 |
|
|
|
|
| |
|
Source: (consider it)
|
Thread: Purgatory: What's the point of anger, protests, indignation, petitions and justice...
|
angelfish
Shipmate
# 8884
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by tclune:
quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
[qb] No, they are the hallmarks of somebody thinking something is, as you put it, "right and true".
No they are not. Anyone who, e.g., took delight in executing a murderer would probably be seen as unfit for the job, even by those people who believe that executing, say, the Colorado shooter is right and true.
That's because anyone who takes delight in the death of another human is sick and goes against the instincts of even those who espouse the view that state execution is right, which proves my point nicely, thank you.
quote:
The plain fact is that anything that we find delightful is not moral. It may not be immoral, but morality only applies to those things that we would not care to do otherwise.
By your definition, it would be impossible for a saint, being one who delights in God's ways, to do anything moral, ever. Was Jesus amoral when he endured the cross "for the joy set before him"? God has made us in His image, so we rightly delight in that which is good and are repelled by that which is evil. This is the very basis of our moral compass. That isn't to say that we cannot enjoy immoral acts (obviously we all do), but greater joy is found in doing what is right.
--------------------
"As God is my witness, I WILL kick Bishop Brennan up the arse!"
Posts: 1017 | From: England | Registered: Dec 2004
| IP: Logged
|
|
Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by tclune:
Doing what you want to do anyway is hardly a virtue -- it's just a pleasure.
The definition of acting out of a virtue is that you do the moral thing and the moral thing is what you want to do. Someone who doesn't want to do the moral thing but does it anyway is merely enkratic, that is, self-controlled or strong-willed.
There are moral systems that disagree - basically ones influenced by stoicism - but they're not moral systems that have much use for the concept of virtues.
It comes down to what you think morality is about. Those who stoically think it's about the exercise of the individual soul in a corrupt world tend to think that acting against inclination is virtuous. Those who Aristotelianly think that morality is about seeking the common good think that the common good is better sought when it's enjoyed as a good rather than merely adhered to grudgingly.
--------------------
we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
| IP: Logged
|
|
Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
From what I can understand of EE's point, it's that there's no such thing as a "personal moral code", there's just one universal morality that everyone follows to a greater or lesser extent.
It only makes sense to talk about a personal moral code if a personal moral code is an attempt to follow a universal morality.
If something is personal but not an attempt to follow a universal morality, then it's not a moral code. A vegetarian who doesn't eat meat because he's uncomfortable with the idea of eating things with faces is in exactly the same boat as a vegetarian who doesn't eat meat because she doesn't like the taste of meat. Unless the first vegetarian thinks other people should also be following his code it makes no sense to say that he is following a moral code any more than the second vegetarian is.
--------------------
we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
| IP: Logged
|
|
tclune
Shipmate
# 7959
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
Was Jesus amoral when he endured the cross "for the joy set before him"?
Rather than relying on the weird logic of Hebrews, I would prefer to look to the words of Christ Himself. They reflect a pretty direct expression of what moral action is about. Or so ISTM.
BTW, I would readily agree that, as we move toward theosis, we have less need of morality -- we choose what is Godly as being what is our pleasure. But I hasten to add that my personal sense of a Godly source of what is right is just that -- my personal sense. I continue to argue that we need not have such a sense to be able to claim that morality need not be either Godly or just an individual bias. EE's position continues to be without merit, even if I agree with him... ![[Big Grin]](biggrin.gif)
--Tom Clune
[ 30. July 2012, 21:41: Message edited by: tclune ]
--------------------
This space left blank intentionally.
Posts: 8013 | From: Western MA | Registered: Jul 2004
| IP: Logged
|
|
Marvin the Martian
Interplanetary
# 4360
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Unless the first vegetarian thinks other people should also be following his code it makes no sense to say that he is following a moral code any more than the second vegetarian is.
Are you suggesting that we can only be said to have a moral code if we seek to make others follow it? Is it not enough to simply follow it ourselves without seeking to convert anyone else?
--------------------
Hail Gallaxhar
Posts: 30100 | From: Adrift on a sea of surreality | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged
|
|
EtymologicalEvangelical
Shipmate
# 15091
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Perhaps you should explain why morality is an exception?
Morality concerns how people relate to one another. Therefore personal taste, which is individualistic, is irrelevant to the argument.
But even if your examples are relevant, I still can't see why you can't give at least one moral example, given that this is what the thread is actually about. It does seem odd - and rather telling - that you are not able to do this.
quote:
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
I explained right at the beginning of this thread that it is nonsense to compare moral issues with personal tastes.
No you didn't. What you said in the OP boils down to "because we feel really strongly about (some) moral issues, they must therefore be based on an independent and objective standard".
The logic there is sketchy, to say the least.
Actually I did. Allow me to quote the relevant section:
quote:
If morality is merely a matter of opinion, merely a matter of taste (even "collective taste", aka consensus), then moral indignation could be likened to my feeling incensed at someone for eating broad beans (which I happen to dislike) and not broccoli (which I happen to like). And those greedy bankers committing fraud are only "eating their broad beans", and therefore it seems rather childish and churlish of me to feel any kind of indignation at their behaviour, if morality really is nothing more than a matter of personal opinion!
How is that not an example of saying that it is "nonsense to compare moral issues with personal tastes"?
quote:
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
Personal taste is something of no relevance to anyone else. Morality is.
This is an interesting thing for you to have said. Why is your personal moral code any more relevant to me than your taste in clothes or music?
OK, so someone says to me that he prefers Coldplay to Keane. Big deal. I may be interested in his preference, and I may be interested in his reasons for it. But his preference makes no difference to me or my life for good or for ill.
Now suppose he then says that he holds to a particular view of, say, censorship, which is different from mine (let's say that he favours greater restrictions). And suppose his particular view directly affects me and my freedom of speech (for example, suppose he is in some form of leadership in the church I attend). Clearly his moral preference - or "moral taste" - is in a completely different category to his opinion about the respective musical merits of Coldplay and Keane!
And suppose his moral position does not affect me directly? Well, it can still affect me indirectly, because we all make moral contributions to the way society is. So his moral view is of far more importance to me personally than his taste in music or art (unless that also has a moral dimension, for example, he expresses delight in songs whose lyrics mock something which is important to me).
quote:
I've long suspected that the underlying question behind all this is not so much "how can we know what's good if morality is all in our heads", but "how can we get others to convert to our moral code without an external authority with which to convince them". This comment of yours seems to support that view.
You are, of course, free to suspect whatever you like. But I'm afraid I can't understand your concern. How on earth am I "trying to get others" to do anything? I can't force anyone to do anything, and neither do I want to.
As a matter of fact, I am arguing against the coherence of naturalistic moral thinking. The target is the philosophy of naturalism, which I regard as utterly untrue, and I am seeking to show how the reality of our moral sense and actions underlines the falsity of this philosophy. I am satisfied in my own mind as to the legitimacy of my viewpoint, because I have not seen any convincing argument to the contrary. If others happen to disagree, then that is their right. I cannot "force" others to think as I do, and the reverse is also true.
--------------------
You can argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome': but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome, but I'm not saying this is true'. CS Lewis
Posts: 3625 | From: South Coast of England | Registered: Sep 2009
| IP: Logged
|
|
Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
Are you suggesting that we can only be said to have a moral code if we seek to make others follow it? Is it not enough to simply follow it ourselves without seeking to convert anyone else?
Somebody has some code of conduct. What makes their code of conduct a moral code and not some other kind of code?
Or why, apart from inertia, would someone who thinks that moral codes are personal preferences talk about morality at all?
I don't like wearing shorts. I might rationalise this by saying that I don't think my legs look good in them, but as I haven't worn shorts since I was at primary school I wouldn't know. I just don't like them. But nobody would call that part of my moral code. But why isn't it part of my moral code? By contrast we can imagine someone who thinks shorts cause lust in the onlookers or are disrespectful and are therefore immoral and for whom that is a moral code. What makes their objection part of their moral code and my objection not part of mine?
If you're a realist about morality the answer is in principle straightforward: opinions are moral if they're trying rightly or wrongly to be about moral facts whatever constitutes those. But if there are no moral facts other than what people think there are, why would people start talking as if there were in the first place? Especially given all the inconveniences if people then start going around seeking to make other people follow their moral codes? The only plausible non-realist answer is that seeking to make / persuade other people follow your moral code is not a bug of moral codes but a feature. It's the explanation and justification for talking about morality at all.
--------------------
we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
| IP: Logged
|
|
Marvin the Martian
Interplanetary
# 4360
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Perhaps you should explain why morality is an exception?
Morality concerns how people relate to one another. Therefore personal taste, which is individualistic, is irrelevant to the argument.
