, as you misrepresent it, link Sumner to normative relativism.
The wiki article does state that normative relativism is rejected by most philosophers.
The wiki article does give an example of a meta-ethical relativist who not only rejects normative relativism but defends some intolerance.

Go back and have another look. I said lets take it step by step. In the meta ethical step I said MMR has implications for trans cultural relations and Sumner argued that since there is no higher moral standard than the local mores of a culture, no trans-cultural judgement about the rightness or wrongness of a culture's mores can be justified. Ths is a more or less direct quote from the wiki section on MMR:
quote:
The American anthropologist William Sumner was an influential advocate of this view. In his 1906 work Folkways he argues that what people consider right and wrong is entirely shaped by the traditions, customs and practices of their culture. Moreover, since there is no higher moral standard than the local mores of a culture, no trans-cultural judgement about the rightness or wrongness of a culture's mores can be justified.
Your whole argument seems to be that relativists think they can indeed justify the view that their culture is superior. But if they think Sumner is correct, then that is not a rational position to hold.
quote:
The wiki article does state that normative relativism is rejected by most philosophers.
A point that I acknowledged in my normative step. The thing is, most objections centre on the relativists' inability to make judgements on other cultures' mores, not their bomb happy proclivities. And I shall repeat, although I'm sick of saying it, that is an objection that actually has legs.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
In the meta ethical step I said MMR has implications for trans cultural relations and Sumner argued that since there is no higher moral standard than the local mores of a culture, no trans-cultural judgement about the rightness or wrongness of a culture's mores can be justified.

1. Sumner isn't necessarily correct. (That would be an argument from authority.)
2. Sumner, while certainly invoking relativism to ridicule the idea of civilizing missions, was equally able to denounce Spanish imperialism for cruelty and lust for glory. That suggests that he didn't hold with a consistent ban on inter-cultural judgements.
3. It's not obvious to me that 'trans-cultural' means what you think it means. Saying that no trans-cultural judgement can be justified by trans-cultural standards is not to say that no culture-specific judgement about another culture can be justified by culture-specific standards.

quote:
quote:
The wiki article does state that normative relativism is rejected by most philosophers.
A point that I acknowledged in my normative step. The thing is, most objections centre on the relativists' inability to make judgements on other cultures' mores, not their bomb happy proclivities. And I shall repeat, although I'm sick of saying it, that is an objection that actually has legs.
The wiki article says that most philosophers do not agree that metaphysical relativism entails normative relativism. The objection that relativists are unable to make judgements on other cultures has fewer legs than a boa constrictor.
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
quote:
1. Sumner isn't necessarily correct. (That would be an argument from authority.)
Indeed. So you might think I should have said something like, if someone accepts Sumners position, then... Oh, wait a minute, I did.
quote:
It's not obvious to me that 'trans-cultural' means what you think it means.
I'm thinking it means what my dictionary says it means: "involving, encompassing, or extending across two or more cultures."
quote:
Saying that no trans-cultural judgement can be justified by trans-cultural standards is not to say that no culture-specific judgement about another culture can be justified by culture-specific standards.
Well, you'd better take that up with the wiki. What it says is that according to the meta ethical relativist view, "no trans-cultural judgement about the rightness or wrongness of a culture's mores can be justified." (Whether that's right or wrong is a different matter, but you are questioning my interpretation of the article here). There is no discussion on the multiple viewpoint thing.

Which issue, as far as I can see, is precisely where many problems around relativism centre. Questions about who moral judgements apply to when you accept there are no universal moral judgments are naturally raised, as are questions about what is meant by a moral truth if it is not universal. You said before that to a relativist there are two ways to judge whether English mores are superior to German ones. But from a meta ethical perspective (say, a French relativist perspective), as far as I can see there is no rational judgement to be made. And if that is the case, how can an English or German relativist justify their opinions from a meta ethical perspective? They can't justify them on the meta ethical plane; if they keep hold of them, they either become moral objectivist on at least one matter, or else moral nihilists. The former, I think, is more usual and is the basis for mixed moral objectivist/relativist viewpoints. I think Blackford would be one such philosopher, as is Wong.
quote:
The wiki article says that most philosophers do not agree that metaphysical relativism entails normative relativism.
Indeed it does. What I'm interested in is how you get from there to saying the archetypal relativist position is to bomb the fuck out of cultures with which they have moral disagreements.

[ 26. July 2014, 20:34: Message edited by: Grokesx ]
 
Posted by Garasu (# 17152) on :
 
Why shouldn't they?
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
But from a meta ethical perspective (say, a French relativist perspective), as far as I can see there is no rational judgement to be made. And if that is the case, how can an English or German relativist justify their opinions from a meta ethical perspective?

Excusez-moi. Comment pouvez-vous parler le Français en anglais ? Vous pouvez seulement parler le Français en Français. D'un point de vue meta-linguistique, au dehors de l'Anglais ou de la Français il n'y a pas des mots à utiliser. Et si c'est le cas, comment peut un parleur d'une autre langue justifier quel mots utiliser d'un point de vue meta-linguistique?(*)

Translated out of Franglais:
Excuse me. How can you talk about the French in English? You can only talk about the French in French. From a meta-linguistic point of view, outside English or French, there are no words to use. And if that's the case, how can a speaker of another language justify what words to use from a meta-linguistic point of view?

[ 26. July 2014, 23:10: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
quote:
Excuse me. How can you talk about the French in English? You can only talk about the French in French. From a meta-linguistic point of view, outside English or French, there are no words to use. And if that's the case, how can a speaker of another language justify what words to use from a meta-linguistic point of view?
I don't think this analogy adds much to the discussion, but it does give me the opportunity to recycle an old joke which may serve to illustrate the themes under discussion here:

Englishman, Frenchman, Italian and German in a bar waxing lyrical on the beauty of their respective languages, in Esperanto, if you like. The Englishman says, "To me, the essence of the English language is summed up in the word 'butterfly'. Two normal, workaday words combined to form a thing of beauty - 'butterfly'. The Frenchman nods in agreement, "Indeed, a most beautiful word. But the French equivalent rolls off the tongue in an even more beautiful fashion - 'papillon.'" And he sighs, savouring the sound of the word for a moment. The Italian says, "All this is undoubtedly true, but when I say the word, 'farfalla' it is as if a butterfly could be conjured out of the air at the very mention of the word."

All the while the German is becoming increasingly agitated. Finally he can take no more, "And what, " he demands, "is wrong with 'schmetterling?'"

[ 27. July 2014, 09:55: Message edited by: Grokesx ]
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
I don't think this analogy adds much to the discussion

Why am I not surprised?
 
Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :
 
As a total side note, every time someone says "Sumner" I think of Sting. [Killing me]
 
Posted by Russ (# 120) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
What I'm interested in is how you get from there to saying the archetypal relativist position is to bomb the fuck out of cultures with which they have moral disagreements.

People can act in accordance with, or against, their moral principles.

If a culture can be said to act, then correspondingly it can act either in accordance with or against its own moral principles.

If you're what Dafyd has called a universalist then you probably believe that some variation on "do as you would be done by" applies at the level of interactions between cultures, and therefore only cultures that enjoy being bombed should bomb others.

If however, you're the sort of moral relativist that Dafyd has described, then the moral question of whether to launch the bombers amounts to the question "is this action in accordance with our own moral principles" ?

