Thread: Historicity Board: Oblivion / Ship of Fools.
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Posted by peter damian (# 18584) on
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Bill Vallicella replies here to my post here on reference to ‘Biblical characters’. Bill makes the interesting (and IMO incoherent) distinction between reference to Biblical characters and ‘reference to really existent persons’, or ‘beings in external reality’. When Jesus meets Pilate, is it that Jesus is a ‘Biblical character’ but Pilate is a ‘really existing person’?
This is connected with the idea of the ‘historicity’ of a character or event. What do we mean by ‘historicity’? Do we mean whether the character really existed or the event really took place? Or do we mean whether there is a reference available in external or independent textual sources?
Posted by Martin60 (# 368) on
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Why do you ask?
Posted by Enoch (# 14322) on
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I suspect you'll tell me I don't get it, but I think this is the wrong question to ask.
If God were not objectively real, then it would be relevant whether different people who refer to God are talking about the same imaginary being.
However, if God is objectively real - as I believe - the question that matters is 'what is the real, objective, God like?' If different people appear to be describing God differently, that's completely explicable on the basis that some may know more about him than others. If we are comparing two people's understanding of God, one perception may be more like the real God than the other, or they may both be equally way off-beam.
As for the question quote:
When Jesus meets Pilate, is it that Jesus is a ‘Biblical character’ but Pilate is a ‘really existing person’?
that's really one of whether you think the New Testament is describing events that actually happened. That is not the same as whether you think you are supposed to believe in literal inerrancy. Saying one is not persuaded of the latter doesn't let a person off coming to terms with the former.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
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quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
Bill Vallicella replies here to my post here on reference to ‘Biblical characters’. Bill makes the interesting (and IMO incoherent) distinction between reference to Biblical characters and ‘reference to really existent persons’, or ‘beings in external reality’. When Jesus meets Pilate, is it that Jesus is a ‘Biblical character’ but Pilate is a ‘really existing person’?
As far as I can see, you've introduced something into the discussion above that was not included in the original blog discussion; Jesus and Pilate.
In fact, Bill Vallicella is specifically talking about mythical characters from distant antiquity - Moses and God - not New Testament characters.
Fairly obviously, Jesus and Pilate could have existed and interacted whilst Moses was a mythical character. Those things are not mutually exclusive.
A deeper question, it seems to me is about Truth and the nature of truth. Can a myth be true even if it is a made up narrative - or includes elements of made up narrative?
And does that really matter anyway? Surely our perceptions of characters from myth and history change so significantly that we might as well be talking a totally different language to those who thought about them before.
There probably was a character called Socrates. But how much of the Republic was just made up by Plato? We have no idea. And which Socrates are we talking about anyway - the great ironic philosophical genius, the private-eye style satirist, the man who liked to go to the baths to get his rocks off with the boys?
quote:
This is connected with the idea of the ‘historicity’ of a character or event. What do we mean by ‘historicity’? Do we mean whether the character really existed or the event really took place? Or do we mean whether there is a reference available in external or independent textual sources?
I think it comes down to truth. Some want to insist that the scriptures must be accepted to be 100% true in all respects - historically, archaeologically, philosophically - because for any of it to be myth would be an attack upon their sacred cow.
Other views are available. Some believe it is not a historical document, but it still helpful in other respects, and that the sacredness is not related to the extent to which all the events happened as described.
Posted by simontoad (# 18096) on
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This stuff is unknowable except through faith, at least from our perspective. There was a Roman guy called Pilate who was an official in Palestine, we think. But is he the guy we meet in the gospels? Does he say and do stuff in the gospels to make points about Jesus and God that the ridgy-didge Roman guy actually didn't say or do? I reckon it's gotta be a distinct possibility, and I reckon so from inside the circle of Christian faith.
We must remember that the gospels are not reportage or accounts of facts but aids to conversion.
I'm trying to set up a modern parallel example, but its tricky. I might come back to it later. Time is running through my fingers.
I love this stuff.
[ 13. May 2016, 07:52: Message edited by: simontoad ]
Posted by anteater (# 11435) on
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Peter Damian:
I find your post a bit difficult to follow, but the question it raises is one which I find very important, so I will try to reply.
quote:
When Jesus meets Pilate, is it that Jesus is a ‘Biblical character’ but Pilate is a ‘really existing person’?
This really touches on how we understand the type of literature that the gospels are, and even whether we are able at the remove to know that. So in most fiction books, the characters are made-up characters, but it is not uncommon for the author to introduce characters into their novels who obviously refers to real existing people, and this is commonplace in historical novels.
Most people would understand the synoptics, at least, to be accounts of real existent persons, although it goes without saying that once they are incorporated into a narrative, they are also literary characters. So most christians would believe that Jesus and Pilate are both
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
Bill makes the interesting (and IMO incoherent) distinction between reference to Biblical characters and ‘reference to really existent persons’, or ‘beings in external reality’. When Jesus meets Pilate, is it that Jesus is a ‘Biblical character’ but Pilate is a ‘really existing person’?
There are certainly contexts in which we can make the distinction. We can talk about Hilary Mantel's Cromwell or Shakespeare's Prince Hal in distinction from the actually existent persons in historical reality. Even so, it would be meaningful for some purposes (but not for others) to say that Prince Hal is a really existing person but that Falstaff is pretty much fictional.
Whether Vallicella's post is one of those contexts is a different matter. It seems to me rather obvious that the Biblical character Allah or God is precisely what Muslims do not believe in, since they believe in God or Allah as depicted in the Qu'ran. The question is whether the Qu'ran is a false (from a Christian point of view) depiction of the same God as in the Bible.
His point might apply better to Jehovah's Witnesses, or even more so, Mormons. They do believe in the God depicted in the Bible according to their interpretation, but it's not clear whether they believe in the same God as other more mainstream Christians. (Jehovah's Witnesses because they specifically claim that mainstream Christians believe in a different God, and Mormons because aiui their God is so metaphysically distinct.)
Either way I think it's unhelpful and imprecise to use 'idol' for a wrong conception of God that might not exist, as opposed to something like a statue or money that does exist but is treated falsely as a god.
quote:
This is connected with the idea of the ‘historicity’ of a character or event. What do we mean by ‘historicity’? Do we mean whether the character really existed or the event really took place? Or do we mean whether there is a reference available in external or independent textual sources?
It would depend on context. Normally it would refer to whether the character really existed.
[ 13. May 2016, 07:58: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
Posted by anteater (# 11435) on
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Peter Damian:
Interesting question.
quote:
When Jesus meets Pilate, is it that Jesus is a ‘Biblical character’ but Pilate is a ‘really existing person’?
This touches on what type of literature the gospels are. In novels, the characters are made-up characters, but it is quite common for the author to introduce characters into their novels which are obviously really existing persons. We can miss this when the novel is before our time and the really existing person is not that famous.
Most christians understand the synoptics to be accounts of really existing persons, although once they are incorporated into a narrative, they are also literary characters, making Jesus and Pilate both.
quote:
What do we mean by ‘historicity’? Do we mean whether the character really existed or the event really took place? Or do we mean whether there is a reference available in external or independent textual sources?
I think most of us want to take "historicity" as referring to something that actually happened, but there is the problem of the non availability of time-machines, which makes us dependent on historical records or artefacts. So that seems to lead us to the second definition. But what is an "independent textual source"? And what can we know about the intention of the author? I don't know anybody who believes that Swift was intending to present Gulliver as a really existing person, but some people would take a different view of the Arthurian Legends, and most people woud assume that Bede's history was all about really existing persons.
Then we want a reliable textual source, but we are back in the bind that we have no means to know without our time machine.
And we know that even well respected textual sources can turn out to be total bullshit. I'm recently reading Josephine Tey's slightly oddball novel which turns out to be about the controversy surrounding Richard III - worth reading and good fun. She dismantles quite a few revered histories, e.g. the Scottish Covenanters, and of course the Princes in the Tower. (Not a trained historian, though).
So I would say that something is to be understood as historically true, if it is attested by texts that we have good reason to believe are intending to assert really existing person/events and are sufficiently reliable that we are prepared to give them credence.
Beyond that, lies Faith.
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
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With the usual health warnings, here is the Wiki article and links to others.
I thought this was a good observation.
quote:
Questions regarding historicity concern not just the issue of "what really happened," but also the issue of how modern observers can come to know "what really happened." This second issue is closely tied to historical research practices and methodologies for analyzing the reliability of primary sources and other evidence.
There seems little wrong in an a priori position that what the modern observer finds in the historical records is likely to a be a mixture of what happened and story, legend or myth about what happened. As a result we have partial pictures of people who really existed.
I think the New Testament provides us with pictures of the Christ of faith. These pictures are based on real events involving real people, two of whom are known to us by the names Jesus and Pilate. What the modern observer, or participant in the life of the church today, makes of this witness (which is in itself part of the witness provided by various traditions - or Traditions) is very variable. As can be seen all over the place, including this discussion forum.
This quotation from the Wiki article points out this this variability is to be expected.
quote:
Because various methodologies thematize historicity differently, it's not possible to reduce historicity to a single structure to be represented. Some methodologies (for example historicism), can make historicity subject to constructions of history based on submerged value commitments.
Nice phrase "submerged value commitments".
Posted by peter damian (# 18584) on
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Dafyd: “We can talk about Hilary Mantel's Cromwell or Shakespeare's Prince Hal in distinction from the actually existent persons in historical reality.”
On this view, the person that Hilary Mantel called ‘Cromwell’ in her book Wolf Hall is not numerically the same person as the one called ‘Oliver Cromwell’ in this Wikipedia article, who lived from 1599 to 1658. On that same view, the characters called ‘Napoleon’, ‘Alexander’, ‘Kutuzov’ etc in War and Peace are not one and the same people as those referred to by historians. That’s a challenging idea. I would say that historical fiction is a mixture of claims about characters who really existed, some of which claims are true, others of which are clearly false, and claims about individuals who never existed at all. Some of the false claims about the historical characters involve them meeting the fictional characters.
Simontoad: “We must remember that the gospels are not reportage or accounts of facts but aids to conversion.”
But presumably these ‘aids to conversion’ only work if the reportage is believed to be true. So, I report that Jesus walked on water to convince you that Jesus had supernatural powers, with the aim of converting you. This depends on you believing that my report is true. Or is it that I preface this by saying ‘It didn’t really happen, I am just trying to convert you by telling you this false story’. Hmm.
Posted by Galloping Granny (# 13814) on
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Are we talking about fact versus truth?
After looking at biblical narratives and reading Crossan's
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
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quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
Simontoad: “We must remember that the gospels are not reportage or accounts of facts but aids to conversion.”
But presumably these ‘aids to conversion’ only work if the reportage is believed to be true. So, I report that Jesus walked on water to convince you that Jesus had supernatural powers, with the aim of converting you. This depends on you believing that my report is true. Or is it that I preface this by saying ‘It didn’t really happen, I am just trying to convert you by telling you this false story’. Hmm.
First, conversion belongs to the Lord. Nobody ought to be "trying to convert" anyone.
But more fundamentally, you appear to be asserting that only things which are 100% factually accurate are good for teaching.
Do you believe it is factually accurate that the world was plunged into darkness at the crucifixion (Mark 15:33) or that the dead rose from their graves (Matthew 27:52)?
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
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quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
On this view, the person that Hilary Mantel called ‘Cromwell’ in her book Wolf Hall is not numerically the same person as the one called ‘Oliver Cromwell’ in this Wikipedia article, who lived from 1599 to 1658.
Well, that's certainly true, because Hilary Mantel has been providing a fascinating historical portrait of Thomas Cromwell. Mantel's portrait builds on generally accepted information about Thomas Cromwell's life - as can be seen from the Wiki article - and seeks to present a possible (or probable) view both of his character and his place in the history of these turbulent times.
Strictly speaking, what Mantel gives us is not history. I suspect I'm not the only one who thinks she has done a remarkable job in providing a plausible illumination of what actually happened. She is a convincing story-teller.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Barnabas62:
Mantel's portrait builds on generally accepted information about Thomas Cromwell's life - as can be seen from the Wiki article - and seeks to present a possible (or probable) view both of his character and his place in the history of these turbulent times.
Strictly speaking, what Mantel gives us is not history. I suspect I'm not the only one who thinks she has done a remarkable job in providing a plausible illumination of what actually happened. She is a convincing story-teller.
I don't understand the question of "whether this is the same person". What does that even mean in the context of a writer using some factual basis for a character in a book?
A woman near here was transported to Tasmania after the Swing Riots of 1830. If I was to gather the scarce information that exists about her and write something to fill in the gaps, am I writing about her or not?
edit: in my view, probably not. There is highly likely to be a lot that I'm writing which is totally different to her actual character because that detail about her life doesn't exist.
[ 13. May 2016, 09:13: Message edited by: mr cheesy ]
Posted by Galloping Granny (# 13814) on
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I hit the wrong button when I’d barely started. Trying again.
Are we talking about fact and truth?
My thoughts on any biblical narrative, OT or NT.
The story of Jonah is a great yarn (that big sulk at the end always gets me) but does anyone here think he was a real character? It does convey the truth, unpalatable as it may have seem to some, that the God that the Jews regarded as their own personal God was equally concerned for the Ninevites. That’s my reading – one comment I heard was that God wanted Jonah to convert them. Well, that’s how she saw it.
So Pilate’s words are not factual, and maybe the confrontation wasn’t anything like what we read (maybe there never was a personal confrontation), but it does make sense within the context of the narrative.
GG
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
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quote:
Originally posted by Galloping Granny:
The story of Jonah is a great yarn (that big sulk at the end always gets me) but does anyone here think he was a real character?
I don't think it matters, to be honest. Parables are true in a much deeper sense than whether or not the characters existed in the way they are depicted.
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
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mr cheesy
I'm very much with you. Hilary Mantel is a professional author, not a professional historian. But she writes stories about people who lived.
There is a kind of parallel between exegesis and eisegesis. Eisegesis is generally regarded as poor exegesis since its creative (or fanciful) syntheses are thought not to be based on critical examination of the texts in context. Story-telling about historical characters is generally regarded as poor history because it often goes further than critical examination of historical records would allow.
Yet both eisegesis and story-telling can illuminate the meaning and the possibilities inherent in historical events in ways that the more analytical (one might argue more soundly-based) approaches may not. I think this is certainly true about Wolf Hall.
I guess the issue is this one. Are they to be trusted to illuminate what actually happened, despite their lack of discipline? Some folks will always say no. For me, I find the answer is "sometimes"!
[ 13. May 2016, 09:46: Message edited by: Barnabas62 ]
Posted by Crśsos (# 238) on
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For edification and amusement I present xkcd's Stories of the Past and Future, which helpfully charts out various works by date of publication and how far in the future/past they were set from their date of publication. The Gospels fall into the area labeled "Former Period Pieces", which is defined as:
quote:
Stories set in the past, but created long enough ago that they were published closer to their setting than to today.
Modern audiences may not recognize which parts were supposed to sound old.
Posted by anteater (# 11435) on
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PeterDamian.
Sorry about double post. It happens.
quote:
On this view, the person that Hilary Mantel called ‘Cromwell’ in her book Wolf Hall is not numerically the same person as the one called ‘Oliver Cromwell’ in this Wikipedia article, who lived from 1599 to 1658.
Leaving aside the confusion about Cromwells, I don't see the point here, and for me it has a whif of arcane philosophy about it.
