Ship of Fools: Morality of impossible situations

Thread: Morality of impossible situations Board: Oblivion / Ship of Fools.

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Posted by mrWaters (# 18171) on :

What I post here may in theory have been posted previously somewhere, however there is no way that I'm going to read and understand over 600 replies in the main Israeli-Palestinian thread, some of which are essay-length.

Some time ago I heard on BBC Radio 4 a program - Moral Maze in which guests and philosophers talk morality. This time it was about Gaza and fighting a war among civilians. The episode wasn't particularly good. The pro-Israeli guests and pro-Palestinian guests clashed and it was a lot of shouting and very little of morality discussion. One of the guests to the program was a philosopher Ted Honderich (UCL emeritus professor) was claiming that no one from the panel understood him and the discussion with him was left at only shouts. Me, being slightly pro-Israeli wanted to examine his theories neutrally and maybe change my views. Professor Honderich claimed that the Principle of Human Dignity is the best way to examine this type of moral dilemmas. I tried to understand it, took me quite a while to get it. I'm still not sure if I understand it fully. Here is one of my source materials used to research the topic.

I'm finishing my studies so I'm kind of used to reading scientific articles that don't explain anything. His pieces gave me a few headaches and still I had to use some supplements to "get it". The principle that he refers to is fairly simple to understand. A man can have a good life or a bad life. A good life is characterized by 8 conditions which include a right to a long and peaceful life, right to have freedom and other fairly basic stuff. Basically everyone in western Europe is having a good life. If one or more of those conditions is broken then a men's life is considered a bad life.

According to the Principle of Human Dignity, we all need to work towards getting everyone out of bad lives. Professor Honderich claims that Palestinians have bad lives, which is true. He claims that since it is not possible for Palestinians to get their freedom peacefully, then they have a moral right to terrorism. Which would make perfect sense to me if I was a censequentialist ("the ends justify the means").

I don't believe that one that considers himself a christian can accept such a position, however I find myself troubled by the ethics of a choice that is standing before any Palestinian. If I were in such a situation as the Palestinians, would I fire the rockets? Some people are sure that they would, only to be shouted at by their superiors.

1. Would you fight if it was the only way you could get your freedom back?
2. Would it be morally right for you to fight? Remember that this situation happened before, so please do not comment on Palestinian fight only. During WWII in occupied territories of Europe anti-nazi resistance existed in situation of "bad lives" without any chance of getting out of them peacefully.

For the hosts - this thread is designed to discuss morality of a just cause in asymmetrical circumstances. I hope to get those that are pro-Israeli, such as myself to reexamine their positions without a specific conflict of reference. I'm still a very new shipmate, but I'm pretty sure this topic is distinctive enough.

Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on :

I'm sorry no one else has responded, so far, to your post, mrWaters. I recently heard Prof Honderich use similar arguments in a debate. There were several things I was slightly dubious about and, from what I've read in the link you provided, I remain so.

Personally I am doubtful of all ethical statements which reduce everything to a single sort of rule. In Honderich's "goods" it isn't clear that all people place the same weight on each (a decent length of life, freedom, relationships etc) or even that the same person may, in different situations, always feel the same way. When dealing with people I know, in actual situations I may feel I can guess what would make their lives better; I can't do that for a whole nation. The same is true if one takes a 'rights' or a 'virtues' view of ethics. Real life is more complicated than the conclusions of philosophers.

A good example was provided in the debate. A ex-aid worker argued that be trying to encourage active compassion within our own society by helping, for example, refugees and the homeless in the UK as well as those elsewhere in dire poverty. Honderich was dismissive, even the worst off in our society are (probably) better than some in the developing world he argued. Aid should go to those with the worst lives. But I think the point being made was that a compassionate attitude spreads outwards: if we encourage it here, we are likely to become more compassionate to others in the long run.

I also doubt that Honderich's principle (or any other in ethics) can be universalised to everyone. If relationships are your highest good, it would be equally logical to claim that you should do all you can for friends and family ("there is no such thing as society") and have successively less concern for those more (emotionally) distant.

1. Would you fight if it was the only way you could get your freedom back?

"All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing." (Edmund Burke).

'Fighting' can of course take many forms. The rescue of the Danish Jews in WWII is a good example. I hope I would fight - if I believed it would be for the long term good as best I understand it. Not if I though it would help perpetuate a cycle of suffering (on either side). I might also fight, though I would believe it immoral, if I had lost so much that I no longer felt I had anything to live for.

