Ship of Fools: Purgatory: What's the point of anger, protests, indignation, petitions and justice...

Thread: Purgatory: What's the point of anger, protests, indignation, petitions and justice... Board: Limbo / Ship of Fools.

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Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

... if morality is entirely subjective (as has been suggested here, and elsewhere on this thread)?

If morality is merely a matter of opinion, merely a matter of taste (even "collective taste", aka consensus), then moral indignation could be likened to my feeling incensed at someone for eating broad beans (which I happen to dislike) and not broccoli (which I happen to like). And those greedy bankers committing fraud are only "eating their broad beans", and therefore it seems rather childish and churlish of me to feel any kind of indignation at their behaviour, if morality really is nothing more than a matter of personal opinion!

And if morality is merely a matter of upbringing, then I suppose I should feel angry at someone's background, which almost sounds like a form of racism. Or if it's merely a matter of genetics, then perhaps I should also campaign against the size of another person's ears!

Doesn't the deep sense we have that moral anger possesses validity just demonstrate how absurd it is to say that morality is subjective? How can we justify moral indignation - and sorrow - on this basis? In fact, such opposition to other people's morality (no matter how obnoxious it may seem) would be just another form of discrimination.

Which of course is total BS.

There has to be an objective basis to our collective moral sense in order for our moral responses to have any validity. Logic.

Those who claim that morality is ultimately subjective need to explain something called "reality".

Discuss.

[ 02. November 2012, 20:30: Message edited by: Barnabas62 ]

Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on :

You say 'merely' a great deal in that OP. Our morals are very much a matter of our culture and upbringing.

I know Muslims who have a deep sense of moral outrage because I wear a swimming costume in the presence of men. Our local baths have 'women only' sessions because of this.

Does that make them objectively right?

If not, why not?

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Boogie
Our morals are very much a matter of our culture and upbringing.

So therefore you would agree that to reject another person's morality is a form of cultural and racial discrimination, yes?

Therefore it is wrong to feel any kind of anger at female genital mutilation or the banning of female education?

I am not suggesting that all forms of morality are equally valid. That is the opposite of what I am saying. But how can we feel any kind of indignation at any moral position if morality is simply (or "very much" - to use your words) a matter of our culture and upbringing?

Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on :

You didn't answer my question.

Posted by Boat Boy (# 13050) on :

If you believe that there is an ultimate moral authority, could you tell us what that is?

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

What is the point? It matters to that starfish.

Harm is not entirely subjective. Harm is visible and demonstrable in some cases. If I cut your hands off at the wrists, that is a matter of objective fact and I have harmed you. You are less than you were.

Growth and healing are not entirely subjective. My little sister is alive through major heart surgery. Someone I know is no longer spending 8 hours a day in tears through medicine. Someone else can walk again. They are all more than they were.

Now there is opinion involved in morality because no human has or can have perfect knowledge. And I only have my instincts and my reason to go on. All of us are flawed, and all of us can end up in dead ends. So as Marvin said, any of us can call something good because we've made a mistaken.

The morality is seen as subjective because we have imperfect knowledge. The facts are objective and as Marvin pointed out . And what we do matters to that starfish.

Part of atheist moral discourse involves accepting that we can be wrong and that others can be wrong on moral issues and pointing out where they are.

Reality exists, but how we piece together reality is clearly subjective. And our morality derives from how we piece together reality and however hard we struggle to make it match to reality it is always going to be subjective. Which doesn't make reality exist less.

Posted by George Spigot (# 253) on :

Because sometimes when enough people protest the powers that be take note and and protesters get what they wanted. So the answer is practical results.

Let's say for example that the local library was going to close. I don't need to navel gaze and try and come up with a valid reason that fits into a world view before I decide to do something. I want to keep the library open because it benefits me and my family and because I like library's. While debates about subjective/objective morality are fascinating in reality I don't really make moral decisions by contemplating philosophy I just sort of get on with it.

I think the main problem I have with objective morality is that I think it's vital that moral questions are decided on a case by case basis. For example there are many occasions where lying is the wrong thing to do but some occasions where it's the right thing to do. Question for the smarter than me people on the ship. Does objective morality allow for lying to be both right and wrong?

Posted by Niteowl2 (# 15841) on :

Morals are also based on community and what is in the best interests of the community, so when bankers or any other entity/person does something that harms the community there will be outrage, petitions, protests, etc. I think your viewpoint is that morals are from Christianity and anything else isn't valid or is questionable, which isn't true. Not to mention even Christians don't always agree on what is moral and what isn't.

Posted by Janine (# 3337) on :

There are standards. Stuff is either "good", or not.

The flexibility and the grey areas come from our personal (frequently slanted and incomplete) perceptions and circumstances.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
Harm is not entirely subjective. Harm is visible and demonstrable in some cases. If I cut your hands off at the wrists, that is a matter of objective fact and I have harmed you. You are less than you were.

That A has cut off B's hands at the wrist is an objective fact. That it is harm is more difficult. If both hands are gangrenous then it may be the only way to save your life - under those circumstances I think we would hesitate to call the surgery harm.
It's true that in that case we could say that the harm had been done already. We can't imagine a situation in which we wouldn't judge that losing one's hands was the result of harm at some point along the line. But merely because a reaction is universal doesn't necessarily mean it's not subjective. (It's generally thought that colour sensations are subjective.)
Compare a sex change operation (male to female) would certainly qualify as harm under the above definition if done without consent. The person is less than they were; they lack an organ that they used to have. But if it is done with consent I think only moral conservatives would call the result harm.
Compare again, deliberately deafening or blinding someone. That would seem to qualify as harm. Yet if a couple who were both deaf or blind said that they wanted to arrange it so that their children to be congenitally deaf/blind I don't think it's an open and shut case that they intend harm to their children. (They would say that being deaf or blind has compensations such that it does not count as harm.)
That there isn't a community of handless people advocating the choice of handlessness may be, with that in mind, a fact that establishes no metaphysical significance.

That all suggests that the judgement of harm is dependent upon the moral judgement rather than the other way around. Saying that harm is or is not objective therefore cannot ground a judgement that morality is objective.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot:
Does objective morality allow for lying to be both right and wrong?

An objective morality cannot allow for lying to be both right and wrong in situations that are similar in all morally relevant respects.

Nothing about the objectivity of morality decides whether or not there are morally relevant respects that alter the morality of lying.

In Kantian morality, lying is either always wrong or always permissible. But under classical utilitarianism - which in its Bentham/Mill formulations is certainly an objective system - lying is right or wrong depending upon whether it maximises utility.

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Doesn't the deep sense we have that moral anger possesses validity just demonstrate how absurd it is to say that morality is subjective?

Not at all. If morality were a fixed and objective standard as you suggest you'd expect only one side of any given controversy (the "objectively moral" side) to feel moral anger. This doesn't seem to be the case.

I'm also a bit curious about this idea that people don't have strong emotional feelings about subjective issues. Like no one would ever get in a heated argument about the superiority of a particular sports team or why the book was so much better than the movie (or vice versa). The way you claim people behave doesn't seem to match the behavior of actual people.

Posted by que sais-je (# 17185) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Niteowl2:
Morals are also based on community and what is in the best interests of the community, so when bankers or any other entity/person does something that harms the community there will be outrage, petitions, protests, etc.

I agree. There isn't any much morality for one person alone on a desert island to have. But 'community' means we need morals to get along. Morality is essentially a communal enterprise. The problem is that none of us belong to just one community. Some bankers don't feel themselves to be - in any real sense - part of the same community as the rest of us (I tend to reciprocate). I'm aware that I feel close to my local community but also part of, say, the community of men, of mathematicians, of Terry Pratchet fans and so on. In some cases I might put the interests of mathematicians, say, ahead of those of my geographic community. This leads to conflict.

As for subjectivity generally, I'm less certain. How about the following, based on Kant, suppose someone asks you to betray a close friend in some way. They might threaten you or your family if you don't agree to do the act, or maybe offer a bribe. You might accept and betray your friend but could you ever think what you had done was 'good'? The lesser of two evils maybe but wouldn't you rather not be in such a situation?

I can't imagine anyone feeling they have done a good thing if they betray someone (or group or cause) that is close to their heart. That's a good enough example for me.

Posted by TurquoiseTastic (# 8978) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Doesn't the deep sense we have that moral anger possesses validity just demonstrate how absurd it is to say that morality is subjective?
Not at all. If morality were a fixed and objective standard as you suggest you'd expect only one side of any given controversy (the "objectively moral" side) to feel moral anger. This doesn't seem to be the case.

Sure you would. It just means that at least one of the sides is incorrect in their moral judgement.

I don't think that the strong feelings EE refers to logically prove the existence of objective morality. But I could buy his use of the word "absurd": if we came to believe in our hearts that there was no real difference between good and evil, it would make the world "absurd", if you like. Difficult to see any reason to strive for anything beyond making oneself as comfortable as possible.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
There has to be an objective basis to our collective moral sense in order for our moral responses to have any validity. Logic.

This is not the first time that you've announced on the Ship that something is simply self-evident or logical and that you've neatly wrapped it up in the space of a single post. Given your track record - including on topics where I've personally agreed with your conclusions but found your means of arriving there badly flawed - forgive me for not finding myself convinced by your latest offering.

All you've really managed to say is that because on certain topics you can't imagine having a different opinion about them, your opinion is 'objective'.

The first example that leapt to my mind is that there have been cultures, eg Sparta, who found it perfectly acceptable to leave infants outside to die. If you tried to harangue an individual Spartan about this prospect I'd imagine they would find your approach puzzling. Why exactly should they listen to you and your self-evident pronouncement that leaving infants to die is a terrible, horrible unacceptable thing, as opposed to listening to the society and culture they grew up in?

Posted by TurquoiseTastic (# 8978) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo:

The first example that leapt to my mind is that there have been cultures, eg Sparta, who found it perfectly acceptable to leave infants outside to die. If you tried to harangue an individual Spartan about this prospect I'd imagine they would find your approach puzzling. Why exactly should they listen to you and your self-evident pronouncement that leaving infants to die is a terrible, horrible unacceptable thing, as opposed to listening to the society and culture they grew up in?

Good question. How would you go about it? First of all, should you go about it and if so, why?

You could try to persuade them on the basis of some other piece of morality that you share. You could try "You should treat others as you would like to be treated". Or a different angle like "It is ignoble for a strong person to kill a defenceless person". Or even "This baby might look useless, but actually he might come in handy someday". But you probably need to appeal to some shared principle that you both see as self-evident - even in the last case, "being useful to society is a good thing"

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

^ Agreed. You would have to find some 'deeper' principle. And it's not immediately obvious to me that you could be guaranteed of finding one. Because if you could, it begs the question as to how that culture ever found child abandonment to be acceptable in the first place (if it's somehow contrary to a 'deeper' moral principle that they shared with us).

There is of course a fair amount of difficulty in empirically testing this. Finding access to a culture that's sufficiently different from our own is not an easy task.

Posted by TurquoiseTastic (# 8978) on :

I don't think it's a big puzzle that a culture could fail to live up to its core principles, and become inured to practices that were contrary to them. Surely it happens all the time. I suppose it's the cultural equivalent of what on an individual level used to be called "the searing of the conscience". In this case the encounter would be a "wake-up call" leading to guilt and (hopefully) contrition and amendment or (tragically) denial and perhaps even deliberate abandonment of the core principle.

But my main point is - to make progress, the cultural norm of exposing infants has to be examined in the light of a higher authority - in this case, a deeper principle that both sides agree is true.

I suppose this isn't an "objective morality" yet - it's just a "shared morality".

What do you do if you can't find a deeper principle that you agree on though? Does that mean it is OK for them to carry on leaving out the babies? If not, why not?

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
This is not the first time that you've announced on the Ship that something is simply self-evident or logical and that you've neatly wrapped it up in the space of a single post. Given your track record - including on topics where I've personally agreed with your conclusions but found your means of arriving there badly flawed - forgive me for not finding myself convinced by your latest offering.

"Given your track record"

Oooh ouch. (Shall I slink away in a quiet corner and have a little cry?)

Actually... I presume that this is filed away in a little filing cabinet marked "OO" (Orfeo's Opinions). Because unless there is some secret file on me in the subterranean vaults of the Ship charting my extremely dodgy behaviour on board, then I am afraid I haven't a flippin' clue what the hell the above statement means in reality.

(Which is further supported by the fact that you have failed to provide any evidence or argument to back up this grotesque generalisation. Which really doesn't say much for your "track record"!!)

Your logic leaves a lot to be desired, because you say that I have "announced" something on the Ship. OK. So has everybody else, when they express their point of view!! Or perhaps I am not allowed to express a viewpoint unless it's authorised by an anonymous person called 'orfeo'? Furthermore, I have apparently neatly wrapped it up in the space of a single post! Did you bother to read the last word of the post? D-I-S-C-U-S-S. I was inviting discussion - and therefore open to my viewpoint being challenged.

If you are going to come out with a smug, snide put down, then take it to hell, while the rest of us can debate the issue in a respectful way.

[ 18. July 2012, 10:24: Message edited by: EtymologicalEvangelical ]

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Boogie
You didn't answer my question.

Fair comment.

So rewind...

quote:
Originally posted by Boogie
You say 'merely' a great deal in that OP. Our morals are very much a matter of our culture and upbringing.

I know Muslims who have a deep sense of moral outrage because I wear a swimming costume in the presence of men. Our local baths have 'women only' sessions because of this.

Does that make them objectively right?

If not, why not?

Obviously those Muslims would regard their moral code as having an objective basis rooted in their religious belief: this is what God has commanded, and God, being God, thus requires this of all his creatures. Therefore they would expect all people everywhere to comply with it. In our culture we would regard their morality as entirely informed by their culture and thus not binding on us.

There are two issues here, which both concern the concept of "objectivity".

Is there actually an objective basis to morality (by which I mean "a basic moral sense")?

Is morality essentially subjective, but it has to be believed to be objectively valid in order to function at all as morality?

Clearly if the Muslims did not regard their moral code as objectively valid - and therefore universally binding - they would have no grounds for indignation at non-compliance (especially by those outside their culture).

And the same applies to "western" views of morality. And this comes back to my initial response to you, and I apologise for "jumping the gun" and not explaining why I had replied in that way.

We, in the west, have our moral views about certain practices in parts of the Muslim word, such as FGM and the ban on female education. I think it is fair to say that most people in our western democracies would regard these practices with revulsion, and we would feel moral outrage. We assume that girls in Afghanistan have a right to an education. But why? If morality is entirely informed by culture, then all we could say is "we don't like what that culture is doing, but we recognise that that is their way of behaving; there is no 'right and wrong' about it - it's just a matter of cultural difference." On that basis, it seems completely absurd to feel any kind of indignation over something entirely subjective - especially if it is something that does not affect us directly (and if it does affect us directly, then our indignation would be entirely driven by self-interest).

Therefore it seems obvious to me that moral indignation only makes sense if - at the very least - we believe that our morality has an objective - i.e. universally valid - basis.