I assume you think that by adding the word "numerically" you are saying more than "they are not the same person". But I can't see what? Can you explain.
But I see no basis for your assertion. If you asked HM, I'm sure she would tell you that she is talking about the "real" Thomas Cromwell, and would probably admit that she has a slant on him which is not universally accepted. Like Josephine Tey's slant on Richard III.
But why does that make it not the same person? You will end up believing that for each "real" person in the "external" world, there are miriads of other persons which are that person's reflection in the minds of all those that know them. Maybe this is a philsophical position. Sounds daft to me (but prejudice for the english school of "common-sense" philosophy admitted).
When I talk of my Sister in Law, I have different views about her character and motivations from my wife, her daughters, and no doubt Uncle Tom Cobley et al. So are there several hundred of them.
A bit confusing for me.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
Dafyd: “We can talk about Hilary Mantel's Cromwell or Shakespeare's Prince Hal in distinction from the actually existent persons in historical reality.”
On this view, the person that Hilary Mantel called ‘Cromwell’ in her book Wolf Hall is not numerically the same person as the one called ‘Oliver Cromwell’ in this Wikipedia article, who lived from 1599 to 1658. On that same view, the characters called ‘Napoleon’, ‘Alexander’, ‘Kutuzov’ etc in War and Peace are not one and the same people as those referred to by historians. That’s a challenging idea. I would say that historical fiction is a mixture of claims about characters who really existed, some of which claims are true, others of which are clearly false, and claims about individuals who never existed at all. Some of the false claims about the historical characters involve them meeting the fictional characters.
I don't believe that historical fiction is making claims, true or false. Certainly my reaction to the statement that Mantel is filling out her sources by making stuff up is different from the reaction I'd have to a historian filling out her sources. Likewise, my reaction to the discovery that Mantel has altered details in pursuit of a more interesting story.
Let's switch to Richard III, as that has a greater weight of critical commentary.
Consider a statement such as: Richard is amoral but most of the other characters' professions of virtue are also hypocritical; the difference is that Richard acknowledges this to himself. It's hard to read that as being about the historical Richard III.
There are connections between Richard as presented in the play and the historical individual in that it's not wrongheaded to consider the play as propaganda in favour of the Tudors; but at the same time there are lots of important things to say about the play utterly ignoring any relations to historical personages.
If someone is writing about the depiction of Napoleon in nineteenth-century fiction, the accuracy of the depictions is only one aspect of what I'd expect them to consider (and even then only in so far as it illuminates what the writers are doing with Napoleon).
Posted by lilBuddha (# 14333) on
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quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
I would say that historical fiction is a mixture of claims about characters who really existed, some of which claims are true, others of which are clearly false, and claims about individuals who never existed at all. Some of the false claims about the historical characters
Funny, this would be an extremely accurate description of most of what we call History.
The difference between the two is honesty of intention.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
But I see no basis for your assertion. If you asked HM, I'm sure she would tell you that she is talking about the "real" Thomas Cromwell, and would probably admit that she has a slant on him which is not universally accepted. Like Josephine Tey's slant on Richard III.
PeterDamian is paraphrasing what he thinks are the consequences of my views, which he disagrees with (unless I've completely misunderstood him). You're really addressing your criticisms to me rather than to him.
My main argument is that if I'm talking about Wolf Hall, I can make statements about Cromwell or Henry or Anne Boleyn as they appear in the novel that do not necessarily refer back to the real world. That makes it difficult to say that in talking about Mantel's depiction of Cromwell I am talking about the historical Cromwell.
Likewise, Mantel writes that Cromwell on the morning that his wife and children died had a vision of his wife saying goodbye to him which he mistook for the living woman saying goodbye for the day. There is (as far as I know) no reason to think anything like that actually happened. Yet it would be wrongheaded to criticise Mantel for making assertions without evidence.
Posted by Brenda Clough (# 18061) on
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I think the OP is trying to grapple with the multiplicity of characters on the page. The Richard III in Shakespeare is not the same person as the Richard in the novel by Josephine Tey, who is slightly but clearly different from the character in the novels by Sharon Kay Penman. And all those Richards are not the same as the skeleton found under the car park recently, who is not quite the same as the actual man who sat on the throne. And if tomorrow somebody writes a rap song about King Dickon, that'll be different too.
There is nothing to be done about this. We are infinite people, containing universes, and if you poke us more comes out. (The quantum physicists argue that all reality is like this.) God is infinite and I guess He can handle it.
Posted by anteater (# 11435) on
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Dafyd, Brenda,
This is getting subtle. I can see where you are right, but the way you express it doesn't come naturally to me. So I suppose I would like to know about whether it is any more than a question of how we like to speak.
So I tend to reserve the word "person" for a real person, and would naturally rewrite Branda's opening statement as: "The [portrayal of] Richard III in Shakespeare is not the same (person) as the [portrayal of] Richard in the novel by Josephine Tey . . ". Which of course is true.
Is there any purpose in stating that by portraying the real Richard III according to a writer's partial knowledge and prejudices, the writer has created a new person? I just don't think it makes common sense to say there are multiple Richards, or Cromwell's, as opposed to varying and often contradictory portrayals of him.
I agree with Dafyd, that you can discuss a character in a play without reference to the real person, and presumably, actors who are working out how to portray Richard III are looking to the play to see the character that is being portrayed, and in that case would give primacy to the text of the play, even if they thought it was historical bollocks.
And the reason why this matters to me is that I am trying to get into the mindset of those, like my Vicar, who talk naturally about Christ as portrayed in the Gospels, such that if you didn't know, you'd assume he believed it all happened just like it is told. Except I know he doesn't believe any such thing. He would accept that a lot is non-objective, but will still cheerfully talk about Jesus walking on the water.
Something within my literalistic mind doesn't get this, but I'd like at least to fully understand, even if I later follow a different approach.
[ 13. May 2016, 19:11: Message edited by: anteater ]
Posted by Brenda Clough (# 18061) on
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You don't even need the veil of fiction. Consider you, yourself. Your spouse knows you, but not all of you -- not, for instance, the bits of you that your best friend when you were four knew. Your employer knows another slightly different subset of you, and your parents yet another. Nobody has the complete picture. You know quite a lot of you, but even you yourself probably do not have it all, not if Sigmund Freud was right. Your subconscious motivations and biases can be teased out but only by careful research and/or analysis. We may hope that all the various overlapping bits of ourselves are known (and orchestrated) by God, and that in Heaven we will, at long last, come into focus and know ourselves, and be known, as what we ought to be.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
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quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
Is there any purpose in stating that by portraying the real Richard III according to a writer's partial knowledge and prejudices, the writer has created a new person? I just don't think it makes common sense to say there are multiple Richards, or Cromwell's, as opposed to varying and often contradictory portrayals of him.
I believe from what the OP has said in other threads that he's coming from a background in analytic philosophy. I'm afraid that analytic philosophers have a tendency to be interested in things that are slightly skew to what people who haven't read a lot of analytic philosophy are interested in.
Shakespeare's Richard III isn't a person. He's a fictional person (fictional persons and real persons are not different types of person).
Since you can say true things about Shakespeare's Richard III that aren't true of the historical Richard III, we can't say that they're the same. Does that mean that there is a person or thing that is Shakespeare's Richard III? I don't think that's a question with a yes/no answer - it depends on why you're asking.
If you're thinking about different fictional works in which Richard III appears as a character you can equally well speak of all the portrayals as different things with no reference to the original (as perhaps with depictions of the Greek gods, for example) or as slanted portrayals of the same character. It all depends on what your interest is.
quote:
And the reason why this matters to me is that I am trying to get into the mindset of those, like my Vicar, who talk naturally about Christ as portrayed in the Gospels, such that if you didn't know, you'd assume he believed it all happened just like it is told. Except I know he doesn't believe any such thing. He would accept that a lot is non-objective, but will still cheerfully talk about Jesus walking on the water.
I am relatively historicist about Jesus; I don't think every detail of the gospels matters, and there are clearly some bits which can't all be accurate (you need some arbitrary criteria to make out that they all accurately report Pilate's inscription on the cross for example), but I think it must be broad strokes the kind of thing that actually happened.
I suppose, trying to understand a position I don't agree with: A lot of people find valuable insights into the meaning of life from avowedly fictional works: Shakespeare or Tolstoy or George Eliot. So they'd argue, why not from the Gospels even if the Gospels aren't historically true. We can say Hamlet says true things about the meaning of life even if none of it actually happened.
I personally am not convinced.
Posted by Brenda Clough (# 18061) on
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Where I come from, we talk about how fiction is both true and not true. Certainly fiction is fictional -- not fact. But it is not not-true either. It is truth, but in a different way.
Here is someone thinking about it.
Posted by no prophet's flag is set so... (# 15560) on
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Jesus and Pilate. The two likely exist. What exactly might have transpired between them? We'd have to know who it was who reported Pilate's questioning of him so that it could be put into the gospels. The source is unlikely to have been Pilate, a Roman soldier or other Roman. Which then leaves some Jewish council person who would seem unlikely to have reported things quite like it is written. Thus, I'd tend to declare the quizzing of Jesus by Pilate as pious but not factual. It has truthiness but isn't true.
Likewise, it is very unlikely that the interaction and temptation of Jesus and Satan after Jesus' baptism occurred as written. If so, who reported it to the gospel writers? It is more obviously fictitious, but designed to indicate something the original story inventors thought was important.
Posted by Crśsos (# 238) on
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quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
Is there any purpose in stating that by portraying the real Richard III according to a writer's partial knowledge and prejudices, the writer has created a new person? I just don't think it makes common sense to say there are multiple Richards, or Cromwell's, as opposed to varying and often contradictory portrayals of him.
Surely there has to be a point where the portrayal of a real person is so divergent from reality that the portrayal has to be considered a different person? For example, it seems likely that Bram Stoker did little more than borrow Vlad Țepeș' nickname when creating Count Dracula. I'm not sure considering Stoker's Dracula (or Lugosi's) to be the same "person" as Vlad the Impaler is in any way clarifying.
Another example is James Bond, deliberately named after an American ornithologist. The British superspy is "based" on the ornithologist insofar as Ian Flemming deliberately borrowed the name (with permission) but other than that there doesn't seem to be much overlap. Does that overlap mean that they're the same person?
Posted by peter damian (# 18584) on
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Apologies for the confusion between the Cromwells, which I should have known as I saw the series and read Wolf Hall. Yes, Thomas Cromwell. How embarrassing.
quote:
anteater I assume you think that by adding the word "numerically" you are saying more than "they are not the same person". But I can't see what? Can you explain.
It’s a philosophical thing just to clear up any confusion between qualitative identity or difference, and numerical identity or difference. We say ‘Thomas is not himself’, meaning he is behaving differently, not feeling well, and so on. We don’t mean ‘Thomas is not Thomas’, in the sense that he and himself are two different yet oddly identical people. That’s all.
quote:
If you asked HM, I'm sure she would tell you that she is talking about the "real" Thomas Cromwell, and would probably admit that she has a slant on him which is not universally accepted. Like Josephine Tey's slant on Richard III.
Agree.
quote:
Dafyd My main argument is that if I'm talking about Wolf Hall, I can make statements about Cromwell or Henry or Anne Boleyn as they appear in the novel that do not necessarily refer back to the real world.
Do you mean simply making statements about Anne Boleyn that are false, or is there something deeper signified by the ‘as they appear’ qualifier? As though there is this different Anne-Boleyn intentional entity, drifting inbetween the real world and fictionality, numerically different from the really real Anne Boleyn. Normally when people use the ‘as’ locution, they are signalling something like this.
quote:
Likewise, Mantel writes that Cromwell on the morning that his wife and children died had a vision of his wife saying goodbye to him which he mistook for the living woman saying goodbye for the day.
Do you mean it was the vision of his wife that said goodbye? I.e. that the subject of the verb ‘said goodbye’ was the vision of his wife? Or did he falsely imagine or envision that his wife said goodbye?
quote:
Brenda Clough I think the OP is trying to grapple with the multiplicity of characters on the page. The Richard III in Shakespeare is not the same person as the Richard in the novel by Josephine Tey, who is slightly but clearly different from the character in the novels by Sharon Kay Penman.
Here again the difficulty of what ‘the same’ and ‘different’ mean. Qualitative difference is when one and the same person (numerically) is portrayed as being qualitatively different. I think you mean this.
quote:
And all those Richards are not the same as the skeleton found under the car park recently, who is not quite the same as the actual man who sat on the throne.
I would say that a skeleton is not numerically or qualitatively the same as the living man. Surely the skeleton is of a man who was once living?
quote:
Anteater So I tend to reserve the word "person" for a real person, and would naturally rewrite Branda's opening statement as: "The [portrayal of] Richard III in Shakespeare is not the same (person) as the [portrayal of] Richard in the novel by Josephine Tey . . ". Which of course is true.
Not sure about this. The portrayal of a person is not a person, any more than a picture of a person is a person. There can be two pictures of Richard III. These are numerically different (because they are two), but they are of one and the same person.
quote:
Dafyd Shakespeare's Richard III isn't a person. He's a fictional person (fictional persons and real persons are not different types of person).
I disagree. Shakespeare's Richard III is certainly a person, but Shakespeare says many things about him that are probably not true. But then you say that fictional persons and real persons are not different types of person, which I agree with.
quote:
Croeos Surely there has to be a point where the portrayal of a real person is so divergent from reality that the portrayal has to be considered a different person? For example, it seems likely that Bram Stoker did little more than borrow Vlad Țepeș' nickname when creating Count Dracula. I'm not sure considering Stoker's Dracula (or Lugosi's) to be the same "person" as Vlad the Impaler is in any way clarifying.
That’s a difficult question. Another difficult question is whether Mr Bennet in Pride and Prejudice is the same person as Jane Austen’s father, who she based the character on.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
:
I'm sorry, I must be thick because I'm not following the significance of something being "numerically" the same person in fiction and in real life.
If Shakespeare made up a load of stuff about King Richard, what does it matter if it has any relationship to the historical truth? How does it make any difference knowing that there was indeed a King Richard? Does that mean it is a "more real" character than Shylock if the latter was not a historical character?
I really don't understand what this hair is that is being sliced. It seems to be suggested above that the only useful character is the one based on a real character (even if the only relationship to the real person is the name). That's nonsense, surely.
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
:
Peter Damian
I'm not sure that historical representations, (reconstructions, accounts, views, analyses) of past people, or events (whether by historians or imaginative authors) are subject to simple true-false distinctions. Our understandings of the past are fluid, subject to change by the uncovering of fresh information, or prior inaccuracies or misinterpretations. Although the past is not fluid, the best understanding of it is fluid. It changes through time, even though the events themselves obviously do not.
When we looks at particular reported, or recorded, events to check whether or not they happened, the most general truth which applies is that we may be able to recover truth as facticity (e.g. Ann Boleyn was beheaded with a sword) but we are in much greater difficulty in recovering truth as meaning; the background story, the roles of the key players, the reasons why they acted as they did.
I think this forms part of the fascination of historical inquiry. We are rarely satisfied with truth as facticity. We are driven on by curiosity, a desire to understand why.
Posted by peter damian (# 18584) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
I'm sorry, I must be thick because I'm not following the significance of something being "numerically" the same person in fiction and in real life.
If Shakespeare made up a load of stuff about King Richard, what does it matter if it has any relationship to the historical truth? How does it make any difference knowing that there was indeed a King Richard? Does that mean it is a "more real" character than Shylock if the latter was not a historical character?
