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Source: (consider it)
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Thread: "The Heresy of Modernism"
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Lamb Chopped
Ship's kebab
# 5528
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dogwalker:
Isn't this whole argument like the emperor's new clothes?
I'd be perfectly willing to accept there are moral absolutes, if I could see an example.
Please express one useful morally absolute statement, accepted by all societies on earth, at all times, without exception.
Nothing I can think of* fits that simple criterion, so it seems to me that in reality we must be relativists.
(Now I'm probably going to get my head handed to me, but I've wanted to ask this for years.)
*Except, perhaps, "Might makes right."
Heheheheheheh.
How about "You are responsible to others beside yourself"? The particular "others" may vary from culture to culture, but no culture agrees that it's okay to do whatever the hell you personally want without regard to anyone else, ever.
There are actually quite a few of these, if you state them as general principles and allow the details to vary from culture to culture.
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Er, this is what I've been up to (book).
Oh, that you would rend the heavens and come down!
Posts: 20059 | From: off in left field somewhere | Registered: Feb 2004
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Dogwalker
Shipmate
# 14135
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Lamb Chopped:
How about "You are responsible to others beside yourself"? The particular "others" may vary from culture to culture, but no culture agrees that it's okay to do whatever the hell you personally want without regard to anyone else, ever.
Thank you. That really helps me quite a lot. And gives me something to think about.
ChastMaster, two things: I realized that "must" could have been better expressed after I had posted. I meant it in the sense of "are forced to be". If I can't work from absolutes, my only choice is to make the best relative decisions I can.
I don't intend to steal, to take one commandment as an example. But if I were in Jean Valjean's shoes, would I steal to feed a starving child? Would it be wrong if I did? How is that not a relativistic decision?
For all the philosophical hot air, I see darn few absolute moral laws I can use to build my life choices, or can teach to my kids. I'd like some; hidden absolutes seem useless to me.
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If God had meant for us to fly, he wouldn't have given us the railways. - Unknown
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Kaplan Corday
Shipmate
# 16119
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by Kaplan Corday:
Let's face it, in practice everyone, right across the spectrum, consciously or unconsciously, jumps between relativism and absolutism all the time as it suits us.
Often it's tangled up with other concepts such as "lesser of two evils" and "means justifying ends".
One of the reasons for being rigourous about these things is to catch ourselves and other people when we or they rationalise like that.
It's certainly important to be aware of it in ourselves and others because it can be harmful, but that is not invariably the case.
It is not so much a matter of "rationalising" something which is always unacceptable, but recognising that it is inevitable, and that it is sometimes necessary and beneficial.
Posts: 3355 | Registered: Jan 2011
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dogwalker:
I'd be perfectly willing to accept there are moral absolutes, if I could see an example.
Please express one useful morally absolute statement, accepted by all societies on earth, at all times, without exception.
Nothing I can think of* fits that simple criterion, so it seems to me that in reality we must be relativists.
To Lamb Chopped's example, I'd add that courage is better than cowardice.
Why, though, should a universalist accept that the challenge is relevant? Even within one society there are people who commit murder and aren't caught. Does that mean that our society thinks murder is sometimes ok? It doesn't. So why should a universalist accept that an example of a society that thinks murder is ok shows that 'don't commit murder' is not a universal rule?
quote:
I don't intend to steal, to take one commandment as an example. But if I were in Jean Valjean's shoes, would I steal to feed a starving child? Would it be wrong if I did? How is that not a relativistic decision?
I believe you're confusing two separate questions here, and it's as well to keep them distinct.
One is, are there any rules within Jean Valjean's society that he may never break under any circumstances.
The other is, is there a higher standard by which Valjean's society can be judged?
Now obviously Jean Valjean's society thinks it is always wrong to steal a loaf of bread, since it locks him up for it and then persecutes him once he's released. Victor Hugo, the author, thinks Valjean's society is wrong by a higher standard.
There's a variety of possibilities here:
Higher standard, rules with no exceptions: Kant.
Higher standard, some rules with exceptions: Aquinas(*)
Higher standard, all rules with exceptions: Bentham(*)
No higher standard, rules with no exceptions: Hume.
No higher standard, rules with exceptions: I can't think of anyone well known.
(*) Strictly speaking, Aquinas thinks there are principles that tell you when certain rules have exceptions, and Bentham thinks there are no rules, only a single principle.
[ 21. July 2014, 13:21: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
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Posted
quote:
Where on relativist premises is the inconsistency? Spell it out logically.
OK, let's go through it step by step. I can't guarantee that it will hold up completely because I ain't no philosopher.
Here goes. The phrase "moral relativism" can be broken down into three distinct positions. Descriptive, meta ethical and normative. To be a normative moral relativist, one must subscribe to meta ethical moral relativism(MMR), to embrace MMR one would most likely take descriptive moral relativism (DMR)to be true.
DMR is simply the empirical observation that different cultures have different moral standards.
MMR is, according to theStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,the view that "the truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons."
Now, at his point it is important to remember that embracing MMR puts no prescriptive burdens on the adherent. But it is, if you like, an absolute truth claim. And that truth claim is that all claims to absolute moral truths are false. Within societies, that is not a problem, members of that society can happily justify their morality within that society. But it has implications for trans cultural relations.
According to the flawed but useful fount of some knowledge, an influential proponent of this idea was William Sumner in his 1906 work Folkways. He argued that since there is no higher moral standard than the local mores of a culture, no trans-cultural judgement about the rightness or wrongness of a culture's mores can be justified.
At this level we are not concerned with different points of view. The English can think they are superior and the Germans can think they are superior. To the meta ethical relativist they are both mistaken, because there is no such thing as superior and inferior morality across cultures.
So far, so uncontroversial, I hope, but here it gets perplexing. The normative moral relativist thinks that this knowledge of how the world is puts an ethical imperative on us. If there is no justification for the perceived moral rightness of our own culture, there is no reason for us to take any action against other cultures simply because they have different morality to ours. MMR implies tolerance of other cultures. Most philosophers disagree, though, because of the issues you highlight. According to Stanford, MMR cannot very well imply that it is an objective moral truth that we should be tolerant: MMR denies that there are such truths. Equally, though, MMR can't imply we should bomb other cultures because they are different. So when you say...
quote:
So clearly you need to have morals and rules and customs that govern interactions with outsiders. And you need to fend off outsider values that undermine your values. One efficient way of fending off outsider values is by judging them to be inferior to your values, by the standards of your society; that's efficient because you don't need any new standards then.
... it might be efficient, but it clashes with MMR. Individuals who accept MMR, accept MMR regardless of what their culture finds efficient. They can't judge their values superior because there is no standard by which they can do the judging. They cannot advocate tolerance or intolerance from a relativist position alone. This is pretty much what I meant in my first post when I said moral relativists have to disappear up their own arses to to take any sort of action in this area.
There are relativists, apparently, such as Wong, who try to finesse all this to advocate tolerance. And that seems to make sense: even though MMR doesn't strictly imply tolerance, it's a bit weird to commit to the position that there are no grounds to judge other cultures' values and then go on to argue that we should. Possibly that's why there are so few people advocating the relativist case for cultural imperialism.
quote:
Why can't a member of society who explains morality in that way use that morality to judge other cultures inferior?
Nothing to stop 'em. But moral relativism it ain't.
quote:
If I'm right that nationalism is effectively a form of relativism, then there have been plenty of relativist cultures.
And if my aunty had bollocks she'd be my uncle.
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For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
MMR is, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,the view that "the truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons."
Now, at his point it is important to remember that embracing MMR puts no prescriptive burdens on the adherent. But it is, if you like, an absolute truth claim. And that truth claim is that all claims to absolute moral truths are false.
All perfectly valid up to this point.
quote:
Within societies, that is not a problem, members of that society can happily justify their morality within that society. But it has implications for trans cultural relations.
According to the flawed but useful fount of some knowledge, an influential proponent of this idea was William Sumner in his 1906 work Folkways. He argued that since there is no higher moral standard than the local mores of a culture, no trans-cultural judgement about the rightness or wrongness of a culture's mores can be justified.
Sumner might have argued that, but was his argument sound?
A relativist believes that they don't have to claim absolute truth for their intra-cultural moral judgements in order for those to be justified. Now, the relativist believes they cannot claim absolute truth for their trans-cultural moral judgements. But why, on the relativist's terms, should the relativist need to claim absolute truth for their trans-cultural moral judgements? The relativist can justify their judgements about other cultures to themselves or to members of their own society using the standards of their own society.
quote:
To the meta ethical relativist they are both mistaken, because there is no such thing as superior and inferior morality across cultures.
Here you're trading on an ambiguity. 'Across cultures' could mean 'using an absolute standard belonging to neither culture'. Or it could mean 'making a judgement about one culture from within another culture'. The relativist thinks the first is impossible. But - and this is the crucial bit - the second has no logical dependence on the first and therefore the relativist can do it.
quote:
quote:
So clearly you need to have morals and rules and customs that govern interactions with outsiders. And you need to fend off outsider values that undermine your values. One efficient way of fending off outsider values is by judging them to be inferior to your values, by the standards of your society; that's efficient because you don't need any new standards then.