Is smiting evil part of our culture ? Absolutely. From Arthurian knights to Top Gun, from True Grit to Star Wars, socking it to the bad guys is what our culture tells us is the right thing to do.

Our culture took the Man who taught "turn the other cheek" and launched the Crusades in His Name.

If there are no moral principles that stand "above" culture, then at the inter-cultural level cultures give themselves permission to behave as they choose.

Seems logical to me...

Best wishes,

Russ

PS: we may have drifted away from the original topic. What the anti-modernists hate about modernism ISTM is not that it espouses moral relativism, but that it relativizes the history of the Church. That theology is a product of its time and place rather than a truth for all time.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
If however, you're the sort of moral relativist that Dafyd has described, then the moral question of whether to launch the bombers amounts to the question "is this action in accordance with our own moral principles" ?

I'd say here that 'not bombing innocent children' is as much a moral principle of our culture as 'smiting evil'. The problem I think is a little more indirect.

Imagine that 'they' practice FGM. Our moral principles tell us to stop FGM from happening. Now if you believe in universal moral principles you believe that in principle there is a right answer and if people of good will sit down around a table and argue about it they will converge on the right answer. Relativism says there is no right answer to converge upon, so there is no point in sitting down around a table to resolve your moral differences. Instead, you move straight onto a more confrontational way to resolve the conflict.
 
Posted by Gildas (# 525) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
If however, you're the sort of moral relativist that Dafyd has described, then the moral question of whether to launch the bombers amounts to the question "is this action in accordance with our own moral principles" ?

I'd say here that 'not bombing innocent children' is as much a moral principle of our culture as 'smiting evil'. The problem I think is a little more indirect.

Imagine that 'they' practice FGM. Our moral principles tell us to stop FGM from happening. Now if you believe in universal moral principles you believe that in principle there is a right answer and if people of good will sit down around a table and argue about it they will converge on the right answer. Relativism says there is no right answer to converge upon, so there is no point in sitting down around a table to resolve your moral differences. Instead, you move straight onto a more confrontational way to resolve the conflict.

I'm not sure that it's as straight forward as that. For one thing the question as to how to prevent, say, FGM is a prudential question. Now even assuming we could get everyone around the table and explain the demerits of FGM until they understood that it was wrong that might be a somewhat lengthy process whilst, in the meantime, you could be locking up parents who procure such operations and doctors who perform them. So a universalist might hold that the urgency of the situation required a twin track approach using both argument and the rigours of the law to discourage the practice. Also, I think, a universalist could hold that bad passions - say fear of female sexuality or ressentiment - might lead a person to ignore good arguments against FGM. So sitting everyone around a table might not be all that as a practical solution.

All in all, in practice FGM is as intractable for a universalist as for a relativist.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Gildas:
All in all, in practice FGM is as intractable for a universalist as for a relativist.

Well, yes, up to a point. But I don't think the ideal case is completely out of touch with the practical case.
Also, I don't think there's any meaningful difference between a relativist and a universalist who thinks that anyone who disagrees with them does so because of intractable moral defects.
 
Posted by Dave Marshall (# 7533) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
if you believe in universal moral principles you believe that in principle there is a right answer and if people of good will sit down around a table and argue about it they will converge on the right answer. Relativism says there is no right answer to converge upon, so there is no point in sitting down around a table to resolve your moral differences.

Does anyone really believe in universal moral principles? However strictly applied by either self-imposed force of will or legally enforced sanctions, such "principles" are only a code of conduct from which we can always opt out. To claim otherwise would be to deny our own or someone else's humanity.

Morality is not in essence about principle but about choice. There is always a point in sitting around a table to resolve differences because that is how we make moral choices, decisions that affect others but are ours to make. Universalism and relativism may be useful categories in abstract philosophy. I don't see they have much real world significance in this context.

[cross-posted]

[ 29. July 2014, 11:56: Message edited by: Dave Marshall ]
 
Posted by IngoB (# 8700) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
Does anyone really believe in universal moral principles?

Sure, I do.

quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
However strictly applied by either self-imposed force of will or legally enforced sanctions, such "principles" are only a code of conduct from which we can always opt out.

Physical law tells you what you will do, moral law what you ought to do. If you stumble you will fall to the ground. That's physics. If somebody is innocent, you should not kill them. That's morals. That you can murder speaks in no way or form against universal moral law. "Ought/should" implies that you can do other. If you cannot do other, then it is not a moral concern. Choice does not speak against morality, it is the very reason for morality.

quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
To claim otherwise would be to deny our own or someone else's humanity.

Nonsense. What universal moral law claims is that as far as what we ought to do, we are all the same. It says that my choice will not be evaluated by other standards than yours. It does not say that we have no choice.

quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
Morality is not in essence about principle but about choice.

Moral principle is exactly about the proper evaluation of choices.

quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
Universalism and relativism may be useful categories in abstract philosophy. I don't see they have much real world significance in this context.

That's because most people are morally incoherent. They are moral relativists as long as they don't care about something, and moral universalists when they do. The value of philosophy, to those who love wisdom, is that it exposes this incoherence and potentially motivates one to rectify it.
 
Posted by Dave Marshall (# 7533) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by IngoB:
Sure, I do [believe in universal moral principles].

As absolutes in their own right? Rather than a consequence of some other belief?
quote:
If somebody is innocent, you should not kill them. That's morals.
It's a widely accepted moral position. That doesn't make it universal. It is quite possible to imagine a situation where killing an innocent person was at least a moral option - if their inevitable slow painful death was the only alternative, for example.

Universal morality implies at least one choice that will be moral in every situation. I don't think such a choice exists, because what is right always depends on the context. We can never exclude the possibility that for any particular choice, however apparently universal (like not killing an innocent person), there will be some situation where it would be wrong.

quote:
What universal moral law claims is that as far as what we ought to do, we are all the same. It says that my choice will not be evaluated by other standards than yours.
No, it says that my choice will be evaluated by whoever decides what the universal moral law is.
quote:
most people are morally incoherent. They are moral relativists as long as they don't care about something, and moral universalists when they do. The value of philosophy, to those who love wisdom, is that it exposes this incoherence and potentially motivates one to rectify it.
Those who love wisdom know the limitations of the rule of law. Morality is not about conforming to any code, however it is derived. A moral code, like law, saves us having to go back to first principles for every choice we make. But it is only an infinitely-refined digest of the vastly multi-generational social process ("sitting round a table") by which we have learnt to be viable moral beings. Moral because we take into account, to the degree we have found to be practical, the interests and sensibilities of others in decisions that are ours to make.
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
quote:
Relativism says there is no right answer to converge upon, so there is no point in sitting down around a table to resolve your moral differences.
No it doesn't. Relativism says there are some moral disagreements that are not rationally resolvable. It does not pre-judge which ones they are. Nothing in relativism precludes people of good will sitting round a table and discussing stuff. It accepts, for instance, that one way of rationally solving such disagreements is for one side to accept the arguments of the other side - maybe one side will see a logical flaw in their reasoning or be made aware of evidence that they were previously unaware of. But, it says there are issues that, at a given point in time, may not resolvable in this fashion. You'd have to be particularly Pollyannaish to think that differences over practices like FGM that have evolved over millennia are going to be resolved, rationally or otherwise, over a nice cup of sweet tea.
quote:
Instead, you move straight onto a more confrontational way to resolve the conflict.
Really? The go to position of a relativist, or anyone else for that matter, when faced with a disagreement with no rational resolution is confrontation? To the relativist the type of differences we are talking about here are in the same category as which colour is better, blue or red, or which word is more beautiful, schmetterling or farfalla. If, as is normally thought in the non batshit insane version of moral relativism usually defended by actual relativists, relativism encourages the idea that the morality of one’s own culture has no special status but is just one moral system among many, then confrontation is just as likely to be low down the list of options as any other ethical stance.
quote:
Also, I don't think there's any meaningful difference between a relativist and a universalist who thinks that anyone who disagrees with them does so because of intractable moral defects.
That's because you either don't understand or wilfully misrepresent what relativism actually means. The most common position for the normative relativist, as I have said more than once, is that there is a significant connection between meta ethical relativism and tolerance. As we have said before, most philosophers disagree, because, to quote Stanford: "Recognition of this fact (descriptive moral relativism), by itself, entails nothing about how we should act towards those with whom we disagree. Meta-ethical relativism (MMR) fares no better. For one thing, MMR cannot very well imply that it is an objective moral truth that we should be tolerant: MMR denies that there are such truths."