I really don't understand what this hair is that is being sliced. It seems to be suggested above that the only useful character is the one based on a real character (even if the only relationship to the real person is the name). That's nonsense, surely.
Is it the conceptual distinction between numerical and qualitative identity that you find problematic. It’s very important in philosoph. This SEP article has something about it. In short, the same person can change, or be portrayed as having different characteristics or qualities. That is qualitative difference. The characteristics are different, not the person. Or we can ask whether George Orwell was the same as Eric Blair. In this case not, because they were numerically one, one and the same person, identical in number etc.
Or is it that the distinction makes perfect sense, but you don’t see the applicability? Well it’s fantasticall important in the theology of the trinity, for example. Also for the ‘God’/ ‘Allah’ problem. Is it that Muslims think that Allah is one and the same deity as the Christian God, i.e. that they are one and the same? In that case, one or the other side is heretical. Or is it that the conception embedded in the name ‘Allah’ is so utterly different from that embedded in ‘God’, as understood by Christians, that they are referring to, or aiming to refer to, different beings? In this case, there is no heresy. Neither side is claiming that there is more than one God. However, since they regard the referents as different, there must be idolatry. The Christian thinks that there is only one God. S/he also thinks that God is the only God. Since s/he also thinks that if there were such a being as Allah, Allah would be numerically different from God, which is impossible, since God is the only God. Therefore there is no such being as Allah, ergo etc.
Does that make sense now?
Posted by peter damian (# 18584) on
:
quote:
Barnabas62 I'm not sure that historical representations, (reconstructions, accounts, views, analyses) of past people, or events (whether by historians or imaginative authors) are subject to simple true-false distinctions. Our understandings of the past are fluid, subject to change by the uncovering of fresh information, or prior inaccuracies or misinterpretations.
So you are saying that the principle of excluded middle does not apply to historical statements? The principle says that any statement or its denial must be true. I.e. either ‘snow is white’ is true, or ‘snow is not white’ is true, no third possibility.
Or are you saying, as your second statement suggests, that our beliefs about truth and falsity can change? That is certainly the case. Before Pythagoras, the Greeks believed that the Morning Star and the Evening Star were two heavenly bodies (another question of numerical identity, of course). Then they discovered they were one and the same (i.e. Venus). I would argue that before the discovery, it was still true that they were one and the same, but people had a false belief about Venus. Then they acquired knowledge. So it was the belief, rather than the fact, that changed.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
Is it the conceptual distinction between numerical and qualitative identity that you find problematic. It’s very important in philosoph. This SEP article has something about it. In short, the same person can change, or be portrayed as having different characteristics or qualities. That is qualitative difference. The characteristics are different, not the person. Or we can ask whether George Orwell was the same as Eric Blair. In this case not, because they were numerically one, one and the same person, identical in number etc.
No, my problem is that is bullshit. It makes no difference if the person is an invented name or has the same name as a person who really exists. If they're fiction, they're both made up - neither has any relationship to the true person.
And history is all subjective anyway. That's the thing that others have been saying above: every historian perceives the facts in a different way (and facts may indeed change) so the reality is that there is always more than one vision of any individual available.
This whole fascination with trying to parse whether an individual is the same person in a range of reports is utterly bankrupt. As others have also said, many characters in fiction are based on other people, so trying to decide whether any person in a fictional account is quote unquote numerically the same as the historical person is waste of effort.
quote:
Or is it that the distinction makes perfect sense, but you don’t see the applicability? Well it’s fantasticall important in the theology of the trinity, for example. Also for the ‘God’/ ‘Allah’ problem. Is it that Muslims think that Allah is one and the same deity as the Christian God, i.e. that they are one and the same? In that case, one or the other side is heretical. Or is it that the conception embedded in the name ‘Allah’ is so utterly different from that embedded in ‘God’, as understood by Christians, that they are referring to, or aiming to refer to, different beings? In this case, there is no heresy. Neither side is claiming that there is more than one God. However, since they regard the referents as different, there must be idolatry. The Christian thinks that there is only one God. S/he also thinks that God is the only God. Since s/he also thinks that if there were such a being as Allah, Allah would be numerically different from God, which is impossible, since God is the only God. Therefore there is no such being as Allah, ergo etc.
Does that make sense now?
No it doesn't. I don't do this kind of stupid philosophy. The reality is that people perceive things in different ways, so it is utterly consistent for there to be a deity and at the same time for different groups to have different perceptions and understandings of what he is like.
Posted by peter damian (# 18584) on
:
quote:
Brenda Where I come from, we talk about how fiction is both true and not true. Certainly fiction is fictional -- not fact. But it is not not-true either. It is truth, but in a different way.
I don’t understand ‘truth in a different way’. Truth is saying of what is the case, that it is the case. If I say that snow is white, and if snow is white, then I speak truly. If I deny that which is not so, I also speak the truth. E.g. If I say that snow is not black, and it is not black, I am speaking the truth.
‘Fiction’ just means ‘invented’, or made up (fingere). I would distinguish (1) saying something you believe to be true, but which is false, which is not lying, (2) saying something you believe to be false, and which is false, but without the intention to deceive, which is fiction in the literary sense. Tolkien says that a hobbit once lived in a hole. False, but there is no intention to deceive, since everyone knows and accepts it is a work of fiction. And (3) saying something you believe to be false, and which is false, and with the intention to deceive. This is ‘lying’.
We can also have true statements about fictional characters. E.g. it is true that Holmes lived in Baker Street. Philosophers find these statements troubling. I would say they really mean ‘In the Holmes stories, Holmes lived in Baker St’, but there are problems with that view too.
Posted by moonlitdoor (# 11707) on
:
Dafyd, could you clarify what from your point of view determines whether a person or fictional person is being referred to ?
Presumably if I say something to my friend about Thomas Cromwell which I know to be untrue in order to make my friend dislike him, that is a reference to the person Thomas Cromwell. If I decide to make people dislike Cromwell by writing a story about him, where do I cross the boundary into creating a fictional person ?
Is it for example because I write a play rather than a newspaper article ?
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
quote:
Dafyd My main argument is that if I'm talking about Wolf Hall, I can make statements about Cromwell or Henry or Anne Boleyn as they appear in the novel that do not necessarily refer back to the real world.
Do you mean simply making statements about Anne Boleyn that are false, or is there something deeper signified by the ‘as they appear’ qualifier? As though there is this different Anne-Boleyn intentional entity, drifting inbetween the real world and fictionality, numerically different from the really real Anne Boleyn. Normally when people use the ‘as’ locution, they are signalling something like this.
The answer is probably closer to, yes, there is a different intentional entity. Though I'm not sure that's a question that is worth asking directly, as opposed to reducing it to various subquestions For example, 'are there true statements about Mantel's depiction of Anne that are not true about the historical Anne?'; 'should we be concerned that Mantel in the novel asserts things about Anne that might be false?' (The answer to that one is itself a good deal more complex than a plain yes/no).
quote:
quote:
Likewise, Mantel writes that Cromwell on the morning that his wife and children died had a vision of his wife saying goodbye to him which he mistook for the living woman saying goodbye for the day.
Do you mean it was the vision of his wife that said goodbye? I.e. that the subject of the verb ‘said goodbye’ was the vision of his wife? Or did he falsely imagine or envision that his wife said goodbye?
As I remember Mantel leaves the matter deliberately ambiguous.
quote:
quote:
Dafyd Shakespeare's Richard III isn't a person. He's a fictional person (fictional persons and real persons are not different types of person).
I disagree. Shakespeare's Richard III is certainly a person, but Shakespeare says many things about him that are probably not true. But then you say that fictional persons and real persons are not different types of person, which I agree with.
Existent and non-existent are not predicates. In the same way, fictional and real are not predicates. The set of people includes real people but not fictional people.
This doesn't mean that fictional people aren't some other type of entity. Rubber ducks and decoy ducks are not types of duck. Now decoy ducks definitely exist: they're wooden or plastic objects painted to look like ducks. They're not a type of duck; they're a type of inanimate object.
I don't know any good answers to the question of quite what type of thing ontologically fictional people are. Answers such as intentional objects or imitations don't I think clear anything much up. I'm unsure about whether the concept of numerical identity even applies in quite the same way.
quote:
Another difficult question is whether Mr Bennet in Pride and Prejudice is the same person as Jane Austen’s father, who she based the character on.
Jane Austen's father had adult male children. I think any claim that '"Mr Bennet had adult male children" is true' is just too big a bullet to bite. So any theory having that consequence must be wrong.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by moonlitdoor:
Dafyd, could you clarify what from your point of view determines whether a person or fictional person is being referred to ?
Presumably if I say something to my friend about Thomas Cromwell which I know to be untrue in order to make my friend dislike him, that is a reference to the person Thomas Cromwell. If I decide to make people dislike Cromwell by writing a story about him, where do I cross the boundary into creating a fictional person ?
I'm going to say social convention.
What the social convention is is not explicitly stated anywhere, and is therefore fuzzy. And indeed I think the answer is different depending upon the context in which the question is being asked.
In short, I don't think there is a clear general answer to your question. The best we can do is to say why we might want to give different answers on different occasions.
Posted by Brenda Clough (# 18061) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
quote:
Brenda Where I come from, we talk about how fiction is both true and not true. Certainly fiction is fictional -- not fact. But it is not not-true either. It is truth, but in a different way.
I don’t understand ‘truth in a different way’. Truth is saying of what is the case, that it is the case. If I say that snow is white, and if snow is white, then I speak truly. If I deny that which is not so, I also speak the truth. E.g. If I say that snow is not black, and it is not black, I am speaking the truth.
‘Fiction’ just means ‘invented’, or made up (fingere). I would distinguish (1) saying something you believe to be true, but which is false, which is not lying, (2) saying something you believe to be false, and which is false, but without the intention to deceive, which is fiction in the literary sense. Tolkien says that a hobbit once lived in a hole. False, but there is no intention to deceive, since everyone knows and accepts it is a work of fiction. And (3) saying something you believe to be false, and which is false, and with the intention to deceive. This is ‘lying’.
We can also have true statements about fictional characters. E.g. it is true that Holmes lived in Baker Street. Philosophers find these statements troubling. I would say they really mean ‘In the Holmes stories, Holmes lived in Baker St’, but there are problems with that view too.
But consider how you, the reader, react to the fiction. People say all the time that they love Harry Potter, or Frodo, or Elizabeth Bennett, because 'they are so real.' In what sense are they real? They have emotional versimilitude; we believe in their travails as we read them.
There's a website somewhere, where you can sign up to receive The Sorrows of Young Werther in your email. As you recall, the book is epistolatory, and so when you sign up it is as if Werther is writing his sappy letters to you. Not only is this quite popular (it is a painless way to read the novel) but people really get sucked into it. The website has gotten emails from concerned readers: "Werther, man up! She's just not that into you -- get over it!" "Werther, have you considered Xanax? Ask your doctor, OK? These thoughts of suicide are not normal. I worry about you."
How real is young Werther, to these readers? Real enough to worry about.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
:
Yeah, but more than just identifying with narrative characters, this attempt to ground "truth" in the space physically occupied solely by the things a "real person" actually did is entirely bogus.
Of course you can learn lessons from Aristotle. It matters not a jot if it turned out all to have been written by someone called Jack who decided to use a pen name and who invented a whole lot of things about himself. Of course one can learn moral and life lessons from Shakespeare, from Orwell, from Cervantes. What has the reality of walking pigs, of Scottish Kings or of an old guy who dresses up in a rusty coat of arms got to do with their moral value?
That's the root of this inane point. Somehow we're supposed to accept the maxim that unless the gospel accounts of Jesus are all 100% true - for any possible measure of truth - then they're telling lies about him.
No. Bullshit. Welcome to the world of narrative, where things don't actually have to be true in all possible ways of understanding truth for them to be useful, true, right, uplifting and godly.
[ 14. May 2016, 14:13: Message edited by: mr cheesy ]
Posted by Freddy (# 365) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
Jesus and Pilate. The two likely exist. What exactly might have transpired between them? We'd have to know who it was who reported Pilate's questioning of him so that it could be put into the gospels. The source is unlikely to have been Pilate, a Roman soldier or other Roman. Which then leaves some Jewish council person who would seem unlikely to have reported things quite like it is written. Thus, I'd tend to declare the quizzing of Jesus by Pilate as pious but not factual. It has truthiness but isn't true.
I'm always a little puzzled by this point of view, although in a way it is the most obvious one.
The gospel accounts are written as if they were recorded by someone who was there. As you point out, there are numerous instances where this is unlikely to have been the case.
Other eras would get around this by believing that the actual dialogue was revealed by God to the gospel writer.
[ 14. May 2016, 14:21: Message edited by: Freddy ]
Posted by Chesterbelloc (# 3128) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Freddy:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
Jesus and Pilate. The two likely exist. What exactly might have transpired between them? We'd have to know who it was who reported Pilate's questioning of him so that it could be put into the gospels. The source is unlikely to have been Pilate, a Roman soldier or other Roman. Which then leaves some Jewish council person who would seem unlikely to have reported things quite like it is written. Thus, I'd tend to declare the quizzing of Jesus by Pilate as pious but not factual. It has truthiness but isn't true.
I'm always a little puzzled by this point of view, although in a way it is the most obvious one.
The gospel accounts are written as if they were recorded by someone who was there. As you point out, there are numerous instances where this is unlikely to have been the case.
Other eras would get around this by believing that the actual dialogue was revealed by God to the gospel writer.
I notice no prophet discounts one of the obvious potential sources - Jesus Himself.
Naturally, it is only an obvious source if you believe He was raised from the dead and spent a hefty part of forty days with His apostles, but this is what the Church has tended to believe these 2000 years or so.
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
Or are you saying, as your second statement suggests, that our beliefs about truth and falsity can change? That is certainly the case. Before Pythagoras, the Greeks believed that the Morning Star and the Evening Star were two heavenly bodies (another question of numerical identity, of course). Then they discovered they were one and the same (i.e. Venus). I would argue that before the discovery, it was still true that they were one and the same, but people had a false belief about Venus. Then they acquired knowledge. So it was the belief, rather than the fact, that changed.
That's close to what I am saying. I think you have not covered the dynamic of historical inquiry. It is possible for one false belief to be replaced by another more plausible belief, treated as true for a while, but subsequently invalidated by further investigation.
Rather like scientific inquiry, historical inquiry can and often does include a progressive falsification of explanations of observations of the evidence.
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
:
Sorry for the long post; I am late coming to the thread and wanted to read it thoroughly (mirabile dictu).
quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
And which Socrates are we talking about anyway - the great ironic philosophical genius, the private-eye style satirist, the man who liked to go to the baths to get his rocks off with the boys?
To quote a wise person on this thread, those things are not mutually exclusive.
quote:
Originally posted by simontoad:
We must remember that the gospels are not reportage or accounts of facts but aids to conversion.
Well, that's what Luke (or the author of the introduction to the gospel which historically has been known as Luke's, if one must) says of his motives. The other evangelists make no such claim. I have read that they were writing so that the memories of the events of the life of Christ would not be lost when the last of the eyewitnesses died. (Which by the way does not require that they were actually written by the people whose names they are associated with, only that they are preserving the accounts given by people who were there, and not made up whole cloth by people who weren't.)
quote:
Originally posted by anteater:
So I tend to reserve the word "person" for a real person,
This is interesting as the original meeting of the Etruscan word is "mask" and it specifically referred to a non-real person, a representation of a person on the stage.
quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
And history is all subjective anyway. That's the thing that others have been saying above: every historian perceives the facts in a different way (and facts may indeed change) so the reality is that there is always more than one vision of any individual available.