But suppose we hold to a philosophical view that morality is actually ultimately entirely subjective? And yet we also wish to express moral indignation at the practices of others? Are we not then admitting that we need to deceive ourselves in order to be logically consistent? We could say to ourselves: "We know morality is entirely subjective, but we are going to convince ourselves that certain moral viewpoints are objectively valid, so that we can express indignation and therefore pursue policies to oppose that which we regard as immoral."

As far as I can see, this is the position of UK culture vis-a-vis other parts of the world. We like to think that our humanistic western democracy is what other people really need, and we are angry that we cannot transplant this ideology easily into other cultures, but philosophically (i.e. from a humanistic point of view) there is no basis at all to our claims.

This is a huge paradox, and it suggests to me that our fundamental moral sense cannot ultimately be entirely subjective.

Feel free to disagree (especially you, orfeo. You are a free agent.)

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
But suppose we hold to a philosophical view that morality is actually ultimately entirely subjective? And yet we also wish to express moral indignation at the practices of others? Are we not then admitting that we need to deceive ourselves in order to be logically consistent?

No, we're not.

quote:
We could say to ourselves: "We know morality is entirely subjective, but we are going to convince ourselves that certain moral viewpoints are objectively valid, so that we can express indignation and therefore pursue policies to oppose that which we regard as immoral."

Why would we need to convince ourselves that our moral viewpoints are objectively valid in order to promote them (vigorously, in some cases) to others? All we really need to convince ourselves of is that they're better than the ones we're seeking to replace. Not perfect. Not objectively valid in all times and places. Just better.

Posted by Enoch (# 14322) on :

Morality is not "entirely subjective". That view is simply wrong - not, 'might be wrong', or 'it depends how you look at it, or 'that's your opinion' - just wrong.

Our take on morality is skewed by our personal and cultural assumptions. That is a very important issue. So, we may regard some things as wrong, which ontologically aren't. We may regard some things as OK which are ontologically wrong. But that is because we see through a glass which is not only dark but also smeary, so that we can't tell where our view is clearer or more confused. But, even though Christian faith is only secondarily about morality, and not primarily, the view that morality is entirely subjective is profoundly incompatible with being a Christian. There is no scope for debate on this.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Why would we need to convince ourselves that our moral viewpoints are objectively valid in order to promote them (vigorously, in some cases) to others? All we really need to convince ourselves of is that they're better than the ones we're seeking to replace. Not perfect. Not objectively valid in all times and places. Just better.

But how would you judge them to be "better"??

That implies that there exists some objective sliding scale that defines the quality of moral principles.

And if you were to suggest that "better" simply means "what we subjectively decide is better" (but there is no measuring stick to define this), then we are back to square one. Indignation is simply an expression of personal taste and nothing more. Which is absurd.

Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Obviously those Muslims would regard their moral code as having an objective basis rooted in their religious belief: this is what God has commanded, and God, being God, thus requires this of all his creatures. Therefore they would expect all people everywhere to comply with it. In our culture we would regard their morality as entirely informed by their culture and thus not binding on us.

There are two issues here, which both concern the concept of "objectivity".

Is there actually an objective basis to morality (by which I mean "a basic moral sense")?

Is morality essentially subjective, but it has to be believed to be objectively valid in order to function at all as morality?

Clearly if the Muslims did not regard their moral code as objectively valid - and therefore universally binding - they would have no grounds for indignation at non-compliance (especially by those outside their culture).

And the same applies to "western" views of morality. And this comes back to my initial response to you, and I apologise for "jumping the gun" and not explaining why I had replied in that way.

Ah - I am with you now.

There is always a problem when looking from the outside-in to a culture's morals imo. The same when we look back into history.

Those of us who are not sociopaths/psychopaths have a deep sense of right and wrong. We have empathy and hurt when others hurt. What informs that empathy is such a mix of experience/upbringing/worldview/religion/culture that we can't easily unpick it to see how subjective/objective we are being.

But it's a good question, because it goes to the heart of what we believe and how we see God.

[Smile]

<edited to remove too much quoting>

[ 18. July 2012, 12:07: Message edited by: Boogie ]

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Why would we need to convince ourselves that our moral viewpoints are objectively valid in order to promote them (vigorously, in some cases) to others? All we really need to convince ourselves of is that they're better than the ones we're seeking to replace. Not perfect. Not objectively valid in all times and places. Just better.
But how would you judge them to be "better"??

Based on our own moral code, of course.

quote:
That implies that there exists some objective sliding scale that defines the quality of moral principles.

No, it just implies that there exists a society which believes that some actions are better than others. There doesn't have to be an objective measuring stick for the morality of those actions in order for such beliefs to be held.

quote:
And if you were to suggest that "better" simply means "what we subjectively decide is better" (but there is no measuring stick to define this), then we are back to square one. Indignation is simply an expression of personal taste and nothing more. Which is absurd.

It's only absurd if you take "subjective" to mean "every possible view has the same worth". But there is no reason why that has to be the case at all.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Enoch:
But, even though Christian faith is only secondarily about morality, and not primarily, the view that morality is entirely subjective is profoundly incompatible with being a Christian. There is no scope for debate on this.

Oh well, thanks for clearing that up. I guess we can close the thread now. [Roll Eyes]

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Enoch:
Morality is not "entirely subjective". That view is simply wrong - not, 'might be wrong', or 'it depends how you look at it, or 'that's your opinion' - just wrong.

Our take on morality is skewed by our personal and cultural assumptions. That is a very important issue. So, we may regard some things as wrong, which ontologically aren't. We may regard some things as OK which are ontologically wrong. But that is because we see through a glass which is not only dark but also smeary, so that we can't tell where our view is clearer or more confused. But, even though Christian faith is only secondarily about morality, and not primarily, the view that morality is entirely subjective is profoundly incompatible with being a Christian. There is no scope for debate on this.

You know, I can't translate the above as anything other than "Our understanding of morality is subjective but morality is objective".

And from my own experience, subjective + objective = subjective. The part you have is your own understanding of morality - the part you see through a smeared glass.

And yet, despite your understanding being entirely subjective you can not accept any sort of debate that emphasises and accepts this subjectivity as necessary. Where as I see absolutely no practical difference between your take and Marvin's.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
That implies that there exists some objective sliding scale that defines the quality of moral principles.
No, it just implies that there exists a society which believes that some actions are better than others. There doesn't have to be an objective measuring stick for the morality of those actions in order for such beliefs to be held.

OK. Let's assume that you are right (whatever the word "right" actually means within a subjectivist epistemology and morality).

It is my personal opinion (and the collective personal opinion of most of the culture in which I live) that it is "right" to give girls an opportunity to benefit from an education. I accept that there is absolutely no objective basis to my - or my culture's - opinion - but I think this anyway. It's a matter of taste. Let's call it my "broccoli" (to use the analogy of the OP).

It is the collective personal opinion of another culture that it is not right to give girls the opportunity to be educated. The viewpoint of this society is also subjective, there being no objective basis to it (even though the members of that society may think there is). Let's call their view their "broad beans" (again the OP analogy).

I think that my "broccoli" is better than their "broad beans". Why? Because, hey, I happen to prefer broccoli!! No objective reason for this. It's just a matter of taste.

And because of my preference for "broccoli" I am going to bomb the shit out of these "broad bean" eaters, and try to force them to eat "broccoli".

In other words, the lesson of subjective morality is this:

MIGHT IS RIGHT.

There is, of course, no way one can reason with another culture, because reasoning requires an objective basis to which one can appeal. You say that such a thing does not exist. Therefore the only way to "persuade" people is by means of something other than reason. Now I wonder what that could be...?

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
It is my personal opinion (and the collective personal opinion of most of the culture in which I live) that it is "right" to give girls an opportunity to benefit from an education. I accept that there is absolutely no objective basis to my - or my culture's - opinion - but I think this anyway. It's a matter of taste. Let's call it my "broccoli" (to use the analogy of the OP).

It is the collective personal opinion of another culture that it is not right to give girls the opportunity to be educated. The viewpoint of this society is also subjective, there being no objective basis to it (even though the members of that society may think there is). Let's call their view their "broad beans" (again the OP analogy).

I think that my "broccoli" is better than their "broad beans". Why? Because, hey, I happen to prefer broccoli!! No objective reason for this. It's just a matter of taste.

So far so good.

quote:
And because of my preference for "broccoli" I am going to bomb the shit out of these "broad bean" eaters, and try to force them to eat "broccoli".

...and then suddenly, WHAM! Where the hell did that come from [Eek!]

? Who the hell mentioned bombing people in an attempt to force them to agree [Ultra confused]

quote:
In other words, the lesson of subjective morality is this:

MIGHT IS RIGHT.

No, it's more like "consensus makes right". It's your preference for divinely-mandated objective truth that boils down to MIGHT MAKES RIGHT - specifically the might of God.

quote:
There is, of course, no way one can reason with another culture, because reasoning requires an objective basis to which one can appeal.

No, it doesn't. It requires a certain amount of shared understanding and a lot of patience, of course, but that's not the same thing at all.

quote:
You say that such a thing does not exist. Therefore the only way to "persuade" people is by means of something other than reason. Now I wonder what that could be...?

Have you ever had a discussion about music in which you tried to persuade someone else that your favourite band was really good, even though they disagreed? If not, do you at least accept that such a conversation is possible? I would hope you do, as such conversations happen thousands of times every day. But how can that be when there's no objective definition of what music - let alone good music - even is?

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
I think that my "broccoli" is better than their "broad beans". Why? Because, hey, I happen to prefer broccoli!! No objective reason for this. It's just a matter of taste.

And because of my preference for "broccoli" I am going to bomb the shit out of these "broad bean" eaters, and try to force them to eat "broccoli".

In other words, the lesson of subjective morality is this:

MIGHT IS RIGHT.

This seems to be the exact opposite of the way people act in real life.

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
There is, of course, no way one can reason with another culture, because reasoning requires an objective basis to which one can appeal. You say that such a thing does not exist. Therefore the only way to "persuade" people is by means of something other than reason.

Wouldn't this make the adherents of obective morality more likely to resort to force? After all, they've taken the trouble to explain why you're worshipping the wrong god, or having sex in the wrong position, or using an inherently immoral economic system, or whatever, and yet you persist in your immorality despite having it proven to you, in objective terms, how evil you're acting. Wouldn't this intellectually perverse rejection of objective reality be a clear demonstration that anyone with a different moral code is simply not willing to listen to reason?

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

On the contrary, EE. Might Makes Right is an objective system of morality. And is pretty much the only actually objective system of morality that works in this world. "I have the might therefore I say what is right." It's perfectly objective. And even testable with an innate way of deciding what happens when two people both claim to have right - test the might.

"Because my God commands this" is not an objective system of morality unless you have a God right there that can be objectively demonstrated. It is subjective. You are subjectively trying to interpret something - the commands of your God.

And the real irony to your post is that the morality displayed in the bible is seldom anything but Might Makes Right. God has the might. Therefore doing what God says is right. And if we don't he sends flood or plague. It's pure undiluted Might Makes Right.

Subjective morality on the other hand says "Things may be worth dying for or even killing for but we need to be very careful about enforcing things because we can never be completely sure we are right." And we have jumped straight to bombing over brocolli because we are trying to use an objective system of morality - i.e. Might Makes Right.

[ 18. July 2012, 14:59: Message edited by: Justinian ]

Posted by Ricardus (# 8757) on :

I think certain posters are confusing two senses of the word "objective".

In sense 1, which is I think how EE means it, something is "objectively true" if it is true whether or not anyone believes it. Drinking caustic soda will kill me regardless of whether I believe it. "Caustic soda is poisonous" is therefore true whether or not I agree with it.

In sense 2, a process or a method of evaluation is "objective" if it comes to the same result when carried out by different people. So for example, "the best ballet dancer is the one who does the most pirouettes" is an objective way of evaluating ballet dancers, even though "X is the best ballet dancer" is not objectively true.

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Ricardus:
I think certain posters are confusing two senses of the word "objective".

In sense 1, which is I think how EE means it, something is "objectively true" if it is true whether or not anyone believes it. Drinking caustic soda will kill me regardless of whether I believe it. "Caustic soda is poisonous" is therefore true whether or not I agree with it.

In sense 2, a process or a method of evaluation is "objective" if it comes to the same result when carried out by different people. So for example, "the best ballet dancer is the one who does the most pirouettes" is an objective way of evaluating ballet dancers, even though "X is the best ballet dancer" is not objectively true.

I'm not sure that's a meaningful distinction in this context. I'm not even sure it's a distinction at all. For instance, doesn't the caustic soda test yield the same result regardless of who does it? And I'm pretty sure the number of pirouettes actually performed by various ballet dancers can't be changed by citing a contrary opinion.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

I think the difference is that in sense 1 the whole judgement is objective (it will happen regardless of what anyone thinks about it, even if you deny the existence of caustic soda), but in sense 2 the criteria by which one judges are subjective (who ever said number of spins is the only way to measure a good ballet dancer?), but once those criteria are agreed and set then the judgements themselves are objective.

Which, of course, still makes sense 2 subjective for the purposes of this thread.

[ 18. July 2012, 15:32: Message edited by: Marvin the Martian ]

Posted by Ricardus (# 8757) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:

quote:
Originally posted by Ricardus:
I think certain posters are confusing two senses of the word "objective".

In sense 1, which is I think how EE means it, something is "objectively true" if it is true whether or not anyone believes it. Drinking caustic soda will kill me regardless of whether I believe it. "Caustic soda is poisonous" is therefore true whether or not I agree with it.

In sense 2, a process or a method of evaluation is "objective" if it comes to the same result when carried out by different people. So for example, "the best ballet dancer is the one who does the most pirouettes" is an objective way of evaluating ballet dancers, even though "X is the best ballet dancer" is not objectively true.
I'm not sure that's a meaningful distinction in this context. I'm not even sure it's a distinction at all. For instance, doesn't the caustic soda test yield the same result regardless of who does it? And I'm pretty sure the number of pirouettes actually performed by various ballet dancers can't be changed by citing a contrary opinion.

Marvin has it (and I don't know where you inserted the word "test" from, and your last sentence seems merely to be repeating what I said in the post you quoted).

OK, let's try and find some examples where sense 1 and sense 2 are in conflict.

50 years ago, Edwin met Rosa in the church of St Clement Danes. Today, all the people concerned are old and their memories are failing. Edwin thinks it was in St Lawrence Jewry, Rosa thinks it was in St Mary-le-Bow.

It is objectively true (sense 1) that Edwin met Rosa in St Clement Danes. Their conflicting memories do not in any way change this fact. However, young Ricardus, investigative journalist, is tasked with finding out where they did meet. All he has to go by are their failing memories and the equally failing memory of the octogenarian parish clergy. Now memory is clearly not objective (sense 2) - because it's coming to different conclusions for different people.

Now consider ballet dancers. Liking pirouettes, and preferring one ballet dancer to another, are matters of personal taste. "The best ballet dancer is the one who does the most pirouettes" is only true as long as people believe that pirouettes are important, i.e. as long as people believe it is true. It is not therefore objective in sense 1.

However, counting pirouettes is going to come to the same result whoever does it (assuming they do it properly). It is therefore an objective metric according to sense 2.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
And because of my preference for "broccoli" I am going to bomb the shit out of these "broad bean" eaters, and try to force them to eat "broccoli".
...and then suddenly, WHAM! Where the hell did that come from? Who the hell mentioned bombing people in an attempt to force them to agree?