These arguments work for whatever normative position you try and wring out of MMR. Just because you can't get an ought to be tolerant out of the is of moral relativism does not mean the relativist is then compelled to become a bomb dropping maniac. In fact, some philosophers think there is still, to quote Stanford again, "a philosophically significant connection between relativism and tolerance." And of course, the popular view of moral relativism, held by the few who actually profess it and the many who revile it, is precisely that it tolerates much that is intolerable to moral universalists. I'm no relativist myself, but any position that can gather opprobrium from Sam Harris, Popes and Mad Mel must have something going for it.

Anyway, I fear I am running out of ways to say the same thing.
 
Posted by Russ (# 120) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:

Universal morality implies at least one choice that will be moral in every situation.

I don't think such a choice exists, because what is right always depends on the context. We can never exclude the possibility that for any particular choice, however apparently universal (like not killing an innocent person), there will be some situation where it would be wrong..

Dave, I think what you're arguing against here is the proposition that objective moral "laws" have to be simple and context-independent. As in, capable of being written down on stone tablets...

While that may be the traditional understanding, I don't think it's a necessary consequence of the existence of moral right answers. Seems to me quite possible to have a universal and objective moral code that is as complex as physics, and as sensitive to the cultural expectations of each party in the situation as any human legal practice. A sort of Platonic ideal of justice, to which all human codes of morality imperfectly approximate.

Whilst "killing the innocent is wrong" is held by some to be a moral absolute, it's not impossible that your view - that mercy-killing is sometimes morally the better course - is in fact objectively the right answer, as a universal moral truth. So it's not evidence against the existence of such universal moral truths.

Best wishes,

Russ
 
Posted by Dave Marshall (# 7533) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
I think what you're arguing against here is the proposition that objective moral "laws" have to be simple and context-independent. As in, capable of being written down on stone tablets...

I wasn't meaning to. I was using Ingo's example to illustrate what I think is a fundamental flaw in the principle of objective morality.
quote:
Seems to me quite possible to have a universal and objective moral code that is as complex as physics, and as sensitive to the cultural expectations of each party in the situation as any human legal practice. A sort of Platonic ideal of justice, to which all human codes of morality imperfectly approximate.
The question then becomes who judges that ideal to be just. Right and wrong always imply "according to who". If we think of God as one who makes such value judgements within human experience, then morality can certainly be understood as conforming to God's will. Otherwise, I'm not sure what an ideal of justice means.

There's also the problem that such an ideal needs to address every moral context in the universe, because a moral ideal will always perfectly account for context. The "right" choice in any context would then be a binary "ideal or not" option. That seems to lose something essential to our humanity: responsibility for assessing a situation in the light of its context (including whatever moral code may apply) and deciding for ourselves what is right. How we act having made that judgement seems something more mechanical, biological perhaps, and one step removed from the question of morality.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Relativism says there is no right answer to converge upon, so there is no point in sitting down around a table to resolve your moral differences.
No it doesn't. Relativism says there are some moral disagreements that are not rationally resolvable. It does not pre-judge which ones they are. Nothing in relativism precludes people of good will sitting round a table and discussing stuff. It accepts, for instance, that one way of rationally solving such disagreements is for one side to accept the arguments of the other side - maybe one side will see a logical flaw in their reasoning or be made aware of evidence that they were previously unaware of. But, it says there are issues that, at a given point in time, may not resolvable in this fashion. You'd have to be particularly Pollyannaish to think that differences over practices like FGM that have evolved over millennia are going to be resolved, rationally or otherwise, over a nice cup of sweet tea.
I feel you risk being inconsistent if you maintain first that it is rational for relativists to sit down around tables and discuss ethical disagreement over a nice cup of sweet tea, and then maintain second that it is pollyannaish for them to do so.
Is it rational for relativists to be pollyannaish or not?

quote:
The go to position of a relativist, or anyone else for that matter, when faced with a disagreement with no rational resolution is confrontation? To the relativist the type of differences we are talking about here are in the same category as which colour is better, blue or red, or which word is more beautiful, schmetterling or farfalla. If, as is normally thought in the non batshit insane version of moral relativism usually defended by actual relativists, relativism encourages the idea that the morality of one’s own culture has no special status but is just one moral system among many, then confrontation is just as likely to be low down the list of options as any other ethical stance.
This misrepresents actual relativists rather severely.
You agree that my child has no special status, but is just one child among many her age? Saying which child is more important is in the same category as whether one colour or one word is more beautiful than another? You agree?
Does that mean that, ethical considerations aside, I wouldn't do anything to ensure that she gets the last place in the lifeboat?
I don't care that my child is not special to the universe. She is special to me. A meta-ethical relativist does not care that their culture is not special to the universe. The meta-ethical relativist's culture is special to them.

quote:
quote:
Also, I don't think there's any meaningful difference between a relativist and a universalist who thinks that anyone who disagrees with them does so because of intractable moral defects.
That's because you either don't understand or wilfully misrepresent what relativism actually means.
I defined relativism (more precisely meta-ethical relativism, which is the kind I've been talking about) twice in my posts up to this point. You didn't take issue with either definition.

quote:
The most common position for the normative relativist, as I have said more than once, is that there is a significant connection between meta ethical relativism and tolerance.
Yes, you've said this more than once. I understood you. I disagreed. I said why I disagreed. You said this again.

quote:
These arguments work for whatever normative position you try and wring out of MMR. Just because you can't get an ought to be tolerant out of the is of moral relativism does not mean the relativist is then compelled to become a bomb dropping maniac.
I don't know. Might I have said that a relativist is only required to become a bomb-dropping maniac if their culture requires them to become a bomb-dropping maniac?

quote:
A relativist believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong for a person if and only if that person's culture believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong.
Yes. I did.

quote:
Anyway, I fear I am running out of ways to say the same thing.
I would have put that sentence in the past tense myself.
 
Posted by Russ (# 120) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
The question then becomes who judges that ideal to be just. Right and wrong always imply "according to who". If we think of God as one who makes such value judgements within human experience, then morality can certainly be understood as conforming to God's will. Otherwise, I'm not sure what an ideal of justice means.