Why is it? One person prefers to be related to in one way, another in another. That's just a matter of taste, but it's also a fundamental part of how people relate to one another.
quote:
But even if your examples are relevant, I still can't see why you can't give at least one moral example, given that this is what the thread is actually about. It does seem odd - and rather telling - that you are not able to do this.
Sigh. Ok fine.
Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good charity is? No. But people still think one charity is better than another.
Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good contraception is? No. But people still hold strong views on both sides.
Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good the death penalty is? No. But people still hold strong views on both sides.
Is there, for that matter, an independent standard by which to measure how good religion is? No. But people still hold very strong views on all sides.
quote:
Actually I did. Allow me to quote the relevant section:
quote:
If morality is merely a matter of opinion, merely a matter of taste (even "collective taste", aka consensus), then moral indignation could be likened to my feeling incensed at someone for eating broad beans (which I happen to dislike) and not broccoli (which I happen to like). And those greedy bankers committing fraud are only "eating their broad beans", and therefore it seems rather childish and churlish of me to feel any kind of indignation at their behaviour, if morality really is nothing more than a matter of personal opinion!
How is that not an example of saying that it is "nonsense to compare moral issues with personal tastes"?
You're saying it's rather childish and churlish to insist on your own moral code being seen as universal, and I agree with you.
But "childish and churlish" isn't the same thing as "nonsense". Not by a long chalk.
quote:
OK, so someone says to me that he prefers Coldplay to Keane. Big deal. I may be interested in his preference, and I may be interested in his reasons for it. But his preference makes no difference to me or my life for good or for ill.
Now suppose he then says that he holds to a particular view of, say, censorship, which is different from mine (let's say that he favours greater restrictions). And suppose his particular view directly affects me and my freedom of speech (for example, suppose he is in some form of leadership in the church I attend). Clearly his moral preference - or "moral taste" - is in a completely different category to his opinion about the respective musical merits of Coldplay and Keane!
Why would you let such a person be in a position of power over you? Ignore them. Find a new church. Organise enough like-minded people from the church to oust the censorship-loving leader.
And I'm not sure, in the example you've cited, that it is any different to his views on music. What if you're an avid Keane fan but the Coldplay-loving church leader declares Keane to be Abomination and commands you to burn your concert tickets and all your CDs?
quote:
The target is the philosophy of naturalism, which I regard as utterly untrue, and I am seeking to show how the reality of our moral sense and actions underlines the falsity of this philosophy.
You're backing the wrong horse then. Nobody in this argument is denying that our moral senses and actions exist. We're arguing about where they come from.
--------------------
Hail Gallaxhar
Posts: 30100 | From: Adrift on a sea of surreality | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged
|
|
Marvin the Martian
Interplanetary
# 4360
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
The only plausible non-realist answer is that seeking to make / persuade other people follow your moral code is not a bug of moral codes but a feature. It's the explanation and justification for talking about morality at all.
I understand the definition that you're putting forth there, but I'm not sure it tells the whole story. I mean, part of my moral code is the belief that it's good to go to church regularly, but I'm not seeking to make/persuade anyone else to do so if they don't want to. Does that mean my belief about churchgoing isn't actually a moral one?
In essence, by drawing this distinction between codes of conduct and morality you're implicitly coming down on my side of the argument about whether morality is objective or subjective. After all, if the only difference between morality and personal preference is whether we think others should agree with us or not then there's no actual difference in kind between the two types of preference. If I were to insist that everyone in the world should like Coldplay that would be a moral opinion, and if I happen to prefer not robbing people but don't care whether anyone else does then that wouldn't be a moral opinion!
--------------------
Hail Gallaxhar
Posts: 30100 | From: Adrift on a sea of surreality | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged
|
|
orfeo
Ship's Musical Counterpoint
# 13878
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Perhaps you should explain why morality is an exception?
Morality concerns how people relate to one another.
Eh?
Oh good. Any sins I commit in the privacy of my own home (I live alone), aren't actually sins any more.
--------------------
Technology has brought us all closer together. Turns out a lot of the people you meet as a result are complete idiots.
Posts: 18173 | From: Under | Registered: Jul 2008
| IP: Logged
|
|
EtymologicalEvangelical
Shipmate
# 15091
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
Oh good. Any sins I commit in the privacy of my own home (I live alone), aren't actually sins any more.
And what "sins" would they be, that really do not and could not have any effect whatsoever on anyone else?
Stealing from yourself, perhaps?
Envying yourself?
Beating yourself up?
I wouldn't want you to embarrass yourself by actually answering my question, but I do find it hard to comprehend how an action that has absolutely no negative effect on another person could be called a sin. In fact, my third example above would most likely affect others, because such an action, if discovered, could upset and grieve a loved one.
Of course, there is also the question of whether to count God as a person in this argument.
"No man is an island..."
--------------------
You can argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome': but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome, but I'm not saying this is true'. CS Lewis
Posts: 3625 | From: South Coast of England | Registered: Sep 2009
| IP: Logged
|
|
Jay-Emm
Shipmate
# 11411
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
Sigh. Ok fine.
Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good charity is? No. But people still think one charity is better than another.
Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good contraception is? No. But people still hold strong views on both sides.
Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good the death penalty is? No. But people still hold strong views on both sides.
Is there, for that matter, an independent standard by which to measure how good religion is? No. But people still hold very strong views on all sides.
Aren't you begging the question a little there?
To take the trivial case there might be no independent standard for how good religion is, but there might be (for want of a crude character if I die and come back a tortoise, Christianity wasn't a good religion, if I die and that's it it's a bit more complicated). We don't know that it exists and we definitely don't know what it is (else we wouldn't be arguing).
Charity (if we're arguing about which charities are better) you can measure by money getting to it's target, lives improved. The platonic perfect charity would be one where you gave your penny and world hunger was solved, cat's lived a perfect life...).
In reality we have to guess our position (and kind of by definition at equilibrium all charities should be equal, and we have 'fraudsters' and the world is constantly changing and ... so we'd expect a tough choice).
That kind of relates to how good A charity is.
Of course we have to decide that giving some money is 'better' than spending it in the pub or funding a law against charity posters. Which is pretty much a subset of "Is morality objective" in particular "is the statement 'morality is objective and there exists a situation in which it is better to give than not to give'".
You may be right in your assertion (if the A was intentionally absent) but the debate is happening because people are behaving as though they are acting as if they expect others believe you are wrong. This could be because this behaviour gives the 'nicest' outcomes than a more cynical view.
Posts: 1643 | Registered: May 2006
| IP: Logged
|
|
Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
I mean, part of my moral code is the belief that it's good to go to church regularly, but I'm not seeking to make/persuade anyone else to do so if they don't want to. Does that mean my belief about churchgoing isn't actually a moral one?
I don't see why it would be a moral belief or part of a moral code. I also think it's a good thing to go to church regularly but I don't think merely going makes me or anyone else who goes regularly a better person than someone who doesn't go.
quote:
In essence, by drawing this distinction between codes of conduct and morality you're implicitly coming down on my side of the argument about whether morality is objective or subjective.
I was explicitly postulating that your side of the argument is correct.
As I said, if morality is 'objective' or realist then you can draw the distinction by reference to what the code is about. There is morality; moral codes are different from aesthetic codes etc by the person who has then thinking that they're about morality. It's only if we suppose that morality is not 'objective' that the question arises.
--------------------
we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
| IP: Logged
|
|
Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
|
Posted
quote:
As a matter of fact, I am arguing against the coherence of naturalistic moral thinking. The target is the philosophy of naturalism, which I regard as utterly untrue, and I am seeking to show how the reality of our moral sense and actions underlines the falsity of this philosophy.
Not the toughest of gigs given the demographics here and even then you've not been conspicuously successful. Your argument rests on a simple appeal to consequence - you say (albeit dressed up in a rhetorical question) that there has to be an objective standard of morality because without it moral judgements are incoherent. Well, reality, sorry, REALITY, doesn't have to abide by your "subjective" desire for coherence. If it turns out that there is no "objective" standard (not that we'll ever be sure one way or another) then we would just have to get by without one. Pretty much as we do now, as it goes. ![[Biased]](wink.gif)
--------------------
For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
| IP: Logged
|
|
orfeo
Ship's Musical Counterpoint
# 13878
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
Oh good. Any sins I commit in the privacy of my own home (I live alone), aren't actually sins any more.
And what "sins" would they be, that really do not and could not have any effect whatsoever on anyone else?
Stealing from yourself, perhaps?
Envying yourself?
Beating yourself up?
I wouldn't want you to embarrass yourself by actually answering my question, but I do find it hard to comprehend how an action that has absolutely no negative effect on another person could be called a sin. In fact, my third example above would most likely affect others, because such an action, if discovered, could upset and grieve a loved one.