Ever heard of a country called "Afghanistan"?

Ever heard of the concept of "regime change"?

Posted by Ricardus (# 8757) on :

(Coda to my last post)

... and to drag that screed back on topic: I think Justinian is correct that the only objective (sense 2) way of doing morality is Might Makes Right.

However, I submit that there is a difference between using subjective methods to come to ethical conclusions that you believe are also subjective, and using them in the belief that there are such things as moral statements that are objectively true (sense 1).

[ 18. July 2012, 16:13: Message edited by: Ricardus ]

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
And because of my preference for "broccoli" I am going to bomb the shit out of these "broad bean" eaters, and try to force them to eat "broccoli".
...and then suddenly, WHAM! Where the hell did that come from? Who the hell mentioned bombing people in an attempt to force them to agree?
Ever heard of a country called "Afghanistan"?

Ever heard of the concept of "regime change"?

No, I don't get where the implication that moral subjectivity inevitably leads to war comes from. If anything moral subjectivity is less likely to lead to war, because it provides people with less reason to want to change another culture in the first place.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Croesos

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
I think that my "broccoli" is better than their "broad beans". Why? Because, hey, I happen to prefer broccoli!! No objective reason for this. It's just a matter of taste.

And because of my preference for "broccoli" I am going to bomb the shit out of these "broad bean" eaters, and try to force them to eat "broccoli".

In other words, the lesson of subjective morality is this:

MIGHT IS RIGHT.
This seems to be the exact opposite of the way people act in real life.

Really?

Apparently some forms of "subjective morality" are more valid than others, and those who refuse to comply are screwed in this wonderful world of "consensus"!

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
And because of my preference for "broccoli" I am going to bomb the shit out of these "broad bean" eaters, and try to force them to eat "broccoli".
...and then suddenly, WHAM! Where the hell did that come from? Who the hell mentioned bombing people in an attempt to force them to agree?
Ever heard of a country called "Afghanistan"?

Ever heard of the concept of "regime change"?

... Seriously? You seriously think that the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions were about morality? Rather than revenge for September 11 and about oil?

Yes, I have heard of Regime Change. Have you ever heard of Realpolitik? Or even the Neoconservative movement? And that whole thing was lead by the same people who reject "moral relativism".

For that matter, have you ever heard of the Crusades?

Posted by Ricardus (# 8757) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Really?

Apparently some forms of "subjective morality" are more valid than others, and those who refuse to comply are screwed in this wonderful world of "consensus"!

Um ... you know what orfeo was saying about agreeing with your conclusions, but not the method by which you come to them ... ?

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Really?

Apparently some forms of "subjective morality" are more valid than others, and those who refuse to comply are screwed in this wonderful world of "consensus"!

I'm sorry EE. I'm sorry that your moral absolutists are no longer allowed to chemically castrate people. And I'm sorry that you consider this wonderful world of consensus in which people aren't allowed to discriminate but instead must live and let live to be intolerable.

But seriously. Claiming there's a subjective morality doesn't mean we can't make any moral decisions. It means we need to be careful about them. And you seem to be considering £3,600 as a massive imposition for hotel owners.

Subjective morality: "Live and let live. And £3600 fines for not letting live."
Objective morality: Kill them all, God will know his own

EE: Trying to claim that subjective morality is bloodier.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Ricardus
Um ... you know what orfeo was saying about agreeing with your conclusions, but not the method by which you come to them ... ?

And...?

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian
Claiming there's a subjective morality doesn't mean we can't make any moral decisions. It means we need to be careful about them. And you seem to be considering £3,600 as a massive imposition for hotel owners.

Subjective morality: "Live and let live. And £3600 fines for not letting live."

Objective morality: Kill them all, God will know his own

EE: Trying to claim that subjective morality is bloodier.

Ah, I see. Some forms of "subjective morality" are more equal than others. So it's OK to impose a certain form of morality on a Christian couple who happen to have views about sexuality.

After all... if morality is entirely subjective, then why can't their moral decision be respected? It was not, and that underlines my point that subjective morality inevitable involves imposition by diktat. I know you may not like the moral position of this couple (and, in fact, I question it as well). But that is not the point. I am trying to get you to be consistent with your claims, which you manifestly seem unable (or rather unwilling) to be.

Even if you think this couple were intolerant, it doesn't matter. Their "intolerance" is still their subjective morality, and therefore it is no worse than your "morality" - because, of course, no value judgments are possible within a subjective morality. (If you think they are, then to what do you appeal to define those values?) And if you fail to respect their morality, then my conclusion that "might is right" is correct: they have been bullied by what "society" has decided constitutes morality.

Now your only argument against me is an emotional outburst about various evils committed by certain people who called themselves Christians. So what? I am no defender of professing Christians. I am making a philosophical point about the nature of how we relate to our moral sense. It would be good if you could actually address that point, instead of waving straw men in front of me.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian
I'm sorry that your moral absolutists are no longer allowed to chemically castrate people.

Who said that I agreed with chemical castration? Please quote something I wrote to justify this comment.

But if you want to trade horrors, then perhaps you might like to explain why the most innocent and vulnerable members of society have no say in this great "moral consensus", which is apparently so peace loving that it considers it right to execute them for committing the sin of being unwanted or disabled.

Yes, subjective morality is certainly about "might is right" (whether it's dressed up in religious language or not).

I prefer something objective like "the love of God", which comes against both atheistic subjectivism and religious fanaticism.

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
I prefer something objective like "the love of God", which comes against both atheistic subjectivism and religious fanaticism.

Okay, I gotta ask. How do you objectively prove "the love of God" exists? Given the difficulty of proving objectively that God Himself exists, an objective proof of his love would seem doubly difficult? And if its possible to make such a demonstration, why do so many people perversely persist in worshipping other gods?

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

And should a statement about the objective nature of morality really start out with "I prefer . . ."? After all, if it's truly objective, your personal preferences should have nothing to do with it. Personal preference seems an awfully subjective measure of morality.

Posted by angelfish (# 8884) on :

Oh dear. It all seems to have dissolved into the usual "your worldview results in worser atrocities than mine" mudslinging. But nobody has addressed the question of whether one person (or group) imposing their views on another by force is (subjectively or objectively) wrong. This seems to be taken as given by both camps. Why is that?

Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

I prefer something objective like "the love of God", which comes against both atheistic subjectivism and religious fanaticism.

Not this side of heaven it doesn't.

People are far too good at claiming God for themselves and putting up their own ideas of morality as 'the love of God'.

Your little book on abortion is a case in point. You call an embryo a person and see no grey areas.

That's the problem, morality is what we do when we find ourselves in a grey area, and choose the best action we can for the sake of others - and there's rarely a cut and dried 'right' or 'wrong' way to go. Context and circumstances make such huge differences.

ETA - I think that's why Jesus, when he was put on the spot, put the question into context by telling a story.

'Who is my neighbour?' is a great starting point.

[ 18. July 2012, 18:39: Message edited by: Boogie ]

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Ah, I see. Some forms of "subjective morality" are more equal than others. So it's OK to impose a certain form of morality on a Christian couple who happen to have views about sexuality.

No. It is acceptable to impose a certain form of behaviour on a group of people. That form of behaviour is "You do not get to try to force others away from the table" and applies to everyone. The Christian couple tried to deny the gay couple was a married couple. They were trying to force them away from the table. So they got slapped for it. They could have continued to disapprove silently and not changed their morality and that would have been fine.

Or they could have tried to force the gay couple away from the table, and by doing so broken the peace. And the peacekeepers came down on the head of the people who broke the peace and broke the law.

Tolerance isn't a "We should accept everything" rule. It's a "No kicking" or "No one gets to throw the first stone" sign.

And tolerance is what prevents all such moral issues becoming battles of might. Without the default of tolerance coming down against whichever side tried to use force first we'd be resorting to trench warfare. Instead, with tolerance, everyone gets protected from everyone else. The Christians chose to hit first in the case you linked and so they were the ones causing the breach of the peace.

quote:
It would be good if you could actually address that point, instead of waving straw men in front of me.

I am addressing all your points. And the point you claim is about professing Christians is about how the oxymoron you call "objective reality" actually works. You are just ignoring my points. You are ignoring that Might Makes Right is literally objective morality. You are ignoring that you do not have an objective understanding of

And then you are trying to claim the Afghanistan war to be an act of subjective morality. And then not understanding how tolerance works.

In short you do not have a single coherent argument left on the table.

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Who said that I agreed with chemical castration? Please quote something I wrote to justify this comment.

Oh, you don't personally. But I justify the comment by your trying to claim moral subjectivity as a cause of the Iraq war. If you get to fling that one around as something moral relativists do (never mind that it was launched by a bunch of Neocons who emphatically reject what they consider 'Moral Relativism') then I get to fling chemical castration as a moral absolutist thing. And for the record I marched against both Afghanistan and Iraq (for all the good it did).

quote:
But if you want to trade horrors, then perhaps you might like to explain why the most innocent and vulnerable members of society have no say in this great "moral consensus"

1: Abortion belongs in Dead Horses

2: They get literally as much say as they are capable of having. I'd try asking them themselves what they want - but they do not have functional brains (or even brains at all in most cases). Which means they physically can not say anything, or even mean anything coherent.

Now is this the right approach? Possibly not. But asking people what they want is certainly a coherent one.

quote:
Yes, subjective morality is certainly about "might is right" (whether it's dressed up in religious language or not).

And so-called objective morality is nothing more than naked might makes right And claiming an invisible being that doesn't act as automatically stronger than anyone else.

Tolerance, however, takes the might out of the equation and puts it on the side of the keeping of the peace.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
But nobody has addressed the question of whether one person (or group) imposing their views on another by force is (subjectively or objectively) wrong. This seems to be taken as given by both camps. Why is that?

Because I could be wrong. And I could find myself on the wrong side. I'm interested in the right answer rather than winning by brute force. And losing by brute force would be worse.

Posted by Drewthealexander (# 16660) on :

It's possible that we may be confusing the *grounds for* or *basis of* morality, with how we might *discover* what constitutes moral or immoral behaviour.

If something is always right, or always wrong, regardless of whether anyone believes it to be right or wrong, then that 'something' is an objective moral standard. It's not based on any one person's opinion. So to take an example, from the middle ages to the nineteenth century, war rape was widely (though by no means universally) regarded as socially acceptable. Now it's quite possible that such a practice could have become universlly acceptable. If no one ever dissented from the view, war rape would be morally acceptable. It could have been regarded universally (as it was widely) as the right of a victorious army.

So let's imagine that this practice is universally considered as acceptable. Does that then make it right, or is there a more fundamental basis which makes it wrong? It can't be *objectively* moral or immoral if one century it is regarded as universally acceptable, partly acceptable in another century, and completely unacceptable in a third century. And the fact that it is currently unacceptable, and proscribed by international law, does not mean it will always be so.

Now let's say, without identifying its source, that there is such an objective basis to morality. Does one need to find the source of morality in order to behave morally? Well if morality is *discovered* then no - one could discover expressions of right moral behaviour from a number of directions.. A theist might find it in her religion, an atheist in cultural or family norms, an agnostic in the example of someone she respects. In fact, anyone of the above, could find practical examples of morality in any of the above. An atheist does not not need to be religious to recognise moral value in theism, and a theist may recognise praiseworthy moral behaviour in atheists.

That's not really the point.

The point is that morality,, wherever we discover it, must be grounded somewhere. And 'objective' moral standards - the right and wrong things to do, the obligations we properly owe - regardless of who, when, or where we live - must be grounded somewhere other than in the shifting opinions of historical culture.

[ 18. July 2012, 19:27: Message edited by: Drewthealexander ]

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
I'm not sure that's a meaningful distinction in this context. I'm not even sure it's a distinction at all. For instance, doesn't the caustic soda test yield the same result regardless of who does it? And I'm pretty sure the number of pirouettes actually performed by various ballet dancers can't be changed by citing a contrary opinion.

If somebody is a materialist then they probably have to be a constructivist about mathematics. That is, mathematical truths are constructs of the human mind. If so, then mathematical statements are not objectively true except in the sense that there is a repeatable method of producing them.

Likewise, the question of what animals were doing what within a radius of fifty metres of this point in space exactly seven thousand years ago
presumably has an objective answer, but I doubt there's any objective technique available to us for resolving the question.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian
Because I could be wrong. And I could find myself on the wrong side. I'm interested in the right answer rather than winning by brute force.

How can you possibly be "interested in the right answer" if everything is subjective? How is it possible to discover what is "right" within the framework of that epistemology? And if you were to discover what is "right" would you not then be committed to something objective, because "right" has no meaning if it is merely the product of your tastes, feelings, opinions and imagination (which is what "subjective" means)?

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian
No. It is acceptable to impose a certain form of behaviour on a group of people. That form of behaviour is "You do not get to try to force others away from the table" and applies to everyone. The Christian couple tried to deny the gay couple was a married couple. They were trying to force them away from the table. So they got slapped for it. They could have continued to disapprove silently and not changed their morality and that would have been fine.

Or they could have tried to force the gay couple away from the table, and by doing so broken the peace. And the peacekeepers came down on the head of the people who broke the peace and broke the law.

Tolerance isn't a "We should accept everything" rule. It's a "No kicking" or "No one gets to throw the first stone" sign.

And tolerance is what prevents all such moral issues becoming battles of might. Without the default of tolerance coming down against whichever side tried to use force first we'd be resorting to trench warfare. Instead, with tolerance, everyone gets protected from everyone else. The Christians chose to hit first in the case you linked and so they were the ones causing the breach of the peace.

Is all this your subjective opinion or not?

Or is this morality of tolerance grounded in something objective?

Please clarify this point, because I am not at all sure why you are telling me all this while claiming that morality is subjective. You seem to want to have it both ways.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
Wouldn't this make the adherents of obective morality more likely to resort to force? After all, they've taken the trouble to explain why you're worshipping the wrong god, or having sex in the wrong position, or using an inherently immoral economic system, or whatever, and yet you persist in your immorality despite having it proven to you, in objective terms, how evil you're acting. Wouldn't this intellectually perverse rejection of objective reality be a clear demonstration that anyone with a different moral code is simply not willing to listen to reason?

Believers in objective morality may sometimes reach that point. But believers in subjective morality start out at that point. A believer in objective morality may think that people who disagree with them are perversely denying reality. A believer in subjective morality knows that people who disagree with them are perversely denying reality, because reality is what the believer in subjective morality says it is. That's what saying morality is subjective means.

Morality, for a moral subjectivist, is a sophisticated way of saying 'do it because I say so'.

Of course, most people who say they believe in subjective morality aren't thinking clearly. What they actually believe is that toleration is objectively a good moral value, and because they're confused they think that's the same as thinking that morality is subjective. Just as many people who say they believe in objective morality merely use it as a way of regulating other people's behaviour and therefore are functionally subjectivists.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
Because I could be wrong. And I could find myself on the wrong side. I'm interested in the right answer rather than winning by brute force. And losing by brute force would be worse.

