Thread: Ontological argument for God's existence Board: Oblivion / Ship of Fools.
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Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
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My GCSE revising teen was yesterday keen to discuss the Ontological Argument and we were getting into all kinds of knots trying to understand it and trying to avoid the obvious looking holes in the logic.
Wikipedia has quite a nice selection of a summary of different ways to express the idea, the one we found most helpful was this:
quote:
By definition, God is a being than which none greater can be imagined.
1. A being that necessarily exists in reality is greater than a being that does not necessarily exist.
2. Thus, by definition, if God exists as an idea in the mind but does not necessarily exist in reality, then we can imagine something that is greater than God.
3. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God.
4. Thus, if God exists in the mind as an idea, then God necessarily exists in reality.
5. God exists in the mind as an idea.
6. Therefore, God necessarily exists in reality.
But the holes in this argument seem quite obvious. On one level it seems to be arguing that my imagination is a measure of existence - if I can imagine an all-creating, all-powerful deity then he must exist because my imagination is always lesser than reality.
Or backwards, complex things don't exist if I can't imagine them. Which is obviously not true.
But then... maybe this isn't about imagining just anything but specifically about an all-powerful creator God. And then surely the problem is that it seems to be saying that only this kind of God is available, all other options are not available. It's a binary choice, take-or-leave-it. Which also can't be true, there must be a range of possible deities which could exist.
Reading further down the wikipedia page, we rather enjoyed Gasking's idea of an Ontological argument for God's non-existence - which seems to be a form of satire. If God is all powerful, then in one sense it isn't such a big deal that he created everything. A sliding scale of "impressiveness" is inversely proportional to the level of God's power (so if he hasn't got so much power, then creating all things is quite an impressive feat) and the most impressive feat would be if the deity didn't exist. Therefore for the creation of all things to be truly magnificent, the weakest imaginable deity would need to be the one doing the creation.. ie one that doesn't exist.
Anyway, we concluded that the whole argument boiled down to "I can imagine a situation where all things were created by this particular kind of deity therefore it was."
Or at least I did. My GCSE revising teen had lost the plot by this point.
So my question here is whether anyone is really convinced by an ontological argument for God. It is a shame IngoB isn't here, because I'd quite like to hear his take on this. Well, maybe.
Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on
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Small Gods.
In Terry Pratchett's Discworld the Gods feed on belief. The more people believe in a god, the more powerful that god becomes. As gods lose belief, they become weaker and smaller. Once there are no more believers, the god becomes a memory in the imagination. But just one believer is enough for the God to live on - enter Brutha, the only believer left in OM. There is a mighty religion for OM, of course - with huge structures and rules. But only one believer left on the whole disc.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
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Yes, I couldn't help thinking of Douglas Adams and the babelfish
quote:
Now it is such a bizarrely improbable coincidence that anything so mindbogglingly useful could have evolved purely by chance that some thinkers have chosen it to see it as a final and clinching proof of the non-existence of God.
The argument goes something like this: "I refuse to prove that I exist," says God, "for proof denies faith, and without faith I am nothing."
"But," says Man, "the Babel fish is a dead giveaway isn't it? It could not have evolved by chance. It proves you exist, and therefore, by your own arguments, you don't. QED."
"Oh dear," says God, "I hadn't thought of that," and promptly vanishes in a puff of logic.
Posted by Paul. (# 37) on
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This may be helpful/interesting:
In Our Time show on The Ontological Argument
I find the Argument interesting but ultimately unconvincing. Existence is not an attribute.
Posted by Sipech (# 16870) on
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While some parts of the ontological argument are useful as an exercise in logic, I'm less and less convinced by the argument as anything useful in theology.
The idea of starting by defining as God as X seems to be where the whole venture falls down. And where X="a being than which none greater can be imagined" is just an example. It rather reminds of this cartoon from NakedPastor. To define God and then try to work from there is just a great big straw man argument, nomatter how complicated and nuanced that straw man might be.
The major theistic religions tend not to be framed in that manner either. In Islam, you have the revelation to Muhammad in the cave, in Judaism, God's existence is pretty much assumed and in christianity, it's part assumption and part incarnation ("Anyone who has seen me has seen the Father").
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
But then... maybe this isn't about imagining just anything but specifically about an all-powerful creator God. And then surely the problem is that it seems to be saying that only this kind of God is available, all other options are not available. It's a binary choice, take-or-leave-it. Which also can't be true, there must be a range of possible deities which could exist.
Yes, it does only apply to a monotheistic God. A monotheist isn't a polytheist who believes that there happens to be only one god.(*)
It's not sensible to put forward a philosophical argument for the existence of Thor or Apollo. There's no particular reason why the Scandinavian gods should exist and not the Greek gods, or vice versa, or neither. Even if the Greek gods exist, if Zeus doesn't sleep with Leto, then there's no Apollo.
Now monotheism is not like that. Whether or not any of the arguments for the existence of God work or not, God is the kind of thing for which there could be a philosophical argument. God, in monotheism, is a feature of the universe like mathematics. God is the sort of thing of which there can only be one.(**)
(Strictly speaking, one can be a monotheist and believe Thor exists. One just does't think one ought to worship Thor, any more than one thinks one ought to worship Julius Caesar. I think Captain America in the Avengers films is such a person.)
In a lot of the philosophical arguments for the existence of God, the word 'God' is a distraction. It brings a lot of baggage which the argument hasn't got to yet. The argument simply establishes, if it works, that a particular description 'most perfect being' or 'first cause' exists. Filling that description out with things like 'loving' or 'omnipotent' or even 'sentient' requires a bit more work.
For what it's worth, I think there's three points at which the ontological argument falls down.
1) It assumes that there are qualities whose possession brings any being, understood as such, closer to perfection. This was widely assumed in the middle ages, but there's no reason why a modern materialist or physicalist should grant it.
2) It assumes that existence is a property, to use the technical term. This seems wrong.
3) The most cogent medieval argument: it assumes you can imagine a perfect being. Aquinas, for one, thought that God is greater than we can imagine, in which case the argument can't get started.
(*) Unless, as I understand it, the 'monotheist' is a Mormon. I believe the Mormons are technically speaking polytheists who think that as a matter of fact there's only one god.
(**) Strictly speaking, a monotheist thinks saying there's one God is as sensible as saying there's only one everything.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
It's not sensible to put forward a philosophical argument for the existence of Thor or Apollo. There's no particular reason why the Scandinavian gods should exist and not the Greek gods, or vice versa, or neither. Even if the Greek gods exist, if Zeus doesn't sleep with Leto, then there's no Apollo.
This is what puzzles me - are you saying that the monotheistic god is capable of being investigated with philosophical argument but any other kind of god is not?
Also I don't really accept that there is a single monotheistic god option available. There could be a single god who is not all-powerful and not the creator of all things. For example the universe could be eternal and the deity could be eternal, but the one was not created by the other. The deity could not be the ultimate power (there may in fact not be an ultimate power at all) but still worthy of worship if he has the power to control this universe, this existence, this dimension.
If we did have a deity who was in fact not all-powerful (and rather was just a lot more powerful and a lot more long-living than we are), how would we know?
And does the fact that I can imagine such things mean that therefore this kind of God must exist?
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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I can't even get off the ground with this argument, as the idea of imagining a perfect being, or even one than whom none is greater, just seems nonsensical to me. Then to shift from imaginary to actual, because necessary existence is superior, strikes me as sleight of hand.
I know that Kurt Gödel translated this argument into formal logic, but I can't follow that.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
It's not sensible to put forward a philosophical argument for the existence of Thor or Apollo. There's no particular reason why the Scandinavian gods should exist and not the Greek gods, or vice versa, or neither. Even if the Greek gods exist, if Zeus doesn't sleep with Leto, then there's no Apollo.
This is what puzzles me - are you saying that the monotheistic god is capable of being investigated with philosophical argument but any other kind of god is not?
Yes. (*) Where's the objection?
That said, you use the phrase 'the monotheistic god' with the definite article. That implies that we're all agreed on what we mean by 'the monotheistic god' before we get started. I think that's one of the things that leads to misunderstanding what is at stake. There's a reason Pascal contrasted the God of the philosophers with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. They may be one and the same; but the philosophical arguments cannot prove that the God they deduce spoke to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.
quote:
Also I don't really accept that there is a single monotheistic god option available. There could be a single god who is not all-powerful and not the creator of all things. For example the universe could be eternal and the deity could be eternal, but the one was not created by the other.