There's also the problem that such an ideal needs to address every moral context in the universe, because a moral ideal will always perfectly account for context. The "right" choice in any context would then be a binary "ideal or not" option. That seems to lose something essential to our humanity: responsibility for assessing a situation in the light of its context (including whatever moral code may apply) and deciding for ourselves what is right.

According to whom does 2 + 2 = 4 ? Whose judgment makes that sum correct ? We don't need to posit a God of Arithmetic in order to know what getting the sum right means...

The laws of arithmetic don't need to address explicitly every possible sum that may be performed in the universe. And they don't take away from the need for calculation by every individual with a numerical issue to solve.

So it's not clear to me where these objections of yours are coming from. Perhaps you're confusing the existence of moral right answers with the existence of known and easy answers ?

The "universalist" position says that some moral codes really are better than others, that it's not just a matter of personal or cultural preference. It doesn't say that any particular person's or culture's moral code is perfect, or that morality can be reduced to something that's simple.

Best wishes,

Russ
 
Posted by Dave Marshall (# 7533) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
According to whom does 2 + 2 = 4 ? Whose judgment makes that sum correct ? We don't need to posit a God of Arithmetic in order to know what getting the sum right means...

Arithmetic generates outcomes that can be verified using well understood and accepted "laws of logic" that are a feature of physical reality. Other things being equal, anyone can check my sums.

There is no corresponding "law of morality". No-one can check my moral judgements in the same way. They can only compare them against some legal framework or court of opinion based on other people's perceptions and judgements.
quote:
The laws of arithmetic don't need to address explicitly every possible sum that may be performed in the universe. And they don't take away from the need for calculation by every individual with a numerical issue to solve.
Of course not. Arithmetic is a well-defined and universally accepted system of symbols and logic. It provides demonstrably correct answers.

Morality is about judgement and choice. The only possible "right" answer to a moral question is one that conforms to the judgement of some accepted authority in that field. If there is no such authority, I don't see there can be any objectively right answer, only what seems right to us.
quote:
Perhaps you're confusing the existence of moral right answers with the existence of known and easy answers ?
Perhaps. Or perhaps right answers to moral questions are only ever attempts by someone to impose their will on someone else.
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
quote:
I feel you risk being inconsistent if you maintain first that it is rational for relativists to sit down around tables and discuss ethical disagreement over a nice cup of sweet tea, and then maintain second that it is pollyannaish for them to do so.
Is it rational for relativists to be pollyannaish or not?

Are you being deliberately obtuse? The fact that there are some disagreements that are not rationally resolvable doesn't mean they all are. And one way to find out if a disagreement is not rationally resolvable might be to try and rationally resolve it.
quote:
I defined relativism (more precisely meta-ethical relativism, which is the kind I've been talking about) twice in my posts up to this point. You didn't take issue with either definition.
I'd say our difference lies in how this definition actually plays out in the (somewhat simplified for our pseudo philosophical purposes) world.
quote:
Yes, you've said this more than once. I understood you. I disagreed. I said why I disagreed. You said this again.
I'm not sure you made clear why you disagreed that the most common form of normative relativism is tolerance. You just keep making assertions as if it isn't. I'll just quote a couple of definitions from about the place to say why I keep repeating it:
David Wong's entry on Relativism in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Normative relativism - the doctrine that it is morally wrong to pass judgment on or to interfere with the moral practices of others who have adopted moralities different from one's own."

Princeton University: "Normative relativism, further still, is the prescriptive or normative position that, as there is no universal moral standard by which to judge others, we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when it runs counter to our personal or cultural moral standards."

Then there's Wikipedia and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the discussion in the Stanford Encyclopedia about relativism and tolerance. I know I'm a philosophical naif, and arguments from authority are dodgy, but this suggests to me that your idea of archetypal relativist is not, er, universally shared.
 
Posted by Russ (# 120) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
The most common position for the normative relativist, as I have said more than once, is that there is a significant connection between meta ethical relativism and tolerance. As we have said before, most philosophers disagree, because, to quote Stanford: "Recognition of this fact (descriptive moral relativism), by itself, entails nothing about how we should act towards those with whom we disagree.

I'd understood from what was said earlier that moral relativism yields a definite moral imperative about how to act towards others - the imperative "do whatever your culture says is right". Because your culture can never be wrong (there lies universalism) and never be able to be set aside for individual preference (there lies nihilism). But maybe I misunderstood...

If IngoB believes that part if the universal moral imperative is that a man should have only one wife, and if I believe that the Arabs and the Mormons who believe in polygamy are thereby no worse than we are, then there's a sense in which I'm more relativist than he is. And thereby more tolerant of other cultures - less condemning. (though I'm not sure if such a difference in belief would ever lead to a different action). Even if I agree with everything IngoB says about the universality of morality, I apply it to a smaller domain - what I see as merely cultural he sees as moral. So in that sense I get the link that you're suggesting there is between relativism and tolerance.

At the extreme end of that spectrum is the Compleat Relativist, to whom everything is culture, and morality is an empty set.

But that's the guy Dafyd calls a nihilist. The Dafydian moral relativist - wherever he draws the line between moral and non-moral cultural differences - believes that once an issue has been judged to fall on the moral side of the line, the moral right answer is whatever one's own culture says it is. But in practice there's still the choice between agreeing to differ - living with the immorality of others - or going to war for what's right. There just isn't the option of trying to educate them out of it.

That sort of relativism isn't necessarily any more or less tolerant than the corresponding point on the universalist spectrum.

Not sure I've said that very well...

Best wishes,

Russ
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:
I feel you risk being inconsistent if you maintain first that it is rational for relativists to sit down around tables and discuss ethical disagreement over a nice cup of sweet tea, and then maintain second that it is pollyannaish for them to do so.
Is it rational for relativists to be pollyannaish or not?

Are you being deliberately obtuse? The fact that there are some disagreements that are not rationally resolvable doesn't mean they all are. And one way to find out if a disagreement is not rationally resolvable might be to try and rationally resolve it.
Well, yes. But there's a matter of probable success. And a relativist will think the probability of success is lower than a universalist will.

quote:
quote:
Yes, you've said this more than once. I understood you. I disagreed. I said why I disagreed. You said this again.
I'm not sure you made clear why you disagreed that the most common form of normative relativism is tolerance.
The reason I didn't make that clear is that I don't disagree with that. A normative relativist is by definition tolerant. I am arguing that meta-ethical relativism does not imply normative relativism. Indeed, I think meta-ethical relativism counts against certain considerations that would favour normative relativism.

I am happy to say that the commonest self-described normative relativist is a cultural liberal who is for meta-ethical relativism only because the cultural conservatives keeps using it as a boo-word, and therefore thinks 'relativism' means woolly cosmopolitan liberal feelings about other cultures.

The archetypal (meta-ethical) relativist, on the other hand, in the sense of the person who best represents meta-ethical ideas put into practice, is not a woolly liberal normative relativist. Quite the contrary, for reasons I have tried to explain.

I'll concede that early on in the argument, when you introduced the term 'normative relativist' as if it were equivalent to 'meta-ethical relativist', I imitated your usage a couple of times. That was sloppy of me.