By definition, if morality is subjective then you can't be wrong. That's what 'subjective' means.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
Because I could be wrong. And I could find myself on the wrong side. I'm interested in the right answer rather than winning by brute force. And losing by brute force would be worse.
By definition, if morality is subjective then you can't be wrong. That's what 'subjective' means.

Nonsense. If morality is subjective you can't necessarily be right. But you can easily be wrong. I used to say I hate mushrooms. Turned out I hate the way my mother cooks mushrooms. Sometimes there is an accounting for taste.

And my path might lead to an utterly undesirable end. I would be then on the wrong path (I used to believe in free market/laisez faire economics with slight Austrian leanings when I was a teenager). If it doesn't work then it's wrong.

Posted by Kwesi (# 10274) on :

Boogie

quote:
I know Muslims who have a deep sense of moral outrage because I wear a swimming costume in the presence of men. Our local baths have 'women only' sessions because of this.
Does that make them objectively right?
If not, why not?

Is this an argument over the essence of morality or over the necessary practical expression of a moral principle? Boogie wearing a swimming costume in the presence of men does not mean the same as a Muslim woman wearing a swimming costume in the presence of men. Perhaps the underlying moral principle has something to do with protecting the dignity of females, about which Boogie and Muslims can agree is desirable, though there may be disagreements as to how that principle ought to be promoted in practice.

Jesus has similar problems re Sabbath observance.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Believers in objective morality may sometimes reach that point. But believers in subjective morality start out at that point. A believer in objective morality may think that people who disagree with them are perversely denying reality. A believer in subjective morality knows that people who disagree with them are perversely denying reality, because reality is what the believer in subjective morality says it is. That's what saying morality is subjective means.

Morality, for a moral subjectivist, is a sophisticated way of saying 'do it because I say so'.

No it isn't. Morality for a moral subjectivist means "I'm doing the best I can but I don't and indeed can't know it all". And to a moral subjectivist, moral objectivity means "I am full of passionate intensity and arrogant enough to think I know everything and can therefore be objective about my moral claims."

quote:
What they actually believe is that toleration is objectively a good moral value, and because they're confused they think that's the same as thinking that morality is subjective.

Toleration, as I have mentioned, is a different issue. As well as a moral value it's a pragmatic one

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Is all this your subjective opinion or not?

Or is this morality of tolerance grounded in something objective?

Please clarify this point, because I am not at all sure why you are telling me all this while claiming that morality is subjective. You seem to want to have it both ways.

Tolerance is even outside the moral dimension protection against error. I may think that you're down a blind alley. But I can not say that for certain.

Objectively reality exists - it's just that everything we know about it is subjective or analytical. And the evidence we have is that tolerance works to bring more to the table so we have more to work on as to working out what the right approach is.

Posted by angelfish (# 8884) on :

I don't think that moral objectivists claim to "know it all". Objectivists claim that, regardless of our imperfect grasp of the matter, and of changing tastes and fashions, there is a standard that does not change. Whether we can know that standard, or even the source of it, is a separate issue.

Objective morality is evidenced by the fact that the subjectivist cannot avoid using terms like "right", "better" and "good" when describing moral actions, and this means something qualitatively different from "to my taste". Also, by the nature of our revulsion against certain actions - coercion, brutality and arrogance being three examples of things everyone agrees are immoral - we can ascertain a sense of objective morality in everyone.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian
Objectively reality exists - it's just that everything we know about it is subjective or analytical. And the evidence we have is that tolerance works to bring more to the table so we have more to work on as to working out what the right approach is.

Tolerance for what exactly?

A society could tolerate parents spanking their children. Or it could demand that parents tolerate the view that says that they should not be allowed to do this. Both are forms of tolerance. Or a society could tolerate allowing disabled babies to be aborted. Alternatively it could argue that parents should tolerate the inconvenience that a disabled child brings by preventing such a reason for abortion.

Or to use an earlier example: society could tolerate the views of a Christian couple running their hotel, or it could demand that that couple tolerate the presence of active gays in their hotel.

All these viewpoints are equally legitimate on the basis of the principle of subjective morality. And all of them work, because the concept of "what works" is dependent on what end people are seeking to achieve.

This demonstrates that the word "tolerance" is empty and meaningless within the context of subjective morality. It's one of those terms that's bandied around as if it means something, whereas, in reality, it's just a smokescreen to hide "my particular form of moral bigotry".

Posted by TurquoiseTastic (# 8978) on :

ISTM that this is an argument about terminology. Justinian and I think Marvin are using "moral subjectivism" to mean "recognising that our own ideas about morality may be mistaken". EE, Dafyd and others including myself are using it to mean "the idea that right and wrong are arbitrary concepts". Everyone in the discussion, except maybe Croesos, appears actually to believe in objective morality.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

I seem to have missed this one...

quote:
Originally posted by Boat Boy
If you believe that there is an ultimate moral authority, could you tell us what that is?

God.

Posted by tclune (# 7959) on :

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
Objective morality is evidenced by the fact that the subjectivist cannot avoid using terms like "right", "better" and "good" when describing moral actions, and this means something qualitatively different from "to my taste". Also, by the nature of our revulsion against certain actions - coercion, brutality and arrogance being three examples of things everyone agrees are immoral - we can ascertain a sense of objective morality in everyone.

But need it mean anything more expansive than "intersubjective?" When we consider that racism and homophobia were esentially universal values for millennia, it has to give you pause. Further, ISTM that a morality that no-one can actually know is no morality at all.

--Tom Clune

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by tclune
When we consider that racism and homophobia were esentially universal values for millennia, it has to give you pause.

The wording of that sentence seems to imply that you consider that racism and homophobia are "wrong" and that we all generally agree with that assessment. But are they inherently wrong, or only wrong on the basis of an entirely arbitrary consensus?

If we have discovered that racism and homophobia are inherently and universally wrong, then that is a discovery not unlike the realisation that the earth is not flat, which was (presumably) believed for millennia. Nothing to do with intersubjectivity.

Of course, if we agree that homophobia and racism are only wrong on the basis of a subjective consensus, then we can hardly feel indignation at those who dissent from that view, unless our indignation is simply driven by a desire for the imposition of universal conformity ("might is right").

Posted by Johnny S (# 12581) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
If it doesn't work then it's wrong.

How do you decide if something works or not? Is that a short-term or long-term view? Does it have to work for the individual or for society? Is that a local society or a global society?

Pragmatism is not the answer either.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Tolerance for what exactly?

A society could tolerate parents spanking their children. Or it could demand that parents tolerate the view that says that they should not be allowed to do this.

If tolerance was a categorical imperative as opposed to a useful guideline then it would tolerate both. Tolerance would say that saying both and doing both is permissable. Just as long as you don't try to force people to do the other one.

However there are other reasons - like not teaching kids that might makes right - that we consider spanking to be a bad thing that harms the child.

quote:
Or a society could tolerate allowing disabled babies to be aborted. Alternatively it could argue that parents should tolerate the inconvenience that a disabled child brings by preventing such a reason for abortion.

If you want to start this up go to Dead Horses.

quote:
Or to use an earlier example: society could tolerate the views of a Christian couple running their hotel, or it could demand that that couple tolerate the presence of active gays in their hotel.

And once again, tolerance would indicate we tolerate the views of the Christians up until they tried to push other people away from the table. It's a doctrine of live and let live - which the Christians were not prepared to do.

You do not understand tolerance. If you did you wouldn't be posting the way you are.

quote:
This demonstrates that the word "tolerance" is empty and meaningless

Bollocks! All you have shown is that your understanding of tolerance is empty and meaningless. It's not the tolerance that is at fault. It is that you do not understand what is going on.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
I seem to have missed this one...

quote:
Originally posted by Boat Boy
If you believe that there is an ultimate moral authority, could you tell us what that is?
God.

OK. Given we can neither see, touch, nor hear God directly, how does that answer anything?

And @TurquoiseTastic, absolutely right.

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
Objective morality is evidenced by the fact that the subjectivist cannot avoid using terms like "right", "better" and "good" when describing moral actions, and this means something qualitatively different from "to my taste".

Does it though? If someone were to claim "jazz is better than ragtime", is that necessarily a moral claim? Or is it a claim more akin to "jazz is more to my taste than ragtime"? It certainly doesn't seem to be an objective truth.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
This is not the first time that you've announced on the Ship that something is simply self-evident or logical and that you've neatly wrapped it up in the space of a single post. Given your track record - including on topics where I've personally agreed with your conclusions but found your means of arriving there badly flawed - forgive me for not finding myself convinced by your latest offering.
"Given your track record"

Oooh ouch. (Shall I slink away in a quiet corner and have a little cry?)

Actually... I presume that this is filed away in a little filing cabinet marked "OO" (Orfeo's Opinions). Because unless there is some secret file on me in the subterranean vaults of the Ship charting my extremely dodgy behaviour on board, then I am afraid I haven't a flippin' clue what the hell the above statement means in reality.

(Which is further supported by the fact that you have failed to provide any evidence or argument to back up this grotesque generalisation. Which really doesn't say much for your "track record"!!)

Your logic leaves a lot to be desired, because you say that I have "announced" something on the Ship. OK. So has everybody else, when they express their point of view!! Or perhaps I am not allowed to express a viewpoint unless it's authorised by an anonymous person called 'orfeo'? Furthermore, I have apparently neatly wrapped it up in the space of a single post! Did you bother to read the last word of the post? D-I-S-C-U-S-S. I was inviting discussion - and therefore open to my viewpoint being challenged.

If you are going to come out with a smug, snide put down, then take it to hell, while the rest of us can debate the issue in a respectful way.

Yes, of course it's filed away in orfeo's opinions. If you must know, the first thing that sprang to mind was a thread that had something to do with the Big Bang and your ability to prove that God existed. I'm not going to spend the time hunting down the thread.

And putting the word D-I-S-C-U-S-S at the end of the post doesn't alter the content before that. Perhaps you haven't noticed, but the majority of Purgatorial threads (at least the ones I find of sufficient interest to click on after reading the title) contain questions in their opening posts and don't contain the author's firm conclusions. Whereas your opening post makes it quite clear what your conclusions are and conveys the distinct impression that your questions are purely rhetorical, challenging anyone who would dare to advocate an alternative answer to the one you've already provided.

This is all just my opinion. It's entirely up to you whether you take the information on board or not.

Meanwhile, I proceeded to engage with the topic by querying how on earth you would convey to a Spartan that their abandonment of children was morally wrong.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
And putting the word D-I-S-C-U-S-S at the end of the post doesn't alter the content before that. Perhaps you haven't noticed, but the majority of Purgatorial threads (at least the ones I find of sufficient interest to click on after reading the title) contain questions in their opening posts and don't contain the author's firm conclusions. Whereas your opening post makes it quite clear what your conclusions are and conveys the distinct impression that your questions are purely rhetorical, challenging anyone who would dare to advocate an alternative answer to the one you've already provided.

So I have come to certain conclusions? Is that a crime? I rather think it's called honesty.

And if people want to challenge those conclusions, they are free to do so. But they must surely know that EtymologicalEvangelical is such a powerful and terrifying being that they are taking a huge risk, because this monster will breathe fire through the computer screen and burn those rebels to a cinder!!!

Alternatively, they might just be grown up enough to feel confident in their own position.

I rather think the latter is true, and apparently so does the Ship, hence the following introductory comment to the Purg board:

quote:
All views are welcome – orthodox, unorthodox, radical or just plain bizarre – so long as you can stand being challenged.

I wasn't aware that OP's in Purg had to have comments framed in the form of questions to cater for highly sensitive souls such as yourself. Perhaps you would like to suggest that as a new rule? Although it does seem rather fascistic to me (imposing absolute scepticism on people).

(Also, it's rather strange that you have not been remonstrating with Justinian, Marvin etc concerning their dogmatic claim and conclusion that morality is subjective. Hmmm... I think that rather tells me something about where you're coming from...)

As for the Sparta issue: I have already answered that kind of issue, by referring to practices from other cultures, such as the banning of female education in certain Muslim societies.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
I seem to have missed this one...

quote:
Originally posted by Boat Boy
If you believe that there is an ultimate moral authority, could you tell us what that is?
God.
OK. Given we can neither see, touch, nor hear God directly, how does that answer anything?

It's an explanation for the necessity of our moral sense, given that naturalism cannot explain it (ever heard of the naturalistic fallacy?).

You seem to be suggesting that morality has to derive from what we can see, touch and hear. We can see, touch and hear dynamite. Is there anything about a stick of dynamite that tells us what we ought to do with it? Should we use it in a controlled explosion to demolish an unsafe building, or should we use it in a public place to kill people? Nothing about the empirical qualities of this object will answer that question.

So empiricism gets us nowhere morally. Therefore your criticism of my answer makes no sense.

Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
I seem to have missed this one...

quote:
Originally posted by Boat Boy
If you believe that there is an ultimate moral authority, could you tell us what that is?
God.
OK. Given we can neither see, touch, nor hear God directly, how does that answer anything?
It's an explanation for the necessity of our moral sense, given that naturalism cannot explain it.

I agree with this. I believe that all that is good comes from God. I believe that all that is comes from God and that the only evil that exists anywhere is within human hearts.

But, practically, this doesn't change anything. We still have to decide what is right and what is wrong - and those of us who call on God are no better at it than anyone else imo.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
So I have come to certain conclusions? Is that a crime? I rather think it's called honesty.

Of course it's not a crime. But it does rather curtail debate. Although, in this particular case, you appear to have done an excellent job of finding people who disagree with your point of view strongly enough to tell you so. Whether or not they have any expectation that they might succeed in changing your views is something you'd have to ask them.

As for why I'm not remonstrating with Marvin and Justinian, that's largely because they're not the people who started the debate. I don't expect the people answering a question to frame their answers in the form of questions. My whole point is that I would normally expect the form to be 1. question 2. answer. Not 1. answer 2. counteranswer.

It's not as if you're the only person who gets this reaction, from me or from others. It's not uncommon for someone to basically post an assertion in Purgatory and be asked by others to clarify what they were seeking to debate, or whehter there was a question in there somewhere. It's happened to me personally, precisely because I opened a thread that was very much "here's what I'm thinking at the moment" with very little invitation to hear what others thought.

I just don't see the point of that approach, or indeed the appeal. To me, Purgatory is not our collective blog or diary or Twitter account. I see a fairly key difference between exchange of ideas and simply responding to ideas. And your "discuss" was very much in the vein of "respond to my ideas" - which had consisted of asserting that something was total BS, declaring your conclusion was "Logic" and that anyone who thought different had to explain something called reality.

All of which I would expect to find on Etymological Evangelical's blog, possibly with an option to make a comment, rather than as a means of opening a genuine debate.

Anyway, at this point I feel like I've spent more than enough time on this meta-debate with you. I don't have any expectation that you will change your techniques or posting style as a consequence of it.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Morality, for a moral subjectivist, is a sophisticated way of saying 'do it because I say so'.

I would phrase it more as "I think you should do this because I think it is better than what you're currently doing, and here are my reasons for thinking so. But I'm interested in hearing your reasons for thinking the things you do are better - let's have a chat about it and see if one of us can't persuade the other that they're right."