You're at risk I think of proposing 'polytheism where the number of gods happens to be one'.
I don't think there's only one monotheistic god option available - there's Plato's form of the Good, there's Aristotle's unmoved mover, there's Hegel's Geist, there's Schopenhauer's Will,...
Once you've posited a supreme being, or a ground of being, or some such feature of existence, you can then argue about the qualities that the feature possesses. Or have faith that it is loving as opposed to indifferent or actively hostile, if you think human reason cannot reach so far.
quote:
The deity could not be the ultimate power (there may in fact not be an ultimate power at all) but still worthy of worship if he has the power to control this universe, this existence, this dimension.
That would I think be power-worship.
quote:
And does the fact that I can imagine such things mean that therefore this kind of God must exist?
The argument has a few more steps than that.
(*) Perhaps some kind of superficially polytheistic system like Blake's Four Zoas could be investigated philosophically.
Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Sipech:
The idea of starting by defining as God as X seems to be where the whole venture falls down. And where X="a being than which none greater can be imagined" is just an example. It rather reminds of this cartoon from NakedPastor. To define God and then try to work from there is just a great big straw man argument, nomatter how complicated and nuanced that straw man might be.
I completely agree. One might just as well begin with the premise "God Exists" and then extrapolate God's existence therefrom. It would require fewer steps, for a start.
Posted by Sioni Sais (# 5713) on
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The OP mentions "God is a being" then "if God exists as an idea in the mind" and these are fundamentally different things. The former is an expression of a God and that is real. The latter does not need a real God (or even a god) just the concept of one in a mind.
I'm not therefore satisfied by the conclusion arrived at in the OP. I'm not sure what does (or does not) satisfy me but I don't think one can move from concept to concrete without evidence - which might well be no more or less than a personal revelation.
YMMV (and indeed it probably will!)
Posted by Ricardus (# 8757) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Sipech:
The idea of starting by defining as God as X seems to be where the whole venture falls down.
I agree the argument is flawed, but I don't think this is the flaw in it. I don't think it becomes a significantly different argument if you take God out of it and just express it as 'let us posit a being beyond which nothing more perfect can be conceived; clearly it is better to exist than not exist, therefore this being exists'.
[ 18. February 2016, 19:20: Message edited by: Ricardus ]
Posted by Martin60 (# 368) on
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By definition, X is an x than which none xier can be imagined.
1. An x that necessarily exists in reality is greater than an x that does not necessarily exist.
2. Thus, by definition, if X exists as an idea in the mind but does not necessarily exist in reality, then we can imagine something that is greater than X.
3. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than X.
4. Thus, if X exists in the mind as an idea, then X necessarily exists in reality.
5. X exists in the mind as an idea.
6. Therefore, X necessarily exists in reality.
7. What a load of XXXX
Posted by Martin60 (# 368) on
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For X try Stilton and for x try cheese.
Posted by agingjb (# 16555) on
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Perhaps I'd turn it round. If God exists, then the Ontological proof is sound.
Posted by Martin60 (# 368) on
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ALL apologetics plays to a draw at best, which dialectically isn't enough. Fails. If God exists no argument is necessary. No argument can make Him.
Posted by HCH (# 14313) on
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Arguments of this sort illustrate why many people lose respect for philosophers.
Posted by Martin60 (# 368) on
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I just gots three words to say to youse HCH.
William
Lane
Craig
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
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quote:
Originally posted by agingjb:
Perhaps I'd turn it round. If God exists, then the Ontological proof is sound.
It takes more than a true conclusion to make an argument sound. It must also have true premises and the conclusion must logically follow from the premises. Without either of those, it is not a sound argument.
This argument has true premises and a true conclusion but is not sound:
I am a public school teacher
All public school math teachers are human
Therefore I teach math.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Martin60:
For X try Stilton and for x try cheese.
That's very good, Martin, for Stilton is indeed the perfection of cheesiness.
I think this illustrates the problem very well. Of course the cheese connoisseur will recognise the brilliance that is the best Stilton, the pinnacle and King of all that is cheese. This goes without saying. But surely that can enchanted cheese moment can only be experienced not reasoned. The person who has never heard of the wonder that is Stilton cannot imagine it into being. The imagination of a cheese fan is not related to the existence of a fine Stilton.
And of course there are heathens who believe cheese perfection lies in a different direction than the blue mould of Melton Mowbray.
[ 19. February 2016, 07:12: Message edited by: mr cheesy ]
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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This is a bit like the perfect island argument, which is very old. Gaunilo (a contemporary of Anselm), made the argument that one can imagine a perfect island, therefore, since existence is better than non-existence, the perfect island exists.
However, it has been contradicted by the issue of necessary existence. The perfect island does not necessarily exist, whereas God does.
It still smacks of sleight of hand to me.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
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quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
However, it has been contradicted by the issue of necessary existence. The perfect island does not necessarily exist, whereas God does.
It still smacks of sleight of hand to me.
When IngoB posted large amounts of text defending "necessary existence" here last year, it made no sense to me and still doesn't. If I can imagine a scenario where a deity is not needed (the universe is eternal or the time is like an elastic band with reality forming out of the ashes of itself), then how is it a "necessary existence" - other than someone asserting that the thing is necessary because he/she has defined it as necessary?
Posted by Ricardus (# 8757) on
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quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
I think this illustrates the problem very well. Of course the cheese connoisseur will recognise the brilliance that is the best Stilton, the pinnacle and King of all that is cheese. This goes without saying. But surely that can enchanted cheese moment can only be experienced not reasoned. The person who has never heard of the wonder that is Stilton cannot imagine it into being. The imagination of a cheese fan is not related to the existence of a fine Stilton.
I don't know what phrase Anselm used, but I think there is a difference between imagining something and having something in one's mind. One cannot imagine Graham's Number, but one can still think about it and use it for mathematical proofs. This seems to be more the sense in which Anselm talks about God existing in the mind.
[ 19. February 2016, 09:31: Message edited by: Ricardus ]
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
However, it has been contradicted by the issue of necessary existence. The perfect island does not necessarily exist, whereas God does.
It still smacks of sleight of hand to me.
When IngoB posted large amounts of text defending "necessary existence" here last year, it made no sense to me and still doesn't. If I can imagine a scenario where a deity is not needed (the universe is eternal or the time is like an elastic band with reality forming out of the ashes of itself), then how is it a "necessary existence" - other than someone asserting that the thing is necessary because he/she has defined it as necessary?
Well, I get that God is not a contingent thing, or an item in the universe, but the condition for there being anything at all. However, it still strikes me as circular, God exists necessarily, therefore God exists. OK, that's a caricature.
There are also different kinds of necessity, getting bored now.
Posted by agingjb (# 16555) on
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I said "Perhaps I'd turn it round. If God exists, then the Ontological proof is sound."
Perhaps I have to explain a joke. I have no particular opinion on whether the argument is sound. Cleverer people than me have accepted it; cleverer people than me have rejected it. For me to call any of these people fools would be silly (and forbidden).
My point was that if the argument's conclusion were true, then we would have to give it more credence, think about it more, even if it were unsound.
Posted by Frankenstein (# 16198) on
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This problem, the existence of God, has engaged the best brains at some time in their lives.
No one has come up with a satisfactory answer.
At school, with the help of some text book, it was established, that all proofs for the existence of God were flawed.
The belief in God requires Faith, not certainty.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Gaunilo (a contemporary of Anselm), made the argument that one can imagine a perfect island, therefore, since existence is better than non-existence, the perfect island exists.
I think the perfect island argument differs from Anselm's argument in that 'perfection' is not well defined for islands. Is a tropical island more perfect than a temperate island? Whereas Anselm and most medieval thinkers believed that perfection was well-defined for being.
In modern thought, I don't think there is a consensus that perfection is well-defined for being.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
When IngoB posted large amounts of text defending "necessary existence" here last year, it made no sense to me and still doesn't. If I can imagine a scenario where a deity is not needed (the universe is eternal or the time is like an elastic band with reality forming out of the ashes of itself), then how is it a "necessary existence" - other than someone asserting that the thing is necessary because he/she has defined it as necessary?