Of course, there is also the question of whether to count God as a person in this argument.
"No man is an island..."
If I spend an extra 5 minutes in bed giving myself an orgasm while lusting after Brad Pitt, who gets hurt?
And yes I did make this example up.
--------------------
Technology has brought us all closer together. Turns out a lot of the people you meet as a result are complete idiots.
Posts: 18173 | From: Under | Registered: Jul 2008
| IP: Logged
|
|
Boogie
Boogie on down!
# 13538
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
Well, reality, sorry, REALITY, doesn't have to abide by your "subjective" desire for coherence. If it turns out that there is no "objective" standard (not that we'll ever be sure one way or another) then we would just have to get by without one. Pretty much as we do now, as it goes.
Exactly!
We get by whether we believe God is the origin of morality or not. And those without a faith get by just as well as those with one (often better).
--------------------
Garden. Room. Walk
Posts: 13030 | From: Boogie Wonderland | Registered: Mar 2008
| IP: Logged
|
|
Marvin the Martian
Interplanetary
# 4360
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
Aren't you begging the question a little there?
I don't think so, no.
quote:
To take the trivial case there might be no independent standard for how good religion is, but there might be (for want of a crude character if I die and come back a tortoise, Christianity wasn't a good religion, if I die and that's it it's a bit more complicated).
There might be an independent standard for anything. It's theoretically possible that such a standard could exist for whether you should put your right shoe on before your left shoe. But I think most people would agree that it doesn't.
quote:
We don't know that it exists and we definitely don't know what it is (else we wouldn't be arguing).
Which is functionally the same as saying "there isn't one".
quote:
Charity (if we're arguing about which charities are better) you can measure by money getting to it's target, lives improved.
You could. You could also measure art by how accurate a representation of the subject it is, but nobody would suggest that that's a genuine objective standard by which all art should be measured.
quote:
You may be right in your assertion (if the A was intentionally absent) but the debate is happening because people are behaving as though they are acting as if they expect others believe you are wrong. This could be because this behaviour gives the 'nicest' outcomes than a more cynical view.
People generally act as if it can be assumed that others will agree with them because that's actually the case. Lots of people agree about lots of things to do with morality, but that in itself doesn't tell us anything other than the fact that lots of people agree about those things. Something can be a near-universal standard without it implying anything about the existence of independent standards.
--------------------
Hail Gallaxhar
Posts: 30100 | From: Adrift on a sea of surreality | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged
|
|
EtymologicalEvangelical
Shipmate
# 15091
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
OK, so someone says to me that he prefers Coldplay to Keane. Big deal. I may be interested in his preference, and I may be interested in his reasons for it. But his preference makes no difference to me or my life for good or for ill.
Now suppose he then says that he holds to a particular view of, say, censorship, which is different from mine (let's say that he favours greater restrictions). And suppose his particular view directly affects me and my freedom of speech (for example, suppose he is in some form of leadership in the church I attend). Clearly his moral preference - or "moral taste" - is in a completely different category to his opinion about the respective musical merits of Coldplay and Keane!
Why would you let such a person be in a position of power over you? Ignore them. Find a new church. Organise enough like-minded people from the church to oust the censorship-loving leader.
And I'm not sure, in the example you've cited, that it is any different to his views on music. What if you're an avid Keane fan but the Coldplay-loving church leader declares Keane to be Abomination and commands you to burn your concert tickets and all your CDs?
The original point was whether there is a fundamental difference between an issue of personal taste and a moral issue. That is the point I was making.
The question of how I would relate to the censorious church leader concerns my response to the moral issue, and you are absolutely right in saying that I should not let such a person have any influence over me (which, as it happens, is the approach I have taken in my various dealings with manipulative church leaders over many years). This kind of moral issue therefore provokes a response from me.
But his view on music is entirely different unless he turns that into a moral issue that really has nothing to do with the two bands in question. If our taste in music differed and he tried to impose his personal view on me, then it's no longer a mere matter of personal taste, but a question of his view of authority over me within the context of the life of the church.
If this person believed that he was "right" to relate to me in this way, then presumably he would not accept my argument that my moral position was different and therefore as valid as his. No. He would "universalise" his moral position, in order to justify imposing it on me.
And this is the whole point of what I have been trying to say. If someone has a moral position and seeks to apply it, and to protest against the contrary position, then that person must believe that his position is universally "right" (even if "universal" is taken to mean "within the entirety of a particular context"). To say that "I believe my position should be adopted by others, and I am angry, frustrated and indignant that it is not" while at the same time believing that all moral positions are ultimately entirely subjective, is a nonsense. A person has to universalise his moral position in order to apply it and argue for it.
Now, of course, all moral positions cannot be objectively true, because many positions contradict each other - even within the same context. But a moral position has to be believed to be universally valid (taking context into account) in order for it to work as a moral position. You clearly don't see this.
Let me give you an example from America (and it's a moral issue you suggested in the post to which I am responding).
As you know, there are states which have abolished the death penalty and others which have not.
A person living in, say, North Dakota may believe that it is right that his state has abolished the death penalty, because he believes in the validity of moral consensus, but he also respects the right of the people of South Dakota to retain this punishment. Perhaps he holds to a view of morality which is ultimately subjective, and he is someone who has the integrity to try to live consistently with his philosophy.
Now suppose this person is a campaigner for the abolition of the death penalty and he frequently travels to South Dakota to argue his case. I can accept that he could campaign consistently with his moral philosophy by saying that the abolition of the death penalty is merely a matter of opinion, and that the alternative is morally just as valid (which is the implication of his philosophy of morality), but he is acting in a way that is consistent with democracy (but actually this implies that the idea of democracy has become his moral absolute). In other words, he just wants other people to choose to agree with his opinion. Yes, I can see the logic of that. Such a campaign would be about as morally insipid as having a friendly chat about the relative merits of Coldplay or Keane.
But what makes no sense at all is the idea that one can hold to a subjectivist moral philosophy, and then move from the mere expression of an opinion to serious protest and moral outrage. It really is absurd for the North Dakotan anti-death penalty campaigner to start waving placards around south of the state line and shouting and screaming about how utterly vile and appalling the death penalty is, while also holding to a moral philosophy which implies that such an "unacceptable" opinion is actually just as valid as his own. Perhaps you just don't see the cognitive dissonance in this, which to me is as clear as daylight!
Such a situation would be as absurd as protesting and expressing moral outrage that anyone should prefer Keane to Coldplay or should prefer broad beans to broccoli.
I can see that we're going nowhere fast with this discussion, but I just can't see what argument anyone could present to me that would persuade me that the above "protest scenario" is remotely valid.
Now let us suppose that the philosophy of naturalism is true (not something I accept), and that we are what we are because of the way matter has happened to organise itself over millions of years - a process which is inherently amoral and mindless. If this is the case, then any moral viewpoint is subjective (unless it can be shown that there is a moral code imprinted on the fundamental structure of matter - good luck to anyone who thinks they can prove that idea!).
But morality can only work in reality if there is a belief (whether held subconsciously or not) that there exists some kind of universal validity to it. Moral outrage and a strong sense of what constitutes "fairness" is essential to the proper functioning of morality (which is clearly in evidence in the attitudes of many die hard atheists, such as Dawkins). But such a moral sense at least tacitly implies an acceptance that morality is not entirely subjective, as I have argued above.
This is a paradox if naturalism is true. It seems strange that a philosophy can be true which is unworkable (and this is especially true of naturalism, which bases its validity on what works - hence the epistemology of the scientific method at the heart of the claim of this philosophy). This worldview just does not fit reality. If the entire population of the world suddenly converted to philosophical naturalism overnight, you can be sure that some kind of "religious" - or metaphysically authoritative - viewpoints would emerge by necessity over a period of time. It just does not make sense to say that everybody can just "do their own thing" and society would function. Of course, one could argue that naturalism could function with a "might is right" ethic, but I thought that was supposed to be the problem with religious morality! Anyway, imposed morality does not resolve the philosophical problem, so it's irrelevant from the point of view of apologetics.
My conclusion is that the functioning of morality constitutes evidence that the philosophy of naturalism (and the moral subjectivism that necessarily flows from it) does not fit reality, which thus calls into question its truth claim.
--------------------
You can argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome': but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome, but I'm not saying this is true'. CS Lewis
Posts: 3625 | From: South Coast of England | Registered: Sep 2009
| IP: Logged
|
|
Marvin the Martian
Interplanetary
# 4360
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
And this is the whole point of what I have been trying to say. If someone has a moral position and seeks to apply it, and to protest against the contrary position, then that person must believe that his position is universally "right" (even if "universal" is taken to mean "within the entirety of a particular context"). To say that "I believe my position should be adopted by others, and I am angry, frustrated and indignant that it is not" while at the same time believing that all moral positions are ultimately entirely subjective, is a nonsense.