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
Ah, I see. Some forms of "subjective morality" are more equal than others. So it's OK to impose a certain form of morality on a Christian couple who happen to have views about sexuality.

After all... if morality is entirely subjective, then why can't their moral decision be respected? It was not, and that underlines my point that subjective morality inevitable involves imposition by diktat.

Look, societies have to have laws in order to function. That's not a moral statement, it's a pragmatic one. And if you have to have rules, then you have to have a means of deciding what they will be. That's where morality comes in.

Objective morality says "these laws shall be the ones we use, regardless of whether anyone likes them or the impact they have on society, and they can never ever change regardless of any new ideas or evidence that might come along."

Subjective morality says "OK, we've got to set some laws. Let's work out between ourselves what we think the best way to structure our society is, and then once we've reached a consensus and/or a set of laws that most people can be happy with we'll go with them. But we'll keep in mind that there might be a better way of doing things, and we'll always be open to changing our laws if someone comes along with a persuasive reason why we should."

Do you see the difference?

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by TurquoiseTastic:
Justinian and I think Marvin are using "moral subjectivism" to mean "recognising that our own ideas about morality may be mistaken". EE, Dafyd and others including myself are using it to mean "the idea that right and wrong are arbitrary concepts".

In practical terms the two are virtually indistinguishable.

Posted by angelfish (# 8884) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
Objective morality is evidenced by the fact that the subjectivist cannot avoid using terms like "right", "better" and "good" when describing moral actions, and this means something qualitatively different from "to my taste".
Does it though? If someone were to claim "jazz is better than ragtime", is that necessarily a moral claim? Or is it a claim more akin to "jazz is more to my taste than ragtime"? It certainly doesn't seem to be an objective truth.

Clearly, expressing an opinion on music is not a moral statement, and we can use the word "better" in that context without importing a moral dimension. What I said was that when the word "better" is used in a moral context, it has a different quality to when it is used in a non-moral context. For example, "jazz is better than ragtime" is a different kind of statement than "helping the homeless is better than ignoring them". In the latter case, there is a sense in which the speaker intends his statement to apply universally, and he does not really think that this is just his opinion and others are free to disagree. My point was that the very meaning of the word "better" in a moral context carries more weight than simply "I prefer".

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
Clearly, expressing an opinion on music is not a moral statement, and we can use the word "better" in that context without importing a moral dimension.

I've spent enough time on music-related message boards to know that some people are quite capable of expressing their opinions about which music is better - artists, albums or songs - with the force and vehemence of a moral imperative!

Posted by angelfish (# 8884) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo:

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
Clearly, expressing an opinion on music is not a moral statement, and we can use the word "better" in that context without importing a moral dimension.
I've spent enough time on music-related message boards to know that some people are quite capable of expressing their opinions about which music is better - artists, albums or songs - with the force and vehemence of a moral imperative!

Quite, but the very fact that people outside of the debate can see the foolishness of getting so worked up about it, reveals the lack of ethical character in the discussion. It is disingenuous to claim that your opinions on music are qualitatively the same as your opinions on genocide - and if we found a person who did act that way (say, a football hooligan) we would think they were wrong in the head.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
It's an explanation for the necessity of our moral sense, given that naturalism cannot explain it (ever heard of the naturalistic fallacy?).

That's just an attempt to use God of the Gaps. Morality can be explained as an evolutionarily advantageous thing for any social animal and an emergent property of any society with individuals interacting.

And how the naturalistic fallacy is relevant is something you're going to explain.

quote:
You seem to be suggesting that morality has to derive from what we can see, touch and hear. We can see, touch and hear dynamite. Is there anything about a stick of dynamite that tells us what we ought to do with it?

We know from the properties of the dynamite what it will do to various things. We know that if you stick it in someone's mouth and then trigger it to explode the results will be messy.

Is that act anything to do with morality? The moral ramifications of that act are to do with the non-dynamite party. The properties of the dynamite tell us it will blow up. The moral issue is rooted in what the consequences for an explosion will be at the point we explode it.

quote:
Should we use it in a controlled explosion to demolish an unsafe building, or should we use it in a public place to kill people? Nothing about the empirical qualities of this object will answer that question.

No. But a simple look at the properties of people and the unsafe building will give us the answer. Once we are into the realms of blowing up and harming people then we are into moral issues.

quote:
So empiricism gets us nowhere morally. Therefore your criticism of my answer makes no sense.

You might as well say that looking at a horse's tail and only its tail gets you nowhere in telling you how fast the horse runs. And therefore looking at a horse is useless.

(And yes, the properties of the dynamite are relevant - blowing up dynamite in a crowded area is very different to blowing up a water bomb in a crowded area).

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
A believer in subjective morality knows that people who disagree with them are perversely denying reality, because reality is what the believer in subjective morality says it is. That's what saying morality is subjective means.

I'm just going to come back to this and expand on why it isn't just projecting negative things on the people that disagree with you, it's using the English language in a way I am not familliar with.

In order to get anywhere we need to work out what subjective actually means. And I'm going to start with what I hope is a non-contentious statement. "If taste isn't subjective then nothing involving the senses is."

But taste is based on objective reality. I don't think that despite taste being subjective two people, one who liked it and one who hated it would say they were actually eating a different coffee cake. The coffee cake is objectively there. But taste, as I think we can agree, is subjective even if both people are eating the same coffee cake. This is because Objective + Subjective = Subjective.

If Objective + Subjective = Objective then taste would be objective. Therefore by claiming that morality is objective you are claiming that every part of your perception that makes up your morals is objective. Because in order to be objective there must be no subjective component.

And for all people claim there's no accounting for taste, this is complete nonsense. There almost always is an accounting for taste. As far as I know almost everyone agrees that grass tastes mildly unpleasant. Most people agree that milk tastes bad - because most people are lactose intolerant. Almost all people who have not trained themselves/acquired it find eating raw scotch bonnet chillis to be an extremely painful act. To some people sprouts taste sulphurous and to others they don't. This is a difference in taste buds.

Taste is subjective. But there is only a very narrow area for which this subjectivity matters to most people - the objective physical makeup of the food combined with cultural conditioning and experiences make up most of peoples' vews on the taste of most objects. (Most of which you aren't going to eat over the age of about two).

Posted by tclune (# 7959) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by tclune
When we consider that racism and homophobia were esentially universal values for millennia, it has to give you pause.
The wording of that sentence seems to imply that you consider that racism and homophobia are "wrong" and that we all generally agree with that assessment. But are they inherently wrong, or only wrong on the basis of an entirely arbitrary consensus?

If we have discovered that racism and homophobia are inherently and universally wrong, then that is a discovery not unlike the realisation that the earth is not flat, which was (presumably) believed for millennia. Nothing to do with intersubjectivity.

I'm on vacation, so my times between connection are relatively long. Sorry for the delay.

ISTM that, if there were a "discovery" that racism and the like are objectively wrong, there would be some specific basis for that understanding, as opposed to a gradual shift of opinion. We recognized the world to be round when folks sailed around it, for example. I don't see any recognizable empirical event that lies behind our changing morality.

I think that part of the anxiety about the liberalization of our views on racism, sexism, and homophobia is precisely that those who are enjoying the new liberalism recognize that each may come roaring back, given the right set of circumstances. Indeed, I have been stunned by the massive growth in overt racism in the US since the election of Obama -- racist thugs seem to have become empowered by talk radio and the like to spew the kind of racist bile that I haven't heard in the last forty years. Anyone who has benefitted from society's liberalization should be very concerned about that trend -- I'm looking at you, log cabin Republicans.

--Tom Clune

Posted by TurquoiseTastic (# 8978) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by TurquoiseTastic:
Justinian and I think Marvin are using "moral subjectivism" to mean "recognising that our own ideas about morality may be mistaken". EE, Dafyd and others including myself are using it to mean "the idea that right and wrong are arbitrary concepts".
In practical terms the two are virtually indistinguishable.

No, I would strongly disagree with that. One possible practical difference:

If you think your own views could be mistaken but still think that there is a true "right and wrong", you will be interested in listening to what others have to say, and might be persuaded by their appeals or arguments.

If you think "right and wrong" are purely arbitrary, there is no particular reason for you ever to change your views.

Posted by Pre-cambrian (# 2055) on :

quote:
Originally posted by TurquoiseTastic:

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by TurquoiseTastic:
Justinian and I think Marvin are using "moral subjectivism" to mean "recognising that our own ideas about morality may be mistaken". EE, Dafyd and others including myself are using it to mean "the idea that right and wrong are arbitrary concepts".
In practical terms the two are virtually indistinguishable.
No, I would strongly disagree with that. One possible practical difference:

If you think your own views could be mistaken but still think that there is a true "right and wrong", you will be interested in listening to what others have to say, and might be persuaded by their appeals or arguments.

If you think "right and wrong" are purely arbitrary, there is no particular reason for you ever to change your views.

I think it's actually the complete opposite of this.

Firstly, of course, to say that morality is subjective is not to say that one's views of "right and wrong" are arbitrary. That is an unmerited slur on how people have arrived at their moral views.

If your views are subjective and you recognise that, and because you can have a view on one issue that is not, of necessity, tied to your view on another issue, then you are much more open to good argumentation without it appearing as a threat.

However, it is the opposite where you believe morality is objective and, which always seems to be the case, where you believe that your own morality is based on that objective morality. Islamic and Christian morality is starkly different on a number of issues, for example on the application of justice. I expect that both you and EE consider your, i.e. the Christian, view of morality is the objectively correct one. (That conclusion is, of course, subjective.) But more than that, because your Christian beliefs are so fundamental to you, you have much more invested in preserving that position, as otherwise your very Christianity could be at risk. So rather than being open to arguments that an Islamic take on morality may be the correct one you will in fact be much more closed to such appeals and arguments.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by TurquoiseTastic:
No, I would strongly disagree with that. One possible practical difference:

If you think your own views could be mistaken but still think that there is a true "right and wrong", you will be interested in listening to what others have to say, and might be persuaded by their appeals or arguments.

If you think "right and wrong" are purely arbitrary, there is no particular reason for you ever to change your views.

You seem to be coming at things from a different angle from me.

You don't need a true "right and wrong" to have a "better and worse". There is no highest or lowest integer but seven is greater than minus three. You just need an ordering. And this gets complex when you're asking whether 1+2i is greater than 1.5 + i

On the other hand if you have a true right and wrong and think that you know what true right is why on earth would you bother to listen to anyone else with the single exception of improving your sales techniques. You already have true right and wrong.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by TurquoiseTastic:
If you think your own views could be mistaken but still think that there is a true "right and wrong", you will be interested in listening to what others have to say, and might be persuaded by their appeals or arguments.

If you think "right and wrong" are purely arbitrary, there is no particular reason for you ever to change your views.

I can think of two reasons right off the top of my head - love for others and self-interest.

The thing about right and wrong being purely arbitrary is it not only means all views are inherently true, it also means all views are inherently false. Including my own.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Morality, for a moral subjectivist, is a sophisticated way of saying 'do it because I say so'.
I would phrase it more as "I think you should do this because I think it is better than what you're currently doing, and here are my reasons for thinking so. But I'm interested in hearing your reasons for thinking the things you do are better - let's have a chat about it and see if one of us can't persuade the other that they're right."

Where in that does the moral subjectivism come in?

There are two words there that can be given a subjectivist interpretation, but which are more naturally interpreted in an objective fashion. That is, 'reasons' and 'better'.

Nothing that you're saying so far requires the use of moral language. I can't think of a subjectivist interpretation of 'better' that doesn't just mean 'more effective in making what I want happen'. If somebody wants to ship food to the hungry in Africa then they can compare notes with somebody else who is shipping food to find out whether it would be better to ship the food by air rather than by sea; but the same conversation could equally happen between two gun-runners.

Posted by TurquoiseTastic (# 8978) on :

Pre-cambrian - hang on, it's Marvin who is saying that "I acknowledge I might be mistaken" is functionally equivalent to "Right and wrong are arbitrary". I was disagreeing with that equation.

I'm saying that "I acknowledge I might be mistaken" is not what I mean by "moral subjectivism". Maybe it would be better to avoid the phrase completely as people seem to be using it in completely different senses.

I agree that "acknowledging that I might be mistaken" is essential for any useful debate to take place with those who disagree. Heck, even Cromwell urged the Scots to have this attitude.

But the idea that "morality is arbitrary" rather destroys the possibility of debate, as there is no intellectually compelling reason to switch from one arbitrary morality to another.

As for discussions with e.g. Muslims - the idea that "morality is not arbitrary" is one of the many points of agreement I would have with them! We might well disagree on the details of what that morality consists in, but the existence of such a thing would not be in dispute between us. As you say, the idea of "I might be mistaken and am willing to be convinced otherwise" will however be essential.

Justinian - as you say, you need an method of ordering! If you say "Seven is greater than three" and someone else says "No, three is greater than seven" then you must be using a different ordering, a different use of the word "greater". It's the absence of a consistent "ordering" that I would regard as problematic. It's the acknowledgement that things can, in principle, be ordered, that I'm after.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Nothing that you're saying so far requires the use of moral language.

Neither does it preclude such use.

I don't see why the best approach to morality can't be discussed in the same way as the best approach to shipping food overseas.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by TurquoiseTastic:
But the idea that "morality is arbitrary" rather destroys the possibility of debate, as there is no intellectually compelling reason to switch from one arbitrary morality to another.

This is the bit I don't get. I mean, OK it's true, but it misses the point that there's no compelling reason to stick with the morality you already have either.

Assuming morality is arbitrary, if someone comes along and persuades you that their moral code would produce even better results for you (and/or those you love) than the one you have, why wouldn't you switch? What would be stopping you?

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by TurquoiseTastic:
As for discussions with e.g. Muslims - the idea that "morality is not arbitrary" is one of the many points of agreement I would have with them! We might well disagree on the details of what that morality consists in, but the existence of such a thing would not be in dispute between us. As you say, the idea of "I might be mistaken and am willing to be convinced otherwise" will however be essential.

It's that last bit, though, that becomes insanely tricky if you start with the common principle that there is a 'right' answer. You then have the conundrum of agreeing that you can't both be right, with very little prospect of either of you being able to convince the other that YOU'RE the one who's got it right.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
In order to get anywhere we need to work out what subjective actually means. And I'm going to start with what I hope is a non-contentious statement. "If taste isn't subjective then nothing involving the senses is."

But taste is based on objective reality. I don't think that despite taste being subjective two people, one who liked it and one who hated it would say they were actually eating a different coffee cake. The coffee cake is objectively there. But taste, as I think we can agree, is subjective even if both people are eating the same coffee cake.

I think you're confusing things.
If I say that the coffee cake tastes of chocolate, in such a way that my friend can tell the difference between the chocolate cake and I cannot, then my taste is in that respect objectively mistaken.
So: that the cake tastes of coffee is an objective judgement. That the cake is nice is a subjective judgement. (*) To say that taste absolutely is either objective or subjective is a category error.

quote:
This is because Objective + Subjective = Subjective.