... it might be efficient, but it clashes with MMR. Individuals who accept MMR, accept MMR regardless of what their culture finds efficient. They can't judge their values superior because there is no standard by which they can do the judging.
Yes there is. There's the standards of their culture.
Sure, there's no absolute standard. But the whole point of being a relativist is you do not need an absolute standard to make judgements.
quote:
They cannot advocate tolerance or intolerance from a relativist position alone.
They can't do so from a relativist position alone. But the whole point of being a relativist is that you also accept the moral standards of your culture. If your culture tells you to be tolerant, relativism cannot advocate intolerance. But if your culture tells you to be intolerant, relativism cannot advocate tolerance.
Suppose we get a little more complicated: suppose your culture is a bit more nuanced, and advocates tolerance, until rational negotiation fails, and then if rational negotiation fails, resorting to force. At that point MMR does make a substantive contribution, it predicts that rational negotiation will always fail, and therefore implies that the culture should resort to force straightaway.
I suggest that cultures falling into that third nuanced camp are more common than one's falling into either of the other two.
quote:
quote:
Why can't a member of society who explains morality in that way use that morality to judge other cultures inferior?
Nothing to stop 'em. But moral relativism it ain't.
And at what step of the argument was moral relativism abandoned, or a premise introduced that was incompatible with moral relativism?
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Russ
Old salt
# 120
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
A lot of our culture thinks that you can't be moral unless you're objectively moral. The relativist thinks that's a mistake, based on confusing an erroneous meta-ethical position (moral universalism) with culture-dependent substantive ethical norms.
Does moral relativism as you describe it imply that there is upon each individual an absolute moral obligation to follow the rules of their culture or society ?
If there is no "higher" universal principle by which a society's morality can be judged, doesn't that mean that there is no principle by which an individual can judge that this social rule is good and that bad, or this morally obligatory and that optional ? No appeal from the tyranny of the majority ? Or of the dictator if that's the way one's society organises itself ?
Or are you saying that substantive content cannot be judged, but meta-ethical philosophical truth or coherence can be ? And does such a judgment have ethical implications ? Are you claiming that a cultural moral imperative that is derived from a faulty philosophical meta-ethic is thereby not morally binding ? Even though the culture holds it to be true ?
And what's to stop your moral relativist from getting together with a few like-minded friends to form a sub-culture or sub-society... ?
I'm struggling to see how this version of relativism is a viable ethical position at all. Maybe I'm just confused...
I would have said that the common-usage meaning of "moral relativism " is something like "drawing the line between universal moral imperatives and culture-specific customs in a way that results in more of life being described as customs and less as moral rules". But then I never studied philosophy.
Best wishes,
Russ
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Wish everyone well; the enemy is not people, the enemy is wrong ideas
Posts: 3169 | From: rural Ireland | Registered: May 2001
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
A lot of our culture thinks that you can't be moral unless you're objectively moral. The relativist thinks that's a mistake, based on confusing an erroneous meta-ethical position (moral universalism) with culture-dependent substantive ethical norms.
Does moral relativism as you describe it imply that there is upon each individual an absolute moral obligation to follow the rules of their culture or society ?
Helpful question. No it doesn't.
It implies that for each individual there is upon everybody an obligation to obey the values of that individual's culture or society.
So, consider an Athenian relativist looking at a Spartan society. The Athenian relativist believes:
It is true for an Athenian that they must obey the values of Athens.
It is true for an Spartan that they must obey the values of Sparta.
But...
It is true for an Spartan that Athenians must obey the values of Sparta.
It is true for an Athenian that Spartans must obey the values of Athens.
quote:
If there is no "higher" universal principle by which a society's morality can be judged, doesn't that mean that there is no principle by which an individual can judge that this social rule is good and that bad, or this morally obligatory and that optional ? No appeal from the tyranny of the majority ? Or of the dictator if that's the way one's society organises itself ?
Well, a moral relativist(*) could argue that most societies and cultures have internal differences. A moral relativist thinks you can appeal to the premises of your society against a particular rule. (If your society says that all people are created equal, and allows slavery, a moral relativist says that you can argue that the two are incompatible.) What a moral relativist thinks you cannot do is appeal to a standard which is independent of your society, or which isn't ultimately arbitrary.
(*) strictly speaking, somebody who thinks everybody must be true to their own values whatever they are is also a moral relativist. And the same structure applies. But the culture/ society moral relativist is the more plausible, since individuals get their own values from their society, and since the culture/society moral relativist has a better story of how morality comes about.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
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Posted
quote:
Sumner might have argued that, but was his argument sound?
I'm not really qualified to say. All I can say is that if the wiki is correct, and Sumner's view is indeed influential in relativist circles, and if your argument rests on that view being false, then you are at odds with many people, philosophers included, arguing from a relativist position. That would make your description of the "archetypal" relativist position somewhat wide of the mark, regardless of disagreements among philosophers on the soundness of Sumner's view and other aspects of MMR. Philosophy ain't physics. It's value lies more in the questions it raises rather than the answers its individual practitioners propose.
From my perspective as a non philosopher inclined towards MMR but accepting that it has limited to negligible practical value, the non Dafyd interpretation is to be favoured because it just makes more sense. The Dafyd interpretation smacks of a moral absolutist looking for a novel take down of a straw bogyman. I mean, nationalism, seriously? You don't think the psychological and sociological explanations of the phenomenon are so deficient that we need to mangle a philosophically dodgy meta ethical position usually associated with cross cultural tolerance to explain it?
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For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:
Sumner might have argued that, but was his argument sound?
All I can say is that if the wiki is correct, and Sumner's view is indeed influential in relativist circles, and if your argument rests on that view being false, then you are at odds with many people, philosophers included, arguing from a relativist position. That would make your description of the "archetypal" relativist position somewhat wide of the mark, regardless of disagreements among philosophers on the soundness of Sumner's view and other aspects of MMR.
Let me quote from the wiki article you cited:
quote:
(Normative relativists) argue that meta-ethical relativism implies that we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when it runs counter to our personal or cultural moral standards. Most philosophers do not agree, partially because of the challenges of arriving at an "ought" from relativistic premises. Meta-ethical relativism seems to eliminate the normative relativist's ability to make prescriptive claims. In other words, normative relativism may find it difficult to make a statement like "we think it is moral to tolerate behaviour" without always adding "other people think intolerance of certain behaviours is moral". Philosophers like Russell Blackford even argue that intolerance is, to some degree, important. As he puts it, "we need not adopt a quietism about moral traditions that cause hardship and suffering. Nor need we passively accept the moral norms of our own respective societies, to the extent that they are ineffective or counterproductive or simply unnecessary." That is, it is perfectly reasonable (and practical) for a person or group to defend their subjective values against others, even if there is no universal prescription or morality. We can also criticize other cultures for failing to pursue even their own goals effectively.
The wiki article does not, as you misrepresent it, link Sumner to normative relativism.
The wiki article does state that normative relativism is rejected by most philosophers.
The wiki article does give an example of a meta-ethical relativist who not only rejects normative relativism but defends some intolerance.
quote:
It's value lies more in the questions it raises rather than the answers its individual practitioners propose.
Certainly when the answers it gives you are not the answers you want.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Callan
Shipmate
# 525
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Posted
Originally posted by Grosex:
quote:
I mean, nationalism, seriously? You don't think the psychological and sociological explanations of the phenomenon are so deficient that we need to mangle a philosophically dodgy meta ethical position usually associated with cross cultural tolerance to explain it?
Depends which version of nationalism you are working with. The liberal version associated with people like Mazzini and Masaryk wasn't relativist but it's not, currently, difficult to find examples of people who think that bombing civilians is morally neutral when carried out by representatives of one national movement and morally deplorable when carried out by it's enemies. That's a kind of relativism, albeit not the one associated with, say, the anthropological school.
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How easy it would be to live in England, if only one did not love her. - G.K. Chesterton
Posts: 9757 | From: Citizen of the World | Registered: Jun 2001
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Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
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Posted
quote:
The wiki article does not, as you misrepresent it, link Sumner to normative relativism.
The wiki article does state that normative relativism is rejected by most philosophers.
The wiki article does give an example of a meta-ethical relativist who not only rejects normative relativism but defends some intolerance.
Go back and have another look. I said lets take it step by step. In the meta ethical step I said MMR has implications for trans cultural relations and Sumner argued that since there is no higher moral standard than the local mores of a culture, no trans-cultural judgement about the rightness or wrongness of a culture's mores can be justified. Ths is a more or less direct quote from the wiki section on MMR:
quote:
The American anthropologist William Sumner was an influential advocate of this view. In his 1906 work Folkways he argues that what people consider right and wrong is entirely shaped by the traditions, customs and practices of their culture. Moreover, since there is no higher moral standard than the local mores of a culture, no trans-cultural judgement about the rightness or wrongness of a culture's mores can be justified.
Your whole argument seems to be that relativists think they can indeed justify the view that their culture is superior. But if they think Sumner is correct, then that is not a rational position to hold.
quote:
The wiki article does state that normative relativism is rejected by most philosophers.
A point that I acknowledged in my normative step. The thing is, most objections centre on the relativists' inability to make judgements on other cultures' mores, not their bomb happy proclivities. And I shall repeat, although I'm sick of saying it, that is an objection that actually has legs.