So are two historians who believe conflicting things about, say Oliver Cromwell, talking about the same person, or different persons? If the same person, then why aren't fiction writers also talking about the same person? If different persons, then why would they argue about, or change their minds about based on new evidence, which is right? "You're right about YOUR Cromwell, and I'm right about MY Cromwell" would suffice, and that would be that.
quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
We can also have true statements about fictional characters. E.g. it is true that Holmes lived in Baker Street. Philosophers find these statements troubling. I would say they really mean ‘In the Holmes stories, Holmes lived in Baker St’, but there are problems with that view too.
I remember learning about this back when I was studying analytic philosophy back in grad school. The concept was called "true to a story" and I don't remember it being terribly problematic then (we're talking mid 1980s).
quote:
Originally posted by Chesterbelloc:
I notice no prophet discounts one of the obvious potential sources - Jesus Himself.
Naturally, it is only an obvious source if you believe He was raised from the dead and spent a hefty part of forty days with His apostles, but this is what the Church has tended to believe these 2000 years or so.
Which is what the Orthodox Church believes, also. (As you might expect.)
quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
Or are you saying, as your second statement suggests, that our beliefs about truth and falsity can change? That is certainly the case. Before Pythagoras, the Greeks believed that the Morning Star and the Evening Star were two heavenly bodies (another question of numerical identity, of course). Then they discovered they were one and the same (i.e. Venus).
But this didn't change their beliefs about truth and falsity, rather their beliefs about Venus. Their epistemology needn't have changed at all.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
It makes no difference if the person is an invented name or has the same name as a person who really exists. If they're fiction, they're both made up - neither has any relationship to the true person.
It cannot be that simple. If it were, satirical fiction would be impossible. Spitting Image is fictional, yet clearly the sketches have some relationship to the real politicians. Napoleon in Animal Farm has some relationship to Stalin.
quote:
And history is all subjective anyway.
If you'd said 'history is all to a greater or lesser extent subjective' you might have a point.
quote:
I don't do this kind of stupid philosophy.
You say, at the start of a paragraph in which you do exactly this kind of philosophy, only not well.
[ 14. May 2016, 20:05: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
The reality is that people perceive things in different ways, so it is utterly consistent for there to be a deity and at the same time for different groups to have different perceptions and understandings of what he is like.
Kind of like the blind men and the elephant?
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
Or are you saying, as your second statement suggests, that our beliefs about truth and falsity can change? That is certainly the case. Before Pythagoras, the Greeks believed that the Morning Star and the Evening Star were two heavenly bodies (another question of numerical identity, of course). Then they discovered they were one and the same (i.e. Venus).
But this didn't change their beliefs about truth and falsity, rather their beliefs about Venus. Their epistemology needn't have changed at all.
Yes, that's a helpful distinction. I think, in the exchanges with me at least, that peter damian was talking about the truth or falseness of specific historical accounts. At any rate, that is how I read him. But your general epistemological point is well worth making in the context of this discussion.
[ 15. May 2016, 09:03: Message edited by: Barnabas62 ]
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on
:
quote:
Chesterbelloc: He was raised from the dead and spent a hefty part of forty days with His apostles
The Gospels give me the impression that there were a couple of appearances, not that He hung out with them a lot. Wasn't there a whole week between those two times with Thomas?
Also, if He spent this time teaching them things, they apparently didn't feel it was worth mentioning those things in the Gospels.
Or perhaps they had a couple more barbecues at the beach? (I would like that.)
Posted by moonlitdoor (# 11707) on
:
quote:
originally posted by Dafyd
I'm going to say social convention. ( determines whether a person or fictional person is being referred to )
How does this convention relate to the point you made about being able to say things about Mantel's Cromwell that don't relate to the real Cromwell ?
If we consider paintings of the virgin Mary, I think we consider them by convention to refer to the real virgin Mary. But it is also true that I can say things about the depictions that don't relate to the real person, like what colour eyes they have, since we don't know what colour her eyes were.
As Dafyd said, it would seem wrong to criticise Mantel for adding unsubstantiated events to her story. It would equally seem wrong to criticise a painter for choosing an eye colour without evidence. A painting not made from life could hardly be done otherwise.
[ 15. May 2016, 12:38: Message edited by: moonlitdoor ]
Posted by Martin60 (# 368) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Chesterbelloc:
quote:
Originally posted by Freddy:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
Jesus and Pilate. The two likely exist. What exactly might have transpired between them? We'd have to know who it was who reported Pilate's questioning of him so that it could be put into the gospels. The source is unlikely to have been Pilate, a Roman soldier or other Roman. Which then leaves some Jewish council person who would seem unlikely to have reported things quite like it is written. Thus, I'd tend to declare the quizzing of Jesus by Pilate as pious but not factual. It has truthiness but isn't true.
I'm always a little puzzled by this point of view, although in a way it is the most obvious one.
The gospel accounts are written as if they were recorded by someone who was there. As you point out, there are numerous instances where this is unlikely to have been the case.
Other eras would get around this by believing that the actual dialogue was revealed by God to the gospel writer.
I notice no prophet discounts one of the obvious potential sources - Jesus Himself.
Naturally, it is only an obvious source if you believe He was raised from the dead and spent a hefty part of forty days with His apostles, but this is what the Church has tended to believe these 2000 years or so.
My thoughts exactly. Ish. He DIDN'T spend a hefty part of the 40 days with any one. But enough obviously.
Posted by peter damian (# 18584) on
:
quote:
mousethief I remember learning about this back when I was studying analytic philosophy back in grad school. The concept was called "true to a story" and I don't remember it being terribly problematic then (we're talking mid 1980s).
Yup. However, this relies on the possibility of attaching a ‘sentential operator’ to sentences, for example ‘According to the Bible, Adam was created out of clay’. Atheists, non-literalists and literalists can all agree with that.
The problem is when we have relational verbs where the accusative is a name of a putatively fictional character. For example ‘Feminists admire Judith’ (meaning the one who chopped off the guy’s head, I think she was the one). These present great difficulty.
quote:
Brenda Clough But consider how you, the reader, react to the fiction. People say all the time that they love Harry Potter, or Frodo, or Elizabeth Bennett, because 'they are so real.' In what sense are they real? They have emotional versimilitude; we believe in their travails as we read them.
This is a similar problem. Many people admire Lizzie Bennet. But there was no such person as Lizzie Bennet! How can anyone stand in the relation ‘a admires b’, when there is no such thing as b? That is, if ‘a admires b’ is true, then for some x and for some y, x admires y. But there isn’t such a y! If you love Harry Potter, then you love someone, right? So there is someone, at least one person that you love. But there isn’t such a person.
On the truth and falsity of religious belief generally, Stephen Law on Wittgensteinian Account of Religious Belief is useful.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
peter damian wrote:
quote:
Many people admire Lizzie Bennet. But there was no such person as Lizzie Bennet! How can anyone stand in the relation ‘a admires b’, when there is no such thing as b? That is, if ‘a admires b’ is true, then for some x and for some y, x admires y. But there isn’t such a y! If you love Harry Potter, then you love someone, right? So there is someone, at least one person that you love. But there isn’t such a person.
Well, you can argue that there is a fictional person, created in a certain narrative world. 'David Cameron' is also created via narrative, images, and so on, but also linked with a flesh and blood human. But the personhood is still a construct.
'Person' doesn't have to be mean flesh and blood, in other words.
Posted by peter damian (# 18584) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Well, you can argue that there is a fictional person, created in a certain narrative world.
I thought the whole point about a fictional person is that there isn't such a person?
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Well, you can argue that there is a fictional person, created in a certain narrative world.
I thought the whole point about a fictional person is that there isn't such a person?
Well, it depends on how you are defining 'person'. For me, to say that Hamlet is the kind of person I would like to meet, makes sense.
Posted by Enoch (# 14322) on
:
A fictional person in a novel is precisely that. We can like them or dislike them, but they don't exist. They never have done. Nobody claims otherwise. Saying we find Elizabeth Bennett realistic is a not compliment we pay her, but a compliment we pay to Jane Austen.
At various stages in my life, I've studied history quite seriously. Possibly as a result, it matters to me a lot how good a representation anything is which purports to represent genuine history. However great it may be as fiction, if it is historically unconvincing as history, as far as I am concerned, that lowers its value. That applies just as much to the human and interpersonal dimensions as to things like machine guns appearing at the Battle of Bosworth.
My suspicion, incidentally, is that Hilary Mantel's Thomas Cromwell is more her infatuation with an imaginary projection than the person anyone present at Hentry VIII's court in the 1530s would recognise.
When we come to the New Testament, that's even more important. 'What is God like?' is one of the most important questions we ever ask. If Jesus is (Col 1:15) "the image of the invisible God" it matters how accurately that image is transmitted to us. After all, what other way have we of knowing?
Posted by peter damian (# 18584) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Enoch:
A fictional person in a novel is precisely that. We can like them or dislike them, but they don't exist.
If there is nothing to dislike, how can there be dislike.
If I dislike someone, there is, i.e. there exists, someone whom I dislike.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
I think people are trying to turn the meaning of 'person' into something fixed, when I would say that it has a sliding usage. As I said above, I find it perfectly acceptable to say, for example, that Hamlet's mother is a nasty person.
OK, you can then say that she doesn't exist, and so on, but language is used in such bendy ways all the time.
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
quote:
mousethief I remember learning about this back when I was studying analytic philosophy back in grad school. The concept was called "true to a story" and I don't remember it being terribly problematic then (we're talking mid 1980s).
Yup. However, this relies on the possibility of attaching a ‘sentential operator’ to sentences, for example ‘According to the Bible, Adam was created out of clay’. Atheists, non-literalists and literalists can all agree with that.
The problem is when we have relational verbs where the accusative is a name of a putatively fictional character. For example ‘Feminists admire Judith’ (meaning the one who chopped off the guy’s head, I think she was the one). These present great difficulty.
I'm not sure I see the difference. You can add "as presented in the Bible" to the latter, and you have the exact same thing as the former.
quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Well, you can argue that there is a fictional person, created in a certain narrative world.
I thought the whole point about a fictional person is that there isn't such a person?
But there's a SOMETHING because it makes perfect sense for people to admire her. Nobody has any problem with this. No analytic philosopher is going to say, "Stop it! Stop admiring Lizzie Bennet! I won't let you! She doesn't exist! "
The problem is not in the admirers. It's in the analytic philosophers who are trying to chop the logic of natural language into little bits that fit their own theories. The real world is not beholden to those theories, however. The philosophers are in a cleft stick of their own making, and it's up to them to logic their way out of it.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
Well said, mousethief. You can't force natural language into the iron hoops of logic. Meaning is use, after all.
Posted by Chesterbelloc (# 3128) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by LeRoc:
quote:
Chesterbelloc: He was raised from the dead and spent a hefty part of forty days with His apostles
The Gospels give me the impression that there were a couple of appearances, not that He hung out with them a lot. Wasn't there a whole week between those two times with Thomas?
There were more than "a couple" of appearances for sure (John records at least three), though we don't know precisely how much time Jesus spent with the apostles after the Resurrection; but Acts 1:3 says: quote:
He presented himself alive to them after his suffering by many proofs, appearing to them during forty days and speaking about the kingdom of God.
Sounds to me like they had quite a bit of "face time" with the Lord.
quote:
Originally posted by LeRoc:
Also, if He spent this time teaching them things, they apparently didn't feel it was worth mentioning those things in the Gospels.
You're like totally begging the question, dude. How do you know how much of what the evangelists recorded came directly from Jesus after the Resurrection? And John does say: quote:
Now there are also many other things that Jesus did. Were every one of them to be written, I suppose that the world itself could not contain the books that would be written.
quote:
Originally posted by LeRoc:
Or perhaps they had a couple more barbecues at the beach? (I would like that.)
Me too.
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on
:
Dr Who exists. Anyone who says that he doesn't, has a too limited definition of 'exist'.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
God exists. <Muffled laughter>.
Posted by Lamb Chopped (# 5528) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
Jesus and Pilate. The two likely exist. What exactly might have transpired between them? We'd have to know who it was who reported Pilate's questioning of him so that it could be put into the gospels. The source is unlikely to have been Pilate, a Roman soldier or other Roman. Which then leaves some Jewish council person who would seem unlikely to have reported things quite like it is written. Thus, I'd tend to declare the quizzing of Jesus by Pilate as pious but not factual. It has truthiness but isn't true.
You're overlooking the servants, who would have been ubiquitous in Pilate's household, and we know that the early Christian church had a particular attraction for such people. There's also the 21st century assumption that everybody back then had the same amount of living space / privacy as we do ourselves, which is really really unlikely (take a look at the archaeological digs). It isn't surprising that these things were witnessed and then later recorded; under ancient circumstances it would be more surprising if nobody heard or witnessed anything but Jesus and Pilate themselves. And all the more so as both people in the conversation were "celebrities" and apt to inspire snooping.
Posted by peter damian (# 18584) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Well, you can argue that there is a fictional person, created in a certain narrative world.
I thought the whole point about a fictional person is that there isn't such a person?
But there's a SOMETHING because it makes perfect sense for people to admire her. Nobody has any problem with this. No analytic philosopher is going to say, "Stop it! Stop admiring Lizzie Bennet! I won't let you! She doesn't exist! "
The problem is not in the admirers. It's in the analytic philosophers who are trying to chop the logic of natural language into little bits that fit their own theories. The real world is not beholden to those theories, however. The philosophers are in a cleft stick of their own making, and it's up to them to logic their way out of it.
That’s precisely what analytic philosophers are not trying to do. Quite the opposite.
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Chesterbelloc:
quote:
Originally posted by LeRoc:
Also, if He spent this time teaching them things, they apparently didn't feel it was worth mentioning those things in the Gospels.
You're like totally begging the question, dude. How do you know how much of what the evangelists recorded came directly from Jesus after the Resurrection?
Indeed, and it also presupposes that the purpose of the gospels is to record everything Jesus said. They didn't feel it was worth mentioning these things in the Gospels because the purpose of the Gospels was by and large to record certain things. They obviously had to edit (as per the quote from John about filling the world with books that Chesterbelloc gives). They recorded some of the things Jesus said post-resurrection.
The Caffix and Orfies believe that some of what he said to the apostles post-rez had to do with the running of the Church. And perhaps the apostles didn't feel it was necessary to jot those down because at the time of the writing of the gospels, those things were already embodied in the actual running of the Church.
Some of them, of course, did get written down in the writings that didn't make the NT cut (Didache in particular). But since the Didache was not written by an actual apostle (or at least the point could not be argued at the time, as opposed to the books that did make it (and even then Hebrews was a near-miss)), it was not included in the canon.
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by peter damian:
That’s precisely what analytic philosophers are not trying to do. Quite the opposite.
They're not trying to create theories that model how natural language is used? Bulltookey. Kripke was a fine fellow but he was fooling himself when he said he wasn't presenting a theory. He most certainly was.
When you say, "There's a problem when people say, 'Feminists admire Judith'," you can only mean that there is a problem reconciling this with some theory of meaning and ontology. To which the users of natural language are entitled to say, "Who gives a fuck if our use doesn't fit into your theory? Fix your theory."