Posted by luvanddaisies (# 5761) on :

I'm also sorry this topic hasn't has more response. I've been mulling it over, still thinking about it - but I don't really have anything that'd interest anyone to add at the moment. I was sort of hoping some of the Ship's thinkers and debators might bandy it about a bit and give me some more stuff to bounce off my own thoughts...

Posted by Alisdair (# 15837) on :

Some thoughts, for better and for worse:

1. None of us have any 'rights'. All 'rights' are arbitrary decisions made by human beings. We may argue philosophically/theologically that such and such a 'right' exists, but in practice it only exists when people choose to describe and enforce it.

2. A 'good'/'bad' life lies very much in the mind of the person whose life it is---no one else is qualified to pass judgement, although anyone may have an opinion. I regularly speak to hospital patients who tell me that "So-and-so in the bed opposite is having a really hard time; I'm glad I'm not in their shoes", only to have, momets later, 'so-and-so' telling me more or less exactly the same thing about the person who was just speaking to me, while they, contrary to the view from the bed opposite, are quite reconciled to what is happening to them, i.e. they may not like it, but they do not see themselves as living a 'bad life'. I realise this may not be quite what is being argued in the OP's summary, but the point still stands---much of what we judge to be 'good' or 'bad' in life is very subjective, and even apparently clear moral situations often have a complexity to them that makes easy judgements about who is 'good' and who is 'bad', or 'right' or 'wrong', invidious to make.

3. On the face of it, wasn't much of Jesus' teaching about exactly this dilemma: the business of 'passing judgement' over others, whilst presuming to stand on the moral high ground? So much of the Church's history is littered with the grievous outcomes of people failing to understand and practice what Jesus calls us to when it comes to recognising evil and wickedness and responding to it.

Much of the time we continue to wallow in the deadly legalism of 'an eye for an eye...' approach to life. As we pick up and employ the weapons of our enemies we become just like our enemy, the only thing that distinguishes us is the labels we nail above each others heads, and nail above our own.

As long as people believe, either that there is no God, or that God is on their side, people will continue to do God's business for Him: passing judgment, committing some to 'Hell' (sometimes with regret and sometimes with extreme prejudice), whilst commending themselves to 'Heaven' (whatever that may be in their minds).

'Love your enemies, and do good to those who hate you', is too subversive, too radical, in fact for many it's downright disgusting.

Having said all that, words are cheap. I guess none of us really knows what we would do if we felt our backs were against the wall, along with those we love. Then we would make our choice and act, and reap the consequences. No doubt, if there is a God worthy of the name, our choices, for better and for worse, will be understood, and when all is said and done we will have no cause for complaint about the outcome.

Posted by Belle Ringer (# 13379) on :

Would you fight if cornered and threatened? Probably yes, any animal does.

SHOULD you fight if cornered and threatened? WWJD? Possibly a different answer if only because as the song says "this world is not my home."

We have contradictory guidance: evil wins when good men do nothing but blessed are the peacemakers. How do you make peace when the other side feels threatened and cornered by you? Or when the other side wants war? (Note, in the Israel/Gaza situation both sides can easily be accused of seeking war, so I'm not choosing sides here.)

We have a situation - not the first in history, not the only in present day - where two nations each believe they have a moral right to the same land.

I don't believe people have a right to a "good life" if "right" means someone else has a duty to hand it to them. They have a right to strive for that good life, in ways that do not diminish someone else's good life. It's that second part gets neglected - below living wages, adulterated products (what's in that "hamburger"?), "ethnic cleansing, most of war. How do you respect others' right to seek a good life if that other is pursuing theirs in ways they know diminish yours?

Posted by Anglican_Brat (# 12349) on :

The existential question for people brutally oppressed is:

"Do you kill and lose your soul, or do you let yourself be killed, and lose your body?"

I don't know what I would do if I was placed in a situation where I was brutally oppressed by a violent military machine. I would like to think that I would not respond violently, but as Jesus once said "the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak."

During the month of July, my church did a study on the Book of Revelation. We read the book using a liberation theology lens and discussed that for the author, the command to the persecuted and suffering community was "faithful and patient endurance": Do not respond violently, do not try to beat the empire at their game, but wait and trust in God.

The reality of course, is that faithful endurance means that some people will die, some people will be martyred.

Posted by HughWillRidmee (# 15614) on :

I have been known to opine that, had I been born of catholic parents in Derry in 1947 rather than anglican parents in London in 1947, I would probably have had a gun in my hands before I was 18 - possibly long before - and I would have done so thinking that defending my community against overwhelming bigotry was moral.

I don't know if I would have been right (moral) but I suspect I might have been justified (acceptable or reasonable in the circumstances).