No. Objective + Subjective = Objective + Subjective.
Saying Objective + Subjective = Subjective is like saying 3+7i = 10i. Just as saying that Objective + Subjective = Objective would be saying that 3+7i= 10, which would be equally a mistake.
You cannot collapse the objective and subjective components of a judgement into a single component. That just yields confusion.

quote:
Therefore by claiming that morality is objective you are claiming that every part of your perception that makes up your morals is objective. Because in order to be objective there must be no subjective component.

I think I've explained why I think the above is fallacious.

A further consequence: suppose secondary qualities such as the taste of cake or the experience of redness are subjective. It would follow on your account that all our knowledge of the world is subjective. That is either a bit stronger than you're intending, or else yields the claim that morality is subjective trivial and therefore meaningless.

One more thing: the phrase 'every part of your perception that makes up your morals' is begging any number of questions. I think blind-tasting a cake is sufficiently disanalogous to making a moral judgement that the analogy isn't helpful. One disanalogy off the top of my head: I can make a moral judgement about an event of which I have no direct experience. I could decide that the Iraq War was morally wrong before it happened. I cannot taste a coffee cake before it has been baked. Moral judgements are not perceptions.

(*) If I say that coffee tastes like chocolate, while still perfectly capable of distinguishing between the two, then that may well be for all we can tell a subjective judgement. This is essentially the same question as 'do you see the same red as I see'. If we see the same red then it's an objective judgement that we have no way of resolving; if it's a meaningless question then it's a subjective judgement.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
If I say that the coffee cake tastes of chocolate, in such a way that my friend can tell the difference between the chocolate cake and I cannot, then my taste is in that respect objectively mistaken.
So: that the cake tastes of coffee is an objective judgement. That the cake is nice is a subjective judgement. (*) To say that taste absolutely is either objective or subjective is a category error.

I hate to venture in here, but...

When people talk about tastes, they usually say the cake tastes LIKE coffee, or chocolate. Not tastes OF.

Whether cake actually has coffee or chocolate IN it is an objective question. Whether the end resulting cake tastes LIKE something that's in the cake, or somehow ends up tasting like something that isn't actually present as an ingredient, is a much more subjective question.

You do of course get people assuming that if a cake tastes like chocolate to them, it must be because it has chocolate in it, and they'll express amazement and disbelief if you tell them that actually it doesn't have any chocolate in it, and might not believe you without, say, seeing the recipe card. But the response won't be "oh in that case it doesn't taste like chocolate to me any more". The response will be "wow, how amazing is that? It tastes like chocolate even though there's no chocolate in it".

In fact many people rely on artificial flavourings to make things taste like something they're not. Most strawberry, orange, lime etc lollies don't contain any strawberry, orange, lime etc. The entire aim of confectionary companies is to give you the impression of strawberries, oranges or limes without using any strawberries, oranges or limes. People will advertise if they DO actually use the real fruit, as a selling point.

[Hot and Hormonal]

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Morality, for a moral subjectivist, is a sophisticated way of saying 'do it because I say so'.
No it isn't. Morality for a moral subjectivist means "I'm doing the best I can but I don't and indeed can't know it all". And to a moral subjectivist, moral objectivity means "I am full of passionate intensity and arrogant enough to think I know everything and can therefore be objective about my moral claims."

That's not what subjective and objective mean.

If I say that Darwinian evolution is objectively more true than creationism am I claiming that biologists think they know everything? No.

Let's take something about which there is no objective truth. How many children does (the fictional) Lady Macbeth have? Answer: there is no answer. There is no truth there to know. There is no more to Lady Macbeth than there is in Macbeth. Somebody who has memorised Macbeth (the play), and is a reasonable logician, knows all there is to know about Lady Macbeth. It would be absurd to say that we don't and indeed can't know all about Lady Macbeth (the character).

On the other hand, Lady Macbeth the real person did exist, and there is some fact of the matter about how many children she had that I at least don't know. Probably there are people who do know, but even if there were no record of her children there would be a truth about it.

Imagine a desk with a computer on it. Do you know all there is to know about that desk? Yes you do. There's nothing to that imaginary desk beyond what you're imagining. The desk's existence is a function of your subjectivity.
Do you know all there is to know about my desk that I'm sitting at? No. You do not. (What colour is the coffee mug?) There are things you do not know about my desk because my desk exists independently of your thoughts and beliefs.

Definition: something is subjective if its existence depends entirely upon the mental state of a subject attending to it. It is objective if it depends upon something other than the mental state of people attending to it.
A judgement is objective if its truth is dependent upon something other than the judgement itself. It is subjective if the truth of the judgement depends on nothing other than the judgement itself - in other words a subjective judgement is intrinsically true.

Truths about the fictional Lady Macbeth are entirely dependent upon mental properties of people thinking about her. Lady Macbeth's existence is subjective. The existence of the historical Lady Macbeth is not dependent upon what people think about her and is objective.

So, if you say that you do not and indeed cannot know it all then you are presuming that the all that you do not and cannot know is a matter of objective fact.
If you say morality is subjective, you say that there is nothing to be known about morality apart from what you believe to be the case.

So a moral subjectivist believes they know everything about morality because the existence of things to know about morality is caused by the subjectivist knowing them. And furthermore, the degree to which something is morally right or wrong depends upon the degree to which the subjectivist cares about it. In which case it follows that to the degree that a moral subjectivist makes a moral judgement they are full of passionate intensity and think they know everything there is to know.
And to the degree that someone is a moral objectivist, they think that they may not and indeed may never know everything there is to be known about morality.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
I think you're confusing things.
If I say that the coffee cake tastes of chocolate, in such a way that my friend can tell the difference between the chocolate cake and I cannot, then my taste is in that respect objectively mistaken.
So: that the cake tastes of coffee is an objective judgement. That the cake is nice is a subjective judgement. (*) To say that taste absolutely is either objective or subjective is a category error.

Then why on earth do you claim that your morality is objective when it is very clearly a mix of your subjective perceptions and some things you consider to be objective?

And subjective factors can and do have objective components. I can not think of a single thing that is purely subjective. How you react to the taste of something has objective components that include chemical composition and temperature. How you react to a sight has the objective component of that sight. And it is impossible to filter the objective component out to leave pure subjectivity.

quote:

quote:
This is because Objective + Subjective = Subjective.
No. Objective + Subjective = Objective + Subjective.
Saying Objective + Subjective = Subjective is like saying 3+7i = 10i. Just as saying that Objective + Subjective = Objective would be saying that 3+7i= 10, which would be equally a mistake.

You're using the wrong branch of mathematics here and therefore your analogy is a category error. Subjective and objective are Boolean values - either one or the other. They are not comparable to the addition of vectors. In order to combine a part subjective, part objective combination you need to define what sort of operation you are combining it with.

For me it is very evident that it's an and gate (assuming objective to be the positive). Something is only objective if all components are objective.

You on the other hand are claiming that it is undefined. The second that one set of subjective values gets into a supposedly objective system it ceases to be either subjective of objective and instead becomes undefined.

quote:
You cannot collapse the objective and subjective components of a judgement into a single component. That just yields confusion.

Fine. (Except you can and I've defined clearly how using Boolean logic - no subjective system is devoid of objective factors but if a system has objective factors it ceases to be objective). Assuming your system of logic you have three choices.

1: You can claim that your morality is neither objective nor subjective. I don't think this likely because you appear to have been entirely on one side of the argument thus far but if I'm misunderstanding you, please say so.

2: You can claim that your morality is objective and has nothing to do with the way you perceive the real world - because that is subjective.

3: You can claim that your entire moral system is immune to any sort of subjective judgement - if there were any subjective judgements in it at all you'd have an undefined when trying to decide whether it was subjective or objective.

Which is it?

quote:
A further consequence: suppose secondary qualities such as the taste of cake or the experience of redness are subjective. It would follow on your account that all our knowledge of the world is subjective. That is either a bit stronger than you're intending, or else yields the claim that morality is subjective trivial and therefore meaningless.

Taste of cake is subjective. Chemical composition is not subjective. And trivial is not the same thing as meaningless. "Concentrated Hydrochloric Acid is corrosive" is trivial - but that doesn't mean sticking hazard warning labels on bottles is meaningless.

Also even if "Morality is subjective" is trivially and self-evidently true (as I believe it is) and you discount the use of this statement as a hazard warning label, it is worth repeating that it it is trivially true every time someone tries to tell you something trivially true is in fact false.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
Taste of cake is subjective. Chemical composition is not subjective.

Egads. You managed to say that in two sentences. Did you see how many paragraphs it took me to stumble through the same idea?

Posted by Ricardus (# 8757) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
Subjective and objective are Boolean values - either one or the other. They are not comparable to the addition of vectors. In order to combine a part subjective, part objective combination you need to define what sort of operation you are combining it with.

For me it is very evident that it's an and gate (assuming objective to be the positive). Something is only objective if all components are objective.

You on the other hand are claiming that it is undefined. The second that one set of subjective values gets into a supposedly objective system it ceases to be either subjective of objective and instead becomes undefined.

Permit me to shove my oar in, but I refer you to this post.

I think you are conflating two separate senses of the word "objective". Dafyd, AIUI, is saying that morality is objective in sense 1 but not in sense 2.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo:
When people talk about tastes, they usually say the cake tastes LIKE coffee, or chocolate. Not tastes OF.

This may be a pond difference.

Tastes of:
Did I use enough coffee/ coffee flavouring? Yes, it tastes of coffee.
Do you like Gran's pudding? Yes/no, it tastes of coffee.

Tastes like:
What does chicory taste of? It tastes a bit like cheap coffee.
Is that coffee or tea? It tastes like coffee.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo:
When people talk about tastes, they usually say the cake tastes LIKE coffee, or chocolate. Not tastes OF.
This may be a pond difference.

Tastes of:
Did I use enough coffee/ coffee flavouring? Yes, it tastes of coffee.
Do you like Gran's pudding? Yes/no, it tastes of coffee.

Tastes like:
What does chicory taste of? It tastes a bit like cheap coffee.
Is that coffee or tea? It tastes like coffee.

Well, I'm nowhere near "the pond" but I take the point. The general thrust still stands, though. It is in theory possible for Gran's pudding to give a taste impression of coffee even if it has no coffee in it - exactly the same way that chicory can taste like coffee despite having a completely different composition.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by TurquoiseTastic:
Pre-cambrian - hang on, it's Marvin who is saying that "I acknowledge I might be mistaken" is functionally equivalent to "Right and wrong are arbitrary". I was disagreeing with that equation.

I'm saying that "I acknowledge I might be mistaken" is not what I mean by "moral subjectivism". Maybe it would be better to avoid the phrase completely as people seem to be using it in completely different senses.

I agree that "acknowledging that I might be mistaken" is essential for any useful debate to take place with those who disagree. Heck, even Cromwell urged the Scots to have this attitude.

But the idea that "morality is arbitrary" rather destroys the possibility of debate, as there is no intellectually compelling reason to switch from one arbitrary morality to another.

Who ever said subjective was the same as arbitrary. As far as I can tell the only people claiming this are those like EE and Dafyd who seem to be building this case against a target they simply do not understand.

quote:
Justinian - as you say, you need an method of ordering! If you say "Seven is greater than three" and someone else says "No, three is greater than seven" then you must be using a different ordering, a different use of the word "greater". It's the absence of a consistent "ordering" that I would regard as problematic. It's the acknowledgement that things can, in principle, be ordered, that I'm after.

They can, in principle, be ordered. This is not a point of disagreement.

The problem is that there are many ways to order things. If you tell me "three is greater than seven" I'm going to look at you as if you are crazy unless you produce a fascinating train of logic behind it. If on the other hand you tell me "Minus seven is greater than three because it is further from zero" I'm going to look at my eyes and rephrase it as "The absolute value of minus seven is greater than the absolute value of three" which is a perfectly true statement and even fits with normal definitions.

Where things get interesting is what happens when we hit two dimensions. Most moral basics are pretty much shared in my experience. "Don't hurt people". "Don't lie". Those are two obvious ones - and both normally come with scales. The fascinating moral questions arise when you get moral scales that run into conflict with each other. Where does "lying to save someone's life" fit? (Probably a good thing). As far as I know, without ducking the issue and saying "Never go below 0 on any scale" (which only solves one part of the problem) or establishing a hierarchy of categorical imperatives that lead to decidedly weird results there isn't a moral system ever invented that will resolve all such issues.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
Of course it's not a crime. But it does rather curtail debate.

Funny, but last time I looked there were over 100 responses on this thread. And it appears that there is quite a vigorous debate. So what are you talking about??

quote:
Although, in this particular case, you appear to have done an excellent job of finding people who disagree with your point of view strongly enough to tell you so. Whether or not they have any expectation that they might succeed in changing your views is something you'd have to ask them.

Well, waddya know? Purg is actually functioning as it's supposed to. People disagree with me! Well I never....

I am certainly open to changing my views, if a coherent and irrefutable argument is presented. Perhaps one of my detractors would like to present one? (Although it's very difficult to imagine what a coherent argument would look like within a subjectivist epistemology!). And, of course, I hope that you will inform these other contributors that they should also be open to changing their views.

Or is your protest just a subtle roundabout way of saying that you disagree with me, while trying to appear open-minded? (In other words, have you come to this debate with fixed conclusions yourself, and are just annoyed that my conclusions don't tally with yours?)

[ 19. July 2012, 17:18: Message edited by: EtymologicalEvangelical ]

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Ricardus:
Permit me to shove my oar in, but I refer you to this post.

I think you are conflating two separate senses of the word "objective". Dafyd, AIUI, is saying that morality is objective in sense 1 but not in sense 2.

I should have replied to the post you linked - it was one of the more interesting sidenotes. And your analogy is interesting - but I'd change the analogies used:

In sense 1 the third planet orbiting Procyon Beta in the universe one to the right has a mass 1.2136 times that of the earth (assuming it is). This is a fact - but it is untestable by humans - we can not see into that universe. So it is true in sense 1 but not in sense 2.

The subjectivists would say to any attempt to link this fact or others like it to morality "so what?" As I understand it the objectivists are fine with facts such as that for a basis for morality. (Your example of the failing memory is one which tested the memories not what actually happened).

The thing is that Dafyd is making two fundamental mistakes. The first is he isn't saying why he doesn't join the other side - he's out and out defining what the side opposed to him means. Not even why their approach is dangerous but literally what they mean. The second is sloppy logic and a poor understanding of what subjective and objective mean (as I have demonstrated).

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Or is your protest just a subtle roundabout way of saying that you disagree with me, while trying to appear open-minded? (In other words, have you come to this debate with fixed conclusions yourself, and are just annoyed that my conclusions don't tally with yours?)

Nope. You hinted at this before, so it's worth responding to head you off (and didn't you notice that last time I had a problem with your arguing style, I specifically indicated that I agreed with your conclusion that God existed while finding your means of arguing for his existence thoroughly unconvincing?)

The objection was to the mode of discourse, not the content. My consideration of methods and my consideration of content are uncoupled a lot of the time. For example, I get pretty annoyed/embarrassed when people who agree with me in say, the political sphere adopt bad tactics to advance "our" cause. The means have to be right as well as the end.

I also don't cheer if a sporting team I support wins by cheating. Nor (and I'm sure I've raised this particular example on the Ship before) did I join in when about 20,000 people booed a referee for sending one of our guys off, because I'd seen as clear as day that our guy had stomped on an opponent's head.