I see no inconsistency between claiming that moral positions are purely the product of the human mind and saying that some moral positions are better than others.
You seem to be arguing that "subjective" means "everything is of equal value". That argument simply is not true.
I said that on page 1.
quote:
Now, of course, all moral positions cannot be objectively true, because many positions contradict each other - even within the same context. But a moral position has to be believed to be universally valid (taking context into account) in order for it to work as a moral position. You clearly don't see this.
On the contrary, I see that perfectly well. But it says nothing about whether morality is purely the product of the human mind or the reaction of the human mind to an externally-defined standard.
quote:
A person living in, say, North Dakota may believe that it is right that his state has abolished the death penalty, because he believes in the validity of moral consensus, but he also respects the right of the people of South Dakota to retain this punishment.
That's not even a hypothetical. I live in a country that has abolished the death penalty, and am very glad to do so. But I don't campaign for those countries that retain it to abolish it as well - I respect their right to vote to retain it.
quote:
Now suppose this person is a campaigner for the abolition of the death penalty and he frequently travels to South Dakota to argue his case.
OK.
quote:
I can accept that he could campaign consistently with his moral philosophy by saying that the abolition of the death penalty is merely a matter of opinion, and that the alternative is morally just as valid
Why would he have to do so in order to remain consistent? Does someone who likes Keane have to adknowledge that liking other bands is just as valid in order to express his opinion?
quote:
In other words, he just wants other people to choose to agree with his opinion. Yes, I can see the logic of that. Such a campaign would be about as morally insipid as having a friendly chat about the relative merits of Coldplay or Keane.
"Morally insipid"? What, you mean it wouldn't interest you?
quote:
It really is absurd for the North Dakotan anti-death penalty campaigner to start waving placards around south of the state line and shouting and screaming about how utterly vile and appalling the death penalty is, while also holding to a moral philosophy which implies that such an "unacceptable" opinion is actually just as valid as his own. Perhaps you just don't see the cognitive dissonance in this, which to me is as clear as daylight!
There is no cognitive dissonance, because "morality is subjective" does not mean "all moral opinions are equally valid".
quote:
Now let us suppose that the philosophy of naturalism is true (not something I accept), and that we are what we are because of the way matter has happened to organise itself over millions of years - a process which is inherently amoral and mindless.
Yes.
quote:
If this is the case, then any moral viewpoint is subjective
Yes.
quote:
But morality can only work in reality if there is a belief (whether held subconsciously or not) that there exists some kind of universal validity to it.
Yes. But that belief is itself subjective - it is itself a product of the human mind.
quote:
Moral outrage and a strong sense of what constitutes "fairness" is essential to the proper functioning of morality (which is clearly in evidence in the attitudes of many die hard atheists, such as Dawkins).
Yes.
quote:
But such a moral sense at least tacitly implies an acceptance that morality is not entirely subjective, as I have argued above.
No it doesn't.
quote:
It just does not make sense to say that everybody can just "do their own thing" and society would function.
Nobody has said that.
quote:
Of course, one could argue that naturalism could function with a "might is right" ethic, but I thought that was supposed to be the problem with religious morality!
If you mean "consensus", then yes that's how society works in reality.
quote:
My conclusion is that the functioning of morality constitutes evidence that the philosophy of naturalism (and the moral subjectivism that necessarily flows from it) does not fit reality, which thus calls into question its truth claim.
Your conclusion, based as it is on false premises, is flawed.
--------------------
Hail Gallaxhar
Posts: 30100 | From: Adrift on a sea of surreality | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged
|
|
Marvin the Martian
Interplanetary
# 4360
|
Posted
And don;t think I haven't noticed that, after making such a ludicrously big issue out of my "inability" to provide (what you class as) moral examples of situations where it's ludicrous to say that "a" is better than "b" if there is no independent standard by which to measure one against the other, you have completely ignored the ones I did give.
I shall take that as acceptance that it is not ludicrous to say such a thing.
--------------------
Hail Gallaxhar
Posts: 30100 | From: Adrift on a sea of surreality | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged
|
|
Crœsos
Shipmate
# 238
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
But morality can only work in reality if there is a belief (whether held subconsciously or not) that there exists some kind of universal validity to it. Moral outrage and a strong sense of what constitutes "fairness" is essential to the proper functioning of morality (which is clearly in evidence in the attitudes of many die hard atheists, such as Dawkins). But such a moral sense at least tacitly implies an acceptance that morality is not entirely subjective, as I have argued above.
The idea that agreement on anything must necessarily mean that thing is imprinted in the fabric of the Universe is something you've consistently asserted, yet never really explained.
For example, one could claim that football is a sport with severe restrictions on the players' use of their hands and arms in most circumstances. Most people would regard this kind of rule as both subjective and arbitrary, yet valid within the context of football. Under your logic, this would mean that a player should be perfectly free to claim that football actually allows extensive use of hands and that his team should actually be awarded six point for the touchdown he just scored rather than suffering a penalty for use of hands.
If football is subjective, by your argument there would seem to be no impediment to officials accepting this argument. Taking it a step further, you seem to be arguing that the fact that they don't do so must mean that True Football is embedded in the underlying fabric of the Universe. In short, your argument boils down to the idea that if people can think something, it must be an underlying reality of the Universe. While this can be consistently argued, it does destroy any distinction between the categories "objective" and "subjective", with literally everything falling into the former category.
--------------------
Humani nil a me alienum puto
Posts: 10706 | From: Sardis, Lydia | Registered: May 2001
| IP: Logged
|
|
Jay-Emm
Shipmate
# 11411
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
[qb]Aren't you begging the question a little there?
I don't think so, no.
quote:
To take the trivial case there might be no independent standard for how good religion is, but there might be (for want of a crude character if I die and come back a tortoise, Christianity wasn't a good religion, if I die and that's it it's a bit more complicated).
There might be an independent standard for anything. It's theoretically possible that such a standard could exist for whether you should put your right shoe on before your left shoe. But I think most people would agree that it doesn't.
True, but also people don't behave as though it does. Which is the difference.
I can quote pretty much anyone, notably, Justanian&Boogie trivially, and with some ferreting you, although you've been very consistent here) saying things that assume the independent standard.
There are plenty of cases where our natural feelings are wrong (I'm going to mention Heliocentricism a lot).
But we can't simultaneously hold that view and sincerely campaign against a rocket to Mars because it will be hit by the Sun.
quote:
quote:
We don't know that it exists and we definitely don't know what it is (else we wouldn't be arguing).
Which is functionally the same as saying "there isn't one".
To some extent (possibly) true, but only if you define functionally to be limited.
It's a bit like saying a Ptolemic Universe is functionally the same as a Heliocentric one (or vice versa). Both are similar for what we can see, but are worlds apart if we are taken to Mars.
quote:
People generally act as if it can be assumed that others will agree with them because that's actually the case. Lots of people agree about lots of things to do with morality, but that in itself doesn't tell us anything other than the fact that lots of people agree about those things. Something can be a near-universal standard without it implying anything about the existence of independent standards.
True, which is why I put so many caveats.
people may say "it is good to give to charity*" and people may be speaking non-sense, but if it is meaningless to say "it is good to give to charity" then it is meaningless to say "it is good to give to charity".
If "it is good to give to charity" then "it is good to give to charity" and there is an objective standard that "things that are good includes giving to charity".
But if your argument with someone with someone who is arguing that "'it is good to give to charity' is a valid statement" is based around "the statement 'it is good to give to charity' is meaningless". Then I don't see how it isn't begging the question. You might be right, but it's not an argument, it's an assertion.
As well as your art comment, there was a good example about music earlier, language has some other more interesting elements. It would be interesting to examine, but I don't have the brains or the years of study for that. Though I don't intend to wimp out so will definitely think and perhaps post some scrappy thoughts later.
*You could think of plenty of situations where that statement as a blanket rule feels almost certainly false, so it does need qualifying. And as such would be an unlikely candidate as is for entry, but it was an example.
Posts: 1643 | Registered: May 2006
| IP: Logged
|
|
EtymologicalEvangelical
Shipmate
# 15091
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
The idea that agreement on anything must necessarily mean that thing is imprinted in the fabric of the Universe is something you've consistently asserted, yet never really explained.
Where have I asserted this??
I have never said any such thing, and this just shows that you have not understood my argument at all. Of course, there can be such a thing as a consensus, which is the result of subjectivism - in fact, if you had bothered to read my last post carefully you would have seen that I was acknowledging the possibility that someone could accept that the contrary positions on the death penalty that obtain in the two Dakotas were the result of subjective moral positions.