I'd rather not contemplate how my thoughts and actions, originally based on the idea of defending my community, might have developed over subsequent years

Posted by Enoch (# 14322) on :

A few thoughts on this.

First, I agree that 'if it was me, would I fight?' and 'if it was me, would I would be morally entitled to fight?' are not the same question and don't necessarily get the same answer.

Second 'am I morally entitled to fight?' and if so, 'am I entitled to use any methods, including random attacks on civilians, non-combatants etc?' aren't the same question. Until very recently, next to no moral theologians have answered yes to the second.

It sounds though as Professor Honderich is answering 'yes' to all three, as sequiturs. So, if I'm short on any of his eight points, I'm entitled to do anything I like to claim my eight, even if it takes away somebody else's. If he is saying that, either explicitly or implicitly, for me, that destroys any credibility in his argument.

I'd also say, which it sounds as though he'd disagree with, that if somebody close to me or for whom I'm responsible has a grade 2 need, and some person or group that I don't know or is somewhere far away, has a grade 5 need, I'd put the person close to me or for whom I'm responsible, with the grade 2 one, first.

Posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard (# 368) on :

There are Christians in Palestine. Are any of them firing rockets that kill 20 x their own side?

Posted by Doublethink (# 1984) on :

How is that relevant ?

Posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard (# 368) on :

The 5th para of the OP.

Posted by Doublethink (# 1984) on :

Still not seeing it, we are being asked we should, or might, do and our reasoning for that. Its not a retread of the Gaza thread.

Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Enoch:
I'd also say, which it sounds as though he'd disagree with, that if somebody close to me or for whom I'm responsible has a grade 2 need, and some person or group that I don't know or is somewhere far away, has a grade 5 need, I'd put the person close to me or for whom I'm responsible, with the grade 2 one, first.

At the debate I attended, someone asked Prof Honderich if he had made a will. He said he was leaving 1/3 of his property to each of his two sons and the rest to charities. It seems unlikely that either of his sons have needs equal to the rest of the world. So I suspect he would disagree with you but would do the same himself!

Posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard (# 368) on :

We should find an impossible way. The way of the early Christians. Of Ahimsa. Of the Civil Rights Movement. That would have worked in Northern Ireland and spared 30 years of terror and counter-terror.

I can far more easily see the ethical case for military action around Mount Sinjar, I cannot see an ethical case for sacrificing ones own people NEVER ones self - for 'their' rights.

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Enoch:
I'd also say, which it sounds as though he'd disagree with, that if somebody close to me or for whom I'm responsible has a grade 2 need, and some person or group that I don't know or is somewhere far away, has a grade 5 need, I'd put the person close to me or for whom I'm responsible, with the grade 2 one, first.

I think you shouldn't ignore either because of the other. Far too often these comparisons become an excuse to 'play' the two off in a race to the bottom.
I'm not sure about who to put 'first' either, but if it's a relative shares in a round robin situation rather than pure fifo, at that point if we're wrong it's much less of a problem.

Posted by Enoch (# 14322) on :

Looking up a bit about him, this man appears deliberately to court controversy. He's a determinist. If you are truly a determinist, what need is their for any ethical rationale for anything? So why is he bothered whether the Palestinians or anyone else needs any justification for what they do? Neither you not anyone else has any more than a delusion that you are deciding things for which you are responsible. With that background, the eight conditions look no more than a way you can feel good about your instinct to further your own interests. He's also tried to insist that a German professor be sacked for disagreeing with him. This man seems to have form.

Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Enoch:
... He's a determinist. If you are truly a determinist, what need is their for any ethical rationale for anything? So why is he bothered whether the Palestinians or anyone else needs any justification for what they do? Neither you not anyone else has any more than a delusion that you are deciding things for which you are responsible. With that background, the eight conditions look no more than a way you can feel good about your instinct to further your own interests.

[tangent]If I believe that my actions are determined, then I have no choice about whether to take an ethical stance or not. If I say "I don't need an ethical rationale" it will be because I have no choice but to say that. Or if it is "a way you can feel good about your instinct to further your own interests" then I had no choice about that either. It may make me feel good - but because I have no choice but to do so.

But of course, if all our actions are determined we may be programmed to be selfish or to be altruistic (or a mixture of both). Perhaps determinism might force some of us us to behave in the interests of other people. You may say a deterministic being can have no ethics, in which case (but only if we are so determined) we'll call it something else.

I didn't take to Prof Honderich, but I don't think you can judge people's views on whether they believe in determinism or not. Unless of course your programming gives you no choice in the matter ....