[ 31. July 2014, 11:48: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
quote:
Well, yes. But there's a matter of probable success. And a relativist will think the probability of success is lower than a universalist will.
And you know this how? A relativist could just as easily argue that universalists are more likely to be averse to accepting opposing moral arguments because they are more heavily invested in the idea that their culture is superior. After all, moral matters are close to our hearts and it's a rare person who starts off thinking they may be wrong about their moral judgements. And if they believe that they are closer to some exalted moral standard than the other guy at the outset, that's a pretty high barrier to get over.

That is, of course, making judgements based on limited data, tribal affiliations and assuming the worst of the other guy.

quote:
The archetypal (meta-ethical) relativist, on the other hand, in the sense of the person who best represents meta-ethical ideas put into practice, is not a woolly liberal normative relativist. Quite the contrary, for reasons I have tried to explain.
But you are just boo-wording from the other end. You are assuming that what your archetype takes from the mere fact of meta ethical moral relativism is that as far as cross cultural relations are concerned, they may as well be moral nihilists with sociopathic tendencies or gung ho moral absolutists happy to crush the faces of the Other beneath their mighty heels. The fact (and it is a fact if you accept MMR) that other cultures' moral proclivities are no less valid in the grand scheme of things than their own doesn't make a dent in their perception or behaviour at all by your account. You just seem to be assuming the worst interpretation of relativism you can build out of a pile of straw and some old clothes and calling it the archetype. That's like saying the Taliban are archetypal universalists.

One way, as you probably know, of illuminating moral relativism, is to look at the statement, "It is raining." If two people are standing side by side in Manchester getting drenched by a heavy shower, then the there can be no rational disagreement on that matter. But if one guy is there and the other on the phone in the Sahara denying the statement, then they're both right. You are saying the archetypal relativist standing in the puddle will happily have the the guy in the Sahara shot if he doesn't put on a cagoule and wellies every time it rains in Manchester.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:
Well, yes. But there's a matter of probable success. And a relativist will think the probability of success is lower than a universalist will.
And you know this how?
By definition a universalist believes that ethical beliefs converge on the truth by a process of rational argument.
By definition a relativist believes that this does not always happen.

quote:
After all, moral matters are close to our hearts and it's a rare person who starts off thinking they may be wrong about their moral judgements. And if they believe that they are closer to some exalted moral standard than the other guy at the outset, that's a pretty high barrier to get over.
This is all true of a relativist as well. In fact, a relativist believes there is no moral standard more exalted than their culture, and you can't get a moral standard much closer than that.

quote:
You are assuming that what your archetype takes from the mere fact of meta ethical moral relativism is that as far as cross cultural relations are concerned, they may as well be moral nihilists with sociopathic tendencies or gung ho moral absolutists happy to crush the faces of the Other beneath their mighty heels.
A moral nihilist is someone who believes that no moral judgements can be justified. You say that a meta-ethical relativist is someone who believes that no trans-cultural moral judgements can be justified.
Therefore, according to you, with respect to trans-cultural moral judgements, meta-ethicial relativists and moral nihilists hold identical beliefs.
Am I wrong? In what way do you think the meta-ethical relativist and the meta-ethical nihilist differ in respect to trans-cultural moral judgements?

It does seem as a matter of observable fact that the degree of sociopathy required to believe that it is sometimes justifiable to bomb other cultures is rather widespread.

Really, what part of:
quote:
A relativist believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong for a person if and only if that person's culture believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong.
is quite so difficult to understand?

quote:
The fact (and it is a fact if you accept MMR) that other cultures' moral proclivities are no less valid in the grand scheme of things than their own doesn't make a dent in their perception or behaviour at all by your account.
This is like saying that one cat is no less red than another cat when looked at through sonar. Things cannot be more or less red unless you're looking at them through visible light. For a relativist cultures cannot be more or less valid in the grand scheme of things. You can only talk about more or less valid from within a particular culture. And from within any particular culture, that particular culture will necessarily be the most valid.

quote:
One way, as you probably know, of illuminating moral relativism, is to look at the statement, "It is raining."
No. That is a way of illuminating moral relativism in the same way as a red strobe light is a way of illuminating open heart surgery.

The statement 'it is raining' by someone in Manchester can be instantly turned into a statement that means exactly the same and is true in the general scheme of things by adding 'in Manchester'. A weather forecaster in a studio in Manchester can make true statements about the weather in London, Manchester, and York, and can be perfectly well understood by listeners in London, Manchester, and York, even if those listeners have no idea where the weather forecaster's studio is.

A relativist believes that the statement, made from within English culture, that 'it is wrong to jump a queue' cannot be turned into any statement that means the same and is true in the general scheme of things. A relativist believes that there are no statements true in the general scheme of things that mean the same as 'it is wrong to jump a queue'.

quote:
You are saying the archetypal relativist standing in the puddle will happily have the the guy in the Sahara shot if he doesn't put on a cagoule and wellies every time it rains in Manchester.
Firstly, statements about the weather do not have implications about the ethical way to treat people with different weather. Ethical systems characteristically do have implications about the ethical way to treat people who behave in ways not sanctioned by those ethical systems.

Secondly, what part of:

quote:
A relativist believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong for a person if and only if that person's culture believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong.
is quite so difficult to understand?
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
quote:
By definition a universalist believes that ethical beliefs converge on the truth by a process of rational argument.
By that definition a univeralist is either an idiot or immortal. Moral universalism has been a characteristic of societies for millennia and there is still a fair bit of converging to do.

quote:
A moral nihilist is someone who believes that no moral judgements can be justified. You say that a meta-ethical relativist is someone who believes that no trans-cultural moral judgements can be justified.

Therefore, according to you, with respect to trans-cultural moral judgements, meta-ethicial relativists and moral nihilists hold identical beliefs.Am I wrong? In what way do you think the meta-ethical relativist and the meta-ethical nihilist differ in respect to trans-cultural moral judgements?

The difference is a subtle one and lies in the realisation that for each party in a trans cultural disagreement the beliefs at issue can be different yet at the same time true for both parties because the moral frameworks within which they are making their judgments are incommensurable.

Your idea of an archetypal relativist holds, as you said yourself, identical beliefs to some moral universalists - they believe their culture is superior and feel justified in bombing other cultures because of it. I say moral relativism adds something to the mix which you insist the archetypal relativist ignores. If you are correct, I don't see how moral relativism has received any attention. Indeed, your version of it, as far as I can see, doesn't receive much attention at all, while the idea that MMR leads to tolerance is widespread. I suppose everyone must be out of step except you.
quote:
A relativist believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong for a person if and only if that person's culture believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong.
Easy enough to understand, hard to take seriously. It is a simple matter of observation that cultures' moral attitudes shift over time. Western culture has changed considerably in the last hundred years. Racism is much less open than it used to be, women have greater equality, homosexuality is more accepted and the idea of a civilising empire being a good thing has less traction than it used to. If a culture has a belief that bombing the fuck out of other cultures, that belief comes from somewhere and is subject to change. There is no requirement placed upon relativists to unthinkingly accept the mores of their culture. Meta ethical relativism simply ays the framework within which one evaluates moral questions is local not universal. That what is true in one culture is not necessarily true in another.
quote:
This is like saying that one cat is no less red than another cat when looked at through sonar. Things cannot be more or less red unless you're looking at them through visible light. For a relativist cultures cannot be more or less valid in the grand scheme of things.
OK, badly worded. This bit is right. You've got it.

quote:
You can only talk about more or less valid from within a particular culture. And from within any particular culture, that particular culture will necessarily be the most valid.
Oh bugger, you've lost it again. You can't talk about it within a particular culture, either. Or if you do you are severely constrained. You can judge whether a another culture is consistent with its own moral code for instance.

quote:
The statement 'it is raining' by someone in Manchester can be instantly turned into a statement that means exactly the same and is true in the general scheme of things by adding 'in Manchester'. A weather forecaster in a studio in Manchester can make true statements about the weather in London, Manchester, and York, and can be perfectly well understood by listeners in London, Manchester, and York, even if those listeners have no idea where the weather forecaster's studio is.A relativist believes that the statement, made from within English culture, that 'it is wrong to jump a queue' cannot be turned into any statement that means the same and is true in the general scheme of things. A relativist believes that there are no statements true in the general scheme of things that mean the same as 'it is wrong to jump a queue
You are missing the whole point. Relative truths are context dependent. "It is raining in Manchester" and "It is not raining in the Sahara" are, as you say, true the same time, obviously. It is also obvious that you don't put a cagoule and wellies on in the Sahara when it rains in Manchester.