Posted by no prophet's flag is set so... (# 15560) on
:
I think that suggesting servants or Jesus himself post death is a nice explanation, though also would seem to be more an argument than anything provable. I also suspect that we are unwise to apply a current understanding of data and evidence. Better to accept that some segments of the bible were written to make rhetorical or faith points and are not true in the sense we consider today. None of the accounts say Jesus or someone else told the story.
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
I think that suggesting servants or Jesus himself post death is a nice explanation, though also would seem to be more an argument than anything provable.
Not so much an argument as an article of faith. Nobody is trying to make an argument for that position. Certainly not me or Chesterbelloc or our churches.
Posted by Chesterbelloc (# 3128) on
:
What mousethief just said.
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
Better to accept that some segments of the bible were written to make rhetorical or faith points and are not true in the sense we consider today.
How "better"? For whom? To what end?
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
None of the accounts say Jesus or someone else told the story.
I'm not sure what that's supposed to show, exactly. Would you expect each specific account of each encounter/event/conversation to include such a provenance statement? Cos that's going to lead to some distracting diversions and clunky prose.
Posted by no prophet's flag is set so... (# 15560) on
:
It isa question of likeliness. It is unlikely on the basis of info we have. Faith or belief: it is possible to believe anything, and we should really use our reason too. Otherwise history and historicity differentiation is irrelevant.
Re clunky prose. It is already that in the Greek.
[ 15. May 2016, 17:57: Message edited by: no prophet's flag is set so... ]
Posted by Chesterbelloc (# 3128) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
It isa question of likeliness. It is unlikely on the basis of info we have. Faith or belief: it is possible to believe anything, and we should really use our reason too.
That's way too vague for me, I'm afraid. What precisely makes it unlikely in the context of what we are told about Jesus's post-resurrection ministry? I can see why it would seem unlikely if one rejected the accounts of the Resurrection and post-R appearances, but if we are arguing from "the basis of info we have" (i.e., those very same scriptural accounts) what makes it seem implausible in that context?
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
When you say, "There's a problem when people say, 'Feminists admire Judith'," you can only mean that there is a problem reconciling this with some theory of meaning and ontology. To which the users of natural language are entitled to say, "Who gives a fuck if our use doesn't fit into your theory? Fix your theory."
What makes you think that when he says 'there's a problem when people say X' he means there's a problem for natural language? rather than that he means there's a problem for any theory to cope with?
Posted by Sarah G (# 11669) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
Jesus and Pilate. The two likely exist. What exactly might have transpired between them? We'd have to know who it was who reported Pilate's questioning of him so that it could be put into the gospels. The source is unlikely to have been Pilate, a Roman soldier or other Roman. Which then leaves some Jewish council person who would seem unlikely to have reported things quite like it is written. Thus, I'd tend to declare the quizzing of Jesus by Pilate as pious but not factual. It has truthiness but isn't true.
Likewise, it is very unlikely that the interaction and temptation of Jesus and Satan after Jesus' baptism occurred as written. If so, who reported it to the gospel writers? It is more obviously fictitious, but designed to indicate something the original story inventors thought was important.
Lamb Chopped beat me to it on the servant explanation for the Pilate interviews- and it's entirely possible that records of some sort were kept.
This section has multiple attestation (all gospels), and elements of it (e.g. the Barabbas incident) were played out in public.
With the temptation in the wilderness, I would have thought that Jesus would have discussed it with the disciples at some point(s) on their travels. There is some form of temptation narrative in both Mark and Q. Further, the Beelzebul controversy makes much more sense if something like the temptation experience has occurred.
Although very far from guaranteeing historical accuracy, there's alternatives to 'invented by the Gospellers' which I would suggest work well enough.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by moonlitdoor:
quote:
originally posted by Dafyd
I'm going to say social convention. ( determines whether a person or fictional person is being referred to )
How does this convention relate to the point you made about being able to say things about Mantel's Cromwell that don't relate to the real Cromwell ?
I would say the practice of writing and reading historical novels including real characters has built up over time in such a way that now readers and writers have different ways of talking about those historical novels.
We can consider the historical novel as a self-contained work of art, in which case we can talk about the historical characters in it in the same way as we'd talk about any fictional characters; or we could talk about those characters as more or less plausible historical antecedents. Some novels might lend themselves better to one approach; others to the other.
So roughly speaking when we read a novel we're trying on the basis of largely implicit and tacit understandings (based on other novels we've read) to judge how much of what the author's attitude to their characters are assertions about the historical characters and how much is just there for the sake of the fiction.
Which is to say it's complicated.
quote:
If we consider paintings of the virgin Mary, I think we consider them by convention to refer to the real virgin Mary. But it is also true that I can say things about the depictions that don't relate to the real person, like what colour eyes they have, since we don't know what colour her eyes were.
One of the conventions is that it's permissible to depict Mary as European rather than as Middle Eastern. And therefore it should also be permissible to depict her as an African.
Equally it's permissible to depict the Virgin Mary wearing an ultramarine robe and in among Roman ruins, either of which are unlikely from a perspective of realistic history painting. That's a sign that pictures of the Virgin Mary are not subject to the conventions of realistic history painting.
Posted by Moo (# 107) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by LeRoc:
The Gospels give me the impression that there were a couple of appearances, not that He hung out with them a lot. Wasn't there a whole week between those two times with Thomas?
It's true that we don't have a lot of information about what Jesus did during those forty days.
OTOH, we don't have that much information about what he did during his ministry, which lasted two years. Leaving aside the events leading up to the crucifixion, there is only enough material to cover about thirty days. What did he do during the rest of his ministry? I assume he did the same kind of thing that is recorded in the gospels, but it was not written down.
Back when the gospels were written, writing materials were expensive, and writing was time-consuming. (They didn't have lower-case letters; think how long it would take to write everything in capital letters by hand.)
The ease with which we type into our computers makes it much harder for us to understand just what a big deal it was back in those days to write a manuscript.
Moo
Posted by Brenda Clough (# 18061) on
:
I had a saint's card in my girlhood, which depicted Mary and the baby Jesus as Asians. It looked perfectly reasonable.
Posted by Lamb Chopped (# 5528) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
It isa question of likeliness. It is unlikely on the basis of info we have. Faith or belief: it is possible to believe anything, and we should really use our reason too. Otherwise history and historicity differentiation is irrelevant.
Re clunky prose. It is already that in the Greek.
Re re clunky prose. Some of it is, and some of it isn't. Luke, for instance.
But as for "unlikely," this is a really hard thing to judge from a distance of two millennia, unless you hold a worldview that rules out the supernatural from the start. If you are NOT ruling out the supernatural but rather episodes that seem to you psychologically or otherwise unlikely, or unlikely to be reported, well, things were different back then. Heck, they were different just forty years ago, when I used to play as a toddler with my grandparents' cigarette smoke, and ashtrays were a common gift to make in elementary school. Go back a bit further and you get King Louis the whatever of France holding court while half-dressed and sitting on a chamber pot. Or royal ladies putting up with official, unrelated, sometimes MALE busybodies watching while they labored to deliver a child. How does that even happen?
I think we do better to give the writers the benefit of the doubt when we have no solid evidence against what they report. Just as we would for people writing the lives of Tiberius or Alexander.
Posted by no prophet's flag is set so... (# 15560) on
:
I'm on another page with this. That the specifics of these incidents don't really matter. I get the intent of all of it, and that's sufficient. It's when I begin to dissect a number of these stories, e.g., Jesus talking to satan during the 40 days, that I find the explanations for who might have provided the details that I get all tangled. Better to admit to myself that the details are there to make points.
A friend of mine constantly asserts that we are not bible-ians, and thus it is okay to not accept or know about some of these stories. We understand the example of Jesus and that's quite enough. A point I keep rethinking.
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Equally it's permissible to depict the Virgin Mary wearing an ultramarine robe and in among Roman ruins, either of which are unlikely from a perspective of realistic history painting. That's a sign that pictures of the Virgin Mary are not subject to the conventions of realistic history painting.
Yes. Because iconography has its own set of conventions with their own meanings, and doesn't claim to be historically accurate. That's not its purpose.
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
When you say, "There's a problem when people say, 'Feminists admire Judith'," you can only mean that there is a problem reconciling this with some theory of meaning and ontology. To which the users of natural language are entitled to say, "Who gives a fuck if our use doesn't fit into your theory? Fix your theory."
What makes you think that when he says 'there's a problem when people say X' he means there's a problem for natural language?
I don't mean that. I said precisely the opposite.
quote:
rather than that he means there's a problem for any theory to cope with?
Yes. Exactly. Did you read what I wrote, or what you think I wrote? Because you are claiming I said the opposite of what I said, and countering it with exactly what I did say.
Posted by moonlitdoor (# 11707) on
:
quote:
originally posted by Dafyd
That's a sign that pictures of the Virgin Mary are not subject to the conventions of realistic history painting.
Indeed, so do they refer to the real virgin Mary even though there are things once can say about them that do not relate back to the real person ? I would have thought that they go well with Peter Damian's idea of descriptions of real people that are inaccurate but not deceptive.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
If you'd said 'history is all to a greater or lesser extent subjective' you might have a point.
I think this tends to underplay the subjective nature of history, which is more than simply identifying facts that can be asserted with confidence.
History is narrative. Making sense of any history is the business of tying together known facts into a wider narrative of some kind, which must be the work of a subjective mind. Hence it is perfectly plausible to have good histories which come to wildly different conclusions. The poorer the available information (or the wider the subject), the more subjective it will be.
Indeed, a really bad history is one which ignores or fobs off known facts in order to shoe-horn an agenda into the narrative.
A fiction might or might not be bad history, depending on whether the presented information runs counter to the known facts or is just an effort to join up the known facts with filler. Whilst a novel might be the extreme of narrative compared to an academic historical thesis, they are not totally different from each other.
It might indeed be fair to say that a historical scholar isn't going to be looking to a modern historical fiction for insights into the character - on the other hand an imaginative author can, sometimes, shed some light onto an incident which encourages the incident to be re-examined from a different angle.
The problem comes when a particular narrative is so long and strongly held that it becomes impossible to dislodge even when alternative factual information comes available which casts doubt on the validity of that interpretation. It seems that it often happens that the more romantic, dramatic narrative is more likely to be accepted as accurate because it is so engaging.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Equally it's permissible to depict the Virgin Mary wearing an ultramarine robe and in among Roman ruins, either of which are unlikely from a perspective of realistic history painting. That's a sign that pictures of the Virgin Mary are not subject to the conventions of realistic history painting.
Yes. Because iconography has its own set of conventions with their own meanings, and doesn't claim to be historically accurate. That's not its purpose.
Right, exactly. Historical accuracy is not the only fruit, as it were. Things which are not historically accurate can still be useful. In this example, the varying artistic impressions may help the faithful to engage with particular aspects of the narrative.
We might also say that studying the various lineages of the iconography could say something about the beliefs and perceptions of those who painted and/or commissioned the art.
I don't see how it is a given that inaccurate paintings are useless in helping understand the character of the person depicted.
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
:
mr cheesy
Well said. That summarises, cogently, my own understanding as well. Absent a time machine, or time viewer, that's the best we can do.
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on
:
quote:
mousethief: The Caffix and Orfies believe that some of what he said to the apostles post-rez had to do with the running of the Church.
This is what you believe? Yikes! Makes me glad I'm not Catholic or Orthodox.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
[QUOTE][qb]rather than that he means there's a problem for any theory to cope with?
Yes. Exactly. Did you read what I wrote, or what you think I wrote? Because you are claiming I said the opposite of what I said, and countering it with exactly what I did say.
Sorry for misunderstanding.
So just so I'm sure I'm not misunderstanding any more. You are saying that you agreed with peter damian?
[ 16. May 2016, 11:05: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
If you'd said 'history is all to a greater or lesser extent subjective' you might have a point.
I think this tends to underplay the subjective nature of history, which is more than simply identifying facts that can be asserted with confidence.
History is narrative. Making sense of any history is the business of tying together known facts into a wider narrative of some kind, which must be the work of a subjective mind. Hence it is perfectly plausible to have good histories which come to wildly different conclusions. The poorer the available information (or the wider the subject), the more subjective it will be.
I thought you were disagreeing with me when I said history was to a greater or lesser extent subjective. Now you're saying some history is more subjective than other history.
Identifying facts must be the work of a subjective mind. In fact, everything must be the work of a subjective mind - in which case the phrase 'the work of a subjective mind' fails to make any meaningful argument.
Nor is the distinction between fact and narrative fixed.
What is a fact at one level is a narrative at another. At one level the death of a Polish boy at the hands of a German soldier is a narrative comprised of more basic facts; at another it is one of the facts that comprises the narrative of the Warsaw ghetto uprising. At another level the Warsaw ghetto uprising is a fact that forms part of the narrative of the Holocaust. And at a higher level the Holocaust is a fact that forms part of the narrative of the twentieth century.
That being the case, rejecting a positivist account of history as based on objective facts can't be a matter of simply asserting the primacy of subjective narrative.
It must be to reject the positivist division into objective facts and subjective everything else altogether and adopt a critical realist account of narrative.
quote:
Indeed, a really bad history is one which ignores or fobs off known facts in order to shoe-horn an agenda into the narrative.
If all history is subjective then criticising history for ignoring or fobbing off facts is a subjective judgement, and cannot be grounds for calling a different narrative 'really bad' except as far as 'really bad' means 'expresses views I do not want to hear'.
quote:
The problem comes when a particular narrative is so long and strongly held that it becomes impossible to dislodge even when alternative factual information comes available which casts doubt on the validity of that interpretation. It seems that it often happens that the more romantic, dramatic narrative is more likely to be accepted as accurate because it is so engaging.
If narrative is subjective then it is meaningless to assert that the facts cast doubt upon the validity of any narrative.
Posted by Chesterbelloc (# 3128) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
I'm on another page with this. That the specifics of these incidents don't really matter. I get the intent of all of it, and that's sufficient.
Well, we all think we get the intent, don't we? But the "specifics of these incidents" might conceivably have some bearing on the intent, it seems to me. Also "the specifics of these incidents" seem to matter to you enough to reject them.
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
Better to admit to myself that the details are there to make points.
[My emphasis]. This makes it sound as if the only reasonable conclusion we can draw is that the "details" are invented for effect. But this is begging the question.
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
A friend of mine constantly asserts that we are not bible-ians, and thus it is okay to not accept or know about some of these stories. We understand the example of Jesus and that's quite enough.
It is pretty well known that neither Catholics nor the Orthodox are "bible-ians" either. But that doesn't mean that we don't take scripture very seriously indeed. We would never claim to "understand the example of Jesus" without the help of scripture - taken seriously and in its entirety - and its authentic interpretation in the apostolic tradition. What makes you sure that you can dispense with what seems to you to be implausible in these accounts? Do these passages give you the impression that the authors didn't want you to take them at face value? What is your criterion for exclusion and how do you validate it?
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
I thought you were disagreeing with me when I said history was to a greater or lesser extent subjective. Now you're saying some history is more subjective than other history.
No, I'm not really. I'm saying it is all subjective. I'm not sure it is very helpful to try to assign how some is more subjective than another.
quote:
Identifying facts must be the work of a subjective mind. In fact, everything must be the work of a subjective mind - in which case the phrase 'the work of a subjective mind' fails to make any meaningful argument.