[/tangent]

Posted by Byron (# 15532) on :

As was pointed out in the program, it's possible for Palestinian Arabs to violently resist without murdering Israeli civilians.

The biggest problem was the Honderich just wasn't clear. If he wants to influence public debate, he needs to work on explaining this Principle of Human Dignity plainly and concisely, or it'll stay an academic footnote.

Even in terms of raw consequentialism, deliberately targeting civilians is unjustified, as it both alienates potential allies, and entrenches your opponents.

Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Byron:
deliberately targeting civilians is unjustified

Posted by mrWaters (# 18171) on :

Well, I'm quite surprised that after more than a week this topic came back from the dead.

I could agree with the idea of principle of humanity, however I reject the idea of consequentializm. I do feel that we should have some moral obligation to care about other people. That is why we now care about thousands of Yazidis stranded on a mountain and that is why we tried to help Haiti after the disastrous earthquake. We had no obligation to help apart from the moral obligation. On some small level we act at least partly with this very general idea of this principle.

Should we fight a just war? I come from Poland and this question comes up a lot there. I started this thread soon after another anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. Another in a long history of failed uprisings in Poland which resulted in disastrous casualties, especially among civilians. For the last 70 years, the whole nation has been arguing about this topic. The uprising was certainly just, however it quickly became a slaughter.

During WWII there was also in Poland a very strong underground with a judiciary system. The polish underground could kill anyone suspected of being a collaborator. Obviously the collaborators had no right to defend themselves. Their sentence was stated only just before their deaths.

Not a particularly moral stance as far as I'm concerned, on the other hand, I'm not sure if I would have objected. Also any armed action by the underground during the Nazi occupation, would result in thousands of people being taken to concentration camps, or being killed outright. The cause is just, however when is the fight worth the price? Is targeting civilians any different to acting in a way that is certain to get thousands killed?

[ 11. August 2014, 01:18: Message edited by: mrWaters ]

Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on :

quote:
Originally posted by mrWaters:
I could agree with the idea of principle of humanity, however I reject the idea of consequentializm. I do feel that we should have some moral obligation to care about other people.

I may misunderstand but you seem to be opposing consequentialism to having a moral obligation. If we didn't have intuitions of obligation to others, ethics would not exist. Consequentialism assumes such obligations, it is about ways of meeting them as are rights based or deontolgical theories. Virtue ethics might not I suppose.

When you say "Also any armed action by the underground during the Nazi occupation, would result in thousands of people being taken to concentration camps, or being killed outright. The cause is just, however when is the fight worth the price?" you are asking a consequentialist question. If you don't accept consequentialism, I can't see that the question has much meaning.

Posted by Enoch (# 14322) on :

quote:
Originally posted by que sais-je:
... I didn't take to Prof Honderich, but I don't think you can judge people's views on whether they believe in determinism or not. Unless of course your programming gives you no choice in the matter .... [/tangent]

If one wants to assess the credibility of a person's claim to speak on issues by profundity, I do tend to take it into account that they appear to be blind to deep seated inconsistencies in the positions they espouse.

Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Enoch:
If one wants to assess the credibility of a person's claim to speak on issues by profundity, I do tend to take it into account that they appear to be blind to deep seated inconsistencies in the positions they espouse.

I haven't read Honderich's views on these inconsistencies - given the time he has been working and his apparently belligerent nature I am sure they have been drawn to his attention many times. There doesn't seem to me an inconsistency (except that to require a moral agent to have free will would of course be meaningless if there were no free will). I have no difficulty in imagining, say, robots with no free will which try to ensure the best environment for each other. And since there may be many types of robot, some might attempt to convert others to their views (determinism does not imply a mind incapable of learning).

I make no claim that determinism is the case, merely that it doesn't seem inconsistent with altruistic behavior or advocacy on its behalf.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Enoch:
If one wants to assess the credibility of a person's claim to speak on issues by profundity, I do tend to take it into account that they appear to be blind to deep seated inconsistencies in the positions they espouse.

There's a difference between determinism and epiphenomenalism. Determinism is the position that our beliefs and actions are entirely accounted for by our past state. Epiphenomenalism is the position that our beliefs and conscious wishes are not causally influential on our actions.
I'd call the position that jointly holds determinism and epiphenomenalism fatalism. In the case of fatalism, it's true that there's no need for an ethical rationale for anything. But if you're a determinist but not a fatalist, then you believe that your ethical rationales are one of the things that might determine your future actions.