But there is a difference between accepting the rules of a consensus, which may not reflect anything about ultimate reality* and engaging in a vigorous protest against what other people have agreed is morally right. I think back to my example of the progamme Question Time, in which all but one of the panelists expressed revulsion at the views of the remaining panelist. The idea that such outrage could be built on a deep-seated belief that the objectionable panelist's views were actually as valid as their own (which would be the case if they believed morality was entirely subjective), is clearly raving lunacy.
If I take your example of football: yes, we agree that a certain code of football should be played according to certain rules. It is the nature of sport that there have to be consistent rules, otherwise fair competition is impossible. But behind this lies a consistent and universal concept of "fairness", which does reflect something about ultimate reality (nothing to do with the physical universe, of course). I have not disputed at all that there are agreed principles and methods by which this concept of fairness is expressed (and these rules may be the result of nothing more than a human consensus). But you seem intent on distorting my words in order to give the impression that I am saying something that I am clearly not saying at all. Football players accept the rules of the game, because they understand that no game would be possible without rules. That understanding flows from an acknowledgement of the universal moral concept of fairness.
Allow me also to take an example from sport. There is the very recent controversy at the Olympics concerning some badminton teams who were deliberately trying to lose games in a round robin competition in order to secure a more favourable draw in the knockout stage. This provoked outrage, although some people expressed their view online that this was legitimate, because it was a cunning tactic to try to secure the ultimate prize of a gold medal. The moral issue here does not concern the particular rules of badminton, which do not necessarily reflect anything about the fundamental nature of reality, but rather the concept of "fairness" expressed through "fair play". Why would anyone be angry with these players if everyone accepted that even the concept of fairness was entirely subjective?
If you want to try to refute my argument, at least try to resist the temptation to use a false analogy, which is what you have done.
*"Ultimate reality" is not the same as "the fabric of the universe" - this being a naturalistic concept. You must surely know that a theist does not regard "the universe" as the ultimate reality, unless you happen to be using the term in the loosest possible sense to mean "everything that exists, whether physical, spiritual, temporal and eternal".
--------------------
You can argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome': but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome, but I'm not saying this is true'. CS Lewis
Posts: 3625 | From: South Coast of England | Registered: Sep 2009
| IP: Logged
|
|
Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
|
Posted
@EE
quote:
This worldview just does not fit reality. If the entire population of the world suddenly converted to philosophical naturalism overnight, you can be sure that some kind of "religious" - or metaphysically authoritative - viewpoints would emerge by necessity over a period of time.
Which would pretty much disqualify the inventors of the new metaphysical authority from being philosophical naturalists, by definition. And if we are playing a game of predicting a theoretical future, we might expect it wouldn't be long before some men among the re-converted supernaturalists donned themselves fancy clothes and claimed a hotline to the authority, whose moral strictures might well be expected to uncannily reflect their pre-existing prejudices.
I just love half arsed thought experiments.
quote:
lies a consistent and universal concept of "fairness
Universal? In the badminton example there are at least 8 people who don't have it.
This is the most distinctive thing about the moral sense - it's a slippery customer. Most of us are considerably more aware of the failures of morality in other people than ourselves. We can act uber morally on some occasions and blatantly immorally on others. We rationalise and excuse our own failings and heap opprobrium on others for theirs. And that's before we even get to the massive disagreements about what constitutes moral behaviour.
It's almost as if we have a bunch of emotions, beliefs and behaviours that are a complex mixture of millions of years of evolution of a social species that has endowed us with an amazingly complex brain - which continues to change in reaction to its environment throughout its life - that is very effective at some things and not so effective at others; a brain that shares many characteristics with other peoples' but is also unique.
Philosophical naturalism has a problem with normative ethics - is/ought and all that. But that is not the same thing as saying it can't ever account for the presence in human beings of a somewhat inconsistent moral sense and the urge to exercise it. And whether as a philosophy it ever does will make no difference at all to the ultimate reality or the fabric of the universe, because as Justinian has said on here a few times recently, the map is not the territory.
But that's another argument.
--------------------
For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
| IP: Logged
|
|
Marvin the Martian
Interplanetary
# 4360
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
people may say "it is good to give to charity*" and people may be speaking non-sense, but if it is meaningless to say "it is good to give to charity" then it is meaningless to say "it is good to give to charity".
"Subjective" does not mean "meaningless".
quote:
If "it is good to give to charity" then "it is good to give to charity" and there is an objective standard that "things that are good includes giving to charity".
Some people think it's good to give to charity. Others think it's not good. There are more people in the first category, which means that an internal societal standard that it's good to give to charity becomes established. Once said internal societal standard is established, people start arguing that it's good to give to charity as if that's a given - as if it's an independent objective standard, if you will. But that doesn't mean it is an independent objective standard - it's just an internal subjective standard that lots of people happen to agree with.
--------------------
Hail Gallaxhar
Posts: 30100 | From: Adrift on a sea of surreality | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged
|
|
Marvin the Martian
Interplanetary
# 4360
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
...a deep-seated belief that the objectionable panelist's views were actually as valid as their own (which would be the case if they believed morality was entirely subjective)...
How many times do I have to refute this interpretation of what "subjective" means before you'll stop asserting it as if it were an obvious truth? It's been the bedrock of your argument since page 1, but it's quite simply false.
--------------------
Hail Gallaxhar
Posts: 30100 | From: Adrift on a sea of surreality | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged
|
|
Jay-Emm
Shipmate
# 11411
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
people may say "it is good to give to charity*" and people may be speaking non-sense, but if it is meaningless to say "it is good to give to charity" then it is meaningless to say "it is good to give to charity".
"Subjective" does not mean "meaningless".
No, but it means that a statement such as that is meaningless without reference to a subject. There may be an implicit one (but there has to be one).
Unless you are using an odd definition of subjective/objective. Maybe we should restart defining terms. But your last phrase is indicative of us using the same language
(if it is subjective) "it's just an internal subjective standard that lots of people happen to agree with"
quote:
quote:
If "it is good to give to charity" then "it is good to give to charity" and there is an objective standard that "things that are good includes giving to charity".
Some people think it's good to give to charity. Others think it's not good. There are more people in the first category, which means that an internal societal standard that it's good to give to charity becomes established. Once said internal societal standard is established, people start arguing that it's good to give to charity as if that's a given - as if it's an independent objective standard, if you will. But that doesn't mean it is an independent objective standard - it's just an internal subjective standard that lots of people happen to agree with.
It's a good (and not unlikely) story as to how we've come to (mistakenly) treat a subjective criteria as objective and true. Like how we see converging lines as going in the distance. However it has consequences. Basically it's asserting we're wrong,
Or to use your words we are treating "as if it's an independent objective standard" what is "just an internal subjective standard that lots of people happen to agree with".
". Giving to charity is (without reference to anyone) good" is now meaningless (or false). We are referring to a reference that doesn't exist. Therefore anyone saying it is either ignorant, deceitful, or lazy.
". Giving to charity is (from my point of view) good"
is ok, "I find giving to charity is good", "(I predict that) X will find giving to charity is good" is ok, or ....
Which are subtly different statements.
[ 02. August 2012, 18:44: Message edited by: Jay-Emm ]
Posts: 1643 | Registered: May 2006
| IP: Logged
|
|
EtymologicalEvangelical
Shipmate
# 15091
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
...a deep-seated belief that the objectionable panelist's views were actually as valid as their own (which would be the case if they believed morality was entirely subjective)...
How many times do I have to refute this interpretation of what "subjective" means before you'll stop asserting it as if it were an obvious truth? It's been the bedrock of your argument since page 1, but it's quite simply false.
No, it's not false (although I'm not quite sure what the word "false" is supposed to mean within a subjective epistemology).
Sooo... I'll pretend that I believe that morality is subjective, but I believe that my views are more valid than someone else's without being logically inconsistent. Hmmm. Can't quite see how that works, unless I have some objective standard by which to assess the validity of our respective views. If that "standard" is merely "me", then fine. That would make me a solipsist, and I am sure I would have a very good time talking to myself. However, I am not quite sure how I would fare in the real world (that strange realm inhabited by that phenomenon known as "other people"). "Reality" is actually what I am concerned about here.
Going back to my example... so Jack Straw slams the BNP for being immoral and so on, but, of course, we all understand that "that's just Jack"! I really don't think that's a coherent basis for trying to persuade anyone. Of course, dear Jack could impose his personal, subjective, feelings-based, "what-he-had-for-breakfast-based" views on other people, but I thought that the practice of "might is right" is what you were complaining about.
So, no, you haven't refuted my argument. Not even remotely.
But if you want to claim victory, go ahead. After all... your "feelings" are obviously more valid than mine!!