A necessary truth is one that couldn't be otherwise. We might think we're able to imagine it otherwise, but only if we haven't quite thought everything through (possibly because we're not able to do so). Just because we can imagine something is possible doesn't mean it is possible. (The ontological argument may have many flaws, but it at least makes an effort to avoid that particular pitfall.)
The main class of (mostly) uncontroversially necessary truths is mathematical truths. Mathematical theorems hold whether or not we imagine them holding.
The sf author Bob Shaw, in The Ragged Astronauts trilogy, imagines a universe in which pi is exactly 3. However, he doesn't actually do any of the mathematics to establish how this can be so - in fact, the nature of mathematics is such that you can't do coherent mathematics in which pi comes out as exactly 3.
Pi is necessarily an irrational number very closely approximated by 355/113. That holds even if we think we can imagine a universe in which it isn't.
The claim is that imagining that God does not exist is something like Bob Shaw's universe: it only looks coherent because we're incapable of thinking it through.
Posted by hatless (# 3365) on
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I like to look for the cash value of concepts. The word God seems to mean the reason why there is something rather than nothing, and what the use, value or purpose of everything is.
The use of the word implies that the world is (or might, or ought to be) intelligible and not just some bad dream. And usually the word God is full of very positive ideas about the ultimate truth, that it is friendly to humans, beautiful, good and possible to relate to.
The concept of God implies the truth that the universe makes sense, so the truth of God is entailed in naming God. That's heading towards an ontological argument. It doesn't seek to establish the existence of God, but it claims the usefulness or truth value of the concept of God, that we can best understand the world by talking about God.
I can't see how asking about the existence of God can avoid reducing God to the name of a thing within the world that might or might not exist, a contingent thing. We have to ask about the truth or validity of God talk. The question is not whether God exists, but whether God talk is nonsense, offensive anti-human nonsense.
It's very much like asking if poetry is a good idea, indeed if we completely fail to do justice to the world without poetry and other arts. I don't mind being gloriously wrong about this. If the world could be shown to me to be a bleak and meaningless place, I would be happy to have nonetheless lived looking for the sense and beauty in it. That is a proper human way to live. If wrong, it's wrongness is beautiful. Therefore it is right. Therefore God talk makes sense!
It will only take you so far, though, all this abstract argument. At some point you need to ask what God is like in a bit more detail. Is God like Jesus? Is God like Ganesha? We either see it, that God is like this, and we want it, we are happy that God is like is, or we don't. Further progress is only possible by poetry,
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
A necessary truth is one that couldn't be otherwise. We might think we're able to imagine it otherwise, but only if we haven't quite thought everything through (possibly because we're not able to do so). Just because we can imagine something is possible doesn't mean it is possible. (The ontological argument may have many flaws, but it at least makes an effort to avoid that particular pitfall.)
OK but just because we might think the deity is a "necessary" truth in the sense that it couldn't be otherwise - by the same logic - does not mean that it is. We might think that a deity is the only explanation, we might be wrong.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
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quote:
Originally posted by hatless:
The concept of God implies the truth that the universe makes sense, so the truth of God is entailed in naming God. That's heading towards an ontological argument. It doesn't seek to establish the existence of God, but it claims the usefulness or truth value of the concept of God, that we can best understand the world by talking about God.
I don't think this is true: it is postulated as a proof of the existence of God.
But you do make an interesting point in that one might be able to point to it as a reason for belief, that it might not be an inarguable fact, but serves to inform a worldview that seeks to make sense of the universe in specific way.
Posted by hatless (# 3365) on
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quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
quote:
Originally posted by hatless:
The concept of God implies the truth that the universe makes sense, so the truth of God is entailed in naming God. That's heading towards an ontological argument. It doesn't seek to establish the existence of God, but it claims the usefulness or truth value of the concept of God, that we can best understand the world by talking about God.
I don't think this is true: it is postulated as a proof of the existence of God.
But you do make an interesting point in that one might be able to point to it as a reason for belief, that it might not be an inarguable fact, but serves to inform a worldview that seeks to make sense of the universe in specific way.
I take it that by 'it' you mean the ontological argument is postulated as a proof of the existence of God. But I remember reading that Anselm didn't see it like this. Apparently he had a lot of criticism for his argument, and said in response that it wasn't meant as a proof, but as something that would make believers happy. A sort of neat and affirming way of looking at things.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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Yes, I think some people see the Famous Five (Aquinas's five ways), not as proofs but corroborations of faith.
I find it odd in any case to construct arguments for the existence of something. Is God so bashful and afraid to appear, that we must do this?
I suppose you could argue that scientists do the same, e.g. for dark matter, but that is rather different, and relies on observations, predictions, and confirmations of predictions (or negations of them).
But normally I don't make arguments for the existence of something, except abstract things.
Posted by Frankenstein (# 16198) on
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One has a choice neither capable of proof:
Does the Universe exist of itself?
Does God exist of himself?
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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It reminds me of working with people who didn't think that love exists. Any arguments you might offer, would be torn to shreds, so really arguments are of no value. What you can do is wait, and see if love goes off in them like a light-bulb. Well, it might or it might not.
Some people have also said that loving them works, but often it doesn't, and might produce further scorn and denial. But you can be with them, which is a form of love, also deniable of course.
Posted by Sioni Sais (# 5713) on
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quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
It reminds me of working with people who didn't think that love exists. Any arguments you might offer, would be torn to shreds, so really arguments are of no value. What you can do is wait, and see if love goes off in them like a light-bulb. Well, it might or it might not.
Some people have also said that loving them works, but often it doesn't, and might produce further scorn and denial. But you can be with them, which is a form of love, also deniable of course.
The cutting point is when they are in need and someone steps in with no thought or prospect of reward and helps them. They don't *all* come round to the idea that love exists but some do. Many of the others are either confused or living in a state of denial.
Posted by Sipech (# 16870) on
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One of the things that bothers me (particularly with christians) that use ontological proofs is that it seems to unnecessarily cede ground to atheist critics. This is rather a post-Hume idea that obviously wasn't what Anselm had in mind, but I'll try to explain.
Instead of talking of christianity, we talk of God (as a friend of mine puts it, we have "godianity") which might then be further generalised into theism, because there are a variety of beliefs that all use the term "God" even if they denote very different ideas. A specific religion can then be deemed as a branch of theism. So if you can attack theism, the idea that there is a god, then by a sort of induction, all theistic religions fall.
But a post-Easter christian epistemology needn't start with a vague idea of "God" but with a historical study of the person of Jesus. It's here that the more astute critiques of the likes of Reimarus and Strauss are far more cutting than any of the work of Dennett or Hitchens. You then get the really silly responses of the Christ-myth hypothesis as espoused by Richard Carrier, whose arguments belong in the same bin as homeopathy, creationism and membership of the flat earth society.
So the christian can start with Jesus and work from there onto God, rather than the other way around. i.e. start with epistemology and use that to grab a hold of ontology.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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Sipech
That's an interesting approach, but a historical study of Jesus will by definition exclude the supernatural. I don't see then how you make the jump from history to the supernatural, without some kind of argument for God.
Posted by hatless (# 3365) on
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Why do you want the supernatural? Poetry doesn't require the supernatural.
Posted by Martin60 (# 368) on
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That's fascinating on Anselm. And Aquinas. It's ALL post-hoc and they knew it. Good to know.
God is NOT necessary.
But He IS.
Because of Jesus.
Posted by Sipech (# 16870) on
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quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
That's an interesting approach, but a historical study of Jesus will by definition exclude the supernatural. I don't see then how you make the jump from history to the supernatural, without some kind of argument for God.
I disagree that history must exclude the supernatural. Of course, a good historian wouldn't jump to that conclusion if they were simply short of evidence or rationale, but it remains a tool that should be available. If one adopts Conan Doyle's phrasing of Occam's razor (when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth) then the question becomes "is the supernatural impossible or improbable"?
As a slight tangent, every maths student gets taught how to prove ideas rigorously; an early example typically being the proof that there is no rational number whose square is 2 (not quite the same as proving that the square root of 2 is irrational, as you may not have yet proved the existence of such a number). But this proof is a proof by contradiction. i.e. you assume such a number exists and then show that this leads to a contradiction. But the logical positivists didn't like this (it was too negative) and an attempt was made to prove the theorem without using a proof by contradiction. That attempt failed, because they threw away the right tool for the job.
If some kind of supernatural (whatever that actually means) is needed to gain an understanding of Jesus' historicity, then is discounting its use a matter of methodological rigour or prejudice?