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For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
In the meta ethical step I said MMR has implications for trans cultural relations and Sumner argued that since there is no higher moral standard than the local mores of a culture, no trans-cultural judgement about the rightness or wrongness of a culture's mores can be justified.
1. Sumner isn't necessarily correct. (That would be an argument from authority.)
2. Sumner, while certainly invoking relativism to ridicule the idea of civilizing missions, was equally able to denounce Spanish imperialism for cruelty and lust for glory. That suggests that he didn't hold with a consistent ban on inter-cultural judgements.
3. It's not obvious to me that 'trans-cultural' means what you think it means. Saying that no trans-cultural judgement can be justified by trans-cultural standards is not to say that no culture-specific judgement about another culture can be justified by culture-specific standards.
quote:
quote:
The wiki article does state that normative relativism is rejected by most philosophers.
A point that I acknowledged in my normative step. The thing is, most objections centre on the relativists' inability to make judgements on other cultures' mores, not their bomb happy proclivities. And I shall repeat, although I'm sick of saying it, that is an objection that actually has legs.
The wiki article says that most philosophers do not agree that metaphysical relativism entails normative relativism. The objection that relativists are unable to make judgements on other cultures has fewer legs than a boa constrictor.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
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Posted
quote:
1. Sumner isn't necessarily correct. (That would be an argument from authority.)
Indeed. So you might think I should have said something like, if someone accepts Sumners position, then... Oh, wait a minute, I did.
quote:
It's not obvious to me that 'trans-cultural' means what you think it means.
I'm thinking it means what my dictionary says it means: "involving, encompassing, or extending across two or more cultures."
quote:
Saying that no trans-cultural judgement can be justified by trans-cultural standards is not to say that no culture-specific judgement about another culture can be justified by culture-specific standards.
Well, you'd better take that up with the wiki. What it says is that according to the meta ethical relativist view, "no trans-cultural judgement about the rightness or wrongness of a culture's mores can be justified." (Whether that's right or wrong is a different matter, but you are questioning my interpretation of the article here). There is no discussion on the multiple viewpoint thing.
Which issue, as far as I can see, is precisely where many problems around relativism centre. Questions about who moral judgements apply to when you accept there are no universal moral judgments are naturally raised, as are questions about what is meant by a moral truth if it is not universal. You said before that to a relativist there are two ways to judge whether English mores are superior to German ones. But from a meta ethical perspective (say, a French relativist perspective), as far as I can see there is no rational judgement to be made. And if that is the case, how can an English or German relativist justify their opinions from a meta ethical perspective? They can't justify them on the meta ethical plane; if they keep hold of them, they either become moral objectivist on at least one matter, or else moral nihilists. The former, I think, is more usual and is the basis for mixed moral objectivist/relativist viewpoints. I think Blackford would be one such philosopher, as is Wong.
quote:
The wiki article says that most philosophers do not agree that metaphysical relativism entails normative relativism.
Indeed it does. What I'm interested in is how you get from there to saying the archetypal relativist position is to bomb the fuck out of cultures with which they have moral disagreements.
[ 26. July 2014, 20:34: Message edited by: Grokesx ]
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For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
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Garasu
Shipmate
# 17152
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Posted
Why shouldn't they?
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"Could I believe in the doctrine without believing in the deity?". - Modesitt, L. E., Jr., 1943- Imager.
Posts: 889 | From: Surrey Heath (England) | Registered: Jun 2012
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
But from a meta ethical perspective (say, a French relativist perspective), as far as I can see there is no rational judgement to be made. And if that is the case, how can an English or German relativist justify their opinions from a meta ethical perspective?
Excusez-moi. Comment pouvez-vous parler le Français en anglais ? Vous pouvez seulement parler le Français en Français. D'un point de vue meta-linguistique, au dehors de l'Anglais ou de la Français il n'y a pas des mots à utiliser. Et si c'est le cas, comment peut un parleur d'une autre langue justifier quel mots utiliser d'un point de vue meta-linguistique?(*)
Translated out of Franglais:
Excuse me. How can you talk about the French in English? You can only talk about the French in French. From a meta-linguistic point of view, outside English or French, there are no words to use. And if that's the case, how can a speaker of another language justify what words to use from a meta-linguistic point of view?
[ 26. July 2014, 23:10: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
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Posted
quote:
Excuse me. How can you talk about the French in English? You can only talk about the French in French. From a meta-linguistic point of view, outside English or French, there are no words to use. And if that's the case, how can a speaker of another language justify what words to use from a meta-linguistic point of view?
I don't think this analogy adds much to the discussion, but it does give me the opportunity to recycle an old joke which may serve to illustrate the themes under discussion here:
Englishman, Frenchman, Italian and German in a bar waxing lyrical on the beauty of their respective languages, in Esperanto, if you like. The Englishman says, "To me, the essence of the English language is summed up in the word 'butterfly'. Two normal, workaday words combined to form a thing of beauty - 'butterfly'. The Frenchman nods in agreement, "Indeed, a most beautiful word. But the French equivalent rolls off the tongue in an even more beautiful fashion - 'papillon.'" And he sighs, savouring the sound of the word for a moment. The Italian says, "All this is undoubtedly true, but when I say the word, 'farfalla' it is as if a butterfly could be conjured out of the air at the very mention of the word."
All the while the German is becoming increasingly agitated. Finally he can take no more, "And what, " he demands, "is wrong with 'schmetterling?'"
[ 27. July 2014, 09:55: Message edited by: Grokesx ]
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For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
I don't think this analogy adds much to the discussion
Why am I not surprised?
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Russ
Old salt
# 120
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
What I'm interested in is how you get from there to saying the archetypal relativist position is to bomb the fuck out of cultures with which they have moral disagreements.
People can act in accordance with, or against, their moral principles.
If a culture can be said to act, then correspondingly it can act either in accordance with or against its own moral principles.
If you're what Dafyd has called a universalist then you probably believe that some variation on "do as you would be done by" applies at the level of interactions between cultures, and therefore only cultures that enjoy being bombed should bomb others.
If however, you're the sort of moral relativist that Dafyd has described, then the moral question of whether to launch the bombers amounts to the question "is this action in accordance with our own moral principles" ?
Is smiting evil part of our culture ? Absolutely. From Arthurian knights to Top Gun, from True Grit to Star Wars, socking it to the bad guys is what our culture tells us is the right thing to do.
Our culture took the Man who taught "turn the other cheek" and launched the Crusades in His Name.
If there are no moral principles that stand "above" culture, then at the inter-cultural level cultures give themselves permission to behave as they choose.
Seems logical to me...
Best wishes,
Russ
PS: we may have drifted away from the original topic. What the anti-modernists hate about modernism ISTM is not that it espouses moral relativism, but that it relativizes the history of the Church. That theology is a product of its time and place rather than a truth for all time.
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Wish everyone well; the enemy is not people, the enemy is wrong ideas
Posts: 3169 | From: rural Ireland | Registered: May 2001
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
If however, you're the sort of moral relativist that Dafyd has described, then the moral question of whether to launch the bombers amounts to the question "is this action in accordance with our own moral principles" ?
I'd say here that 'not bombing innocent children' is as much a moral principle of our culture as 'smiting evil'. The problem I think is a little more indirect.
Imagine that 'they' practice FGM. Our moral principles tell us to stop FGM from happening. Now if you believe in universal moral principles you believe that in principle there is a right answer and if people of good will sit down around a table and argue about it they will converge on the right answer. Relativism says there is no right answer to converge upon, so there is no point in sitting down around a table to resolve your moral differences. Instead, you move straight onto a more confrontational way to resolve the conflict.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Callan
Shipmate
# 525
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
If however, you're the sort of moral relativist that Dafyd has described, then the moral question of whether to launch the bombers amounts to the question "is this action in accordance with our own moral principles" ?
I'd say here that 'not bombing innocent children' is as much a moral principle of our culture as 'smiting evil'. The problem I think is a little more indirect.
Imagine that 'they' practice FGM. Our moral principles tell us to stop FGM from happening. Now if you believe in universal moral principles you believe that in principle there is a right answer and if people of good will sit down around a table and argue about it they will converge on the right answer. Relativism says there is no right answer to converge upon, so there is no point in sitting down around a table to resolve your moral differences. Instead, you move straight onto a more confrontational way to resolve the conflict.
I'm not sure that it's as straight forward as that. For one thing the question as to how to prevent, say, FGM is a prudential question. Now even assuming we could get everyone around the table and explain the demerits of FGM until they understood that it was wrong that might be a somewhat lengthy process whilst, in the meantime, you could be locking up parents who procure such operations and doctors who perform them. So a universalist might hold that the urgency of the situation required a twin track approach using both argument and the rigours of the law to discourage the practice. Also, I think, a universalist could hold that bad passions - say fear of female sexuality or ressentiment - might lead a person to ignore good arguments against FGM. So sitting everyone around a table might not be all that as a practical solution.
All in all, in practice FGM is as intractable for a universalist as for a relativist.
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How easy it would be to live in England, if only one did not love her. - G.K. Chesterton
Posts: 9757 | From: Citizen of the World | Registered: Jun 2001
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Gildas:
All in all, in practice FGM is as intractable for a universalist as for a relativist.