So, relativists believe, "It is wrong for an English person, in England, to jump a queue" and "It is not wrong for an Italian, in Italy, to jump a queue". Armed with these beliefs, English relativists visiting Italy approach queue related activities differently than would be the case at home if they want to get into museums without fisticuffs. In short, when in Rome they do what the Romans do.

quote:
Firstly, statements about the weather do not have implications about the ethical way to treat people with different weather.
It's that willful obtuseness again. Get a grip. It's an analogy.

quote:
Ethical systems characteristically do have implications about the ethical way to treat people who behave in ways not sanctioned by those ethical systems.
And relativists incorporate the idea of what is true for me is not necessarily true for you in their ethical systems.
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
Tried to edit but was too late:
quote:
Firstly, statements about the weather do not have implications about the ethical way to treat people with different weather.
OK, assuming you are getting it's an analogy. So, statements about the weather, if true, have implications about how to deal with weather conditions. Statements about ethics, if you believe them, have implications for your ethical decisions.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:
By definition a universalist believes that ethical beliefs converge on the truth by a process of rational argument.
By that definition a univeralist is either an idiot or immortal. Moral universalism has been a characteristic of societies for millennia and there is still a fair bit of converging to do.
This is why relativism is more plausible in ethics than it is in the physical sciences.
Nevertheless, the universalist might point to some of the things you point to later in your post.

quote:
quote:
In what way do you think the meta-ethical relativist and the meta-ethical nihilist differ in respect to trans-cultural moral judgements?
The difference is a subtle one and lies in the realisation that for each party in a trans cultural disagreement the beliefs at issue can be different yet at the same time true for both parties because the moral frameworks within which they are making their judgments are incommensurable.
You've said what you think the difference lies in. What do you think the difference actually is?

How can there be a trans cultural disagreement if there are no trans cultural judgements that disagree?

quote:
If a culture has a belief that bombing the fuck out of other cultures, that belief comes from somewhere and is subject to change. There is no requirement placed upon relativists to unthinkingly accept the mores of their culture. Meta ethical relativism simply ays the framework within which one evaluates moral questions is local not universal. That what is true in one culture is not necessarily true in another.
This is all true. Now let's look at the implications.
A meta ethical relativist believes we should use local frameworks to evaluate ethical questions.
Meta ethical relativism is a universal framework.
Therefore the meta ethical relativist does not use meta ethical relativism when evaluating ethical questions, because meta ethical relativism is not a local framework.
Should we bomb that neighbouring culture is an ethical question.
That it concerns a different culture does not make it not an ethical question.
Therefore, a meta ethical relativist evaluates it in the same way as the meta ethical relativist evaluates every other ethical question; they use a local framework.

Now, certainly our local culture had, at least over the later part of the twentieth century, moved towards a more tolerant outlook. I would say, however, that a good many of the reasons that might be adduced in favour of that are unavailable to a consistent relativist. i.e. if somebody says 'why can't we all get along together?' the relativist might have to say, because we have incommensurable ethical frameworks that mean we can never agree on the right way to resolve our conflict.

quote:
quote:
You can only talk about more or less valid from within a particular culture. And from within any particular culture, that particular culture will necessarily be the most valid.
Oh bugger, you've lost it again. You can't talk about it within a particular culture, either.
Why can't you if the local framework makes it possible?
Sumner can certainly say 'if we Americans become imperialists like the Spanish are that would make us illiberal and cruel...' Why is it irrational for him to follow that up with '...like the Spanish?'

A moral universalist says 'The Taliban deny women education, denying women education is cruel and illiberal and wrong, therefore the Taliban are cruel and illiberal and wrong.'
A moral relativist says, your second premise is 'denying women education is cruel and illiberal and wrong by the standards of our culture, and therefore your conclusion should be the Taliban are cruel and illiberal and wrong by the standards of our culture.'
The new conclusion is not self-contradictory, and follows from the new premise. So what is wrong with it?

quote:
quote:
The statement 'it is raining' by someone in Manchester can be instantly turned into a statement that means exactly the same and is true in the general scheme of things by adding 'in Manchester'.(...) A relativist believes that the statement, made from within English culture, that 'it is wrong to jump a queue' cannot be turned into any statement that means the same and is true in the general scheme of things. A relativist believes that there are no statements true in the general scheme of things that mean the same as 'it is wrong to jump a queue
You are missing the whole point. Relative truths are context dependent.So, relativists believe, "It is wrong for an English person, in England, to jump a queue" and "It is not wrong for an Italian, in Italy, to jump a queue". Armed with these beliefs, English relativists visiting Italy approach queue related activities differently than would be the case at home if they want to get into museums without fisticuffs. In short, when in Rome they do what the Romans do.
You mean, when in Rome, conquer Italy, destroy Carthage and salt the ground, invade Gaul and Britain, and proclaim the superiority of the Imperium Romanum?

I didn't miss your point. I said why I thought it was wrong. There is a difference between missing a point and disagreeing with it.
On the other hand, as you haven't referred to my point at all, I think I'd say you have missed mine.

'When in Rome do as the Romans do' is a truth that is supposed to be true for everyone wherever they are. It is a universal moral truth, and therefore a relativist cannot accept it. (Strictly, a relativist can only accept that it is true for someone whose culture dictates it.)

'It is wrong for an English person in England to jump a queue' and 'it is not wrong for an Italian person in Italy to jump a queue' are equally universal context-independent statements. Anybody, whatever culture they belong to is supposed to accept them. Therefore, a relativist cannnot accept them.
What the relativist believes is rather: 'For an English person in England, it is wrong (for anyone anywhere) to jump a queue', and 'For an Italian person in Italy, it is not wrong (for anyone anywhere) to jump a queue'. In so far as those are context-independent truths, they are anthropological statements with no normative force, not ethical statements.

quote:
And relativists incorporate the idea of what is true for me is not necessarily true for you in their ethical systems.
Consider it the other way around.
A relativist believes that just because something is not true for you, that does not stop it being true for me. So just because 'people who jump queues should be tut-tutted at,' is not true for you, does not stop it from being true for me that if you jump a queue I should tut-tut at you.
 
Posted by Russ (# 120) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
The fact (and it is a fact if you accept MMR) that other cultures' moral proclivities are no less valid in the grand scheme of things than their own doesn't make a dent in their perception or behaviour at all by your account.