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Sipech:
]I disagree that history must exclude the supernatural. Of course, a good historian wouldn't jump to that conclusion if they were simply short of evidence or rationale, but it remains a tool that should be available. If one adopts Conan Doyle's phrasing of Occam's razor (when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth) then the question becomes "is the supernatural impossible or improbable"?
Which is the most ridiculous thing anyone has ever uttered - how can anyone eliminate all possible options? There is always an unknown number of unknown factors which could have a bearing on any given situation, and therefore one could always be looking at something with incomplete information about it and jumping to a conclusion which is wrong - simply because one doesn't know about the truth. Maybe there is some cigarette end that Holmes has not studied from a country he has not visited which looks similar to one that he does know. Maybe the soil colours Holmes is aware of in Hertfordshire are actually very similar to those found in small parts of Herefordshire or Outer Mongolia. Maybe it isn't soil at all but some other substance that Holmes cannot interrogate with the tools of logic and knowledge he has available to him.
Of course, given that Conan Doyle spent much of his life trying to prove the existence of fairies, I'm not sure he is a particularly good advertisement for the powers of Holmsian deductive reasoning anyway.
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As a slight tangent, every maths student gets taught how to prove ideas rigorously; an early example typically being the proof that there is no rational number whose square is 2 (not quite the same as proving that the square root of 2 is irrational, as you may not have yet proved the existence of such a number). But this proof is a proof by contradiction. i.e. you assume such a number exists and then show that this leads to a contradiction. But the logical positivists didn't like this (it was too negative) and an attempt was made to prove the theorem without using a proof by contradiction. That attempt failed, because they threw away the right tool for the job.
Whilst mathematics was once a form of philosophy, philosophy does not all work like mathematics. Therefore, unfortunately, most things in the real world cannot be proven like mathematics.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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Originally posted by Sipech:
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Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
That's an interesting approach, but a historical study of Jesus will by definition exclude the supernatural. I don't see then how you make the jump from history to the supernatural, without some kind of argument for God.
I disagree that history must exclude the supernatural. Of course, a good historian wouldn't jump to that conclusion if they were simply short of evidence or rationale, but it remains a tool that should be available. If one adopts Conan Doyle's phrasing of Occam's razor (when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth) then the question becomes "is the supernatural impossible or improbable"?
As a slight tangent, every maths student gets taught how to prove ideas rigorously; an early example typically being the proof that there is no rational number whose square is 2 (not quite the same as proving that the square root of 2 is irrational, as you may not have yet proved the existence of such a number). But this proof is a proof by contradiction. i.e. you assume such a number exists and then show that this leads to a contradiction. But the logical positivists didn't like this (it was too negative) and an attempt was made to prove the theorem without using a proof by contradiction. That attempt failed, because they threw away the right tool for the job.
If some kind of supernatural (whatever that actually means) is needed to gain an understanding of Jesus' historicity, then is discounting its use a matter of methodological rigour or prejudice?
Well, historians use historical method, which is naturalistic. That is, it relies on documentation of various kinds, archaeology, and so on.
To shift from this to the supernatural means abandoning this method. I don't see how probability can be calculated either, and again, I would say that this pertains to the natural world, in fact, possible outcomes therein. How do you calculate supernatural outcomes?
Is it probable that Quetzalcoatl stole the cocoa plant from the gods? Is blue triangular?
I think historians such as Sanders don't reject the supernatural, but they don't accept it either.
Posted by Ricardus (# 8757) on
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Originally posted by mr cheesy:
OK but just because we might think the deity is a "necessary" truth in the sense that it couldn't be otherwise - by the same logic - does not mean that it is. We might think that a deity is the only explanation, we might be wrong.
I don't know if it affects your argument, but a necessary truth need not be a known truth or even a knowable truth. Until relatively recently one could say 'We don't know if Fermat's last theorem is true, but if it is true, then it's true necessarily'. Gödel demonstrated that there are statements in mathematics that cannot be proven even though they are necessarily true, but as an arts graduate I am not capable of commenting on this.
Posted by Paul. (# 37) on
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quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
quote:
Originally posted by Sipech:
]I disagree that history must exclude the supernatural. Of course, a good historian wouldn't jump to that conclusion if they were simply short of evidence or rationale, but it remains a tool that should be available. If one adopts Conan Doyle's phrasing of Occam's razor (when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth) then the question becomes "is the supernatural impossible or improbable"?
Which is the most ridiculous thing anyone has ever uttered - how can anyone eliminate all possible options? There is always an unknown number of unknown factors which could have a bearing on any given situation, and therefore one could always be looking at something with incomplete information about it and jumping to a conclusion which is wrong - simply because one doesn't know about the truth.
Indeed.
Douglas Adams has Dirk Gently contradict Holmes' razor by stating that we shouldn't rule out the impossible in favour of the improbable because the improbable goes against what we know whereas the impossible merely means there's something we don't know yet.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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Originally posted by mr cheesy:
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Originally posted by Dafyd:
A necessary truth is one that couldn't be otherwise. We might think we're able to imagine it otherwise, but only if we haven't quite thought everything through (possibly because we're not able to do so). Just because we can imagine something is possible doesn't mean it is possible. (The ontological argument may have many flaws, but it at least makes an effort to avoid that particular pitfall.)
OK but just because we might think the deity is a "necessary" truth in the sense that it couldn't be otherwise - by the same logic - does not mean that it is. We might think that a deity is the only explanation, we might be wrong.
Obviously we might be wrong.
This has nothing though to do with whether or not a deity is the only explanation for the universe. Just because one fact is the only explanation for a second fact doesn't mean that the one fact is necessarily true. (Just because the only explanation for the child's symptoms is chickenpox, doesn't mean it's a necessary truth that the child has chickenpox; if the child hadn't gone to school that day the child needn't have caught it.)
What makes God's existence a necessary truth (assuming God's existence is a truth at all) is to do with the answer to the question of who made God. (Not who made the universe.)
Since nobody made God, then if God exists, God must exist without any need to be made. Which means that God necessarily exists. There's no contingent fact that if it weren't true would mean God didn't exist.
Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on
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Originally posted by Martin60:
For X try Stilton and for x try cheese.
I agree about the cheese. What's always worried me about the argument is the possibility of turning it around. A totally evil being that existed would be more awful than one that didn't ....
"Logic and Theism:Arguments For and Against Beliefs in God" by Jordan Sobel translates most of the arguments into formal logic (including Godel's version of the ontological argument). A minority interest book if ever there was one.
What makes me doubtful of all of them is that Andrew Wile's proof of Fermat's last theorem runs to 150 pages. If you expanded it by all the other results it uses from about 20 pages of references (and then expanded them similarly) it would probably run into thousands of pages. A number of other mathematical proofs are similarly long. It seems surprising that the existence of God can be disposed of in a couple of dozen lines.
Posted by Martin60 (# 368) on
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3 good paras. The first is chillingly good. Reminds me of King's grimly curdling Lovecraftian Revival.
Posted by Schroedinger's cat (# 64) on
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I did have something of this discussion with someone at work (whose son is also trying to wrestle with this). We concluded that the logical proofs for God are all flawed, because (in essence) logical proofs and the existence of God are in different ontological spaces. We cannot apply one to the other.
If you accept that the Christian-like God exists, then he explicitly does not conform to logical proofs. He breaks them, which does not disprove logical proofs, but exists outside of them.
The problem you have with this demonstration is that you do not have a proof of anything like the Christian God. WBC can imagine a vile, vindictive God - does that mean that he exists?
I think the idea that we cannot imagine something that doesn't exist is incredibly flawed. Most of the progress over the last 300 years has been from people imagining things that don't exist, and then making them exist. That is the point of human imagination. My dreams imagine all sorts of things that don't exists. I am often very grateful.
Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on
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Originally posted by Schroedinger's cat:
We concluded that the logical proofs for God are all flawed, because (in essence) logical proofs and the existence of God are in different ontological spaces. We cannot apply one to the other.
William of Ockham seems to have had a similar idea: only God exists necessarily, everything else is contingent on God so the existence of God cannot be deduced from anything in this contingent universe.
(I still think there should be a block buster movie about William. Not many Essex lads who drop out of Uni without a degree get to accuse a pope of heresy in his own court and live to see his dethronement.)