Well, yes, up to a point. But I don't think the ideal case is completely out of touch with the practical case.
Also, I don't think there's any meaningful difference between a relativist and a universalist who thinks that anyone who disagrees with them does so because of intractable moral defects.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Dave Marshall
Shipmate
# 7533
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
if you believe in universal moral principles you believe that in principle there is a right answer and if people of good will sit down around a table and argue about it they will converge on the right answer. Relativism says there is no right answer to converge upon, so there is no point in sitting down around a table to resolve your moral differences.
Does anyone really believe in universal moral principles? However strictly applied by either self-imposed force of will or legally enforced sanctions, such "principles" are only a code of conduct from which we can always opt out. To claim otherwise would be to deny our own or someone else's humanity.
Morality is not in essence about principle but about choice. There is always a point in sitting around a table to resolve differences because that is how we make moral choices, decisions that affect others but are ours to make. Universalism and relativism may be useful categories in abstract philosophy. I don't see they have much real world significance in this context.
[cross-posted]
[ 29. July 2014, 11:56: Message edited by: Dave Marshall ]
Posts: 4763 | From: Derbyshire Dales | Registered: Jun 2004
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IngoB
Sentire cum Ecclesia
# 8700
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
Does anyone really believe in universal moral principles?
Sure, I do.
quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
However strictly applied by either self-imposed force of will or legally enforced sanctions, such "principles" are only a code of conduct from which we can always opt out.
Physical law tells you what you will do, moral law what you ought to do. If you stumble you will fall to the ground. That's physics. If somebody is innocent, you should not kill them. That's morals. That you can murder speaks in no way or form against universal moral law. "Ought/should" implies that you can do other. If you cannot do other, then it is not a moral concern. Choice does not speak against morality, it is the very reason for morality.
quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
To claim otherwise would be to deny our own or someone else's humanity.
Nonsense. What universal moral law claims is that as far as what we ought to do, we are all the same. It says that my choice will not be evaluated by other standards than yours. It does not say that we have no choice.
quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
Morality is not in essence about principle but about choice.
Moral principle is exactly about the proper evaluation of choices.
quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
Universalism and relativism may be useful categories in abstract philosophy. I don't see they have much real world significance in this context.
That's because most people are morally incoherent. They are moral relativists as long as they don't care about something, and moral universalists when they do. The value of philosophy, to those who love wisdom, is that it exposes this incoherence and potentially motivates one to rectify it.
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They’ll have me whipp’d for speaking true; thou’lt have me whipp’d for lying; and sometimes I am whipp’d for holding my peace. - The Fool in King Lear
Posts: 12010 | From: Gone fishing | Registered: Oct 2004
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Dave Marshall
Shipmate
# 7533
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by IngoB:
Sure, I do [believe in universal moral principles].
As absolutes in their own right? Rather than a consequence of some other belief?
quote:
If somebody is innocent, you should not kill them. That's morals.
It's a widely accepted moral position. That doesn't make it universal. It is quite possible to imagine a situation where killing an innocent person was at least a moral option - if their inevitable slow painful death was the only alternative, for example.
Universal morality implies at least one choice that will be moral in every situation. I don't think such a choice exists, because what is right always depends on the context. We can never exclude the possibility that for any particular choice, however apparently universal (like not killing an innocent person), there will be some situation where it would be wrong.
quote:
What universal moral law claims is that as far as what we ought to do, we are all the same. It says that my choice will not be evaluated by other standards than yours.
No, it says that my choice will be evaluated by whoever decides what the universal moral law is.
quote:
most people are morally incoherent. They are moral relativists as long as they don't care about something, and moral universalists when they do. The value of philosophy, to those who love wisdom, is that it exposes this incoherence and potentially motivates one to rectify it.
Those who love wisdom know the limitations of the rule of law. Morality is not about conforming to any code, however it is derived. A moral code, like law, saves us having to go back to first principles for every choice we make. But it is only an infinitely-refined digest of the vastly multi-generational social process ("sitting round a table") by which we have learnt to be viable moral beings. Moral because we take into account, to the degree we have found to be practical, the interests and sensibilities of others in decisions that are ours to make.
Posts: 4763 | From: Derbyshire Dales | Registered: Jun 2004
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Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
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Posted
quote:
Relativism says there is no right answer to converge upon, so there is no point in sitting down around a table to resolve your moral differences.
No it doesn't. Relativism says there are some moral disagreements that are not rationally resolvable. It does not pre-judge which ones they are. Nothing in relativism precludes people of good will sitting round a table and discussing stuff. It accepts, for instance, that one way of rationally solving such disagreements is for one side to accept the arguments of the other side - maybe one side will see a logical flaw in their reasoning or be made aware of evidence that they were previously unaware of. But, it says there are issues that, at a given point in time, may not resolvable in this fashion. You'd have to be particularly Pollyannaish to think that differences over practices like FGM that have evolved over millennia are going to be resolved, rationally or otherwise, over a nice cup of sweet tea.
quote:
Instead, you move straight onto a more confrontational way to resolve the conflict.
Really? The go to position of a relativist, or anyone else for that matter, when faced with a disagreement with no rational resolution is confrontation? To the relativist the type of differences we are talking about here are in the same category as which colour is better, blue or red, or which word is more beautiful, schmetterling or farfalla. If, as is normally thought in the non batshit insane version of moral relativism usually defended by actual relativists, relativism encourages the idea that the morality of one’s own culture has no special status but is just one moral system among many, then confrontation is just as likely to be low down the list of options as any other ethical stance.
quote:
Also, I don't think there's any meaningful difference between a relativist and a universalist who thinks that anyone who disagrees with them does so because of intractable moral defects.
That's because you either don't understand or wilfully misrepresent what relativism actually means. The most common position for the normative relativist, as I have said more than once, is that there is a significant connection between meta ethical relativism and tolerance. As we have said before, most philosophers disagree, because, to quote Stanford: "Recognition of this fact (descriptive moral relativism), by itself, entails nothing about how we should act towards those with whom we disagree. Meta-ethical relativism (MMR) fares no better. For one thing, MMR cannot very well imply that it is an objective moral truth that we should be tolerant: MMR denies that there are such truths."
These arguments work for whatever normative position you try and wring out of MMR. Just because you can't get an ought to be tolerant out of the is of moral relativism does not mean the relativist is then compelled to become a bomb dropping maniac. In fact, some philosophers think there is still, to quote Stanford again, "a philosophically significant connection between relativism and tolerance." And of course, the popular view of moral relativism, held by the few who actually profess it and the many who revile it, is precisely that it tolerates much that is intolerable to moral universalists. I'm no relativist myself, but any position that can gather opprobrium from Sam Harris, Popes and Mad Mel must have something going for it.
Anyway, I fear I am running out of ways to say the same thing.
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For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
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Russ
Old salt
# 120
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
Universal morality implies at least one choice that will be moral in every situation.
I don't think such a choice exists, because what is right always depends on the context. We can never exclude the possibility that for any particular choice, however apparently universal (like not killing an innocent person), there will be some situation where it would be wrong..
Dave, I think what you're arguing against here is the proposition that objective moral "laws" have to be simple and context-independent. As in, capable of being written down on stone tablets...
While that may be the traditional understanding, I don't think it's a necessary consequence of the existence of moral right answers. Seems to me quite possible to have a universal and objective moral code that is as complex as physics, and as sensitive to the cultural expectations of each party in the situation as any human legal practice. A sort of Platonic ideal of justice, to which all human codes of morality imperfectly approximate.
Whilst "killing the innocent is wrong" is held by some to be a moral absolute, it's not impossible that your view - that mercy-killing is sometimes morally the better course - is in fact objectively the right answer, as a universal moral truth. So it's not evidence against the existence of such universal moral truths.
Best wishes,
Russ
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Wish everyone well; the enemy is not people, the enemy is wrong ideas
Posts: 3169 | From: rural Ireland | Registered: May 2001
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Dave Marshall
Shipmate
# 7533
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
I think what you're arguing against here is the proposition that objective moral "laws" have to be simple and context-independent. As in, capable of being written down on stone tablets...
I wasn't meaning to. I was using Ingo's example to illustrate what I think is a fundamental flaw in the principle of objective morality.
quote:
Seems to me quite possible to have a universal and objective moral code that is as complex as physics, and as sensitive to the cultural expectations of each party in the situation as any human legal practice. A sort of Platonic ideal of justice, to which all human codes of morality imperfectly approximate.
The question then becomes who judges that ideal to be just. Right and wrong always imply "according to who". If we think of God as one who makes such value judgements within human experience, then morality can certainly be understood as conforming to God's will. Otherwise, I'm not sure what an ideal of justice means.
There's also the problem that such an ideal needs to address every moral context in the universe, because a moral ideal will always perfectly account for context. The "right" choice in any context would then be a binary "ideal or not" option. That seems to lose something essential to our humanity: responsibility for assessing a situation in the light of its context (including whatever moral code may apply) and deciding for ourselves what is right. How we act having made that judgement seems something more mechanical, biological perhaps, and one step removed from the question of morality.