Does that "fact" have ethical consequences or not ?

If not, why are you complaining that it doesn't impact on behaviour ?

If it does, how do those consequences not constitute the sort of universal moral imperative that MMR denies ?

Maybe I've been vaccinated against it... [Smile] .

Best wishes
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
quote:
How can there be a trans cultural disagreement if there are no trans cultural judgements that disagree?
Indeed. I believe some philosophers maintain that trans cultural ethical disagreements would simply dissolve if both sides were consistent relativists.
quote:
This is all true. Now let's look at the implications.
A meta ethical relativist believes we should use local frameworks to evaluate ethical questions.

Slightly wrong. There is no should. A meta ethical relativist believes that each culture only has its own frameworks available to evaluate ethical questions.
quote:
Meta ethical relativism is a universal framework.Therefore the meta ethical relativist does not use meta ethical relativism when evaluating ethical questions, because meta ethical relativism is not a local framework.
Meta ethical relativism is a universal truth. Moral truths are relative truths. When evaluating ethical matters, the meta-ethical truth that there is no universal truth is still hanging around, nudging the relativist in the ribs and saying stuff like, "You know, it's all well and proper for you to tut tut at that queue jumping Italian in your eyes, but in his eyes it is all well and proper for him to nip in ahead of you. So ask yourself, is it rational to get into confrontation with the guy - after all, you believe, meta-ethically speaking, that you're both right."
quote:
Should we bomb that neighbouring culture is an ethical question. That it concerns a different culture does not make it not an ethical question.Therefore, a meta ethical relativist evaluates it in the same way as the meta ethical relativist evaluates every other ethical question; they use a local framework
And if they do that, they need never have taken the intellectual and emotional effort to accept MMR in the first place. They are, as noted before by both of us, just doing what a certain sort of moral universalist does, judging the other culture wrong and acting (or more likely, justifying an action decided upon for other less elevated reasons like land or resource grabbing) accordingly.
quote:
...if somebody says 'why can't we all get along together?' the relativist might have to say, because we have incommensurable ethical frameworks that mean we can never agree on the right way to resolve our conflict
And they might go on to say, "So we might be able to find a way to agree to disagree."
quote:

'When in Rome do as the Romans do' is a truth that is supposed to be true for everyone wherever they are.

Not to a relativist it isn't. It's a rational response to an inescapable fact.
quote:
'For an English person in England, it is wrong (for anyone anywhere) to jump a queue', and 'For an Italian person in Italy, it is not wrong (for anyone anywhere) to jump a queue'.
And I maintain it is rational for an English relativist to recognise that the Italian is doing nothing wrong when jumping a queue. And it is rational for the Italian relativist to recognise that when English people tut tut, they are justified.

Mind you, I am also talking about actual human beings and not logicians.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:

'When in Rome do as the Romans do' is a truth that is supposed to be true for everyone wherever they are.

Not to a relativist it isn't. It's a rational response to an inescapable fact.
A rational response to an inescapable fact is a truth that is supposed to be true for everyone wherever they are.

[ 03. August 2014, 19:28: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
 
Posted by Russ (# 120) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
There is no should. A meta ethical relativist believes that each culture only has its own frameworks available to evaluate ethical questions.

If I have it right then Dafyd is distinguishing two positions:

If there is no "should" anywhere, no moral imperative, then in your system you've abolished morality altogether - there is nothing but custom. The "local framework" has no moral force, only the "prudential ought" - if you want to be on good terms with your neighbours then follow the local custom (which in England means not only not jumping the queue but also not advocating genocide on foreigners). This he calls nihilism.

The other position seems equivalent to a universal but tautological moral imperative to "act morally", with the details on what acting morally involves left blank for individual cultures to fill in. So that a moral Italian, seeking to act justly and do what is right, has only Italian culture to guide him as to what "justice" is. And is therefore morally obliged to do the best he can to follow that. Which, being his only guide, he can never judge to be wrong. This is a version of moral relativism that seems to lead to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that for practical purposes one's own culture is always absolutely right...

Your version seems closer to the former...

Best wishes,

Russ
 
Posted by Dave Marshall (# 7533) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
[One position is:] If there is no "should" anywhere, no moral imperative, then in your system you've abolished morality altogether - there is nothing but custom. The "local framework" has no moral force, only the "prudential ought" - if you want to be on good terms with your neighbours then follow the local custom (which in England means not only not jumping the queue but also not advocating genocide on foreigners). This he calls nihilism.

Nothing like a bit of pejorative labelling. But to expand slightly on my earlier comment, I'm still unclear what value ideas like "moral force" and "moral imperative" have, or in what context they are significantly different in practice to your "prudential ought".

Morality is not law. Sanctions for immorality however defined have no inherent structure. I struggle to see how any claim to be morally right is any different to an assertion that "this is what most of us approve of", for whatever value of "us" we're talking about.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
If I have it right then Dafyd is distinguishing two positions:

Three positions, I think.

Your first position, I suppose I'd call moral nihilism: the belief that moral propositions and statements about values aren't really true and so can be put aside in favour of pragmatic considerations.

Your second I think I'd call something like cosmopolitan tolerance, which is a universalist position. (Judging people from other cultures by the standards of your culture is wrong; imposing your culture's values on other people is wrong; otherwise, when in Rome do as the Romans do; doing otherwise is wrong.)

Relativism I think falls in between: it believes there are no eternal values and no eternal moral truths. But it doesn't care. It thinks the values and moral propositions of a culture are sufficient to be binding on members of that culture. So it doesn't put those values aside just for the sake of convenience.

(I was, of course, making a joke when I implied that the English treat 'don't jump the queue' as an eternal moral value that may not be put aside for mere convenience.)
 
Posted by Gildas (# 525) on :
 
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:

quote:
Nothing like a bit of pejorative labelling. But to expand slightly on my earlier comment, I'm still unclear what value ideas like "moral force" and "moral imperative" have, or in what context they are significantly different in practice to your "prudential ought".
Giving up your seat on a train to a lady is a prudential ought. Refraining from pushing someone under a train is a moral imperative.

quote:
Morality is not law. Sanctions for immorality however defined have no inherent structure. I struggle to see how any claim to be morally right is any different to an assertion that "this is what most of us approve of", for whatever value of "us" we're talking about.
I'm not sure that claims about morality and claims for what most people approve of are the same. I think, for example, that the death penalty is morally wrong but I have no idea whether that is a majority view among the population of Great Britain, let alone the rest of the world. It doesn't make a great deal of sense to claim that "the death penalty is morally wrong" is a claim about an "us" of which I am a member, except among opponents of the death penalty, which would be a fairly tautological claim. That the death penalty is something that the majority of opponents of the death penalty oppose is hardly a convincing argument for opposing the death penalty.
 
Posted by Dave Marshall (# 7533) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Gildas:
Giving up your seat on a train to a lady is a prudential ought. Refraining from pushing someone under a train is a moral imperative.

Yes, that reflects my impression of how the terms are used. So the significant difference is something like "degree of seriousness"? Causing physical injury rates above the "morality threshold", defying social convention is below?