Posted by Jack o' the Green (# 11091) on
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Originally posted by que sais-je:
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Originally posted by Schroedinger's cat:
We concluded that the logical proofs for God are all flawed, because (in essence) logical proofs and the existence of God are in different ontological spaces. We cannot apply one to the other.
William of Ockham seems to have had a similar idea: only God exists necessarily, everything else is contingent on God so the existence of God cannot be deduced from anything in this contingent universe.
I think this is exactly correct. I think there is often a failure to distinguish between necessary existence and necessary truths. Only God necessarily exists, but abstract entities which are conceived in God's intellect and which are reliant on him for their existence are necessarily true i.e. can’t be conceived in any other way.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
quote:
Originally posted by Sipech:
If some kind of supernatural (whatever that actually means) is needed to gain an understanding of Jesus' historicity, then is discounting its use a matter of methodological rigour or prejudice?
Well, historians use historical method, which is naturalistic. That is, it relies on documentation of various kinds, archaeology, and so on.
That's a bit off the point though. A document might perfectly well describe supernatural events, etc. There's nothing in that kind of methodology that excludes appeal to the supernatural as explanation. What precludes the use of the supernatural is that, given we know almost nothing about the supernatural even assuming it does exist, and given that we know a fair bit about human motivations and so on, the latter are more satisfying and meaningful as explanations.
(On the other hand, the historical method does rule out the use of past-life regression as a means of establishing what happened.)
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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Originally posted by Dafyd:
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Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
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Originally posted by Sipech:
If some kind of supernatural (whatever that actually means) is needed to gain an understanding of Jesus' historicity, then is discounting its use a matter of methodological rigour or prejudice?
Well, historians use historical method, which is naturalistic. That is, it relies on documentation of various kinds, archaeology, and so on.
That's a bit off the point though. A document might perfectly well describe supernatural events, etc. There's nothing in that kind of methodology that excludes appeal to the supernatural as explanation. What precludes the use of the supernatural is that, given we know almost nothing about the supernatural even assuming it does exist, and given that we know a fair bit about human motivations and so on, the latter are more satisfying and meaningful as explanations.
(On the other hand, the historical method does rule out the use of past-life regression as a means of establishing what happened.)
Well, you are right, I should have qualified 'documentation' with a paraphrase of 'naturalistic'. It's absolutely right that there are documents which refer to the supernatural, after all, the Bible is full of them, but generally historians ignore them, except as records of beliefs.
Thus, if a document is discovered, which states that the German army was carried by angels across the Danube in 1943, historians would be unlikely to use that as evidence about the German army's movements.
I can't see that there is any method to establish, or record, or check, the supernatural. How would it be done? Another way of saying this is that there appear to be no constraints on it. Hence, my example of Quetzalcoatl stealing the cocoa plant from the gods.
In relation to Jesus, in my limited reading, there are reasonable historical arguments and evidence for his actual human existence, but historians don't deal with stuff like the resurrection, although they may deal with beliefs about it - I think this is Sanders' position.
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
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Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
[I]f a document is discovered, which states the German army was carried by angels across the Danube in 1943, historians would be unlikely to use that as evidence about the German army's movements.
I think that would be foolish. You may not believe the angels carried the army, but the document may well have the date and location of the crossing, and it would be foolish to discount it entirely. Nobody living presumably believes an angel appeared at Mons, but other details in the accounts are not invalidated thereby. All witnesses are unreliable, and supernatural truth-embroidery is just one among many varieties.
Posted by Schroedinger's cat (# 64) on
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More than that, if a witness believes that angels were involved, that gives you an insight into their views, their beliefs which will impact the rest of the document. That does not invalidate it but helps you understand the position that the witness is coming from. It may be that they saw something of crucial importance, that they are interpreted as angels.
I think William of Orange is expressing the face that the existence (or non-existence) of God is a matter of my ontological belief. That is, it is a statement that I accept without any proof. To change this ontological belief does not need logical proofs, because the logical proofs are interpreted within my belief system. To change this, what is needed is a demonstration that this ontological belief is fundamentally inconsistent with reality.
To make that change is core, and fundamental. But it is a personal decision, that I am going to change my essential view of the world.
Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on
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Originally posted by Schroedinger's cat:
... William of Orange ....
Is this
- William III of England?
- The (orange haired) Prince William?
- William of Ockham (or Occam)?
Posted by Schroedinger's cat (# 64) on
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Ockham of course. I can't be expected to be able to type on a Sunday morning. Or any other morning actually. And the afternoons are great either. Evenings are no better.
Posted by Russ (# 120) on
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Originally posted by Sipech:
if some kind of supernatural (whatever that actually means) is needed to gain an understanding of Jesus' historicity, then is discounting its use a matter of methodological rigour or prejudice?
I suspect that what "supernatural" means is something like "magic" - a label used to denote the inexplicable.
If magic worked and we understood how magic worked, it wouldn't be magic, it would be a branch of technology.
Similarly, a supernatural explanation is one which goes outside natural "laws". If you understand how that can be done, then why doesn't that understanding constitute one more "natural law" ?
Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on
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Originally posted by Russ:
I suspect that what "supernatural" means is something like "magic" - a label used to denote the inexplicable.
If magic worked and we understood how magic worked, it wouldn't be magic, it would be a branch of technology.
Magicians, alchemists and scientists were once almost the same thing. But science moves on because people are willing to admit when things were wrong, or plain bullshit.
This is an interesting article.
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Galileo, emphatically did not believe in magic. Galileo has no time for supernatural explanations of any kind - indeed, when he goes wrong, as he did when he rejected the idea that the Moon causes the tides, it's because he resists the right explanation because it just sounds too strange or magical.
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History has taught us that science didn't just happen in a burst. Alchemy and astrology evolved slowly and over time into chemistry and astronomy. Galileo even made a buck in his youth by casting horoscopes for rich people.
There were no bright lines. Indeed sometimes science slipped back into astrology and alchemy and superstition and the occult. It's well-known that Isaac Newton spent a lifetime searching for the Philosopher's Stone.
Religion and faith are even slippier customers than alchemy and astrology in my view!
Posted by alienfromzog (# 5327) on
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I'm not sure if I am about to add to the discussion or not.
A few years ago I knew Peter S Williams quite well. If I was going to show off, I'd tell you I'm acknowledged in one of his books... The reason for mentioning this is not to name-drop
but that having had several conversations with a professional philosopher as well as reading his works (coz I knew him) has given me, at the very least, a starting point for engaging with this kind of thinking. I'm not sure I would have found a way-in otherwise.
This series of lectures are really good if you're interested in these things:
Williams speaking at Unbelievable? 2013 on 'Lewis vs Dawkings'
As a trained philosopher, I've heard Peter explain the ontological argument but he majors more on fine tuning and moral arguments. Moreover he acknowledges that these arguments independently are not totally compelling, but taken together are a strong case for God's existence and moreover for the kind of God the Bible describes.
Now Peter is smarter than me so I won't try to explain the ontological argument as he does it better but I think the circularity here speaks to a fundemental intellectual problem.
This argument is vital and at the same time ridiculous. I would term this the 'necessity problem.' (I suspect it has a real name.) Either God exists necessarily or he doesn't. Necessarily.
Let me explain:
If God exists then he/she/it is the source of all existence. The reason there is a universe at all is because God willed it. Nothing could possibly exist without God. Therefore, for creatures of said universe to even ask the question does God exist is faintly ridiculous. God exists. He always has, always will. So supposing a universe without God is just silly.
Conversely if God doesn't exist we have a godless universe. Be it due to Steady-state or a simple Big Bang or the variations of the multi-verse: if all this comes about by natural processes (in the naturalist sense) then there is no place for God and it is complete foolishness to posit a god.
Of course we live in uncertainty and reasoning from where we are is tricky. So we're stuck with this paradox of ridiculousness. This is partly why the moral argument and fine tuning argument are more compelling in my view.
I think that the ontological argument, whilst it may not convince an atheist it does have a place in understanding the nature of God much more than helping us to answer the question of god's existence. I.e. God as the greatest possible being is a helpful concept as I think we spend far to much of our lives with a very small view of God. This does come up in arguments with atheists and this probably does have some value and use; "I do not believe in a god because of x, y and z..." says the atheist. "Yep," says the theist, "I don't believe in that god either. You are right about x, y and z. What I actually believe is this..."