Posts: 4763 | From: Derbyshire Dales | Registered: Jun 2004
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
Originally posted by Dafyd: quote:
Relativism says there is no right answer to converge upon, so there is no point in sitting down around a table to resolve your moral differences.
No it doesn't. Relativism says there are some moral disagreements that are not rationally resolvable. It does not pre-judge which ones they are. Nothing in relativism precludes people of good will sitting round a table and discussing stuff. It accepts, for instance, that one way of rationally solving such disagreements is for one side to accept the arguments of the other side - maybe one side will see a logical flaw in their reasoning or be made aware of evidence that they were previously unaware of. But, it says there are issues that, at a given point in time, may not resolvable in this fashion. You'd have to be particularly Pollyannaish to think that differences over practices like FGM that have evolved over millennia are going to be resolved, rationally or otherwise, over a nice cup of sweet tea.
I feel you risk being inconsistent if you maintain first that it is rational for relativists to sit down around tables and discuss ethical disagreement over a nice cup of sweet tea, and then maintain second that it is pollyannaish for them to do so.
Is it rational for relativists to be pollyannaish or not?
quote:
The go to position of a relativist, or anyone else for that matter, when faced with a disagreement with no rational resolution is confrontation? To the relativist the type of differences we are talking about here are in the same category as which colour is better, blue or red, or which word is more beautiful, schmetterling or farfalla. If, as is normally thought in the non batshit insane version of moral relativism usually defended by actual relativists, relativism encourages the idea that the morality of one’s own culture has no special status but is just one moral system among many, then confrontation is just as likely to be low down the list of options as any other ethical stance.
This misrepresents actual relativists rather severely.
You agree that my child has no special status, but is just one child among many her age? Saying which child is more important is in the same category as whether one colour or one word is more beautiful than another? You agree?
Does that mean that, ethical considerations aside, I wouldn't do anything to ensure that she gets the last place in the lifeboat?
I don't care that my child is not special to the universe. She is special to me. A meta-ethical relativist does not care that their culture is not special to the universe. The meta-ethical relativist's culture is special to them.
quote:
quote:
Also, I don't think there's any meaningful difference between a relativist and a universalist who thinks that anyone who disagrees with them does so because of intractable moral defects.
That's because you either don't understand or wilfully misrepresent what relativism actually means.
I defined relativism (more precisely meta-ethical relativism, which is the kind I've been talking about) twice in my posts up to this point. You didn't take issue with either definition.
quote:
The most common position for the normative relativist, as I have said more than once, is that there is a significant connection between meta ethical relativism and tolerance.
Yes, you've said this more than once. I understood you. I disagreed. I said why I disagreed. You said this again.
quote:
These arguments work for whatever normative position you try and wring out of MMR. Just because you can't get an ought to be tolerant out of the is of moral relativism does not mean the relativist is then compelled to become a bomb dropping maniac.
I don't know. Might I have said that a relativist is only required to become a bomb-dropping maniac if their culture requires them to become a bomb-dropping maniac?
quote:
A relativist believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong for a person if and only if that person's culture believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong.
Yes. I did.
quote:
Anyway, I fear I am running out of ways to say the same thing.
I would have put that sentence in the past tense myself.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Russ
Old salt
# 120
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
The question then becomes who judges that ideal to be just. Right and wrong always imply "according to who". If we think of God as one who makes such value judgements within human experience, then morality can certainly be understood as conforming to God's will. Otherwise, I'm not sure what an ideal of justice means.
There's also the problem that such an ideal needs to address every moral context in the universe, because a moral ideal will always perfectly account for context. The "right" choice in any context would then be a binary "ideal or not" option. That seems to lose something essential to our humanity: responsibility for assessing a situation in the light of its context (including whatever moral code may apply) and deciding for ourselves what is right.
According to whom does 2 + 2 = 4 ? Whose judgment makes that sum correct ? We don't need to posit a God of Arithmetic in order to know what getting the sum right means...
The laws of arithmetic don't need to address explicitly every possible sum that may be performed in the universe. And they don't take away from the need for calculation by every individual with a numerical issue to solve.
So it's not clear to me where these objections of yours are coming from. Perhaps you're confusing the existence of moral right answers with the existence of known and easy answers ?
The "universalist" position says that some moral codes really are better than others, that it's not just a matter of personal or cultural preference. It doesn't say that any particular person's or culture's moral code is perfect, or that morality can be reduced to something that's simple.
Best wishes,
Russ
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Wish everyone well; the enemy is not people, the enemy is wrong ideas
Posts: 3169 | From: rural Ireland | Registered: May 2001
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Dave Marshall
Shipmate
# 7533
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
According to whom does 2 + 2 = 4 ? Whose judgment makes that sum correct ? We don't need to posit a God of Arithmetic in order to know what getting the sum right means...
Arithmetic generates outcomes that can be verified using well understood and accepted "laws of logic" that are a feature of physical reality. Other things being equal, anyone can check my sums.
There is no corresponding "law of morality". No-one can check my moral judgements in the same way. They can only compare them against some legal framework or court of opinion based on other people's perceptions and judgements.
quote:
The laws of arithmetic don't need to address explicitly every possible sum that may be performed in the universe. And they don't take away from the need for calculation by every individual with a numerical issue to solve.
Of course not. Arithmetic is a well-defined and universally accepted system of symbols and logic. It provides demonstrably correct answers.
Morality is about judgement and choice. The only possible "right" answer to a moral question is one that conforms to the judgement of some accepted authority in that field. If there is no such authority, I don't see there can be any objectively right answer, only what seems right to us.
quote:
Perhaps you're confusing the existence of moral right answers with the existence of known and easy answers ?
Perhaps. Or perhaps right answers to moral questions are only ever attempts by someone to impose their will on someone else.
Posts: 4763 | From: Derbyshire Dales | Registered: Jun 2004
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Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
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Posted
quote:
I feel you risk being inconsistent if you maintain first that it is rational for relativists to sit down around tables and discuss ethical disagreement over a nice cup of sweet tea, and then maintain second that it is pollyannaish for them to do so.
Is it rational for relativists to be pollyannaish or not?
Are you being deliberately obtuse? The fact that there are some disagreements that are not rationally resolvable doesn't mean they all are. And one way to find out if a disagreement is not rationally resolvable might be to try and rationally resolve it.
quote:
I defined relativism (more precisely meta-ethical relativism, which is the kind I've been talking about) twice in my posts up to this point. You didn't take issue with either definition.
I'd say our difference lies in how this definition actually plays out in the (somewhat simplified for our pseudo philosophical purposes) world.
quote:
Yes, you've said this more than once. I understood you. I disagreed. I said why I disagreed. You said this again.
I'm not sure you made clear why you disagreed that the most common form of normative relativism is tolerance. You just keep making assertions as if it isn't. I'll just quote a couple of definitions from about the place to say why I keep repeating it:
David Wong's entry on Relativism in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Normative relativism - the doctrine that it is morally wrong to pass judgment on or to interfere with the moral practices of others who have adopted moralities different from one's own."
Princeton University: "Normative relativism, further still, is the prescriptive or normative position that, as there is no universal moral standard by which to judge others, we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when it runs counter to our personal or cultural moral standards."
Then there's Wikipedia and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the discussion in the Stanford Encyclopedia about relativism and tolerance. I know I'm a philosophical naif, and arguments from authority are dodgy, but this suggests to me that your idea of archetypal relativist is not, er, universally shared.
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For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
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Russ
Old salt
# 120
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
The most common position for the normative relativist, as I have said more than once, is that there is a significant connection between meta ethical relativism and tolerance. As we have said before, most philosophers disagree, because, to quote Stanford: "Recognition of this fact (descriptive moral relativism), by itself, entails nothing about how we should act towards those with whom we disagree.
I'd understood from what was said earlier that moral relativism yields a definite moral imperative about how to act towards others - the imperative "do whatever your culture says is right". Because your culture can never be wrong (there lies universalism) and never be able to be set aside for individual preference (there lies nihilism). But maybe I misunderstood...
If IngoB believes that part if the universal moral imperative is that a man should have only one wife, and if I believe that the Arabs and the Mormons who believe in polygamy are thereby no worse than we are, then there's a sense in which I'm more relativist than he is. And thereby more tolerant of other cultures - less condemning. (though I'm not sure if such a difference in belief would ever lead to a different action). Even if I agree with everything IngoB says about the universality of morality, I apply it to a smaller domain - what I see as merely cultural he sees as moral. So in that sense I get the link that you're suggesting there is between relativism and tolerance.
At the extreme end of that spectrum is the Compleat Relativist, to whom everything is culture, and morality is an empty set.
But that's the guy Dafyd calls a nihilist. The Dafydian moral relativist - wherever he draws the line between moral and non-moral cultural differences - believes that once an issue has been judged to fall on the moral side of the line, the moral right answer is whatever one's own culture says it is. But in practice there's still the choice between agreeing to differ - living with the immorality of others - or going to war for what's right. There just isn't the option of trying to educate them out of it.
That sort of relativism isn't necessarily any more or less tolerant than the corresponding point on the universalist spectrum.
Not sure I've said that very well...