There will be cultures (for example in a TV drama like Sons of Anarchy) where casual murder is no big thing but disrespect can be an ultimate sin. The scale seems a matter of emphasis rather than any essential difference between the concepts.

quote:
I'm not sure that claims about morality and claims for what most people approve of are the same.
Not in a single-step cause-and-effect way. But as a feature of the "digest of a vastly multi-generational social process" that cultures pass down to successive generations, it seems a plausible theory.

[ 04. August 2014, 17:22: Message edited by: Dave Marshall ]
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Gildas:
Giving up your seat on a train to a lady is a prudential ought. Refraining from pushing someone under a train is a moral imperative.

A prudential ought is you ought to give up your wallet without a fight should someone with a knife ask you for it. Or you ought not to make recordings of yourself discussing plans to bug your political opponents.
'Don't get caught' is a prudential imperative.

The lines get a bit blurred by such things as 'honesty is the best policy' and other maxims of enlightened self-interest.

But giving up your seat to an old lady is normally on the moral side of the line.
 
Posted by Gildas (# 525) on :
 
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:

quote:
quote:
Originally posted by Gildas:
Giving up your seat on a train to a lady is a prudential ought. Refraining from pushing someone under a train is a moral imperative.

Yes, that reflects my impression of how the terms are used. So the significant difference is something like "degree of seriousness"? Causing physical injury rates above the "morality threshold", defying social convention is below?

There will be cultures (for example in a TV drama like Sons of Anarchy) where casual murder is no big thing but disrespect can be an ultimate sin. The scale seems a matter of emphasis rather than any essential difference between the concepts.

Well, yes, different cultures of that sort exist but no-one actually behaves as if the difference between a motorcycle gang and The Society of St. Francis or the British Humanist Association is merely one of convention. If a member of the Sons of Anarchy pull a knife on you and demand your wallet you, may, to use Dafyd's example, think it prudent to hand it over but you aren't likely to regard the distinction between the Sons of Anarchy and the law abiding public as one of purely anthropological curiosity. I've no idea as to the population dynamics of atheists in foxholes but I am pretty sure that there are no relativists in dark alleyways.

quote:
quote:

I'm not sure that claims about morality and claims for what most people approve of are the same.

Not in a single-step cause-and-effect way. But as a feature of the "digest of a vastly multi-generational social process" that cultures pass down to successive generations, it seems a plausible theory.
That might be an account of cultural formation but it doesn't really hold as a account of moral decision making. It is undoubtedly the case that, for various reasons, the death penalty is less popular than it was in the eighteenth century. To that extent your multi-generational social processes can be invoked but that wouldn't tell you how to vote if Mr Cameron decided tomorrow to hold a referendum on the subject. I think that, say, Lord Tebbit's views on the subject are wrong but it would be otiose to suggest that the fact that they are less popular than they were fifty years ago was some kind of proof of that.
 
Posted by Dave Marshall (# 7533) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Gildas:
different cultures of that sort exist but no-one actually behaves as if the difference between a motorcycle gang and The Society of St. Francis or the British Humanist Association is merely one of convention.

It's this "no-one" I'm querying. There are minority cultures all over the place, from Eton to the East End, that operate codes that clash with each other and with whatever "mainstream" standard of morality we might want to select. Who is to say which is right if not the majority for any given context?
quote:
That might be an account of cultural formation but it doesn't really hold as a account of moral decision making.
I think it takes an appeal to external authority to justify the difference. The various threads on morality seem to be dancing round this without getting any closer to an alternative. Some view of God as ultimate moral authority is probably still implicit in most majority western cultures. If for whatever reason God no longer fulfils that role, and we'd prefer not to defer to some human institution, convention and personal moral responsibility seem all that are left.
 
Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :
 
@Russ
quote:
Does that "fact" have ethical consequences or not ?
It can do.
quote:
If not, why are you complaining that it doesn't impact on behaviour ?
I'm not complaining, I'm saying that Dafyd's contention that archetypal relativists ignore cross cultural implications of MMR in favour of going with the local morality is incorrect.
quote:
If it does, how do those consequences not constitute the sort of universal moral imperative that MMR denies ?
They clearly can't, which is why normative moral relativism has problems philosophically speaking. Does that mean MMR can't inform moral choices? As far as I can see, that depends more on currently existing convictions than the merits or otherwise of the arguments. It's not as if universalism or nihilism answer all of the meta ethical questions satisfactorily. If one of them did, moral relativism wouldn't be a thing.

[ 05. August 2014, 22:17: Message edited by: Grokesx ]
 
Posted by Russ (# 120) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
Morality is about judgement and choice. The only possible "right" answer to a moral question is one that conforms to the judgement of some accepted authority in that field. If there is no such authority, I don't see there can be any objectively right answer, only what seems right to us.

Yes, morality is about choices.

What if the right answer is what someone with perfect empathy would do ? What seems right to you or I at any moment in time would be capable of being wrong. What any Pope or other recognised authority decided would be capable of being wrong.

While we'd never have cast-iron certainty that our choices were morally good ones, it would be open to us all to try to act as if we had more empathy than we actually feel.

Best wishes,

Russ
 
Posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard (# 368) on :
 
Perfect empathy would mean that lesser laws are made to be broken.
 
Posted by Russ (# 120) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard:
Perfect empathy would mean that lesser laws are made to be broken.

Indeed - don't let the rules get in the way of doing what's right.

Which is why conceptualising morality in terms of a set of rules may be unhelpful.

Rule-following is a stage we all need to grow through. But maybe the need to be reminded of those rules is something we never grow out of ?

Best wishes,

Russ
 
Posted by Dave Marshall (# 7533) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
What if the right answer is what someone with perfect empathy would do ?

What exactly do we mean by empathy, though.

I'm drawn to the idea that it's a dialogue between two perspectives, mine and what I imagine to be someone else's. Perfect empathy would mean imagining correctly and completely, but get no closer to determining which options are better or worse.

Alternatively, if empathy is inhabiting that imagined other perspective, perfect empathy would lose my perspective and turn empathy into something like projection or transference. The moral choice is merely shifted to a different context and remains unresolved.

I suspect perfect empathy is inherently contradictory. But either way I don't see it separates the allocation of rightness or wrongness from the chooser (or whatever moral authority they defer to).
 
Posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard (# 368) on :
 
Aye, empathy can be used to catch criminals, conquer and destroy adversaries.

So what should be the end of empathy and the means to that end?
 
Posted by Russ (# 120) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
What exactly do we mean by empathy, though.

I'm drawn to the idea that it's a dialogue between two perspectives, mine and what I imagine to be someone else's. Perfect empathy would mean imagining correctly and completely, but get no closer to determining which options are better or worse.

Alternatively, if empathy is inhabiting that imagined other perspective, perfect empathy would lose my perspective and turn empathy into something like projection or transference. The moral choice is merely shifted to a different context and remains unresolved.

I suspect perfect empathy is inherently contradictory. But either way I don't see it separates the allocation of rightness or wrongness from the chooser (or whatever moral authority they defer to).

I imagine perfect empathy to be more than understanding the other's perspective correctly and completely, to something like owning that perspective alongside one's own, treating the other's pain as of equal significance to one's own. Nothing to do with losing sight of who you are, just taking the other person with full seriousness.

It's not any guarantee of choosing the wisest option. It just rules out those which involve stealing from the other, deceiving the other, punishing the other, exploiting the other, etc.

No contradiction, no appeal to authority, just feeling the wrongness of the morally wrong options.

Best wishes,

Russ
 


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