If you're debating with Dawkins he'll then tell you what you believe so he can attack it. If you try to tell him you believe something else he'll either tell you that you're wrong or not a Christian. It is nice to have him around to tell me what I believe. It is the direct equivalent of saying to him: You believe in evolution: that's ridiculous to think we evolved by chance! I am fairly confident that Dawkins reply would explain that the very notion that Darwin describes is how Natural Selection acting on mutations, is the very opposite of random chance, or 'antichance' as he terms it, and hence, makes intellectual sense. What the ontological argument does, for me, is to point to how the only kind of 'god' that makes sense, is an infinite, necessarily existing being.
I agree with what was said previously: for the Christian, it all begins and ends with Christ. That's how we encounter God. I believe that Jesus is God because I believe he lived and died and rose again. And My understanding of what God is like is centred in Jesus.
I must admit to not having read Anselm myself. I have read some of Aquinas (and am a big fan). As I said, I am not sure I am adding to the discussion here...
AFZ
Posted by Martin60 (# 368) on
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It's a nice iteration AFZ
Apart from 'the God of the Bible'. That's us projected.
Posted by Doone (# 18470) on
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Thank you AFZ, that is very helpful for me
Posted by hatless (# 3365) on
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I don't quite agree, afz. Perhaps I'm nitpicking.
It's the 'if God exists,' 'if God doesn't exist' alternatives that first trouble me. This suggests a view of God as something that might not exist, and I don't think that's tight. The Bible, I note in passing, never seeks to establish the existence of God.
You then talk about a natural world that came about, say, through a Big Bang. Again, I have problems. This should not be an alternative to God. God is not one of a number of possible causes, either God or the Big Bang, either God or evolution, either God or human action.
Because I accept, just about, that language shapes our experience of the world, indeed that there is no experience of reality that does not come wrapped in language, I see God as a unique part of language. God is a word that refers to no thing, but enables us to talk about the world in ways that either do or do not make sense, and with which we are either comfortable or uncomfortable.
There is, therefore, a truth or falsity to God talk, but the issue is not whether a supreme being exists, but whether it is, for example, right to rage against the dying of the light, to insist the all humans are of one family, and to trust that all good things work together, and that love is stronger than hatred.
This may seem a strange or even a weak sort of truth, but I think it's actually the same sort of truth that gravity has, or anything else.
So belief in God is not an enquiry about the origins of the world, but about its character from a human perspective, as inhabited minute by minute.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
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I'm now thinking this is just a silly argument. If you are defining the deity as that beyond which nothing else can be conceived or contemplated then it is obvious that this deity must exist. Because however far back you go at some point there will be no known explanation and therefore ah-ha, God.
But this doesn't therefore mean that any particular deity is omnipotent, omipresent and all those other characteristics associated with any specific deity.
The only reason that the argument works is that the terms and definitions have been set such that it has to. If the parameters are changed - or other options as to the nature of the deity are introduced - then it doesn't actually work at all.
Posted by Ricardus (# 8757) on
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Originally posted by mr cheesy:
But this doesn't therefore mean that any particular deity is omnipotent, omipresent and all those other characteristics associated with any specific deity.
I don't think it's intended to.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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Exactly. There are (I think) further arguments as to why this supreme power, established by the ontological and other arguments, should have the properties of being omnibenevolent, and so on.
In particular, the convertibility of the transcendentals argument means that being, love, goodness, can be converted into each other, and thus, pure actuality (Aristotelian jargon for God), is goodness, and so on.
This argument is used to counter the evil god challenge (Stephen Law), which posits that the immensely powerful being derived from the ontological argument, could in fact be an evil one.
I don't find this any more convincing than the ontological argument, but it's an interesting continuation.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
But this doesn't therefore mean that any particular deity is omnipotent, omipresent and all those other characteristics associated with any specific deity.
The only reason that the argument works is that the terms and definitions have been set such that it has to.
Well, no. But then it's not intended to.
Suppose we consider the relevant passage of Aquinas. First of all, having done some preliminary clearing the decks about the possibility of talking about God at all, he puts forward the arguments for the existence of something 'which everybody calls a divine being'. All he takes himself to have demonstrated at that point is that something exists. He then goes on to argue that anything that fulfils the existence argument must also be simple, perfect, good, infinite, immutable, one, loving, etc, etc. But he doesn't think the existence argument establishes this directly.
Posted by Martin60 (# 368) on
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So why meaningless suffering?
Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on
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quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
But this doesn't therefore mean that any particular deity is omnipotent, omipresent and all those other characteristics associated with any specific deity.
As I said at the top of the thread - small gods, and pretty pointless.
If a god is reduced to a simple thought experiment then she isn't a god at all imo.
Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on
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Originally posted by hatless:
I see God as a unique part of language. God is a word that refers to no thing, but enables us to talk about the world in ways that either do or do not make sense, and with which we are either comfortable or uncomfortable.
There is, therefore, a truth or falsity to God talk, but the issue is not whether a supreme being exists, but whether it is, for example, right to rage against the dying of the light, to insist the all humans are of one family, and to trust that all good things work together, and that love is stronger than hatred.
I find your idea appealing but suspect that many theists will feel too much is being sacrificed and many atheists will see the extra framework of 'God talk' unnecessary.
But I'm not completely clear what you are suggesting. An example which seems to have similarity are those entities which come into existence because we believe they should. 'Human rights' for example come into existence because we want to make them 'real' - admittedly a patchy existence at best so far. It is possible to say there is no existent which is 'Human Rights' not would there ever be such a 'thing' and yet in other senses it does exist as a framework for assessing our behaviour.
Does that capture any sense of what you are suggesting (obviously on a 'infinitely' wider scale)? Or have I got it quite wrong - I'd be interested to know.
Posted by hatless (# 3365) on
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I can see a similarity, but it's not that human rights come to exist, or that God comes to exist, it's to do with what you can say with them.
I can imagine someone who is unjustly detained, perhaps a bonded labourer or a Guantanamo inmate, who is broken in spirit and constantly told there are no options for them. To say to such a person that they have, in my eyes and in the laws of my land, a right to representation, a fair hearing and freedom, could be transforming. Not just the legal information, but the impact on the person of the affirmation, respect, support and dignity it would communicate to them.
God talk is like this. It is personal, not about God in Godself. It is always about who God is for us. It is poetic. It has impact on how we understand ourselves and our lives. It's not about information, but imagination and hope.
The question is whether we can express these things in other ways or only by means of God language. And whether the negative uses of God language, the punitive and discriminatory uses, are so much of a problem that we would be better of without any God talk.
Posted by alienfromzog (# 5327) on
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If anyone's interested and has an hour (I listening why driving home from work) This is a pretty good exploration of the argument.
To answer Hatless's point above, I hope you can see what I was getting at by saying the argument is inescapably ridiculous. IF God exists then taking about him not existing is silly. IF There is no God, there equally there is no room for gods either. I agree the Bible assumes God. Of course it does, it's God's word. To do otherwise would be nonsensical.
AFZ
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by hatless:
It is always about who God is for us. It is poetic.
You say that as if it's clear to everyone what 'poetic' means. Does it mean the same thing in Chaucer, Herbert, Milton, Wordsworth, Tennyson?
Posted by hatless (# 3365) on
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quote:
Originally posted by alienfromzog:
If anyone's interested and has an hour (I listening why driving home from work) This is a pretty good exploration of the argument.
To answer Hatless's point above, I hope you can see what I was getting at by saying the argument is inescapably ridiculous. IF God exists then taking about him not existing is silly. IF There is no God, there equally there is no room for gods either. I agree the Bible assumes God. Of course it does, it's God's word. To do otherwise would be nonsensical.
AFZ
We may regard the Bible as God's word, but it wasn't written with that assumption. It assumes God because God is simply how you talk about the deep things of life. It's not assuming God exists, it talks about God in order to talk about life.
Posted by hatless (# 3365) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by hatless:
It is always about who God is for us. It is poetic.
You say that as if it's clear to everyone what 'poetic' means. Does it mean the same thing in Chaucer, Herbert, Milton, Wordsworth, Tennyson?
It's just another way of saying what I am saying. Poetic language as opposed to plain, literal, informative, workaday language. Language to surprise, inspire, evoke and allude. Language to provoke thought and stimulate imagination and emotion. Metaphors, like talking about the depths and heights. Parables, stories. The Beatitudes. Martin Luther King's dream.