![[brick wall]](graemlins/brick_wall.gif)
--------------------
You can argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome': but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome, but I'm not saying this is true'. CS Lewis
Posts: 3625 | From: South Coast of England | Registered: Sep 2009
| IP: Logged
|
|
Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Sooo... I'll pretend that I believe that morality is subjective, but I believe that my views are more valid than someone else's without being logically inconsistent. Hmmm. Can't quite see how that works, unless I have some objective standard by which to assess the validity of our respective views.
For the life of me I can't see how this is less logically consistent than believing your views are more valid than someone else's by referencing an "objective" standard that is only available for consultation in a mind. A standard is something that relies on inter-subjective agreement for it to function, but you reject intersubjective agreement as a basis of morality.
quote:
Going back to my example... so Jack Straw slams the BNP for being immoral and so on, but, of course, we all understand that "that's just Jack"! I really don't think that's a coherent basis for trying to persuade anyone.
But if there is, as you claim, an available objective standard to work to, Jack wouldn't need to persuade, because everyone would use it to come to the same conclusion. Now, you may argue, like many before you, that the objective standard is there, but our wonky reason interprets it differently. But if in the end that interpretation is all we have to go on, how does that differ from a bunch of people arguing for their own "subjective" opinion?
--------------------
For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
| IP: Logged
|
|
EtymologicalEvangelical
Shipmate
# 15091
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by grokesx
But if there is, as you claim, an available objective standard to work to, Jack wouldn't need to persuade, because everyone would use it to come to the same conclusion.
... assuming everyone was an automaton.
It's interesting that you should use this argument, because you know that not everyone comes to the same conclusion on matters which philosophical naturalism argues are objectively valid, such as certain scientific "facts". Are we really to believe that worldwide unanimity (without exception) is a necessary condition for the establishment of absolutely any fact?
If there is no objective basis to our moral sense, then when Jack Straw expressed his outrage at the views of the BNP, and sought to persuade others of the rightness of his own position, what exactly was he appealing to?
Each listener's personal moral "taste"?
or...
Each listener's basic acknowledgment of the concept of "right" and "wrong" (concepts which actually have genuine meaning)?
If the former, then what was the basis of his outrage, given that no one can be blamed for finding the views of the BNP more appetising than those of Mr Straw? In fact, it's interesting that Straw drew a distinction between the views of the BNP, on the one hand, and the differences of opinion of the "mainstream" parties, on the other. What exactly was the basis of this distinction if he was not appealing to an objective standard of morality?
Clearly the consensus behind the discussion on Question Time was that the BNP had transgressed a moral boundary, which the other parties had not done. That makes absolutely no sense if the boundary itself was merely a matter of personal taste. So it supports my point that moral discussion only makes sense with the (at least tacit) acknowledgment that there is an objective basis to our moral sense. It seems very odd that a philosophy could be true that so contradicts this requirement of reality.
quote:
Now, you may argue, like many before you, that the objective standard is there, but our wonky reason interprets it differently. But if in the end that interpretation is all we have to go on, how does that differ from a bunch of people arguing for their own "subjective" opinion?
Yes, we have different interpretations, but interpretations of what exactly?
There has to exist something objective in order for any interpretation to take place. This objective fact is our moral sense, which cannot be explained simply with reference to the laws of physics and chemisty.
Furthermore, we have freedom. But freedom has to operate within certain bounds, even if only within the limit of the principle of freedom itself.
--------------------
You can argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome': but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome, but I'm not saying this is true'. CS Lewis
Posts: 3625 | From: South Coast of England | Registered: Sep 2009
| IP: Logged
|
|
Marvin the Martian
Interplanetary
# 4360
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
Basically it's asserting we're wrong,
In the sense that there is no objectively-measurable way to prove that we're right, yes. But not in any other sense.
quote:
Or to use your words we are treating "as if it's an independent objective standard" what is "just an internal subjective standard that lots of people happen to agree with".
". Giving to charity is (without reference to anyone) good" is now meaningless (or false). We are referring to a reference that doesn't exist.
Not quite, we're referring to the 'standard' of lots and lots of people agreeing with us. Such a societal consensus can itself become a standard by which to judge individual morality, even though it's not an objective one.
--------------------
Hail Gallaxhar
Posts: 30100 | From: Adrift on a sea of surreality | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged
|
|
Marvin the Martian
Interplanetary
# 4360
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Sooo... I'll pretend that I believe that morality is subjective, but I believe that my views are more valid than someone else's without being logically inconsistent.
Why use the phrase "more valid"? I've only ever used "better".
--------------------
Hail Gallaxhar
Posts: 30100 | From: Adrift on a sea of surreality | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged
|
|
Marvin the Martian
Interplanetary
# 4360
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
If there is no objective basis to our moral sense, then when Jack Straw expressed his outrage at the views of the BNP, and sought to persuade others of the rightness of his own position, what exactly was he appealing to?
Each listener's personal moral "taste"?
Yes.
--------------------
Hail Gallaxhar
Posts: 30100 | From: Adrift on a sea of surreality | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged
|
|
Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
But if there is, as you claim, an available objective standard to work to, Jack wouldn't need to persuade, because everyone would use it to come to the same conclusion. Now, you may argue, like many before you, that the objective standard is there, but our wonky reason interprets it differently. But if in the end that interpretation is all we have to go on, how does that differ from a bunch of people arguing for their own "subjective" opinion?
I think you're being as unfair to realist theories as EE is being to non-realist theories.
The difference is surely in the means one can use for argument.
On a realist theory there are some methods that are agreed to be error-reducing: identifying and removing logical contradiction, becoming aware of personal bias, becoming aware of other points of view or of how one's views affect other people who have to live with them, and so on. Further, if someone is trying to persuade me to change my mind using such methods I have a reason to pay attention (they may be right and I wrong). So a group of realists are not reduced to just repeating themselves over and over. But some methods of persuasion are not legitimate: logical fallacies, coercion, bribery, and so on.
For non-realists everything is legitimate. That is, there are two methods of persuasion: rhetorical force (which may use the methods that realists consider reasonable or may not), and appeals to either bribery or force, carrots or sticks. If they use rhetorical force, including appeals to rational means of argument, I have reason not to listen in so far as I care about my moral opinions. It's only if the other party is capable of either rewarding me or threatening that I have reason to listen.
So thinking that realists and non-realists are in the same boat here is to claim that error-reducing moves are simply not available to the realist.
--------------------
we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
| IP: Logged
|
|
George Spigot
Outcast
# 253
|
Posted
@EtymologicalEvangelical
So imagine I'm arguing with the BNP
If as you say morals come from an objective, universal standard then what's the information flow. How does the standard get into my head?
--------------------
C.S. Lewis's Head is just a tool for the Devil. (And you can quote me on that.) ~
Philip Purser Hallard
http://www.thoughtplay.com/infinitarian/gbsfatb.html
Posts: 1625 | From: Derbyshire - England | Registered: May 2001
| IP: Logged
|
|
Ramarius
Shipmate
# 16551
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot:
@EtymologicalEvangelical
So imagine I'm arguing with the BNP
If as you say morals come from an objective, universal standard then what's the information flow. How does the standard get into my head?
It can get into your head from a number of sources - revelation, religion, atheism... The point is that there *is* an objective moral standard with concomitant repsonibilities, which continues to exist regardless of how it's found, who finds it or, indeed, if no-one finds it. Which is the other point - moral standards are discovered, and rather imperfectly at that since they are discovered through the filter of imperfect human beings. That we may have problems perfectly finding the perfection of objective morality doesn't in any way weaken the claim that objective moral duties and responsibilities are there to be found.
Personally I'd recommend some sources more than others.
--------------------
'
Posts: 950 | From: Virtually anywhere | Registered: Jul 2011
| IP: Logged
|
|
Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
I think you're being as unfair to realist theories as EE is being to non-realist theories.
Well, one grossly simplistic caricature deserves another.
quote:
On a realist theory there are some methods that are agreed to be error-reducing: identifying and removing logical contradiction, becoming aware of personal bias, becoming aware of other points of view or of how one's views affect other people who have to live with them, and so on.
I think you're doing a bit of over simplification of your own here. How does the subjectivist view that there are moral facts, but that they inhere in our minds, preclude one from removing logical contradiction or being aware of personal bias and the rest?
quote:
So a group of realists are not reduced to just repeating themselves over and over.
You might try telling one particular moral realist on here that.
--------------------
For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
| IP: Logged
|
|
Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
It's interesting that you should use this argument, because you know that not everyone comes to the same conclusion on matters which philosophical naturalism argues are objectively valid, such as certain scientific "facts".
Which ones would they, be, then? Scientific facts, that is, that are argued as "objectively valid" in the sense you are using it? (That might give us a bit of a clue about what you actually mean in all this word salad.)
quote:
Each listener's personal moral "taste"?
or...