Best wishes,
Russ
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Wish everyone well; the enemy is not people, the enemy is wrong ideas
Posts: 3169 | From: rural Ireland | Registered: May 2001
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:
I feel you risk being inconsistent if you maintain first that it is rational for relativists to sit down around tables and discuss ethical disagreement over a nice cup of sweet tea, and then maintain second that it is pollyannaish for them to do so.
Is it rational for relativists to be pollyannaish or not?
Are you being deliberately obtuse? The fact that there are some disagreements that are not rationally resolvable doesn't mean they all are. And one way to find out if a disagreement is not rationally resolvable might be to try and rationally resolve it.
Well, yes. But there's a matter of probable success. And a relativist will think the probability of success is lower than a universalist will.
quote:
quote:
Yes, you've said this more than once. I understood you. I disagreed. I said why I disagreed. You said this again.
I'm not sure you made clear why you disagreed that the most common form of normative relativism is tolerance.
The reason I didn't make that clear is that I don't disagree with that. A normative relativist is by definition tolerant. I am arguing that meta-ethical relativism does not imply normative relativism. Indeed, I think meta-ethical relativism counts against certain considerations that would favour normative relativism.
I am happy to say that the commonest self-described normative relativist is a cultural liberal who is for meta-ethical relativism only because the cultural conservatives keeps using it as a boo-word, and therefore thinks 'relativism' means woolly cosmopolitan liberal feelings about other cultures.
The archetypal (meta-ethical) relativist, on the other hand, in the sense of the person who best represents meta-ethical ideas put into practice, is not a woolly liberal normative relativist. Quite the contrary, for reasons I have tried to explain.
I'll concede that early on in the argument, when you introduced the term 'normative relativist' as if it were equivalent to 'meta-ethical relativist', I imitated your usage a couple of times. That was sloppy of me.
[ 31. July 2014, 11:48: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
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Posted
quote:
Well, yes. But there's a matter of probable success. And a relativist will think the probability of success is lower than a universalist will.
And you know this how? A relativist could just as easily argue that universalists are more likely to be averse to accepting opposing moral arguments because they are more heavily invested in the idea that their culture is superior. After all, moral matters are close to our hearts and it's a rare person who starts off thinking they may be wrong about their moral judgements. And if they believe that they are closer to some exalted moral standard than the other guy at the outset, that's a pretty high barrier to get over.
That is, of course, making judgements based on limited data, tribal affiliations and assuming the worst of the other guy.
quote:
The archetypal (meta-ethical) relativist, on the other hand, in the sense of the person who best represents meta-ethical ideas put into practice, is not a woolly liberal normative relativist. Quite the contrary, for reasons I have tried to explain.
But you are just boo-wording from the other end. You are assuming that what your archetype takes from the mere fact of meta ethical moral relativism is that as far as cross cultural relations are concerned, they may as well be moral nihilists with sociopathic tendencies or gung ho moral absolutists happy to crush the faces of the Other beneath their mighty heels. The fact (and it is a fact if you accept MMR) that other cultures' moral proclivities are no less valid in the grand scheme of things than their own doesn't make a dent in their perception or behaviour at all by your account. You just seem to be assuming the worst interpretation of relativism you can build out of a pile of straw and some old clothes and calling it the archetype. That's like saying the Taliban are archetypal universalists.
One way, as you probably know, of illuminating moral relativism, is to look at the statement, "It is raining." If two people are standing side by side in Manchester getting drenched by a heavy shower, then the there can be no rational disagreement on that matter. But if one guy is there and the other on the phone in the Sahara denying the statement, then they're both right. You are saying the archetypal relativist standing in the puddle will happily have the the guy in the Sahara shot if he doesn't put on a cagoule and wellies every time it rains in Manchester.
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For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:
Well, yes. But there's a matter of probable success. And a relativist will think the probability of success is lower than a universalist will.
And you know this how?
By definition a universalist believes that ethical beliefs converge on the truth by a process of rational argument.
By definition a relativist believes that this does not always happen.
quote:
After all, moral matters are close to our hearts and it's a rare person who starts off thinking they may be wrong about their moral judgements. And if they believe that they are closer to some exalted moral standard than the other guy at the outset, that's a pretty high barrier to get over.
This is all true of a relativist as well. In fact, a relativist believes there is no moral standard more exalted than their culture, and you can't get a moral standard much closer than that.
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You are assuming that what your archetype takes from the mere fact of meta ethical moral relativism is that as far as cross cultural relations are concerned, they may as well be moral nihilists with sociopathic tendencies or gung ho moral absolutists happy to crush the faces of the Other beneath their mighty heels.
A moral nihilist is someone who believes that no moral judgements can be justified. You say that a meta-ethical relativist is someone who believes that no trans-cultural moral judgements can be justified.
Therefore, according to you, with respect to trans-cultural moral judgements, meta-ethicial relativists and moral nihilists hold identical beliefs.
Am I wrong? In what way do you think the meta-ethical relativist and the meta-ethical nihilist differ in respect to trans-cultural moral judgements?
It does seem as a matter of observable fact that the degree of sociopathy required to believe that it is sometimes justifiable to bomb other cultures is rather widespread.
Really, what part of:
quote:
A relativist believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong for a person if and only if that person's culture believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong.
is quite so difficult to understand?
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The fact (and it is a fact if you accept MMR) that other cultures' moral proclivities are no less valid in the grand scheme of things than their own doesn't make a dent in their perception or behaviour at all by your account.
This is like saying that one cat is no less red than another cat when looked at through sonar. Things cannot be more or less red unless you're looking at them through visible light. For a relativist cultures cannot be more or less valid in the grand scheme of things. You can only talk about more or less valid from within a particular culture. And from within any particular culture, that particular culture will necessarily be the most valid.
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One way, as you probably know, of illuminating moral relativism, is to look at the statement, "It is raining."
No. That is a way of illuminating moral relativism in the same way as a red strobe light is a way of illuminating open heart surgery.
The statement 'it is raining' by someone in Manchester can be instantly turned into a statement that means exactly the same and is true in the general scheme of things by adding 'in Manchester'. A weather forecaster in a studio in Manchester can make true statements about the weather in London, Manchester, and York, and can be perfectly well understood by listeners in London, Manchester, and York, even if those listeners have no idea where the weather forecaster's studio is.
A relativist believes that the statement, made from within English culture, that 'it is wrong to jump a queue' cannot be turned into any statement that means the same and is true in the general scheme of things. A relativist believes that there are no statements true in the general scheme of things that mean the same as 'it is wrong to jump a queue'.
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You are saying the archetypal relativist standing in the puddle will happily have the the guy in the Sahara shot if he doesn't put on a cagoule and wellies every time it rains in Manchester.
Firstly, statements about the weather do not have implications about the ethical way to treat people with different weather. Ethical systems characteristically do have implications about the ethical way to treat people who behave in ways not sanctioned by those ethical systems.
Secondly, what part of:
quote:
A relativist believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong for a person if and only if that person's culture believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong.
is quite so difficult to understand?
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
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Posted
quote:
By definition a universalist believes that ethical beliefs converge on the truth by a process of rational argument.
By that definition a univeralist is either an idiot or immortal. Moral universalism has been a characteristic of societies for millennia and there is still a fair bit of converging to do.
quote:
A moral nihilist is someone who believes that no moral judgements can be justified. You say that a meta-ethical relativist is someone who believes that no trans-cultural moral judgements can be justified.
Therefore, according to you, with respect to trans-cultural moral judgements, meta-ethicial relativists and moral nihilists hold identical beliefs.Am I wrong? In what way do you think the meta-ethical relativist and the meta-ethical nihilist differ in respect to trans-cultural moral judgements?
The difference is a subtle one and lies in the realisation that for each party in a trans cultural disagreement the beliefs at issue can be different yet at the same time true for both parties because the moral frameworks within which they are making their judgments are incommensurable.
Your idea of an archetypal relativist holds, as you said yourself, identical beliefs to some moral universalists - they believe their culture is superior and feel justified in bombing other cultures because of it. I say moral relativism adds something to the mix which you insist the archetypal relativist ignores. If you are correct, I don't see how moral relativism has received any attention. Indeed, your version of it, as far as I can see, doesn't receive much attention at all, while the idea that MMR leads to tolerance is widespread. I suppose everyone must be out of step except you.
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A relativist believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong for a person if and only if that person's culture believes bombing the fuck out of other cultures is wrong.
Easy enough to understand, hard to take seriously. It is a simple matter of observation that cultures' moral attitudes shift over time. Western culture has changed considerably in the last hundred years. Racism is much less open than it used to be, women have greater equality, homosexuality is more accepted and the idea of a civilising empire being a good thing has less traction than it used to. If a culture has a belief that bombing the fuck out of other cultures, that belief comes from somewhere and is subject to change. There is no requirement placed upon relativists to unthinkingly accept the mores of their culture. Meta ethical relativism simply ays the framework within which one evaluates moral questions is local not universal. That what is true in one culture is not necessarily true in another.
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This is like saying that one cat is no less red than another cat when looked at through sonar. Things cannot be more or less red unless you're looking at them through visible light. For a relativist cultures cannot be more or less valid in the grand scheme of things.
OK, badly worded. This bit is right. You've got it.
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You can only talk about more or less valid from within a particular culture. And from within any particular culture, that particular culture will necessarily be the most valid.