Posted by Enoch (# 14322) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
... I'd call the position that jointly holds determinism and epiphenomenalism fatalism. In the case of fatalism, it's true that there's no need for an ethical rationale for anything. But if you're a determinist but not a fatalist, then you believe that your ethical rationales are one of the things that might determine your future actions.

That strikes me as either circular or inconsistent. If one is saying that one's ethical rationales are part of what is determined, then they are as much a deterministic process as one's blood circulation. The only difference is that one is under the delusion that one is taking ethical decisions.

Ultimately, if, rather than earn one's living by spouting off about them, one were actually to live by such convictions therein would lie lunacy.

Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Enoch:
Ultimately, if, rather than earn one's living by spouting off about them, one were actually to live by such convictions therein would lie lunacy.

I am still confused. Suppose I am convinced of determinism, give me an example of how I might live by my convictions. What does a determinist do differently from someone who believes in free will?

Posted by Russ (# 120) on :

quote:
Originally posted by mrWaters:
Professor Honderich claims that Palestinians have bad lives, which is true. He claims that since it is not possible for Palestinians to get their freedom peacefully, then they have a moral right to terrorism.

Earlier in the article, he says that this moral imperative is to take steps that:
- one can reasonably actually believe will be effective
- do not cause more distress than they alleviate.

Palestinian terrorism fails on both counts.

His major point is that "we should do something about this". And there are many who would agree - if they could see some action that their government could take that would be effective in reducing the overall level of distress in the region.

Best wishes,

Russ

Posted by Enoch (# 14322) on :

quote:
Originally posted by que sais-je:

quote:
Originally posted by Enoch:
Ultimately, if, rather than earn one's living by spouting off about them, one were actually to live by such convictions therein would lie lunacy.
I am still confused. Suppose I am convinced of determinism, give me an example of how I might live by my convictions. What does a determinist do differently from someone who believes in free will?

I would imagine that a determinist will say to themselves either,

'it doesn't matter what I do or for what I take responsibility; however much I think I am agonising over my moral choices, it would all happen anyway - so I might as well do what I like',

or will tie themselves up in knots,
'am I taking decisions over which I have any control, or is this all just some determinised illusion of consciousness agonising over whether 'I' whatever that is, have any capacity to be anything other than an automaton? If I have any convictions, are these merely something that is weirdly predetermined which I am imagining because it makes me feel good or because they have somehow become part of my internal motor processes?' etc etc etc found and round in ever decreasing concentric circles.

Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Enoch:
Ultimately, if, rather than earn one's living by spouting off about them, one were actually to live by such convictions therein would lie lunacy.

But they'd be fated to suffer lunacy, of course. [Razz]

Posted by Doc Tor (# 9748) on :

quote:
Originally posted by mrWaters:
Professor Honderich claims that Palestinians have bad lives, which is true. He claims that since it is not possible for Palestinians to get their freedom peacefully, then they have a moral right to terrorism.

For the greater part, the Palestinians are not being held in Gaza against their will. It's difficult to get accurate statistics, but the net migration from Gaza is in the tens of thousands (and not zero as official statistics state).

Certainly, the number of Palestinian Christians has diminished considerably due to emigration. Which does indicate that there is a third response to the Nakba, other than non-violent resistance or terrorism: simply leave.

Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Enoch:

'it doesn't matter what I do or for what I take responsibility; however much I think I am agonising over my moral choices, it would all happen anyway - so I might as well do what I like',

or will tie themselves up in knots,
'am I taking decisions over which I have any control, or is this all just some determinised illusion of consciousness agonising over whether 'I' whatever that is, have any capacity to be anything other than an automaton? If I have any convictions, are these merely something that is weirdly predetermined which I am imagining because it makes me feel good or because they have somehow become part of my internal motor processes?' etc etc etc found and round in ever decreasing concentric circles.

This robot's brain goes ... chunter .... chunter ... that robot hurt/sad ... help other robot.

Freewill or determinism, which ever it may be, I don't find whether or not to try and help others involves much agonising, and certainly not over my internal cognitions and motivations. It isn't about 'me'.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Enoch:
I would imagine that a determinist will say to themselves either,

'it doesn't matter what I do or for what I take responsibility; however much I think I am agonising over my moral choices, it would all happen anyway - so I might as well do what I like',

No - that would be fatalism. The determinist believes that whatever happens happens for a sufficient cause, and in this case that sufficient cause is the determinist agonising over their moral choices.

Posted by ChastMastr (# 716) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
and in this case that sufficient cause is the determinist agonising over their moral choices.

But the agonizing would also be fated. As would their giving up after agonizing a while and deciding they don't care.

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