Each listener's basic acknowledgment of the concept of "right" and "wrong" (concepts which actually have genuine meaning)?
How are you distinguishing between the two?
quote:
This objective fact is our moral sense, which cannot be explained simply with reference to the laws of physics and chemisty.
Bare assertion. Argument from ignorance. Take your pick.
--------------------
For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
| IP: Logged
|
|
Jay-Emm
Shipmate
# 11411
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
[qb]Basically it's asserting we're wrong,
In the sense that there is no objectively-measurable way to prove that we're right, yes. But not in any other sense.
I can understand that (after all it's pretty much my perspective -and EE's?). I can understand how you call it subjective*.
*it would be rather ironic as those claiming it too be subjective would be taking the basic objective reality for granted and those claiming it to be objective would be taking the subjective assessment for granted.
Alternatively I can understand your story.
But then there IS an objectively-measurable way to prove it's the majority opinion (or the enforceable opinion, or whatever...)!?
And then how are we not wrong (or speaking nonsense), in every other sense? Either you have to slavishly follow the crowd or you have a sentence like "I feel it is the desired group option of most individuals that the desired group option not held by most individuals is the desired group option held most people" or "I know my desires go against morality, which you've defined, but I don't care" or say a sentence that is in point of fact untrue.
But how do you get the two sentences together...I really don't get it and you just seem to be asserting it.
Posts: 1643 | Registered: May 2006
| IP: Logged
|
|
Crœsos
Shipmate
# 238
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
If I take your example of football: yes, we agree that a certain code of football should be played according to certain rules. It is the nature of sport that there have to be consistent rules, otherwise fair competition is impossible. But behind this lies a consistent and universal concept of "fairness", which does reflect something about ultimate reality (nothing to do with the physical universe, of course). I have not disputed at all that there are agreed principles and methods by which this concept of fairness is expressed (and these rules may be the result of nothing more than a human consensus).
So two teams of eleven facing off against each other is "objectively fair", but twelve vs. twelve or ten vs. ten is "unfair" in some objective sense derived from underlying reality?
I'm having trouble with the concept that thing which seem to be the products of the human mind (moral codes, the rules of football, the Law of the Sea Treaty, etc.) are really akin to physical artifacts, not invented but "discovered". It's especially hard to take given that you don't seem to have any consistent method of recognizing such artifacts. You seem consistent in your assertion that Jack Straw's morality is "real" but the BNP's isn't but don't give us any explanation as to how you arrived at that conclusion other than personal preference, something the BNP speaker could claim just as easily.
--------------------
Humani nil a me alienum puto
Posts: 10706 | From: Sardis, Lydia | Registered: May 2001
| IP: Logged
|
|
George Spigot
Outcast
# 253
|
Posted
I think it's more likely that morals come from people who decided to live together in groups as has been mentioned before in this thread. You start way back in time with people who decided to live together in community's for obviously reasons. You can defend against animals and bandits, work the environment to get greater returns of food etc.
The community where members help each other is going to thrive while the community where people murder each other in the streets is going to die off.
Eventually as community's get larger and larger people realise that certain modes of behaviour have big advantages and people start to talk about actions that are good or bad.
In short first comes the community from which grows a moral standard rather than the moral standard existing first then people forming a community.
--------------------
C.S. Lewis's Head is just a tool for the Devil. (And you can quote me on that.) ~
Philip Purser Hallard
http://www.thoughtplay.com/infinitarian/gbsfatb.html
Posts: 1625 | From: Derbyshire - England | Registered: May 2001
| IP: Logged
|
|
Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
On a realist theory there are some methods that are agreed to be error-reducing: identifying and removing logical contradiction, becoming aware of personal bias, becoming aware of other points of view or of how one's views affect other people who have to live with them, and so on.
How does the subjectivist view that there are moral facts, but that they inhere in our minds, preclude one from removing logical contradiction or being aware of personal bias and the rest?
A subjectivist isn't prevented from doing so. But why should he or she? The subjectivist doesn't believe that they're error reducing moves, since they believe that there is no such thing as error. They're just basically ways of changing my mind about things, among all the other ways of changing my mind about things. And if I choose to dignify some of my likes and dislikes with the name of morality, those could very well be things that I'm motivated not to change my mind about.
--------------------
we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
| IP: Logged
|
|
Marvin the Martian
Interplanetary
# 4360
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
But then there IS an objectively-measurable way to prove it's the majority opinion (or the enforceable opinion, or whatever...)!?
And then how are we not wrong (or speaking nonsense), in every other sense?
Sorry, what? All I'm saying is that we can say stuff like "it's good to give to charity" because we have an established (but still subjective) societal norm that says that is the case. And the only reason I'm saying it is to argue against the claim that the only way we can say stuff like that without being illogical or dishonest is if there's an external objective moral code that tells us so.
quote:
Either you have to slavishly follow the crowd or you have a sentence like "I feel it is the desired group option of most individuals that the desired group option not held by most individuals is the desired group option held most people" or "I know my desires go against morality, which you've defined, but I don't care" or say a sentence that is in point of fact untrue.
But how do you get the two sentences together...I really don't get it and you just seem to be asserting it.
I suspect you're still coming at this from a perspective that says there should only be one morality (however derived), and everybody must follow it. I'm not arguing from that perspective.
--------------------
Hail Gallaxhar
Posts: 30100 | From: Adrift on a sea of surreality | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged
|
|
Marvin the Martian
Interplanetary
# 4360
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
A subjectivist isn't prevented from doing so. But why should he or she?
Because he or she wants to be part of society?
quote:
The subjectivist doesn't believe that they're error reducing moves, since they believe that there is no such thing as error.
"Error" in what sense, though? Are you talking about the "error" that comes from making a moral decision in a society that slightly disapproves of it, the "error" of making such a decision in a society that really detests it, or some sort of cosmic "error" where the transgression is against something completely outside of and alien to society itself? It's only the last type of error that subjectivists deny the possibility of.
"How should we live our lives" is still a valid question in the subjectivist paradigm. Being aware of ones biases and avoiding contradiction are still valuable tools in answering that question.
--------------------
Hail Gallaxhar
Posts: 30100 | From: Adrift on a sea of surreality | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged
|
|
Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
A subjectivist isn't prevented from doing so. But why should he or she?
Because he or she wants to be part of society?
It is not at all obvious to me that as a matter of empirical fact people who restrict themselves to rational-like means of persuasion manage to be more part of society than people who use threats or bribery or emotional rhetoric to get what they want. Are politicians who restrict themselves to rational-like methods of persuasion going to be more or less successful in running for office? (I presume successful politicians are part of society by any meaningful definition.)
quote:
quote:
The subjectivist doesn't believe that they're error reducing moves, since they believe that there is no such thing as error.
"Error" in what sense, though? Are you talking about the "error" that comes from making a moral decision in a society that slightly disapproves of it, the "error" of making such a decision in a society that really detests it, or some sort of cosmic "error" where the transgression is against something completely outside of and alien to society itself? It's only the last type of error that subjectivists deny the possibility of.
I see no reason (assuming that there are no real moral facts) to suppose that the kind of error-reducing moves that I'm talking about will track what a society really detests, let alone what a society slightly disapproves of. A society in the grip of a periodic fit of morality is not notably consistent or equitable. I'd say the social consensus tends to be even more inconsistent than any given individual.
quote:
"How should we live our lives" is still a valid question in the subjectivist paradigm. Being aware of ones biases and avoiding contradiction are still valuable tools in answering that question.
The word 'bias' is meaningless in the subjectivist paradigm, surely? How can my opinions be biased when there's nothing for them to be biased from? If I say that I prefer chocolate cake to victoria sponge, what would it mean to ask me whether I'm biased?
On a subjectivist paradigm, 'how should we live our lives?' means either (a) 'how would I like us to live our lives?' or else - if you bring in intersubjectivity - (b) 'how do we end up living once we've all pooled our answers to (a)?' Note that the method of pooling our preferences is one of the things up for grabs. And so long as the result is practically feasible it really doesn't matter whether there are any contradictions in the manner in which we get there. (For example, 'All animals are equal but some are more equal than others' is a perfectly feasible political principle, however logically incoherent.)
--------------------
we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
| IP: Logged
|
|
Jay-Emm
Shipmate
# 11411
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
But then there IS an objectively-measurable way to prove it's the majority opinion (or the enforceable opinion, or whatever...)!?
And then how are we not wrong (or speaking nonsense), in every other sense?
Sorry, what?
quote:
...
But how do you get the two sentences together...I really don't get it and you just seem to be asserting it.
I suspect you're still coming at this from a perspective that says [that if such a thing exists there is -jayemm / there should be -MtM] only be one morality (however derived), and everybody must follow it. I'm not arguing from that perspective.
Possibly. In any case it appears we're not going to understand each others full perspective*.