Oh bugger, you've lost it again. You can't talk about it within a particular culture, either. Or if you do you are severely constrained. You can judge whether a another culture is consistent with its own moral code for instance.
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The statement 'it is raining' by someone in Manchester can be instantly turned into a statement that means exactly the same and is true in the general scheme of things by adding 'in Manchester'. A weather forecaster in a studio in Manchester can make true statements about the weather in London, Manchester, and York, and can be perfectly well understood by listeners in London, Manchester, and York, even if those listeners have no idea where the weather forecaster's studio is.A relativist believes that the statement, made from within English culture, that 'it is wrong to jump a queue' cannot be turned into any statement that means the same and is true in the general scheme of things. A relativist believes that there are no statements true in the general scheme of things that mean the same as 'it is wrong to jump a queue
You are missing the whole point. Relative truths are context dependent. "It is raining in Manchester" and "It is not raining in the Sahara" are, as you say, true the same time, obviously. It is also obvious that you don't put a cagoule and wellies on in the Sahara when it rains in Manchester.
So, relativists believe, "It is wrong for an English person, in England, to jump a queue" and "It is not wrong for an Italian, in Italy, to jump a queue". Armed with these beliefs, English relativists visiting Italy approach queue related activities differently than would be the case at home if they want to get into museums without fisticuffs. In short, when in Rome they do what the Romans do.
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Firstly, statements about the weather do not have implications about the ethical way to treat people with different weather.
It's that willful obtuseness again. Get a grip. It's an analogy.
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Ethical systems characteristically do have implications about the ethical way to treat people who behave in ways not sanctioned by those ethical systems.
And relativists incorporate the idea of what is true for me is not necessarily true for you in their ethical systems.
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For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
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Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
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Posted
Tried to edit but was too late:
quote:
Firstly, statements about the weather do not have implications about the ethical way to treat people with different weather.
OK, assuming you are getting it's an analogy. So, statements about the weather, if true, have implications about how to deal with weather conditions. Statements about ethics, if you believe them, have implications for your ethical decisions.
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For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:
By definition a universalist believes that ethical beliefs converge on the truth by a process of rational argument.
By that definition a univeralist is either an idiot or immortal. Moral universalism has been a characteristic of societies for millennia and there is still a fair bit of converging to do.
This is why relativism is more plausible in ethics than it is in the physical sciences.
Nevertheless, the universalist might point to some of the things you point to later in your post.
quote:
quote:
In what way do you think the meta-ethical relativist and the meta-ethical nihilist differ in respect to trans-cultural moral judgements?
The difference is a subtle one and lies in the realisation that for each party in a trans cultural disagreement the beliefs at issue can be different yet at the same time true for both parties because the moral frameworks within which they are making their judgments are incommensurable.
You've said what you think the difference lies in. What do you think the difference actually is?
How can there be a trans cultural disagreement if there are no trans cultural judgements that disagree?
quote:
If a culture has a belief that bombing the fuck out of other cultures, that belief comes from somewhere and is subject to change. There is no requirement placed upon relativists to unthinkingly accept the mores of their culture. Meta ethical relativism simply ays the framework within which one evaluates moral questions is local not universal. That what is true in one culture is not necessarily true in another.
This is all true. Now let's look at the implications.
A meta ethical relativist believes we should use local frameworks to evaluate ethical questions.
Meta ethical relativism is a universal framework.
Therefore the meta ethical relativist does not use meta ethical relativism when evaluating ethical questions, because meta ethical relativism is not a local framework.
Should we bomb that neighbouring culture is an ethical question.
That it concerns a different culture does not make it not an ethical question.
Therefore, a meta ethical relativist evaluates it in the same way as the meta ethical relativist evaluates every other ethical question; they use a local framework.
Now, certainly our local culture had, at least over the later part of the twentieth century, moved towards a more tolerant outlook. I would say, however, that a good many of the reasons that might be adduced in favour of that are unavailable to a consistent relativist. i.e. if somebody says 'why can't we all get along together?' the relativist might have to say, because we have incommensurable ethical frameworks that mean we can never agree on the right way to resolve our conflict.
quote:
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You can only talk about more or less valid from within a particular culture. And from within any particular culture, that particular culture will necessarily be the most valid.
Oh bugger, you've lost it again. You can't talk about it within a particular culture, either.
Why can't you if the local framework makes it possible?
Sumner can certainly say 'if we Americans become imperialists like the Spanish are that would make us illiberal and cruel...' Why is it irrational for him to follow that up with '...like the Spanish?'
A moral universalist says 'The Taliban deny women education, denying women education is cruel and illiberal and wrong, therefore the Taliban are cruel and illiberal and wrong.'
A moral relativist says, your second premise is 'denying women education is cruel and illiberal and wrong by the standards of our culture, and therefore your conclusion should be the Taliban are cruel and illiberal and wrong by the standards of our culture.'
The new conclusion is not self-contradictory, and follows from the new premise. So what is wrong with it?
quote:
quote:
The statement 'it is raining' by someone in Manchester can be instantly turned into a statement that means exactly the same and is true in the general scheme of things by adding 'in Manchester'.(...) A relativist believes that the statement, made from within English culture, that 'it is wrong to jump a queue' cannot be turned into any statement that means the same and is true in the general scheme of things. A relativist believes that there are no statements true in the general scheme of things that mean the same as 'it is wrong to jump a queue
You are missing the whole point. Relative truths are context dependent.So, relativists believe, "It is wrong for an English person, in England, to jump a queue" and "It is not wrong for an Italian, in Italy, to jump a queue". Armed with these beliefs, English relativists visiting Italy approach queue related activities differently than would be the case at home if they want to get into museums without fisticuffs. In short, when in Rome they do what the Romans do.
You mean, when in Rome, conquer Italy, destroy Carthage and salt the ground, invade Gaul and Britain, and proclaim the superiority of the Imperium Romanum?
I didn't miss your point. I said why I thought it was wrong. There is a difference between missing a point and disagreeing with it.
On the other hand, as you haven't referred to my point at all, I think I'd say you have missed mine.
'When in Rome do as the Romans do' is a truth that is supposed to be true for everyone wherever they are. It is a universal moral truth, and therefore a relativist cannot accept it. (Strictly, a relativist can only accept that it is true for someone whose culture dictates it.)
'It is wrong for an English person in England to jump a queue' and 'it is not wrong for an Italian person in Italy to jump a queue' are equally universal context-independent statements. Anybody, whatever culture they belong to is supposed to accept them. Therefore, a relativist cannnot accept them.
What the relativist believes is rather: 'For an English person in England, it is wrong (for anyone anywhere) to jump a queue', and 'For an Italian person in Italy, it is not wrong (for anyone anywhere) to jump a queue'. In so far as those are context-independent truths, they are anthropological statements with no normative force, not ethical statements.
quote:
And relativists incorporate the idea of what is true for me is not necessarily true for you in their ethical systems.
Consider it the other way around.
A relativist believes that just because something is not true for you, that does not stop it being true for me. So just because 'people who jump queues should be tut-tutted at,' is not true for you, does not stop it from being true for me that if you jump a queue I should tut-tut at you.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Russ
Old salt
# 120
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
The fact (and it is a fact if you accept MMR) that other cultures' moral proclivities are no less valid in the grand scheme of things than their own doesn't make a dent in their perception or behaviour at all by your account.
Does that "fact" have ethical consequences or not ?
If not, why are you complaining that it doesn't impact on behaviour ?
If it does, how do those consequences not constitute the sort of universal moral imperative that MMR denies ?
Maybe I've been vaccinated against it... ![[Smile]](smile.gif) .
Best wishes
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Wish everyone well; the enemy is not people, the enemy is wrong ideas
Posts: 3169 | From: rural Ireland | Registered: May 2001
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Grokesx
Shipmate
# 17221
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Posted
quote:
How can there be a trans cultural disagreement if there are no trans cultural judgements that disagree?
Indeed. I believe some philosophers maintain that trans cultural ethical disagreements would simply dissolve if both sides were consistent relativists.
quote:
This is all true. Now let's look at the implications.
A meta ethical relativist believes we should use local frameworks to evaluate ethical questions.
Slightly wrong. There is no should. A meta ethical relativist believes that each culture only has its own frameworks available to evaluate ethical questions.
quote:
Meta ethical relativism is a universal framework.Therefore the meta ethical relativist does not use meta ethical relativism when evaluating ethical questions, because meta ethical relativism is not a local framework.
Meta ethical relativism is a universal truth. Moral truths are relative truths. When evaluating ethical matters, the meta-ethical truth that there is no universal truth is still hanging around, nudging the relativist in the ribs and saying stuff like, "You know, it's all well and proper for you to tut tut at that queue jumping Italian in your eyes, but in his eyes it is all well and proper for him to nip in ahead of you. So ask yourself, is it rational to get into confrontation with the guy - after all, you believe, meta-ethically speaking, that you're both right."