And you should have seen the looks I got for expressing the view that actually, the penalty Italy got against Australia in the 2006 World Cup was probably a correct decision. Ay-ay-ay, how "un-Australian" was I for expressing THAT view the morning after the game...

I'm not trying to paint myself as some kind of superior being here, I'm simply pointing out that I have a recurring history of treating agreement with a conclusion and agreement with the method of arriving at the conclusion as two very separate questions. You should not, ahem, draw any conclusions about my conclusions just because I don't agree with your methods of arguing. I'm not saying I won't arrive at the same destination, I'm only saying that I won't be following the same route.

[ 19. July 2012, 17:34: Message edited by: orfeo ]

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd
Morality, for a moral subjectivist, is a sophisticated way of saying 'do it because I say so'.
I would phrase it more as "I think you should do this because I think it is better than what you're currently doing, and here are my reasons for thinking so. But I'm interested in hearing your reasons for thinking the things you do are better - let's have a chat about it and see if one of us can't persuade the other that they're right."

I am rather confused as to how this approach is "subjective". If two people are trying to persuade each other to come to a better moral position, then surely there must exist something outside the minds of each of these people (i.e. something "objective") to which they appeal in order to win the argument. How can I persuade someone that my view is correct if my only argument is: "I want you to accept my position because I think it"? That is absurd. I could not possibly appeal to a subjective principle in order to persuade others. What I would say is: "I would like you to consider my view, because it makes sense out there in the real world, and we both acknowledge that it is inherently right to care for people rather than harm them." In other words, I would be appealing to two objective principles: what works in the external world, and an objectively recognised moral sense of care for people. On this basis we can both assess which moral positions are better than others.

But how can "better" be defined simply on the basis of the subjective: "I think it. Period." (Which is what subjective means: relating entirely to the mind of the subject).

quote:
Objective morality says "these laws shall be the ones we use, regardless of whether anyone likes them or the impact they have on society, and they can never ever change regardless of any new ideas or evidence that might come along."

This is certainly not my view. To acknowledge an objective basis to our morality does not mean that we cannot frame laws with reference to a changing context. But how can we decide which laws are most suited to the context unless there is an unchanging underlying moral agenda, by which we select the most appopriate laws? Let me give you the analogy of a tennis match. Roger Federer doesn't use the same shot every rally does he? He changes his tactics throughout the game depending on the conditions of each rally, game and set. He does this because he is pursuing an unchanging goal: to win the game. The goal of winning the game according to the rules is his "objective position" whereas the constant change of tactics and shots is the complex method he uses to achieve this end. The idea that "objectivity" involves employing a single tactic or shot on every point is, of course, absurd. But this is what you seem to be suggesting.

quote:
Subjective morality says "OK, we've got to set some laws. Let's work out between ourselves what we think the best way to structure our society is, and then once we've reached a consensus and/or a set of laws that most people can be happy with we'll go with them. But we'll keep in mind that there might be a better way of doing things, and we'll always be open to changing our laws if someone comes along with a persuasive reason why we should."

See my point above re your response to Dafyd.

quote:
Do you see the difference?

Clearly I do.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
What I would say is: "I would like you to consider my view, because it makes sense out there in the real world, and we both acknowledge that it is inherently right to care for people rather than harm them." In other words, I would be appealing to two objective principles: what works in the external world, and an objectively recognised moral sense of care for people. On this basis we can both assess which moral positions are better than others.

Those two principles seem to have quite different bases, though. The idea of what works in practice is capable of a kind of assessment - one where people may reach different conclusions if you've got something that is more prone to qualitative measurement rather than quantitative, and one where the proposition can be falsified by measurement/evidence that shows that actually, it isn't working.

Whereas the idea of something being 'inherently right' simply isn't falsifiable by evidence. It's a value judgement. An axiom.

To describe BOTH of those things by the one word, 'objective', tends to demonstrate that just having two categories of 'subjective' and 'objective' isn't really cutting it.

[ 19. July 2012, 18:17: Message edited by: orfeo ]

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian
That's just an attempt to use God of the Gaps. Morality can be explained as an evolutionarily advantageous thing for any social animal and an emergent property of any society with individuals interacting.

In other words, "evolution (or naturalism) of the gaps". Or, begging the question.

quote:
And how the naturalistic fallacy is relevant is something you're going to explain.

It's completely relevant. You made an appeal to empiricism, and I question whether morality can be ascertained by that naturalistic method. It cannot. Hence my reference to dynamite. If the only reference we have is nature - i.e. the physical realm - then it clearly cannot be the source of our morality. So morality must come from elsewhere: a non-empirical realm such as a supernatural reality (e.g. God) or our own minds / consciousness.

Therefore your comment about not hearing, seeing or touching God is irrelevant, as concerns moral authority. We cannot hear, see or touch our own minds or consciousness, but presumably you think that that is the source of our morality.

All your comments about dynamite are irrelevant. We cannot ascertain what we ought to do with dynamite from its empirical properties. You say:

quote:
But a simple look at the properties of people and the unsafe building will give us the answer.

No it won't. I am sure that Al-Qaeda operatives have a simple look at the properties of people and their environment and decide to use explosives in a destructive way. Nothing about the empirical properties of people and buildings tell us how we ought to relate to those entities.

quote:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
So empiricism gets us nowhere morally. Therefore your criticism of my answer makes no sense.
You might as well say that looking at a horse's tail and only its tail gets you nowhere in telling you how fast the horse runs. And therefore looking at a horse is useless.

That is a category error. If I looked at every single atom and sub-atomic particle in the entire universe - and, of course, this would include analysing every aspect of a horse's anatomy and functioning - I will not discover whether I ought to ride a horse in order to charge and injure a child or whether to give that same child a free riding lesson.

So your argument is irrelevant. You cannot discover morality by observing nature.

quote:
(And yes, the properties of the dynamite are relevant - blowing up dynamite in a crowded area is very different to blowing up a water bomb in a crowded area).

So Al-Qaeda ought to go for dynamite then, yes?

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
Then why on earth do you claim that your morality is objective when it is very clearly a mix of your subjective perceptions and some things you consider to be objective?

Where have I said "my morality is objective"? I've used F3 to search this thread and I can't find it.
If I did say that, I retract it as being a nonsensical thing to say.

Are we perhaps talking past each other? Do you think that by 'objective' I mean 'unbiased'?

When we say 'morality is objective' (no possessive pronoun) I mean that moral judgements say something that is objectively there independently of our judgements about it. And when I say that moral judgements are objective I mean the same thing: the truth or falsehood of a moral judgement depends on some set of morally relevant facts independent upon that judgement. Therefore, I do not mean to say that moral judgements are unbiased.

Clear?

When we say that morality is subjective we mean it is not the kind of thing that can be false or in error.

quote:
Taste of cake is subjective. Chemical composition is not subjective.

You determine the chemical composition of molecules using your perceptions. Your perceptions are not entirely free of subjective elements. Therefore, by the same boolean logic that determines that moral statements are subjective chemical statements such as statements of chemical composition are subjective.

Except... your argument for the boolean nature of objective/subjective makes perfect sense if by objective you mean 'unbiased' and by 'subjective' you mean 'biased by personal psychology'. But it makes no sense to say that chemical compositions are not biased by personal psychology. It only makes sense to say chemical compositions are not subjective if you're using subjective in the way that I'm using it. But then your argument for the boolean nature of objective/subjective falls apart completely.
Could you elucidate your argument to make it clear that you're not falling victim to your own fallacy of ambiguity?

quote:
And trivial is not the same thing as meaningless. "Concentrated Hydrochloric Acid is corrosive" is trivial - but that doesn't mean sticking hazard warning labels on bottles is meaningless.
it is worth repeating that it it is trivially true every time someone tries to tell you something trivially true is in fact false.

That's not what I mean by trivial. An illustration: Suppose somebody is subjected to an operation whereby the input from their green and blue cones is redirected to the red part of their brain. They see every colour as red.
So to tell them that something is red is trivial and completely uninformative. Everything is red. And if somebody tells them that something is blue that's not even in fact false. They cannot be misled by being told that something is blue since the blue/red distinction just doesn't exist for them.
The analogy for the way I use 'trivial' is going around sticking labels on all the bottles in a laboratory that say 'may contain chemicals'.
If the physical sciences are just as subjective as morality then it becomes meaningless to say that morality is subjective because the objective/subjective distinction just doesn't exist. Saying morality is subjective is like complaining that our drinking water contains lots of chemicals.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Nothing that you're saying so far requires the use of moral language.
Neither does it preclude such use.

I don't see why the best approach to morality can't be discussed in the same way as the best approach to shipping food overseas.

That's not quite my point. My point is to ask why introduce moral considerations at all.

But also... the best approach to morality? Does 'best' mean 'morally best' or does it mean 'best' in some other, amoral, sense?
If it means morally best then discussing the best approach to morality is inherently begging the question. If it means 'best' in some other sense what sense is that? What standard is being used?

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Where have I said "my morality is objective"? I've used F3 to search this thread and I can't find it.
If I did say that, I retract it as being a nonsensical thing to say.

You haven't. You have, however, quite deliberately waded into what is essentially a two sided argument and fired off broadsides right from the get-go entirely saying that subjective morality makes you a bad person (never mind the fact that all you are showing is that by redefining the language you can project things on other people) while saying absolutely nothing bad about objective approaches to morality.

I offered you simply claiming your morality to be neither in the very post you are replying to and also said why I consider it not reflective of your reasoning.

quote:
When we say that morality is subjective we mean it is not the kind of thing that can be false or in error.

I have demonstrated why this is the humpty-dumpty school of debating. You may use language that way but I and an entire half of this argument do not. And I find it not to be in line with the common use of the English language.

Now stop attempting to define terms to claim victory when I have laid out very clearly what the terms as I use them mean and why your attempt to redefine them is not compatable with my ordinary understanding of the English language.

You can, of course, define the terms for yourself in your own essays. But to attempt to define how the other side is using them when orfeo and I have both said how we are using them is a cheap rhetorical trick and entirely unworthy of you.

quote:
You determine the chemical composition of molecules using your perceptions.

You might. If I'm trying to determine the chemical composition of molecules I use a mass-spectrometer - my eyesight certainly isn't sharp enough. One of the purposes of using a mass-spec is to make sure that my senses have as little a distortionary impact as possible - and where they do mean I differ from someone else's reading one of us is right and the other wrong.

quote:
That's not what I mean by trivial. An illustration:

Having read your illustration, what you mean by trivial is irrelevant. Mathematics isn't subjective. What actually happened at a time isn't subjective - even if what we saw happening and even how it was taken by the participants is.

quote:
Saying morality is subjective is like complaining that our drinking water contains lots of chemicals.

I convinced my physics teacher to sign a petition to ban DiHydrogen Monoxide many years ago...

And part right on the "drinking water contains lots of chemicals" issue. Saying our morality is subjective, at least from my perspective, is only necessary when someone representing a water company tries to claim that the water is absolutely pure and objective. I don't feel the need to say that humans evolved unless there is a creationist claiming otherwise. I don't feel the need to say that morality is objective unless someone speaking for a religion (or one of Ayn Rand's followers) tries to claim that morality is objective.

Posted by Ramarius (# 16551) on :

@Justinian. You reckoned that objective + subjective = subjective.

Nope. I'm seated on a chair (objective). The colour of the chair is pleasing to me (subjective). How does my subjective view of the colour of the chair make the fact I'm sitting on it subjective?

Posted by Ramarius (# 16551) on :

@Pre Cambrian. You wrote 'Firstly, of course, to say that morality is subjective is not to say that one's views of "right and wrong" are arbitrary. That is an unmerited slur on how people have arrived at their moral views.'

Hmmm.....no. The validity of a view doesn't depend on how you come by it. That's the genetic fallacy. You can come to an entirely correct conclusion by an entirely arbitrary route.

Read Drew's post up thread. And Daffyd's 'When we say 'morality is objective' (no possessive pronoun) I mean that moral judgements say something that is objectively there independently of our judgements about it. And when I say that moral judgements are objective I mean the same thing: the truth or falsehood of a moral judgement depends on some set of morally relevant facts independent upon that judgement. Therefore, I do not mean to say that moral judgements are unbiased.' ...also sums up the issue nicely.

Posted by TurquoiseTastic (# 8978) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
Who ever said subjective was the same as arbitrary. As far as I can tell the only people claiming this are those like EE and Dafyd who seem to be building this case against a target they simply do not understand.

You didn't, but some people do take this line - Marvin, for example, now seems to be saying that indeed, "subjective" is basically the same as "arbitrary".

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:

quote:
Originallyposted by TurquoiseTastic:
Justinian - as you say, you need an method of ordering! If you say "Seven is greater than three" and someone else says "No, three is greater than seven" then you must be using a different ordering, a different use of the word "greater". It's the absence of a consistent "ordering" that I would regard as problematic. It's the acknowledgement that things can, in principle, be ordered, that I'm after.
They can, in principle, be ordered. This is not a point of disagreement.

I think indeed you and I are agreed on this. But not everyone is agreed on this.

quote:

The problem is that there are many ways to order things. If you tell me "three is greater than seven" I'm going to look at you as if you are crazy unless you produce a fascinating train of logic behind it. If on the other hand you tell me "Minus seven is greater than three because it is further from zero" I'm going to look at my eyes and rephrase it as "The absolute value of minus seven is greater than the absolute value of three" which is a perfectly true statement and even fits with normal definitions.

OK. But here, in order to resolve the disagreement about ordering, we are carefully thinking about the objective mathematics behind it - defining things like "absolute value". As you say, we have to "produce a fascinating train of logic". And ultimately we have to agree on our terms.

Similarly if we want to tease out the roots of a moral disagreement, we have to think about the roots of our morality and work out what principles it is based on.

quote:

Where things get interesting is what happens when we hit two dimensions. Most moral basics are pretty much shared in my experience. "Don't hurt people". "Don't lie". Those are two obvious ones - and both normally come with scales.

What would we do if confronted with someone who didn't accept these "obvious" principles though? There do seem to be a small but significant number of such people around.

quote:

The fascinating moral questions arise when you get moral scales that run into conflict with each other. Where does "lying to save someone's life" fit? (Probably a good thing). As far as I know, without ducking the issue and saying "Never go below 0 on any scale" (which only solves one part of the problem) or establishing a hierarchy of categorical imperatives that lead to decidedly weird results there isn't a moral system ever invented that will resolve all such issues.

But we still generally try to "do the right thing" - most people make a judgement that "lying to save someone's life" is indeed normally the objectively right thing to do. I don't think the proponents of "objective morality" on this thread would have a problem with that.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Ramarius:
@Justinian. You reckoned that objective + subjective = subjective.

Nope. I'm seated on a chair (objective). The colour of the chair is pleasing to me (subjective). How does my subjective view of the colour of the chair make the fact I'm sitting on it subjective?

That's not objective + subjective. That's objective + irrelevant.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
But also... the best approach to morality? Does 'best' mean 'morally best' or does it mean 'best' in some other, amoral, sense?
If it means morally best then discussing the best approach to morality is inherently begging the question. If it means 'best' in some other sense what sense is that? What standard is being used?