With that in mind I'm going to leave it, as soon as polite, till the next thread which will come up sooner or later. (assuming that takes a different start and that's ok with you and I have the willpower to shut up).
*I've put a starting qualification on your post, actually I'd turn it round and inside out (before I was happy with it). But it's close enough that you wouldn't be using that if your perspective was close enough to mine (and given the way we can't see the difference between what you say and what we say you say, I'm guessing you'd see it as being the same).
Posts: 1643 | Registered: May 2006
| IP: Logged
|
|
EtymologicalEvangelical
Shipmate
# 15091
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
If I take your example of football: yes, we agree that a certain code of football should be played according to certain rules. It is the nature of sport that there have to be consistent rules, otherwise fair competition is impossible. But behind this lies a consistent and universal concept of "fairness", which does reflect something about ultimate reality (nothing to do with the physical universe, of course). I have not disputed at all that there are agreed principles and methods by which this concept of fairness is expressed (and these rules may be the result of nothing more than a human consensus).
So two teams of eleven facing off against each other is "objectively fair", but twelve vs. twelve or ten vs. ten is "unfair" in some objective sense derived from underlying reality?
The number of players on each side is completely irrelevant! I think the vast majority of people would accept that it is "fair" to have the SAME number of players on each side, but, of course, the particular number is incidental and arbitrary. You seem to be conflating the underlying moral concept of fairness with the arbitrary method by which that concept is expressed. That is a category error.
The key concept is the word "same", not "eleven", "ten" or "twelve".
quote:
I'm having trouble with the concept that thing which seem to be the products of the human mind (moral codes, the rules of football, the Law of the Sea Treaty, etc.) are really akin to physical artifacts, not invented but "discovered".
Well you are not alone, because I am not claiming that moral concepts are akin to physical artifacts. It's nothing to do with the physical world, as I have explained before. I am not a materialist.
But as for the distinction between "inventing" and "discovering", as it happens, nothing is ever technically "invented" by man, but "discovered", given that all the possibilities already exist outside the mind of man in potential form. But I guess that what you mean is: are certain ideas arbitrary or necessary?
Clearly the concept of "fairness" is necessary, otherwise morality cannot function at all. Try organising the Olympics by declaring that each nation can compete under its own arbitrary understanding of "fairness"! It's pretty obvious to all but the most deluded fantasist that there exists a universal moral sense of fairness to which people appeal (even though some individuals in their self-centredness - and free will - try to undermine it, as in the case of doping). That is the nature of reality.
quote:
You seem consistent in your assertion that Jack Straw's morality is "real" but the BNP's isn't but don't give us any explanation as to how you arrived at that conclusion other than personal preference, something the BNP speaker could claim just as easily.
Actually what I have consistently asserted in this thread is that human behaviour implies the "belief" (whether subconscious or not) that morality has an objective basis. My argument is that people have to live (at least tacitly) as though the philosophy of naturalism is not actually true in order to make morality work, given that such a philosophy implies that morality is a merely human invention - a theory that all ideas are the emergent property of a merely physical brain, itself constructed entirely by mindless and amoral matter.
Let us suppose that the philosophy of naturalism is true, and that this is the prevailing view of the education system in, say, the UK (in fact, it probably is the tacitly prevailing view, more or less). Let us also suppose that everyone is highly educated in "critical thinking" according to this philosophy. Therefore everyone is encouraged to think through the logical implications of this philosophy. Let us suppose that all those who participated in the Question Time discussion (including the audience) adhered to this philosophy and were educated accordingly in the way I have just described. Wouldn't the discussion have been entirely different?
So we would have Jack Straw saying something like this: "We all know that morality is entirely a human construct, and that matter is amoral. Since we are all just material beings - products of nature and nothing more - we understand that our respective moral positions are just a matter of opinion, since there does not exist any kind of absolute morality. So we all recognise that philosophically the views of the BNP are logically valid. However, I am completely outraged and disgusted with their position, and regard their moral position as being in a different category to the differences between the mainstream parties."
If he had said that then the only logical conclusion one could draw from this is that Jack Straw's sense of outrage and disgust was for him nothing more than an expression of personal taste, of no more significance than a personal distaste for a particular food. (Of course, Jack Straw could be - or have been - a philosophical naturalist - I don't know. But my point is that, if he was, he was not acting like one. He was clearly appealing to a sense of "right" and "wrong", by which he condemned the BNP. Such condemnation is nonsense, if morality is merely subjective).
Now if people want to believe that an appeal to personal taste is the basis of moral discussion in the real world, then there is nothing I can say that could dissuade such a person. But I have come on here to express my view that such a position has nothing to do with the way reality actually works. It is almost universally the case that people do not express moral outrage on this basis, irrespective of their own personal philosophy. All moral protests are based on an appeal to what is believed to be objectively "right" and "wrong" and not "we are angrily marching in our thousands through the streets of London to appeal to you to love Marmite"! That kind of protest is just pure fantasy.
That is why I say that the philosophy of naturalism does not fit reality. The logical implications of that philosophy are not reflected in the reality of human behaviour.
Therefore the fundamentally moral sense we all have can only be explained with reference to a moral reality which is outside and above nature. Having said that, this does not mean that we don't have the freedom to find the best way to make morality work. But "best" implies a standard by which this goal is defined.
There is, of course, another explanation that could fit naturalism: might is right. Morality is entirely subjective, but some people decide to impose their particular taste on everyone else by fiat of authority. But I thought that was the great complaint about religion!! If morality is entirely subjective then you cannot appeal to people's reason, because that implies an appeal to something objective. Therefore "naturalistic morality" is inevitably imposed, which makes any complaint about religious moral authority obviously completely hypocritical!
--------------------
You can argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome': but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome, but I'm not saying this is true'. CS Lewis
Posts: 3625 | From: South Coast of England | Registered: Sep 2009
| IP: Logged
|
|
EtymologicalEvangelical
Shipmate
# 15091
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot
@EtymologicalEvangelical
So imagine I'm arguing with the BNP
If as you say morals come from an objective, universal standard then what's the information flow. How does the standard get into my head?
OK, so let me assume that moral subjectivism is right, and that there is no objective moral reality. What's the alternative? How does it work in reality?
On the assumption that you disagree with the "values" of the BNP, and on the assumption that morality is entirely a matter of personal opinion and taste, then how would you argue with them?
What would you say to them, other than "I disagree with you. Period."??
If there is no information flow from an objective standard of morality, then how does naturalistic morality work?
Can a (philosophical) naturalist actually engage in a moral debate? If so, how?
If you can't actually show me how subjective morality can work, then this implies that there is an objective moral reality that informs our moral discourse. Having established that, we then need to accept (or at least have the courage to "come to terms with") a world view that explains it, and this, of course, has practical implications, as Ramarius has hinted at in his reply to you.
--------------------
You can argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome': but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome, but I'm not saying this is true'. CS Lewis
Posts: 3625 | From: South Coast of England | Registered: Sep 2009
| IP: Logged
|
|
EtymologicalEvangelical
Shipmate
# 15091
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd
I think you're being as unfair to realist theories as EE is being to non-realist theories.
"Unfair"??
What does that word mean?
Any idea (other than a realist one)?
--------------------
You can argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome': but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, 'Rice is unwholesome, but I'm not saying this is true'. CS Lewis
Posts: 3625 | From: South Coast of England | Registered: Sep 2009
| IP: Logged
|
|
Marvin the Martian
Interplanetary
# 4360
|
Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
"How should we live our lives" is still a valid question in the subjectivist paradigm. Being aware of ones biases and avoiding contradiction are still valuable tools in answering that question.
The word 'bias' is meaningless in the subjectivist paradigm, surely? How can my opinions be biased when there's nothing for them to be biased from? If I say that I prefer chocolate cake to victoria sponge, what would it mean to ask me whether I'm biased?
There's no bias when you're talking about what you individually prefer, of course. But in the context of a societal conversation about what we should all do it's an important consideration.
If you're eating alone, it matters not whether you choose chocolate cake or victoria sponge. Nobody else is affected by that decision. But the discussions on morality we're referring to are more like us all being at the same table, and only being able to choose one type of dessert that we'll all have to eat. In that context - where we're trying to figure out what is best for all of us - we have to be aware of our biases, so that we're genuinely deciding what's best for everyone rather than just what's best for us.
--------------------
Hail Gallaxhar
Posts: 30100 | From: Adrift on a sea of surreality | Registered: Apr 2003
| IP: Logged
|
|
|
|
|
Pages in this thread: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
|
Contact us | Ship of Fools | Privacy statement
© Ship of Fools 2016
UBB.classicTM
6.5.0
|
|
|
|
|
| |
 |
|
|
|
|
|
Printer-friendly view