I think it has meaning beyond, for example, the way that we talk about experimental science. We can say things about science that we can't say about history because we are able to conduct experiments. Yes, there is also a sense that we don't "know anything" about science, but there is something to measure when we're talking about science, so any interpretation is based on the things we can measure about reality.
That doesn't happen with history, because we're usually presented with a very incomplete amount of information, and this usually isn't collected for the purposes of later analysis.
So I think there might well be a sense in which science is less subjective than history as a intellectual pursuit.
That's not to say that history is less useful than science. And that isn't either to say that we can't make judgements about which histories are better than others.
quote:
Nor is the distinction between fact and narrative fixed.
What is a fact at one level is a narrative at another. At one level the death of a Polish boy at the hands of a German soldier is a narrative comprised of more basic facts; at another it is one of the facts that comprises the narrative of the Warsaw ghetto uprising. At another level the Warsaw ghetto uprising is a fact that forms part of the narrative of the Holocaust. And at a higher level the Holocaust is a fact that forms part of the narrative of the twentieth century.
That's true. And, of course, even the way facts are presented can be manipulated or perceived in totally different ways.
quote:
That being the case, rejecting a positivist account of history as based on objective facts can't be a matter of simply asserting the primacy of subjective narrative.
It must be to reject the positivist division into objective facts and subjective everything else altogether and adopt a critical realist account of narrative.
I'm not sure what you mean here.
quote:
If all history is subjective then criticising history for ignoring or fobbing off facts is a subjective judgement, and cannot be grounds for calling a different narrative 'really bad' except as far as 'really bad' means 'expresses views I do not want to hear'.
No, I don't think that's true. The "good/bad" distinction in history isn't related to the fact that one is subjective and another is objective. They're all subjective. So trying to wrestle with anything in history is to try to make sensible judgements about the way any given historian is manipulating the narrative. In my view, it is a fairly straightforward exercise to reject Holocaust denial as history - because it appears to reject facts that are hard to deny.
That's quite a different thing to trying to compare Israeli and Palestinian histories of the conflict in the 19/20 century. Whilst it seems clear that it is possible to reject some which are clearly ignoring facts for political reasons, I believe we're still left with competing narratives that are basically both valid histories, albeit viewed from different standpoints.
quote:
If narrative is subjective then it is meaningless to assert that the facts cast doubt upon the validity of any narrative.
Only if we're going with a subjective-bad, objective-good model. If we're accepting that all are narratives, and we're also accepting that some are good and some are bad historical narratives, then it certainly makes sense to think about how we're distinguishing the one from the other.
But I do accept what you've said about about the subjective nature even of the facts, which means that the whole exercise is complicated and meta.
And subjective. Sigh.
[ 16. May 2016, 12:42: Message edited by: mr cheesy ]
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
So just so I'm sure I'm not misunderstanding any more. You are saying that you agreed with peter damian?
Not unless I understood him as badly as you understood me. Which is certainly not impossible.
Posted by Freddy (# 365) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
If narrative is subjective then it is meaningless to assert that the facts cast doubt upon the validity of any narrative.
Yes, even the facts of science are only available to most of us as narrative.
Isn't the point of all of this that we need to have reason to have confidence in any particular narrative, as opposed to another?
Posted by no prophet's flag is set so... (# 15560) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Chesterbelloc:
It is pretty well known that neither Catholics nor the Orthodox are "bible-ians" either. But that doesn't mean that we don't take scripture very seriously indeed.
Taking it seriously does not mean that all of the stories within are factual. There are inconsistencies between the 4 canonical gospels that tell us that. If someone wants to accept that particular scenes or sequences of events occurred factually, and someone else does not, they still meet each other and God at the communion rail.
quote:
We would never claim to "understand the example of Jesus" without the help of scripture - taken seriously and in its entirety - and its authentic interpretation in the apostolic tradition. What makes you sure that you can dispense with what seems to you to be implausible in these accounts? Do these passages give you the impression that the authors didn't want you to take them at face value? What is your criterion for exclusion and how do you validate it?
We are required to reason in addition to read. The intent of the authors is probably not the intent you imply: that these are factual historical accounts. The bible is a story of belief and faith, not a factual account of events. I'm not sure where the trouble is with that.
It's not as stark as you make it "criteria for exclusion ", rather reading it as a story of belief and faith, and not factual or false. More like morality tales and designed to educate us about something. I gather that in your certainty you might like to have someone take the extreme position of rejection. I am not more willing to take that position as I am your's.
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on
:
mr cheesy wrote:
quote:
Historical accuracy is not the only fruit, as it were. Things which are not historically accurate can still be useful. In this example, the varying artistic impressions may help the faithful to engage with particular aspects of the narrative.
We might also say that studying the various lineages of the iconography could say something about the beliefs and perceptions of those who painted and/or commissioned the art.
I don't see how it is a given that inaccurate paintings are useless in helping understand the character of the person depicted.
I find this very interesting. Straight away, I recall Freud saying that there is no negation in the unconscious, in other words, that what we deny, we are also asserting.
This seems incorrect, but as with other incorrect ideas, it's quite fertile; I suppose it is connected with the idea of 'being in denial' in modern parlance.
But I am also thinking of the Freudian slip, where a false narrative is disrupted by an error which is not false. Thus, I rang up a holiday agent recently, and at the end of the conversation, she said, 'if you want to know any other details, don't bother to ring us', instead of 'don't hesitate'. I like it.
Anyway, I think this connects with the 'untruth' of art and so on, in very interesting ways, but off topic possibly. After all, Hamlet is a pretty decent bloke, even if/especially since, he wants to shag his mother.
Posted by peter damian (# 18584) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
When you say, "There's a problem when people say, 'Feminists admire Judith'," you can only mean that there is a problem reconciling this with some theory of meaning and ontology. To which the users of natural language are entitled to say, "Who gives a fuck if our use doesn't fit into your theory? Fix your theory."
What makes you think that when he says 'there's a problem when people say X' he means there's a problem for natural language? rather than that he means there's a problem for any theory to cope with?
Quite.
On the Kripke puzzle, Kripke himself said:
quote:
Kripke ‘My main thesis is a simple one: that the puzzle is a puzzle’, he said, noting that ‘As any theory of truth must deal with the Liar Paradox, so any theory of belief and names must deal with this puzzle’.
He admits there is no theory. Just a puzzle.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
So just so I'm sure I'm not misunderstanding any more. You are saying that you agreed with peter damian?
Not unless I understood him as badly as you understood me. Which is certainly not impossible.
Let me suggest an alternative possibility, which is that you've misunderstood me.
I think you think I asked: 'what makes you (mousethief) think there's a problem for natural language'?
What I actually asked was 'What makes you think that ...(Peter Damian)... means there's a problem for natural language?'.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
The bible is a story of belief and faith, not a factual account of events. I'm not sure where the trouble is with that.
If I take something to be a factual account of events, that means I believe it.
If Boris Johnson asserts that the EU is costing us 350 bananas a week and I have faith in Boris Johnson then I will believe that it is a fact that the EU is costing us 350 bananas a week. If on the other hand I do not have faith in Boris Johnson then I will not believe that what he says is a fact. Likewise, if I know that it is not a fact then I will not have any faith in Boris Johnson when he says it.
It's no good someone replying to me saying that Boris Johnson doesn't intend it as a fact; he intends it as a statement of belief and faith. That is precisely the problem.
I am not here arguing that a fictional story can't be a story of belief and faith. I'm just arguing against one invalid shortcut to that position.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
I thought you were disagreeing with me when I said history was to a greater or lesser extent subjective. Now you're saying some history is more subjective than other history.
No, I'm not really. I'm saying it is all subjective. I'm not sure it is very helpful to try to assign how some is more subjective than another.
This doesn't stop you from saying that physics is less subjective than history later on in your post.
quote:
quote:
Identifying facts must be the work of a subjective mind. In fact, everything must be the work of a subjective mind - in which case the phrase 'the work of a subjective mind' fails to make any meaningful argument.
I think it has meaning beyond, for example, the way that we talk about experimental science. We can say things about science that we can't say about history because we are able to conduct experiments. Yes, there is also a sense that we don't "know anything" about science, but there is something to measure when we're talking about science, so any interpretation is based on the things we can measure about reality.
And yet any measuring has to be done by a subjective mind. So somehow being made by a subjective mind isn't incompatible with being based on things in reality.
quote:
That doesn't happen with history, because we're usually presented with a very incomplete amount of information, and this usually isn't collected for the purposes of later analysis.
This I think rather depends. In many cases, I think the problem for the historian in constructing a narrative is having too much data and having to select from it.
quote:
quote:
That being the case, rejecting a positivist account of history as based on objective facts can't be a matter of simply asserting the primacy of subjective narrative.
It must be to reject the positivist division into objective facts and subjective everything else altogether and adopt a critical realist account of narrative.
I'm not sure what you mean here.
Positivism is the belief that ideas can be divided into factual ideas (good and proper) about which we can be objective and everything else, which is merely subjective and thus ought to be rejected as useless.
I don't think you can reject positivism while still keeping the positivist concepts.
Fundamentally, I think the terms 'objective' and 'subjective' raise far more confusion that they're worth.
Let's look at why.
A judgement (e.g. grass is green, the atomic number of carbon is 6, eating people is wrong, I do not like green eggs and ham) is made by a subject (if Sam likes green eggs and ham, Sam is the subject) about an object (green eggs and ham).
Sense One.
A judgement is objective if it is determined by the object (I think grass is green because it reflects light at that particular wavelength) and subjective if it is determined by the subject (it's been dyed red but I'm colour blind).
Sense Two.
A judgement is objective if it ought to be determined by the object (I ought to judge that the atomic number of carbon is 6 because it is). It is subjective if it doesn't matter or if it ought to be determined by the subject.
Sense Three.
A subject matter or fact or area of study is said to be objective if it is about some subject matter about which people can and do make objective judgements in sense one. It is said to be subjective if it is about some subject matter about which people only make judgements that are subjective in sense One.
Sense Four.
A subject matter or fact or area of study is said to be objective if it is about some subject matter about which people ought to make objective judgements. It is said to be subjective if it is about some subject matter about which people need not make objective judgements.
There may be other senses.
(Note that especially in senses one and three, a continuum is possible between wholly objective and wholly subjective.)
My experience is that in any argument in which the words 'subjective' and 'objective' is used, the various senses are thrown about interchangeably in such a way as to make coherent argument or understanding impossible.
I think also the scheme as I've outlined it still implies that judgements can be analysed into objective and subjective aspects in a far stronger fashion than I think is warranted. It implies that the discovery of objective subject matters (sense three or four) depends much more simply on the ability to make purely objective judgements (sense one) than I think warranted.
quote:
quote:
Criticising history for ignoring or fobbing off facts is a subjective judgement, and cannot be grounds for calling a different narrative 'really bad' except as far as 'really bad' means 'expresses views I do not want to hear'.
No, I don't think that's true. The "good/bad" distinction in history isn't related to the fact that one is subjective and another is objective. They're all subjective. So trying to wrestle with anything in history is to try to make sensible judgements about the way any given historian is manipulating the narrative. In my view, it is a fairly straightforward exercise to reject Holocaust denial as history - because it appears to reject facts that are hard to deny.
If you say history is subjective do you mean it is subjective in sense three or subjective in sense four?
If it's subjective in sense three that means, without any value judgement, that it is made up of judgements determined by qualities of the historian, and not by facts about the Holocaust. To the extent that facts about the Holocaust come into it to that extent history is not wholly subjective but partly objective.
If on the other hand you're saying it's subjective in sense four you're saying that you cannot fault a historian for making judgements according to things other than the facts or for denying the facts. If denying facts that are hard to deny is grounds for rejecting a historian's work then to that extent history is in sense four objective.
quote:
But I do accept what you've said about about the subjective nature even of the facts, which means that the whole exercise is complicated and meta.
I don't think facts are subjective.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
There may be other senses.
I forgot two big ones.
Sense Five.
Something is objective if it exists or is otherwise independent of any judgements being made about it. It is subjective if it depends on judgements being made.
Sense Six.
A person or other judge is objective if the judgements they make are objective in sense one. They're subjective if the judgements they make are subjective.
I don't think I've covered 'subjective mind'. I think it means that all the judgements the mind makes are made by the mind as the subject; with an accompanying sense that therefore the mind is subjective in sense six.
Posted by no prophet's flag is set so... (# 15560) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
The bible is a story of belief and faith, not a factual account of events. I'm not sure where the trouble is with that.
If I take something to be a factual account of events, that means I believe it.
If Boris Johnson asserts that the EU is costing us 350 bananas a week and I have faith in Boris Johnson then I will believe that it is a fact that the EU is costing us 350 bananas a week. If on the other hand I do not have faith in Boris Johnson then I will not believe that what he says is a fact. Likewise, if I know that it is not a fact then I will not have any faith in Boris Johnson when he says it.
It's no good someone replying to me saying that Boris Johnson doesn't intend it as a fact; he intends it as a statement of belief and faith. That is precisely the problem.
I am not here arguing that a fictional story can't be a story of belief and faith. I'm just arguing against one invalid shortcut to that position.
That story doesn't work as a comparison. It would better to say that Boris is long dead but said by someone else, who we don't know anything much about, and it may be that the attribution of that authorship is not factual, to have said something. And we don't have anything like a first or second hand account, we have a 47th or 15th hand account. And we don't know exactly the sources of the account, and whether the person who told them meant them all literally or to make points.
And we have another account by another person which is somewhat close but differs in some important ways with the first account. Such that we don't know, for example if Judas hanged himself or fell down dead. But we do know that he's dead after doing a betrayal.
And maybe some of what is written down contains aspects of truth and aspects of pious fantasy and aspects designed to persuade, by for example, by showing how it fits with the OT.
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
So just so I'm sure I'm not misunderstanding any more. You are saying that you agreed with peter damian?
Not unless I understood him as badly as you understood me. Which is certainly not impossible.
Let me suggest an alternative possibility, which is that you've misunderstood me.
I think you think I asked: 'what makes you (mousethief) think there's a problem for natural language'?
What I actually asked was 'What makes you think that ...(Peter Damian)... means there's a problem for natural language?'.
No, that's what I took you to be saying. It turns out, apparently, that I did misunderstand Peter, nor you. As I suggested. Not sure why this needed to be about you.
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
:
That's helpful, Dafyd. I'm not entirely sure that it illuminates fully the challenges historians face when looking at historical data. Even if one looks at modern historical data e.g. the Zapruder film of Kennedy's assassination and the subsequent Warren Commission report, it seems reasonable to argue that the best one can do is obtain some kind of 'probable, but not certain' judgment that the 'lone nut' explanation is the most likely. And that became the case only after it was possible to use the Zapruder movie plus some supporting evidence to provide a 3D reconstruction of what happened. Such techniques were not available to the Warren Commission, one of the reasons why conspiracy theorists had quite a lot to go on.
When one looks at earlier events, the data tend to fall into two categories. Witness statements of various kinds, which may or may not have been subject to critical examination of any kind to determine validity, and artifacts from storage or obtained by excavation. Plus earlier accounts by previous historians who may, or may not, have had their own motives (including self-preservation!) for telling it the way they did. The siftings and syntheses will, inevitably, involve a measure of subjective judgment over what may be trusted.
I'm pretty sure this is what mr cheesy has been trying to convey. Modern historians apply historical-critical methods to the problematic evidence which is available. And offer their conclusions for critical examination by their peers and others. That's the best that can be done but it cannot recover the whole truth about past events.