God is always God-for-us, Christ-for-us, never God In Godself. There is no knowledge of God except in relationship, as Buber said, God is only ever subject, never object. So God language is, has to be, personal and powerful; poetic.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by hatless:
It's just another way of saying what I am saying. Poetic language as opposed to plain, literal, informative, workaday language.
Poetic language is not opposed to plain literal informative workaday language.
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Language to surprise, inspire, evoke and allude. Language to provoke thought and stimulate imagination and emotion.
Again, this is not opposed to plain literal workaday language. We would have no science if biologists and astronomers and physicists and chemists were not inspired by plain literal informative workaday langauge.
Although what kind of language are you using here? It falls short of workaday. And no good poet would pass the sequence of words 'surprise, inspire, evoke and allude' as if they're the same activities.
The opposite of 'plain workaday language' is not 'poetic language'. The opposite of 'plain workaday language' is 'cliched management-speak language' or 'journalese language' or 'political demagogue language'. Good poetic language can be more than workaday language but is never less than or other than workaday language. Cliched management-speak language passes itself off as inspiring when it is merely drawing on tepid half-understood stock response feelings, designed to keep people in their local comfort zone.
And I am afraid 'surprise, inspire, evoke and allude' is cliched mangagement speak language. Each is a word that trails stock-response. 'Parables' and 'stories' are in this context almost always stock-response words.
'Poetic' is almost always in meta-theological discourse a stock-response word. Which is why my first reaction to anyone using 'poetic' in this way is to ask if they can talk intelligently about plain literal poets.
Posted by Amos (# 44) on
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Dafydd:
(I don't do 'not worthies' as Erin once said)
[ 24. February 2016, 10:18: Message edited by: Amos ]
Posted by hatless (# 3365) on
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Dafyd said: quote:
And I am afraid 'surprise, inspire, evoke and allude' is cliched mangagement speak language. Each is a word that trails stock-response. 'Parables' and 'stories' are in this context almost always stock-response words.
'Poetic' is almost always in meta-theological discourse a stock-response word.
Ouch. I wonder what words I might be able to find that you would take seriously. You don't sound as if you're in the mood for any at all.
I agree that plain workaday language is not the opposite of poetry and does not deserve to be contrasted with it. Poetry is about what you do with language, and is possible across all styles. It was a hastily typed phrase.
But some language does more than it says, and God language has to be of this sort.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
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That reminds me of the Zen image of the finger pointing to the moon. The finger is not the moon, but then for Zen radicals, it's not even a finger!
Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on
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quote:
Originally posted by hatless:
Dafyd said: quote:
And I am afraid 'surprise, inspire, evoke and allude' is cliched mangagement speak language.......
But some language does more than it says ....
Words like 'surprise, inspire, evoke and allude' have become cliche-ed. This is surely true. And there are many others. Today's cliche for what exposes the cracks behind the stucco is surely 'uncanny' (google scholar comes up with 164000 references). One could throw in 'numinous', 'transcendental', 'oceanic' or the 'mysterium tremendum et fascinans' (I found a new reprint of "The Idea of the Holy" in the charity bookshop a couple of weeks back!) - even 'paradigm shift'.
We may wonder why so many people in so many cultures have so often used such words. Cliches are cliches because, though they may be true, they are overused. Here they describe an experience that most people have had and felt to be important - even if later usage becomes banal and mundane.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by hatless:
But some language does more than it says, and God language has to be of this sort.
Let's think about what it means to say, with Buber, that God is always subject, never object.
Let us take money. Money does not exist in the way that rocks or birds exist. It exists within our language, as the expression of our hopes and imagination. One way of saying this is to say that money is always object, never subject. It never has any independent existence of its own (although in Isaian-Feuerbachian fashion we can alienate our subjectivity to it).
Inanimate objects such as rocks are a bit less object, and a bit less subject. They do not purely exist within our language. We can stub our toes on them, and they stubbornly remain where they are regardless of our imagination and hope.
Animals are much more subject. We can have a relationship with animals, in which the animal is not about our hopes and imagination, but has its own reality.
Human beings are far more subject than (some) animals. They not only resist reduction to our language, but can recreate our language. But we can still try to reduce other human beings to language about them.
God, as Buber says, is purely subject never object. God can never be reduced to our language about God.
[ 24. February 2016, 21:01: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
Posted by hatless (# 3365) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by hatless:
But some language does more than it says, and God language has to be of this sort.
Let's think about what it means to say, with Buber, that God is always subject, never object.
Let us take money. Money does not exist in the way that rocks or birds exist. It exists within our language, as the expression of our hopes and imagination. One way of saying this is to say that money is always object, never subject. It never has any independent existence of its own (although in Isaian-Feuerbachian fashion we can alienate our subjectivity to it).
Inanimate objects such as rocks are a bit less object, and a bit less subject. They do not purely exist within our language. We can stub our toes on them, and they stubbornly remain where they are regardless of our imagination and hope.
Animals are much more subject. We can have a relationship with animals, in which the animal is not about our hopes and imagination, but has its own reality.
Human beings are far more subject than (some) animals. They not only resist reduction to our language, but can recreate our language. But we can still try to reduce other human beings to language about them.
God, as Buber says, is purely subject never object. God can never be reduced to our language about God.
And that is why our language for God can never merely be language about God. It has to enlist us as persons, or as Buber would say, we have to become Thou so that God, who can only be Thou, may address us.
Being subject or object is not mainly about the character of money, rocks, animals of people. It is about the nature of the relationship they are in. Buber talks about how a tree may become a Thou.
I think that this is what Bonhoeffer (who never names Buber, but uses very similar concepts) means when he talks about who Christ us for us.
Posted by hatless (# 3365) on
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On cliches, we all come out with them, and one of the best places to find a bunch us second rate poetry.
Allude is a bit cliched, evoke, perhaps, inspire, definitely, though we're stuck with it because of our scriptural tradition. But I would defend surprise. No management speaker likes language to surprise. It's on the money for our awareness of the Other as subject. It's not what everyone says about language in this or any context.
A lazy ear can hear a cliche as easily as a lazy finger can type one.
Posted by Baptist Trainfan (# 15128) on
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I am no philosopher and I may be missing the point of this thread. But surely money or rocks, however objectively or independently they may or may not exist, only enter human discourse when we perceive them in some way? In other words, all such items only exist, from our human frame of reference, when we are in relation to them.
Now I could turn that on its head and say that rocks would actually exist whether we perceived them or not (although we would not have any knowledge of, or relationship with, them. Indeed, we might conceive of them in our minds without be aware of their actual existence.
So how does this leave us in respect of God? I happen to believe that He has an existence which is independent of my perception of him. But that is palpably unproveable as all arguments for his existence must derive from my experience and relationship with him. Some people would say that God is merely a human construct and has no "real" existence at all; I disagree with this view but recognise that it is difficult to prove otherwise.
Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Baptist Trainfan:
Some people would say that God is merely a human construct and has no "real" existence at all; I disagree with this view but recognise that it is impossible to prove otherwise.
FTFY
All things are dependent on our perception of them - and also on how we perceive them. I have recently read a biography written by a blind woman who had an operation and regained her sight at the age of 40. She didn't recognise anything. Sometimes she knew what things were from feel, smell and sound etc - but even her brother was a complete stranger to her until he spoke. She had to re-learn everything.
If we 'feel' God has touched us somehow that experience is all within our selves. Read and theologise as much as we like - all we say and experience of God is entirely subjective.
Posted by Martin60 (# 368) on
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How did Jesus experience Him?
Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Martin60:
How did Jesus experience Him?
He tells us doesn't he? As 'father'.
Posted by Martin60 (# 368) on
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No He don't Boogie! It was as The Father. Unless the definite article and capitalization are artefacts:
ego kai ho Pater hen esmen
ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν
I and the Father one are
How did this 100%, totally human natured AND fully divine natured, normal, human psychological, enculturated person, experience the Father?
Apart from how we do, as you rightly say, by making Him up?
Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Martin60:
Apart from how we do, as you rightly say, by making Him up?
I didn't say 'making Him up' Jesus experienced God (more than any other human being ever has imo).
Jesus was full of God's spirit - he experienced God and spoke to us of Him. Was Jesus experience subjective, like ours? Of course it was.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by hatless:
On cliches, we all come out with them, and one of the best places to find a bunch us second rate poetry.