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Should we bomb that neighbouring culture is an ethical question. That it concerns a different culture does not make it not an ethical question.Therefore, a meta ethical relativist evaluates it in the same way as the meta ethical relativist evaluates every other ethical question; they use a local framework
And if they do that, they need never have taken the intellectual and emotional effort to accept MMR in the first place. They are, as noted before by both of us, just doing what a certain sort of moral universalist does, judging the other culture wrong and acting (or more likely, justifying an action decided upon for other less elevated reasons like land or resource grabbing) accordingly.
quote:
...if somebody says 'why can't we all get along together?' the relativist might have to say, because we have incommensurable ethical frameworks that mean we can never agree on the right way to resolve our conflict
And they might go on to say, "So we might be able to find a way to agree to disagree."
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'When in Rome do as the Romans do' is a truth that is supposed to be true for everyone wherever they are.
Not to a relativist it isn't. It's a rational response to an inescapable fact.
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'For an English person in England, it is wrong (for anyone anywhere) to jump a queue', and 'For an Italian person in Italy, it is not wrong (for anyone anywhere) to jump a queue'.
And I maintain it is rational for an English relativist to recognise that the Italian is doing nothing wrong when jumping a queue. And it is rational for the Italian relativist to recognise that when English people tut tut, they are justified.
Mind you, I am also talking about actual human beings and not logicians.
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For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. H. L. Mencken
Posts: 373 | From: Derby, UK | Registered: Jul 2012
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:
'When in Rome do as the Romans do' is a truth that is supposed to be true for everyone wherever they are.
Not to a relativist it isn't. It's a rational response to an inescapable fact.
A rational response to an inescapable fact is a truth that is supposed to be true for everyone wherever they are.
[ 03. August 2014, 19:28: Message edited by: Dafyd ]
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Russ
Old salt
# 120
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
There is no should. A meta ethical relativist believes that each culture only has its own frameworks available to evaluate ethical questions.
If I have it right then Dafyd is distinguishing two positions:
If there is no "should" anywhere, no moral imperative, then in your system you've abolished morality altogether - there is nothing but custom. The "local framework" has no moral force, only the "prudential ought" - if you want to be on good terms with your neighbours then follow the local custom (which in England means not only not jumping the queue but also not advocating genocide on foreigners). This he calls nihilism.
The other position seems equivalent to a universal but tautological moral imperative to "act morally", with the details on what acting morally involves left blank for individual cultures to fill in. So that a moral Italian, seeking to act justly and do what is right, has only Italian culture to guide him as to what "justice" is. And is therefore morally obliged to do the best he can to follow that. Which, being his only guide, he can never judge to be wrong. This is a version of moral relativism that seems to lead to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that for practical purposes one's own culture is always absolutely right...
Your version seems closer to the former...
Best wishes,
Russ
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Wish everyone well; the enemy is not people, the enemy is wrong ideas
Posts: 3169 | From: rural Ireland | Registered: May 2001
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Dave Marshall
Shipmate
# 7533
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
[One position is:] If there is no "should" anywhere, no moral imperative, then in your system you've abolished morality altogether - there is nothing but custom. The "local framework" has no moral force, only the "prudential ought" - if you want to be on good terms with your neighbours then follow the local custom (which in England means not only not jumping the queue but also not advocating genocide on foreigners). This he calls nihilism.
Nothing like a bit of pejorative labelling. But to expand slightly on my earlier comment, I'm still unclear what value ideas like "moral force" and "moral imperative" have, or in what context they are significantly different in practice to your "prudential ought".
Morality is not law. Sanctions for immorality however defined have no inherent structure. I struggle to see how any claim to be morally right is any different to an assertion that "this is what most of us approve of", for whatever value of "us" we're talking about.
Posts: 4763 | From: Derbyshire Dales | Registered: Jun 2004
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Russ:
If I have it right then Dafyd is distinguishing two positions:
Three positions, I think.
Your first position, I suppose I'd call moral nihilism: the belief that moral propositions and statements about values aren't really true and so can be put aside in favour of pragmatic considerations.
Your second I think I'd call something like cosmopolitan tolerance, which is a universalist position. (Judging people from other cultures by the standards of your culture is wrong; imposing your culture's values on other people is wrong; otherwise, when in Rome do as the Romans do; doing otherwise is wrong.)
Relativism I think falls in between: it believes there are no eternal values and no eternal moral truths. But it doesn't care. It thinks the values and moral propositions of a culture are sufficient to be binding on members of that culture. So it doesn't put those values aside just for the sake of convenience.
(I was, of course, making a joke when I implied that the English treat 'don't jump the queue' as an eternal moral value that may not be put aside for mere convenience.)
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Callan
Shipmate
# 525
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Posted
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
quote:
Nothing like a bit of pejorative labelling. But to expand slightly on my earlier comment, I'm still unclear what value ideas like "moral force" and "moral imperative" have, or in what context they are significantly different in practice to your "prudential ought".
Giving up your seat on a train to a lady is a prudential ought. Refraining from pushing someone under a train is a moral imperative.
quote:
Morality is not law. Sanctions for immorality however defined have no inherent structure. I struggle to see how any claim to be morally right is any different to an assertion that "this is what most of us approve of", for whatever value of "us" we're talking about.
I'm not sure that claims about morality and claims for what most people approve of are the same. I think, for example, that the death penalty is morally wrong but I have no idea whether that is a majority view among the population of Great Britain, let alone the rest of the world. It doesn't make a great deal of sense to claim that "the death penalty is morally wrong" is a claim about an "us" of which I am a member, except among opponents of the death penalty, which would be a fairly tautological claim. That the death penalty is something that the majority of opponents of the death penalty oppose is hardly a convincing argument for opposing the death penalty.
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How easy it would be to live in England, if only one did not love her. - G.K. Chesterton
Posts: 9757 | From: Citizen of the World | Registered: Jun 2001
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Dave Marshall
Shipmate
# 7533
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Gildas:
Giving up your seat on a train to a lady is a prudential ought. Refraining from pushing someone under a train is a moral imperative.
Yes, that reflects my impression of how the terms are used. So the significant difference is something like "degree of seriousness"? Causing physical injury rates above the "morality threshold", defying social convention is below?
There will be cultures (for example in a TV drama like Sons of Anarchy) where casual murder is no big thing but disrespect can be an ultimate sin. The scale seems a matter of emphasis rather than any essential difference between the concepts.
quote:
I'm not sure that claims about morality and claims for what most people approve of are the same.
Not in a single-step cause-and-effect way. But as a feature of the "digest of a vastly multi-generational social process" that cultures pass down to successive generations, it seems a plausible theory.
[ 04. August 2014, 17:22: Message edited by: Dave Marshall ]
Posts: 4763 | From: Derbyshire Dales | Registered: Jun 2004
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Dafyd
Shipmate
# 5549
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Posted
quote:
Originally posted by Gildas:
Giving up your seat on a train to a lady is a prudential ought. Refraining from pushing someone under a train is a moral imperative.
A prudential ought is you ought to give up your wallet without a fight should someone with a knife ask you for it. Or you ought not to make recordings of yourself discussing plans to bug your political opponents.
'Don't get caught' is a prudential imperative.
The lines get a bit blurred by such things as 'honesty is the best policy' and other maxims of enlightened self-interest.
But giving up your seat to an old lady is normally on the moral side of the line.
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we remain, thanks to original sin, much in love with talking about, rather than with, one another. Rowan Williams
Posts: 10567 | From: Edinburgh | Registered: Feb 2004
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Callan
Shipmate
# 525
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Posted
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
quote:
quote:
Originally posted by Gildas:
Giving up your seat on a train to a lady is a prudential ought. Refraining from pushing someone under a train is a moral imperative.
Yes, that reflects my impression of how the terms are used. So the significant difference is something like "degree of seriousness"? Causing physical injury rates above the "morality threshold", defying social convention is below?
There will be cultures (for example in a TV drama like Sons of Anarchy) where casual murder is no big thing but disrespect can be an ultimate sin. The scale seems a matter of emphasis rather than any essential difference between the concepts.
Well, yes, different cultures of that sort exist but no-one actually behaves as if the difference between a motorcycle gang and The Society of St. Francis or the British Humanist Association is merely one of convention. If a member of the Sons of Anarchy pull a knife on you and demand your wallet you, may, to use Dafyd's example, think it prudent to hand it over but you aren't likely to regard the distinction between the Sons of Anarchy and the law abiding public as one of purely anthropological curiosity. I've no idea as to the population dynamics of atheists in foxholes but I am pretty sure that there are no relativists in dark alleyways.
quote:
quote:
I'm not sure that claims about morality and claims for what most people approve of are the same.
Not in a single-step cause-and-effect way. But as a feature of the "digest of a vastly multi-generational social process" that cultures pass down to successive generations, it seems a plausible theory.
That might be an account of cultural formation but it doesn't really hold as a account of moral decision making. It is undoubtedly the case that, for various reasons, the death penalty is less popular than it was in the eighteenth century. To that extent your multi-generational social processes can be invoked but that wouldn't tell you how to vote if Mr Cameron decided tomorrow to hold a referendum on the subject. I think that, say, Lord Tebbit's views on the subject are wrong but it would be otiose to suggest that the fact that they are less popular than they were fifty years ago was some kind of proof of that.
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How easy it would be to live in England, if only one did not love her. - G.K. Chesterton
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Printer-friendly view
![[Killing me]](graemlins/killingme.gif)