[ 17. May 2016, 06:58: Message edited by: Barnabas62 ]
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
:
OK, I accept that there are various ways to define subjective.
My point is just that there are a bunch of facts about the past - which vary in certainty - overlayed with perception and interpretation, which means that any history is a subjective narrative.
So for example in my town we have deep shelters built just before the second world war, supposedly for 60,000 people. We can be pretty darn sure that these exist (I've been in them), that they were built at the time (I've read the contemporary reports), that people used them during the war (lots of photographic and eyewitness reports). So it is very hard to cast doubt on that they existed and were used.
But it is very hard to show that they were ever used by 60,000 people (it seems very unlikely, but there might be some military records somewhere showing this after Dunkirk or something), and when we get into the importance of them for the war effort, then we're getting into the business of subjective historical interpretation. I'm not sure that it would ever be possible to give an objective, unquestionable view on that.
It might well be the case that their importance has been talked up over the decades, or their access has meant that their importance has been overplayed compared to - for example - less accessible but more strategic war shelters.
If we have incomplete information about something that happened 60 or 70 years ago which means that there are a range of valid possible interpretations of the known facts, how much more space is there for interpretation of events which happened much further back and for which we have much more limited information?
This is what I mean about it being subjective.
The sense that facts are subjective is a different one on a different meta level, I think. As we're subjective beings doing the observations, it isn't possible for us to be totally fail-proof in our observations, never mind the interpretations we make upon those observations. So we might be very sure about some general fact (for example more than 6 million people were exterminated in the holocaust) but much less sure about specific facts (for example how many mentally disabled people died in the death camps).
For me, that makes the whole thing a level of subjective upon another layer of subjective. Which means that the things we state about history can only be inaccurate by necessity. The further back it is, the less accurate it can be.
So unless someone is talking about something very general ("the holocaust happened in the twentieth century") - which isn't very engaging as a historical argument - anything written about history is going to have a massive element of perception impact from the individual historian. Partly that's going to be educated by the sources he has available, but a major part is going to be related to the way he understands those sources and how he weighs them.
A fiction author may not have access to many of the sources and may be making up a load of shit about the character. But that doesn't necessarily mean they're wrong about that character, providing the stuff they make up is not in contradiction with the quote unquote known facts about that person.
It might be a random stab in the dark, it might be a guess based on other information available about other individuals who wrote things at the time, it might be a deep understanding of human nature, it might be educated by the geography, archaeology, philosophy of the time.
Just because it is fiction doesn't make it historically inaccurate. Of course, that also doesn't mean that it should overly sway or influence a careful historian who is seeking to write something about what is known about the character rather than what is made up.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Barnabas62:
I'm not entirely sure that it illuminates fully the challenges historians face when looking at historical data.
Well, no, it doesn't. That's because I wasn't talking about the challenges that historians face when looking at historical data.
Historians wouldn't face a challenge in looking at historical data if all they were trying to meet was the historian's own sense of what fits their agenda, their pre-existing beliefs about what happened and human motivation and so on. The challenge arises because historians try to push past their pre-existing beliefs to what the data will support.
History tries to be objective in my sense 4. That's why there's a difficulty there.
History can't ever tell the whole truth. That's not the problem we're discussing. The question is how the historian mediates between what the data supports and the fact that the historian needs to use their pre-existing beliefs about motivation to work out what the data supports. The historian is ideally trying to enter a critical equilibrium where they flesh out the data with their pre-existing beliefs, and use the data to change their pre-existing beliefs, and hopefully settle somewhere that's as close to the truth as they can get from where they started.
quote:
When one looks at earlier events, the data tend to fall into two categories. Witness statements of various kinds, which may or may not have been subject to critical examination of any kind to determine validity, and artifacts from storage or obtained by excavation.
I think you're omitting administrative paperwork and other records of people trying to get things done.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
OK, I accept that there are various ways to define subjective.
My point is just that there are a bunch of facts about the past - which vary in certainty - overlayed with perception and interpretation, which means that any history is a subjective narrative.
In what sense of subjective are you saying any history is a subjective narrative?
Being based upon incomplete evidence does not of itself make history subjective. A historian trying to decide on incomplete evidence how many people used the shelters can describe the evidence. Maybe the last step when the historian says 'probably only about 40 000 people used them' is subjective. That doesn't make the whole subjective. (Especially not when the way in which the statement goes beyond the evidence is made clear.)
If there are a range of valid interpretations based on the evidence, but a historian dismisses or rules out one interpretation based on something other than the evidence, then that is subjective in a bad sense.
Interpretation goes beyond the subjective-objective distinction.
If I read one of your posts I start from my prior experience. I've read people saying something a bit like what you're saying, and so I think you might be coming from the same place. And that colours my attitude. Then I read what you're actually saying in the light of that, and I revise my prior interpretation in so far as what you're saying doesn't quite fit, and adjust my attitude, to see if I've got a better handle on where you're coming from. In the case of someone coming from a similar background to me this isn't really a conscious process; it's basic reading comprehension. But my final opinion as to your meaning doesn't fit into a straight objective-subjective binary - it starts out incorporating subjective factors such as prior experience, but hopefully I end up actually understanding what you said, which is objective.
Now that process, which isn't conscious in this case, is how all interpretation works. It's a collaboration between prior experience and evidence.
quote:
The sense that facts are subjective is a different one on a different meta level, I think. As we're subjective beings doing the observations, it isn't possible for us to be totally fail-proof in our observations, never mind the interpretations we make upon those observations.
In what sense of subjective are you saying facts are subjective? And in what sense of subjective are you saying that we're subjective beings? (I doubt it's the same sense of subjective in both cases.)
quote:
A fiction author may not have access to many of the sources and may be making up a load of shit about the character. But that doesn't necessarily mean they're wrong about that character, providing the stuff they make up is not in contradiction with the quote unquote known facts about that person.
This is of course true. It all depends.
Fiction can be good in lots of different ways. One of the ways it can be good is in trying to present a plausible interpretation of the past. If so, it needs to be consistent with all relevant known facts. On the other hand, a fiction writer can alter the known facts in pursuit of other ways of being good.
One thing to note is that fiction writers with pretence at being realistic don't normally present us with a range of evidence and show how they evaluate it. They just show us the conclusion that they're going with for the sake of the story. Whereas we would expect a historian to give at least a basic account of where there's a valid range of interpretations.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
If I take something to be a factual account of events, that means I believe it.
If Boris Johnson asserts that the EU is costing us 350 bananas a week and I have faith in Boris Johnson then I will believe that it is a fact that the EU is costing us 350 bananas a week.
That story doesn't work as a comparison.
The story is not a comparison. It's an example.
I am not constructing any kind of complicated analogy between Boris Johnson and the gospel writers. I'm just giving examples to describe how 'faith', 'belief', and 'factual' work as concepts when we're not discussing the Bible or religion.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
In what sense of subjective are you saying any history is a subjective narrative?
Being based upon incomplete evidence does not of itself make history subjective. A historian trying to decide on incomplete evidence how many people used the shelters can describe the evidence. Maybe the last step when the historian says 'probably only about 40 000 people used them' is subjective. That doesn't make the whole subjective. (Especially not when the way in which the statement goes beyond the evidence is made clear.)
If there are a range of valid interpretations based on the evidence, but a historian dismisses or rules out one interpretation based on something other than the evidence, then that is subjective in a bad sense.
I'm not sure anyone would write a book which contained only facts about the war tunnels, because that would be boring to read. As soon as it becomes a narrative, in my view, it becomes subjective. When a historian writes about the wider context, the importance of the coastal tunnels, their contribution to the wider war effort, etc, then they've mixed in a whole lot of their own interpretation and perceptions.
Another example I was reading this morning was about Dylan and the famous concert when someone shouted out "Judas" during his electric set.
That article makes it clear that even those who were at the concert disagree fundamentally about it. Some say that the heckler made Dylan angry, some say he expected it (due to previous shouts at previous concerts). So one can write a history of Dylan and of electric folk rock where the heckle becomes the pivotal moment for Dylan and had wider influence on the folk revival. Or one could write a history that suggested that this was a progression of Dylan's music, that the shout wasn't particularly influential (possibly even a plant - given nobody is entirely sure who did it). One could take the view that Dylan was already progressively isolating himself from the loyal folk-inspired protest movement that supported him, and that the heckler was a convenient prop which he could use later. One could, presumably, write some kind of history which painted Dylan as an outsider from the founders of the movement such as Guthrie and Seeger.
Now, I'm not a historian of folk music, so some of those versions may be easy to disprove from the mountain of available evidence. But I'm betting that at least two different views can be supported by the available evidence. In that sense they're subjective - the evidence is not so strong that one is forced to believe a particular narrative over any other. Objectively we know that Dylan played this famous concert and that there was this famous heckle. When we're into what it meant, then we're into the subjective.
quote:
Interpretation goes beyond the subjective-objective distinction.
If I read one of your posts I start from my prior experience. I've read people saying something a bit like what you're saying, and so I think you might be coming from the same place. And that colours my attitude. Then I read what you're actually saying in the light of that, and I revise my prior interpretation in so far as what you're saying doesn't quite fit, and adjust my attitude, to see if I've got a better handle on where you're coming from. In the case of someone coming from a similar background to me this isn't really a conscious process; it's basic reading comprehension. But my final opinion as to your meaning doesn't fit into a straight objective-subjective binary - it starts out incorporating subjective factors such as prior experience, but hopefully I end up actually understanding what you said, which is objective.
Now that process, which isn't conscious in this case, is how all interpretation works. It's a collaboration between prior experience and evidence.
Well see the thing that I'm not sure that I agree is the suggestion, which you also made to Barnabas62 above, that the challenge for the historian is to "their pre-existing beliefs about what happened and human motivation and so on."
That to me seems to underestimate the influence of perception. We might understand the idea that a Marxist historian looks at a particular event within the framework of that wider meta-narrative. But I'm not sure it is possible for anyone to look objectively at anything, even if they do not hold to a wider meta-narrative like Marxism or Christianity.
If I was to examine the history of something to which I am totally ignorant and which is alien to everything I've ever experienced - I believe that I would still be experiencing it subjectively. To give silly examples: I might unconsciously give greater weight to things in newspapers over hand-written notes, I might give weight to something because I happened to be reading it on a sunny day. I might be in a love affair that makes the sources seem more favourable than the sources I read at a different time.
I am not a robot, I can't look at the evidence and come to a cold rational view of them. Whether I like it or not, I am influenced by my own experience, but also a whole load of different inexplicable things that may be affecting me moment by moment.
quote:
In what sense of subjective are you saying facts are subjective? And in what sense of subjective are you saying that we're subjective beings? (I doubt it's the same sense of subjective in both cases.)
In microbiology, the microbes which are studied are those which can be grown - or "plated". There are thought to be a very large number of microbes which are not studied because they can't be plated, and we're only just getting some understanding of them by widespread DNA analysis which shows that they exist. In microbiological science, we're massively over-studying the organisms which are easy to study and massively under-studying those which are hard to study.
That's a massive oversimplification, but I think it illustrates the reality that our perception of the facts are influenced by the reality of the kind of beings that we are. If we were other kinds of beings, we'd perceive things in a different way.
So the way we collect and analyse information is subjective, flawed, incomplete. It isn't just that we'd be objective if we avoided making interpretations of the facts, the facts themselves are a function of the subjective nature of humanity.
And then there is another overlay of subjectivity in that we perceive those facts in different ways.
And another in the way that we weigh and assign importance to those facts.
Maybe those are indeed different definitions of the subjective, but the end result is that there is very little we can be very sure about in any form of knowledge. Mostly the things we can be sure about are very general things. The more specific we get, the more subjective it becomes.
And a history that is stimulating and interesting is not a collection of general and uncontroversial statements that everyone (or at least everyone sane) can agree with. It is a digestion of varied information, presented in an engaging form, providing a wider meta-narrative to put the events in context.
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This is of course true. It all depends.
Fiction can be good in lots of different ways. One of the ways it can be good is in trying to present a plausible interpretation of the past. If so, it needs to be consistent with all relevant known facts. On the other hand, a fiction writer can alter the known facts in pursuit of other ways of being good.
One thing to note is that fiction writers with pretence at being realistic don't normally present us with a range of evidence and show how they evaluate it. They just show us the conclusion that they're going with for the sake of the story. Whereas we would expect a historian to give at least a basic account of where there's a valid range of interpretations.
I agree in general but disagree with your conclusion. I believe there are always a valid range of interpretations in almost all historical research.
Posted by Chesterbelloc (# 3128) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
We are required to reason in addition to read. The intent of the authors is probably not the intent you imply: that these are factual historical accounts. The bible is a story of belief and faith, not a factual account of events. I'm not sure where the trouble is with that.
The trouble with that is that it is, for Catholics and for countless other Christians, simply not true. The Gospels (and Acts) are not just "morality tales ... designed to educate us about something" - they are most definitely putting themselves forward as factual accounts of historical events. They just are.
Here is what the 1965 Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation Dei verbum has to say on the Gospels: quote:
18. It is common knowledge that among all the Scriptures, even those of the New Testament, the Gospels have a special preeminence, and rightly so, for they are the principal witness for the life and teaching of the incarnate Word, our savior.
The Church has always and everywhere held and continues to hold that the four Gospels are of apostolic origin. For what the Apostles preached in fulfillment of the commission of Christ, afterwards they themselves and apostolic men, under the inspiration of the divine Spirit, handed on to us in writing: the foundation of faith, namely, the fourfold Gospel, according to Matthew, Mark, Luke and John.
Holy Mother Church has firmly and with absolute constancy held, and continues to hold, that the four Gospels just named, whose historical character the Church unhesitatingly asserts, faithfully hand on what Jesus Christ, while living among men, really did and taught for their eternal salvation until the day He was taken up into heaven (see Acts 1:1).
Indeed, after the Ascension of the Lord the Apostles handed on to their hearers what He had said and done. This they did with that clearer understanding which they enjoyed after they had been instructed by the gloriousevents of Christ's life and taught by the light of the Spirit of truth.
The sacred authors wrote the four Gospels, selecting some things from the many which had been handed on by word of mouth or in writing, reducing some of them to a synthesis, explaining some things in view of the situation of their churches and preserving the form of proclamation but always in such fashion that they told us the honest truth about Jesus.
That's what I believe, and it is not contrary to reason to do so, it seems to me. The Catholic faith is religion of divine revelation - the ulitmate revelation being the person of Jesus Christ, true God and true man.
So, as I asked before, if we are taking the internal evidence of the Gopels (plus Acts) quote:
What precisely makes it [i.e., that He told his apostles things about Himself they did not yet know] unlikely in the context of what we are told about Jesus's post-resurrection ministry? I can see why it would seem unlikely if one rejected the accounts of the Resurrection and post-R appearances, but if we are arguing from "the basis of info we have" (i.e., those very same scriptural accounts) what makes it seem implausible in that context?
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
The question is how the historian mediates between what the data supports and the fact that the historian needs to use their pre-existing beliefs about motivation to work out what the data supports. The historian is ideally trying to enter a critical equilibrium where they flesh out the data with their pre-existing beliefs, and use the data to change their pre-existing beliefs, and hopefully settle somewhere that's as close to the truth as they can get from where they started.