Allude is a bit cliched, evoke, perhaps, inspire, definitely, though we're stuck with it because of our scriptural tradition. But I would defend surprise. No management speaker likes language to surprise. It's on the money for our awareness of the Other as subject. It's not what everyone says about language in this or any context.
On the contrary, management speak loves to make things sound more exciting than they are. Hence effects are always 'impacts'.
I'm sorry - you're getting the brunt of my dissatisfaction with the way some strands in Christianity use the word 'poetic'.
The word 'surprise' crops up with predictable regularity in some liberal Christian milieus. I'll call it Wild Goose Christianity.
John Bell of the Iona Community is a brilliant preacher and explores in his sermon themes around God's reversal of worldly values. Being a good preacher, he uses resonant phrases and keywords as mnemonics. One of which is 'surprise'. Then the Wild Goose songwriting group work these mnemonics into their songs, which is ok for those people who have heard Bell preaching and are thereby reminded of the full expanded version. But uncoupled from Bell's preaching, the various words become shibboleths - their meaning reduced to signs that we are this kind of Christian and not that kind.
Hughes' book God of Surprises is no doubt somewhere at the bottom as well.
In any case, you were making a contrast between 'plain literal workaday informative language' and another kind of language. Which 'surprises, inspires, evokes, and alludes.'
But 'surprise' can't make that contrast (unless you're using it in the Wild Goose shibboleth manner).
Informative language can be used to surprise.
'The Conservatives are going to win a majority' was both a surprise and informative, and not at all inspiring.
Meanwhile, a lot of religious language is not being used to surprise: one does not naturally say that the point of praying the Lord's Prayer for the two thousandth time is to be surprised by it.
'Surprise' is not as far as I can see a word that without a particular religious jargon draws the contrast you were trying to draw.
The point I am trying to make clumsily is that I don't think there is any way to draw the contrast you're trying to draw without using jargon, because I don't think the contrast is there to be drawn in that way.
Aquinas starts out his Summa Theologica by arguing that language cannot refer to God literally - that God cannot be said to exist in the way that stones and trees exist. He then immediately goes on to reject the ontological argument for God and to set out his Five Ways. He clearly didn't think the two positions were incompatible.
I similarly disagree with your use of Buber, and I think I would disagree with your use of Bonhoeffer. I don't think Bonhoeffer would disagree that the us that God is for also includes the non-human creation.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Baptist Trainfan:
But surely money or rocks, however objectively or independently they may or may not exist, only enter human discourse when we perceive them in some way? In other words, all such items only exist, from our human frame of reference, when we are in relation to them.
My baby daughter is just acquiring object permanence, that is, the concept that things and people are still around when she isn't perceiving them. This manifests partly in dropping things and then looking down to see if they're where she dropped them, and partly in complaining when Mum is at work.
I would not be happy with the implications of applying your paragraph that I quote not to rocks but to other people. There are in this world a lot of people who treat many groups of other people as if they have no existence independent of their discourse about them or their relationship to them. We are all subject to the temptation. But it's not so much a fact as a problem. Treating other people ethically involves learning to see them as people who continue to exist other than as they exist in our discourse, and who are not reducible to our relationship to them.
On a different note, would an island inhabited by say several species of endemic flightless birds with no predators be valuable in its own right even if no human being ever set foot upon it? I'd certainly have difficulty in espousing any philosophy that implies that the answer is no.
Posted by Martin60 (# 368) on
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So, Boogie, you're saying that we subjectively respond to God actually, really - not the idea of Him, our story of Him - affecting our minds, changing our thoughts and feelings, in some way despite the fact that nothing else can do that without sensory input? That we actually do perceive Him but our medium distorts the message? The signal is perfect but the receiver isn't?
And that's what happened to an ordinary child to a greater degree than anyone before or since? That we know about? Although Gautama Siddhartha was on the spectrum?
There's humanity and there's God and they overlap, but didn't do something pivotally unique in Jesus?
Posted by hatless (# 3365) on
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It feels like a relief, Dafyd, to be able to say that we will just have to disagree.
Management speak doesn't like surprises or unpredictability. What it loves is power, control and machismo. That's the reason for impact, as well as driving forwards, drilling down, and interrogating data, etc.
I disagree that surprise is a bad word to use about God and our experience of God. I find it an effective word sometimes in hymns and songs. My impression, incidentally, is that the Wild Goose song writing group is effectively John Bell.
I don't think you're right about Buber. He is all about relationships, not natures - the primary words I-it and I-Thou. The first couple of chapters of I and Thou are, I would say, poetry.
I don't see the significance of your comment about Bonhoeffer. His emphatic and ultimate question is, Who is Christ for us today? That is a question cast in relational and experiential terms.
I think we can only talk about God in language that not only also talks about us, but does so in a way that makes us pause, stand up straight, lift our heads, look to the horizon, remember our private promises, sense the warmth of our neighbours, taste the coming laughter, and more and more cliches than you can imagine.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by hatless:
It feels like a relief, Dafyd, to be able to say that we will just have to disagree.
I should probably not have made it about the language you personally were using. For that I apologise.
Posted by hatless (# 3365) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by hatless:
It feels like a relief, Dafyd, to be able to say that we will just have to disagree.
I should probably not have made it about the language you personally were using. For that I apologise.
Thank you.
Posted by Russ (# 120) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by Baptist Trainfan:
But surely money or rocks, however objectively or independently they may or may not exist, only enter human discourse when we perceive them in some way
... would an island inhabited by say several species of endemic flightless birds with no predators be valuable in its own right even if no human being ever set foot upon it? I'd certainly have difficulty in espousing any philosophy that implies that the answer is no.
Valuing is something that minds do. To say that birds are valuable is to say that they would or should be valued if there were any sapient species around to do the valuing.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
Valuing is something that minds do. To say that birds are valuable is to say that they would or should be valued if there were any sapient species around to do the valuing.
I suppose that's a reason for saying, no, because what makes islands with endemic bird species important is not that they're valued or might be valued.
But I would say that the importance of such islands to human minds that are aware of them is based upon something intrinsic that does not derive from human minds being aware of them.
Posted by mdijon (# 8520) on
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The word "should" applies some external standard. If the definition was "would" be valued then that could be completely subjective without objective reality and depends simply on a consensus view of what people think. As soon as we say "should" be valued we are implying some other standard that human minds ought to recognize.
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
But I would say that the importance of such islands to human minds that are aware of them is based upon something intrinsic that does not derive from human minds being aware of them.
Do you mean intrinsic as in some property that is totally independent of anything else?
But does an island full of endemic birds exist totally independent of everything else?
Birds are dependent on their ecosystem and their evolutionary history. That particular island depends on its geologic history. Can you really separate such an island from everything else? A truly isolated island with no connection to anything else is in my view not "important". It only has "importance" because of its connections.
We give it importance it gives us importance, I don't think you can disentangle that.
Posted by Russ (# 120) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
Valuing is something that minds do. To say that birds are valuable is to say that they would or should be valued if there were any sapient species around to do the valuing.
I suppose that's a reason for saying, no, because what makes islands with endemic bird species important is not that they're valued or might be valued.
But I would say that the importance of such islands to human minds that are aware of them is based upon something intrinsic that does not derive from human minds being aware of them.
Not sure where you're coming from on this.
If there is a mind or culture of minds that doesn't value fligbtless birds, why should that mind or culture think it of the slightest importance whether a particular island has flightless birds or not?
Is not importance a type of value judgment ?
I guess most value judgments are responding to some intrinsic property of the thing in question. If I value flightless birds as a source of food, that relates to their intrinsic meatiness or egg-laying propensity. If I assign to birds aesthetic value it's related to their colour or shape or way of moving. If I value flightless birds for their rarity or novelty-value (don't see one of those every day ) then that's because of those intrinsic characteristics that cause them to be rare.
But those are real objective properties; there isn't ISTM a thing called a value or an importance that exists in the absence of a mind that makes judgments of value or importance.
I note that in English we have a prudential sense of "important" as well as the absolute sense. In the same way as the word "should". So you can say for example that if you want your pet to be healthy then it's important that you feed it well. Such a statement expresses an objective truth (in this case a proposition of biology) in conditional form. But it presupposes a mind that can value a healthy pet; it's not an importance that is prior to mind.
Is this some cunning argument for God that you're leading me to make ?
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