Isn't this a collective, hopefully progressive, process? In the same sort of ballpark as the logic of scientific discovery. Pre-existing beliefs are, or ought to be, held lightly by anyone using historical-critical methodology. Thought experiments, speculative hypotheses, can help and can also be tested against the data.
Of course there are differences. Historical syntheses are not the same as scientific hypotheses. If there is discipline involved, it is not the same as that involved in scientific experimentation. But the principles are the same. A good historian will seek to be humble, honest, teachable and correctable when looking at the information available and trying to work out what it reveals about past events.
[ 17. May 2016, 17:58: Message edited by: Barnabas62 ]
Posted by Freddy (# 365) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Chesterbelloc:
I can see why it would seem unlikely if one rejected the accounts of the Resurrection and post-R appearances, but if we are arguing from "the basis of info we have" (i.e., those very same scriptural accounts) what makes it seem implausible in that context?
I think that you name the obvious dividing line.
If someone rejects the accounts of the Resurrection then this makes many things about the accounts suspect.
On the other hand if the Resurrection is accepted then it would seem foolish to reject other aspects of the account as implausible. Once you have swallowed the camel why bother about the gnats?
Posted by no prophet's flag is set so... (# 15560) on
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How about, as I also noted earlier in this thread, neither complete acceptance nor rejection? When people begin to quote doctrinal stuff, I gather the separation of sheep and goats is afoot.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
In what sense of subjective are you saying any history is a subjective narrative?
Being based upon incomplete evidence does not of itself make history subjective. A historian trying to decide on incomplete evidence how many people used the shelters can describe the evidence. Maybe the last step when the historian says 'probably only about 40 000 people used them' is subjective. That doesn't make the whole subjective. (Especially not when the way in which the statement goes beyond the evidence is made clear.)
If there are a range of valid interpretations based on the evidence, but a historian dismisses or rules out one interpretation based on something other than the evidence, then that is subjective in a bad sense.
I'm not sure anyone would write a book which contained only facts about the war tunnels, because that would be boring to read. As soon as it becomes a narrative, in my view, it becomes subjective. When a historian writes about the wider context, the importance of the coastal tunnels, their contribution to the wider war effort, etc, then they've mixed in a whole lot of their own interpretation and perceptions.
I have been trying to get beyond this idea that on the one hand we have the facts (which are objectively available) and on the other we have the interpretation and perceptions (which are subjective), and then they get mixed together.
quote:
quote:
Interpretation goes beyond the subjective-objective distinction.
If I read one of your posts I start from my prior experience.
Now that process, which isn't conscious in this case, is how all interpretation works. It's a collaboration between prior experience and evidence.
Well see the thing that I'm not sure that I agree is the suggestion, which you also made to Barnabas62 above, that the challenge for the historian is to "their pre-existing beliefs about what happened and human motivation and so on."
That to me seems to underestimate the influence of perception. We might understand the idea that a Marxist historian looks at a particular event within the framework of that wider meta-narrative. But I'm not sure it is possible for anyone to look objectively at anything, even if they do not hold to a wider meta-narrative like Marxism or Christianity.
I'm really not sure you're responding to what I said.
Some points:
I do not believe a purely rational robot with no prior opinions or experience could objectively know anything (or subjectively know anything either).
You write:
quote:
If I was to examine the history of something to which I am totally ignorant and which is alien to everything I've ever experienced - I believe that I would still be experiencing it subjectively.
My argument here is not that you would still experience it subjectively. It's that you would be experiencing it entirely subjectively.
Now take your room. You have a lot of experience and emotional baggage attached to it. Nevertheless, your experience of it is about as objective as your experience of anything gets (sense one but not sense six). You can find your way around it without thinking about it. You have a much better chance of drawing it accurately or finding your way about it with your eyes closed than you do of finding your way about a room about which you have no prior experience.
We may not be terribly good at coming to an understanding of each other in English (which I believe is the first language for both of us). But we'd have no chance in ancient Harappan, of which nobody living has any experience. About Harappan, having no preconceptions, any knowledge would be entirely subjective.
That being the case, I reject the idea that perfect 'objective' knowledge could be reached by a presuppositionless recording machine. And therefore I reject the idea that subjective presuppositions should be opposed to objective knowledge. And therefore I reject the idea that the objective/ subjective opposition is a good way to analyse knowledge at all.
I further add that you seem to take presuppositions entirely as givens which cannot be changed. That seems to me untrue. If we couldn't change our presuppositions we could never learn anything. Admittedly frequently ideas that don't fit into people's preexisting conceptual schemes do run off people like water off a duck's back. But I don't think that's inevitable.
As a third and final point, I don't think that once two historians have agreed on the facts there's nothing more to be said about the interpretations. Interpretations can be discussed and compared; historians can and do question each other (or themselves) on why they prefer particular interpretations. And that being the case, it cannot be the case that historians' interpretations are wholly grounded in characteristics of each individual historian. There is something that exists in the public space open to common inspection.
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So the way we collect and analyse information is subjective, flawed, incomplete. It isn't just that we'd be objective if we avoided making interpretations of the facts, the facts themselves are a function of the subjective nature of humanity.
I dispute the equation of subjective with flawed. Not because I think subjective isn't flawed, but because I dispute the whole terms.
quote:
quote:
Whereas we would expect a historian to give at least a basic account of where there's a valid range of interpretations.
I agree in general but disagree with your conclusion. I believe there are always a valid range of interpretations in almost all historical research.
My point is that you'd expect a good historian to at least gesture at the whole range of interpretations that they consider valid.
[ 18. May 2016, 10:38: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
:
Dafyd, I'm going to stop this conversation after this post, as we seem to be talking past each other.
I just wanted to respond to these aspects of what you've said:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
My argument here is not that you would still experience it subjectively. It's that you would be experiencing it entirely subjectively.
Now take your room. You have a lot of experience and emotional baggage attached to it. Nevertheless, your experience of it is about as objective as your experience of anything gets (sense one but not sense six). You can find your way around it without thinking about it. You have a much better chance of drawing it accurately or finding your way about it with your eyes closed than you do of finding your way about a room about which you have no prior experience.
I don't believe that I objective experience my room. In fact there is almost nothing about it that I could be sure about. I doubt that I could accurately describe the wallpaper from memory. I probably would be wrong on the size and so on.
To me this just illustrates my point. Colour is one of those in-built human perceptions which are easily deceived. Take the famous Lotto Lab cube. I have seen it many times, I've even used computer software to prove that the centre squares of the front and top face are the same colour.
But I still see them as different colours. I know they're the same, but I can't be objective about it without the aid of some kind of non-human measure.
quote:
I further add that you seem to take presuppositions entirely as givens which cannot be changed. That seems to me untrue. If we couldn't change our presuppositions we could never learn anything. Admittedly frequently ideas that don't fit into people's preexisting conceptual schemes do run off people like water off a duck's back. But I don't think that's inevitable.
Well, that's where we differ in a nutshell. We can't be objective because we have in-built biases, including those we are not aware of.
If I can't persuade myself to see two colours as being different that I know are different, then how many other things that I perceive are actually wrong? A lot, I think.
OK, I'm leaving it here. Good luck.
Posted by Chesterbelloc (# 3128) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
How about, as I also noted earlier in this thread, neither complete acceptance nor rejection?
I've no real idea of what you mean by that.
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
When people begin to quote doctrinal stuff, I gather the separation of sheep and goats is afoot.
Likewise confused by this. What I did (if this is directed at me) was cite a document that encapsulates my and many millions of other Catholics' understanding of the historicity of documents to which you deny any historicity. Why is explaining my take on the issues separating livestock any more than you expressing yours is?
And I still don't see why, in the context of "the info we have", Jesus continuing to teach and enlighten His apostles after His resurrection is so very unlikely. There's a very long (i.e., dating back to apostolic times) tradition to that effect. And as Freddy says, why strain at the gnat of that after swallowing the camel of the scriptural Resurrection and post-R accounts?
Posted by chris stiles (# 12641) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Chesterbelloc:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
How about, as I also noted earlier in this thread, neither complete acceptance nor rejection?
I've no real idea of what you mean by that.
I think there are cases where the historicity of particular events can be left open even as we accept the immediate arguments presented in the text. Obvious examples in the NT would be certain cases where extra-biblical sources are brought in (which were often earlier attempts at harmonising the OT).
So it's not necessary to the core of 1 Corinthians 10 to believe that the rock that Moses struck literally followed the Israelites from place to place as they moved around the desert. Similarly, one does not have to accept that Michael and Satan literally argued over the corpse of Moses in order to accept the overall argument of Jude.
Posted by Chesterbelloc (# 3128) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by chris stiles:
quote:
Originally posted by Chesterbelloc:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
How about, as I also noted earlier in this thread, neither complete acceptance nor rejection?
I've no real idea of what you mean by that.
I think there are cases where the historicity of particular events can be left open even as we accept the immediate arguments presented in the text. Obvious examples in the NT would be certain cases where extra-biblical sources are brought in (which were often earlier attempts at harmonising the OT).
So it's not necessary to the core of 1 Corinthians 10 to believe that the rock that Moses struck literally followed the Israelites from place to place as they moved around the desert. Similarly, one does not have to accept that Michael and Satan literally argued over the corpse of Moses in order to accept the overall argument of Jude.
Absolutely agreed, Chris.
My confusion was principally over what point no prophet's was making by that comment in relation to his argument about the (im)plausibility of Jesus's post-Resurrection teaching to the Apostles.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
Colour is one of those in-built human perceptions which are easily deceived. Take the famous Lotto Lab cube. I have seen it many times, I've even used computer software to prove that the centre squares of the front and top face are the same colour.
The interesting point there to me is that were that visual experience of a genuine solid object, we would be quite correct to judge that the colours were different. If that were the solid object it's imitating then the colours would be objectively different even though the effect on the retina is subjectively the same. It's only because the colours have been created by an aberrant route that we're judging wrongly.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
The interesting point there to me is that were that visual experience of a genuine solid object, we would be quite correct to judge that the colours were different. If that were the solid object it's imitating then the colours would be objectively different even though the effect on the retina is subjectively the same. It's only because the colours have been created by an aberrant route that we're judging wrongly.
Really? I've never heard that to be the case. I don't think this is anything about the fact it is on the screen and everything about the shadows in the picture.
[ 19. May 2016, 10:32: Message edited by: mr cheesy ]
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
I've never heard that to be the case. I don't think this is anything about the fact it is on the screen and everything about the shadows in the picture.
We're back to the difference between fictional representations and real objects. Those aren't real shadows in the picture. They're imitations of shadows made by selecting darker colours to represent the side in shadow than the lighter colours used to represent the brightly-lit top.
To represent yellow on the side in shadow one has to use a darker shade than would be used on the top; it's been set up so that the darker shade used to represent yellow on the side is the same that represents a dark brown on the top.
The fact that it's a screen doesn't matter - you could reproduce it on a painting. But it does have to be an imitation of a shadow rather than the real thing. I apologise if I'm pointing out the obvious.
[ 19. May 2016, 14:51: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
We're back to the difference between fictional representations and real objects. Those aren't real shadows in the picture. They're imitations of shadows made by selecting darker colours to represent the side in shadow than the lighter colours used to represent the brightly-lit top.
To represent yellow on the side in shadow one has to use a darker shade than would be used on the top; it's been set up so that the darker shade used to represent yellow on the side is the same that represents a dark brown on the top.
The fact that it's a screen doesn't matter - you could reproduce it on a painting. But it does have to be an imitation of a shadow rather than the real thing. I apologise if I'm pointing out the obvious.
I think you are missing the point. It might be a set-up, but it illustrates something about perspective. If the thing had been set up in the same way in "real life" it would still work.
Anyway, even that doesn't really matter. The fact is still the same - namely that in this specific set of circumstances, we are deceived by our perceptions of colour on the screen.
And there is plenty of evidence to suggest that there are forms of systematic bias that mean we are subject to all kinds of subjectivity in the rest of our lives, so that when we think we're able to objectively assess something - such as colour in this example - we can't.
Saying that one can be objective about a room one knows well is clearly wrong.
Posted by no prophet's flag is set so... (# 15560) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Chesterbelloc:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
How about, as I also noted earlier in this thread, neither complete acceptance nor rejection?
I've no real idea of what you mean by that.
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
When people begin to quote doctrinal stuff, I gather the separation of sheep and goats is afoot.
Likewise confused by this. What I did (if this is directed at me) was cite a document that encapsulates my and many millions of other Catholics' understanding of the historicity of documents to which you deny any historicity. Why is explaining my take on the issues separating livestock any more than you expressing yours is?
And I still don't see why, in the context of "the info we have", Jesus continuing to teach and enlighten His apostles after His resurrection is so very unlikely. There's a very long (i.e., dating back to apostolic times) tradition to that effect. And as Freddy says, why strain at the gnat of that after swallowing the camel of the scriptural Resurrection and post-R accounts?
Your statements provide a much more strident and rigid perspective.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
:
Other forms of subjective bias which have nothing to do with colour include Hyperbolic discounting - ie the tendency to favour a short term gain over a longer term but bigger gain.
And there is also a lot of evidence that we tend to make up excuses or justifications to persuade ourselves that we're making rational and objective choices when in fact we're just choosing jam today over jam tomorrow.
Posted by Barnabas62 (# 9110) on
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The journey towards objectivity is a collective one. As individuals, we need to be aware of our fallibility and in particular, the fact that we can't see our own blind spots.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by no prophet's flag is set so...:
Your statements provide a much more strident and rigid perspective.
That's not really very fair. Clearly CB is working from a different frame of reference from you, but that doesn't make his perspective "strident and rigid" compared to (presumably) your moderate and flexible perspective.
We're talking about something that happened a very long time ago and then making assessments based on who we trust.
CB has said that he trusts that the church retained accurately the things that Christ taught in the post-resurrection period. That's something of a pre-requisite for his position, so it wouldn't make a lot of sense if he actually believed that the church had made it all up.
An alternative is to try to read the text and make judgements about whether the church would have been capable of keeping that truth, whether the bible would look the way it does if Christ had taught these things, whether the church would.. blahdiblah.
That might be a reasonable, logical and explainable position, but is still based on a lack of information. And requires a level of rigidity and prerequisite refusal to believe the church's historic claims.
Posted by Chesterbelloc (# 3128) on
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Thank you, mr cheesy - I couldn't have put it better myself.
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by mr cheesy:
And there is plenty of evidence to suggest that there are forms of systematic bias that mean we are subject to all kinds of subjectivity in the rest of our lives, so that when we think we're able to objectively assess something - such as colour in this example - we can't.
If so, how would we know?
quote:
Saying that one can be objective about a room one knows well is clearly wrong.
If you don't hack your shins on the furniture every time you walk across it you're being objective about it.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
If so, how would we know?
We can't. That's part of the problem.
quote:
f you don't hack your shins on the furniture every time you walk across it you're being objective about it.
It wouldn't take very much to show that I couldn't walk across the room without hacking my shins. For example me having a stroke, becoming blind, losing my memory.
Hence the interaction I have with the room is subject to me having certain abilities in the way I engage with it.
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on
:
Sorry I might have misunderstood the first question: we can know because we can design experiments which can overcome our inbuilt biases. Such as a computer which can accurately measure the colour in an image which our eyes cannot.
But on another level, we're engaging with these experiments with our subjective selves, so even the way we understand those might be subject to bias we haven't thought of yet.
Which is to circle back to what I posted originally in this thread - there are levels of bias and subjectivity on top of others in terms of our perception.
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