"Best" as in "what is most likely to lead to the sort of society we want to live in".

Of course, first we have to decide what sort of society we want to live in. That's the hard part, and if we can't all agree on the basic structure we want our society to have then it'll have to either go down to popular vote or result in the society splitting into two.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
When we say that morality is subjective we mean it is not the kind of thing that can be false or in error.

But it also cannot be true! You're focusing on the part of it that means we can't say anyone else is definitely wrong, while ignoring the part that means we can't say we are definitely right!

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Ramarius:
I mean that moral judgements say something that is objectively there independently of our judgements about it.

No.

An example: someone has been killed. That is objective fact. The question of whether it is moral that they were killed is subjective - there is no "good" or "bad" that is objectively there independently of our judgements about the situation.

Posted by Ricardus (# 8757) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
The subjectivists would say to any attempt to link this fact or others like it to morality "so what?" As I understand it the objectivists are fine with facts such as that for a basis for morality. (Your example of the failing memory is one which tested the memories not what actually happened).

The thing is that Dafyd is making two fundamental mistakes. The first is he isn't saying why he doesn't join the other side - he's out and out defining what the side opposed to him means. Not even why their approach is dangerous but literally what they mean. The second is sloppy logic and a poor understanding of what subjective and objective mean (as I have demonstrated).

My own perspective is that I'm not sure what people mean when they call themselves moral subjectivists. My impression from this thread is that they mean several different things. ISTM that EE is basically arguing against existentialism, which is indeed a form of moral subjectivism, but I don't think I've ever met an existentialist in real life.

AIUI, the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' come from Kant. In Kant, if you take a sentence like 'Friedrich sees the tree', the tree-in-itself is described as 'objective' (because it's the object of sight), and the sensory impressions produced by the tree are 'subjective' (because they affect the subject of the sentence, i.e. Friedrich). And Friedrich cannot actually perceive the tree-in-itself, but only the sensory impressions it produces. This has the consequence that the entirety of human knowledge is subjective, or (to put it another way) we can only know about subjective sense-impressions, never about objective things-as-they-are.

IME, when people actually say 'subjective' and 'objective', that is not quite what they mean, but the degree to which they deviate from Kant depends on the degree to which their philosophy differs from Kant's.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Where have I said "my morality is objective"? I've used F3 to search this thread and I can't find it.
If I did say that, I retract it as being a nonsensical thing to say.
You haven't. You have, however, quite deliberately waded into what is essentially a two sided argument and fired off broadsides right from the get-go entirely saying that subjective morality makes you a bad person (never mind the fact that all you are showing is that by redefining the language you can project things on other people) while saying absolutely nothing bad about objective approaches to morality.

1. Is 'deliberately waded in' an irregular verb? I contribute to a discussion on a discussion board; you deliberately wade in? My post to which you originally replied was a reply to Croesos. Would you say that you were deliberately wading in to an argument between me and Croesos?
2.a. In the post you cite I was deliberately using exactly the same words that Croesos had just used of believers in objective morality. So if you think the phrasing was offensive take it up with Croesos.
2.b. What I said didn't amount to saying that subjective morality makes someone a bad person. Moral subjectivism is a theory about what people are doing or talking about when they are using moral language - i.e. they are expressing personal preferences. That does not, according to most moral subjectivists, imply that people who believe it are any less moral than anybody else. (To the best of my knowledge the leading philosopher advancing the line of thought that I'm criticising is a Guardian-reading liberal and a perfectly decent person.)
3. I said nothing about approaches to morality either objective or subjective. I am talking about morality, not about approaches to morality.

quote:
I offered you simply claiming your morality to be neither in the very post you are replying to and also said why I consider it not reflective of your reasoning.

The F*** you did. The answer I gave was that your question was based on "fallacious" premises because "you cannot collapse the objective and subjective components of a judgement into a single component". You put the word 'undefined' into my mouth on the basis of your bare unsupported assertions that I'm not allowed to give an answer that isn't Boolean.

quote:

quote:
When we say that morality is subjective we mean it is not the kind of thing that can be false or in error.
I have demonstrated why this is the humpty-dumpty school of debating. You may use language that way but I and an entire half of this argument do not. And I find it not to be in line with the common use of the English language.

Anyway, from dictionary.com

quote:
1. existing independently of perception or an individual's conceptions: are there objective moral values?
2. undistorted by emotion or personal bias
3. of or relating to actual and external phenomena as opposed to thoughts, feelings, etc

Now, EE and I are using 'objective' in senses 1 and 3, which are closely related. That is, when I talk about 'objective morality' I'm using it in sense 1; when I talk about 'objective judgements' I'm using it in sense 3. A judgement is objective (sense 3) when it is about something that is objective (sense 1). (My hardcopy dictionary doesn't even bother to distinguish between senses 1 and 3.) And I'm using 'subjective' as the antonym in both cases. These are the senses that are relevant to philosophical discussion. This is a philosophical discussion. I do not think it is unreasonable to use the words in those senses.

Sense 2 is unrelated. A judgement that is subjective in sense 2 may be about something that is objective in sense 1 and therefore objective in sense 3.

As far as I can tell you are treating senses 1 and 3 as if they are interchangeable with sense 2. There's a clear instance of you doing just that further down in your post. But that's a fallacy of equivocation because the two senses have no logical link between them. (Whereas sense 1 and 3 do have a logical link between them.)

quote:
Now stop attempting to define terms to claim victory when I have laid out very clearly what the terms as I use them mean and why your attempt to redefine them is not compatable with my ordinary understanding of the English language.

I am attempting to define terms to achieve clarity. Not to claim victory.

And no, you haven't even started to make it clear what the terms as you use them mean.
If you are referring to your sentence, "If taste isn't subjective then nothing involving the senses is." then that is nothing more than a sentence using the word 'subjective'. It certainly doesn't do anything to make it clear whether you're distinguishing between senses 2 and 3. And the rest of that post goes on in the same vein, using the words as if their meaning is already settled and clear, without doing anything to clarify them.

quote:
But to attempt to define how the other side is using them when orfeo and I have both said how we are using them is a cheap rhetorical trick and entirely unworthy of you.

If you are not using the words in the sense in which I am using them then you are not the other side. The only way in which you can qualify for membership of the other side is if you disagree with what I am saying in the sense in which I am using the words.

quote:

quote:
You determine the chemical composition of molecules using your perceptions.
You might. If I'm trying to determine the chemical composition of molecules I use a mass-spectrometer - my eyesight certainly isn't sharp enough. One of the purposes of using a mass-spec is to make sure that my senses have as little a distortionary impact as possible - and where they do mean I differ from someone else's reading one of us is right and the other wrong.

If combining subjective and objective is a Boolean operation then it doesn't matter how little distortionary impact your senses have. If they have even the most miniscule idiosyncratic impact at all - and as the mass spectrometer is not wired directly into your brain they do - the entire operation is just as subjective as if you'd hallucinated the whole thing. Because there are no degrees of subjectivity if subjectivity is Boolean.
This is ridiculous, and the ridiculousness is derived from treating subjective/objective as Boolean.

quote:
What actually happened at a time isn't subjective - even if what we saw happening and even how it was taken by the participants is.

What happened at a time isn't subjective in sense 1. What we saw happening and how it was taken by the participants are subjective in sense 2. It would be nonsense to interpret the first half of the sentence in sense 2 and nonsense to interpret the second half of the sentence in sense 1.

As I said above, you are equivocating within the course of one sentence.

quote:
Saying our morality is subjective, at least from my perspective, is only necessary when someone representing a water company tries to claim that the water is absolutely pure and objective.

A case study. Vince Cable is studying whether to allow News International to take over BSkyB. It turns out that he already believes that News International has too much influence on public life already, and on the basis that he has a prior prejudice, the task is taken away from him and given to Jeremy Hunt. Jeremy Hunt it turns out is best pals with News International executives.
So there would have been subjective factors (his prior opinions about News International) entering into Vince Cable's decision. Either his decision was distorted by subjective factors or it was undistorted. 0 or 1, subjective or objective. There were subjective factors, so 0.
There were subjective factors (his pallyness with News International) entering into Jeremy Hunt's decision. Either his decision was distorted by subjective factors or it was undistorted. 0 or 1, subjective or objective. There were subjective factors, so 0.
Conclusion: if you are right that objectivity is either 0 or 1 then Jeremy Hunt's decision was no more distorted by subjective factors than Vince Cable's would have been. So I reject your application of Boolean algebra to subjectivity and objectivity.

If there are no degrees of objectivity it is impossible for the mainstream media to be any more objective than Fox News. And certainly that's what Fox News says. I disagree. So I reject your application of Boolean algebra to subjectivity and objectivity.

Fox News gets away with its 'all bias is equal' fallacy by trading on people's "ordinary understanding of the English language". Because "ordinary understanding of the English language" fails to distinguish between the senses of words and so leads people to fallacious conclusions.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Anyway, from dictionary.com

quote:
1. existing independently of perception or an individual's conceptions: are there objective moral values?
2. undistorted by emotion or personal bias
3. of or relating to actual and external phenomena as opposed to thoughts, feelings, etc
Now, EE and I are using 'objective' in senses 1 and 3, which are closely related. That is, when I talk about 'objective morality' I'm using it in sense 1; when I talk about 'objective judgements' I'm using it in sense 3.

OK then, if morality exists independently of any individual's perception and/or conception, then show me some of it. Just one molecule of morality would be enough to persuade me that it's something that can exist independently of human thought. Or maybe it's a fundamental force like gravity or magnetism - can you demonstrate its strength? Which SI unit is it measured in?

If there were no people to believe that iron exists, it would still be there in the ground. If there were no people to believe that gravity exists, the stars, planets and moons would still orbit one other. But if there were no people around to believe morality exists, there would be no such thing as morality.

Posted by Ricardus (# 8757) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
If there were no people to believe that iron exists, it would still be there in the ground. If there were no people to believe that gravity exists, the stars, planets and moons would still orbit one other. But if there were no people around to believe morality exists, there would be no such thing as morality.

The answer which I think EE is pushing for is that it must exist in the mind of God.

That is, anyone who believes in objective (sense 1) morality must be either a theist or logically inconsistent.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
...if morality exists independently of any individual's perception and/or conception, then show me some of it. Just one molecule of morality would be enough to persuade me that it's something that can exist independently of human thought. Or maybe it's a fundamental force like gravity or magnetism - can you demonstrate its strength? Which SI unit is it measured in?

If there were no people to believe that iron exists, it would still be there in the ground. If there were no people to believe that gravity exists, the stars, planets and moons would still orbit one other. But if there were no people around to believe morality exists, there would be no such thing as morality.

You are assuming that the philosophy of naturalism is true, and therefore you are interpreting external realities in purely empirical terms. Of course, morality is not something material, but who said that the only reality external to all human minds is material / natural?

I would argue that the necessity of the objective basis for both morality and reason constitutes evidence that a non-natural - or rather super-natural - reality exists external to any human mind. In fact, this is the only explanation which makes logical sense.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Ricardus:
That is, anyone who believes in objective (sense 1) morality must be either a theist or logically inconsistent.

I'd certainly agree with that. Of course I'd also point out that religion, being a matter for faith and belief rather than proof and knowledge, is itself a subjective thing.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
You are assuming that the philosophy of naturalism is true, and therefore you are interpreting external realities in purely empirical terms. Of course, morality is not something material, but who said that the only reality external to all human minds is material / natural?

Depends what you mean by "reality".

quote:
I would argue that the necessity of the objective basis for both morality and reason constitutes evidence that a non-natural - or rather super-natural - reality exists external to any human mind.

You haven't successfully argued that there is a need for an objective basis for both morality and reason yet. All you've done is stated your belief in that claim and treated it as if it's absolute truth.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Of course I'd also point out that religion, being a matter for faith and belief rather than proof and knowledge, is itself a subjective thing.

A point with which I would disagree (especially considering that "faith and belief" are not necessarily opposed to "proof and knowledge").

By the way... you seem to be implying that "knowledge" is something objective. But knowledge can only exist in minds. So how can it be objective, if "objectivity" is defined as that which is external to human minds?

quote:
You haven't successfully argued that there is a need for an objective basis for both morality and reason yet.

Apparently I have, if the lack of refutation is anything to go by.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
1. Is 'deliberately waded in' an irregular verb? I contribute to a discussion on a discussion board; you deliberately wade in? My post to which you originally replied was a reply to Croesos. Would you say that you were deliberately wading in to an argument between me and Croesos?

I apologise for the waded in comment - on reviewing the thread it turned out that you had been involved in the thread for a couple of posts before you launched a full broadside and massively raised the temperature of the thread by declaring what those you were objecting to meant.

quote:
2.a. In the post you cite I was deliberately using exactly the same words that Croesos had just used of believers in objective morality. So if you think the phrasing was offensive take it up with Croesos.

It was partly offensive because it is incoherent and missing the target. "reality is what the believer in subjective morality says it is" doesn't follow from anything and isn't in fact true. It may be true in some cases (it may even be true in Creosus' case).

2.b. What I said didn't amount to saying that subjective morality makes someone a bad person. Moral subjectivism is a theory about what people are doing or talking about when they are using moral language - i.e. they are expressing personal preferences. That does not, according to most moral subjectivists, imply that people who believe it are any less moral than anybody else. (To the best of my knowledge the leading philosopher advancing the line of thought that I'm criticising is a Guardian-reading liberal and a perfectly decent person.)

quote:
3. I said nothing about approaches to morality either objective or subjective. I am talking about morality, not about approaches to morality.

And that, I see, as a distinction without a difference unless you argue a perfect understanding of morality to have been poured ex nihilo into your skull.

quote:
The F*** you did. The answer I gave was that your question was based on "fallacious" premises because "you cannot collapse the objective and subjective components of a judgement into a single component". You put the word 'undefined' into my mouth on the basis of your bare unsupported assertions that I'm not allowed to give an answer that isn't Boolean.

Then you can define it. As neither objective nor subjective I trust. It is currently undefined within the frame of this discussion.

quote:
Anyway, from dictionary.com

quote:
1. existing independently of perception or an individual's conceptions: are there objective moral values?
2. undistorted by emotion or personal bias
3. of or relating to actual and external phenomena as opposed to thoughts, feelings, etc

Better.

1: You're not talking about specific moral values - you're talking about morality, which includes those values and their application. It can't not include their application because the map is not the territory. So it fails here.

2: This is an ideal to aim for. "I'm trying to be objective about this case". It's not something you can actually achieve.

3: If thoughts don't have a place in morality, wtf?

Morality fails to be objective on all three counts.

quote:
Now, EE and I are using 'objective' in senses 1 and 3, which are closely related. That is, when I talk about 'objective morality' I'm using it in sense 1; when I talk about 'objective judgements' I'm using it in sense 3. A judgement is objective (sense 3) when it is about something that is objective (sense 1). (My hardcopy dictionary doesn't even bother to distinguish between senses 1 and 3.)

And as I've said above it fails in the cases of points 1 and 3. It isn't objective. It needs to be processed through your brain.

And as for sense 3, show me a lump of morality. An atom will do. Show me it is objectively there.

quote:
Sense 2 is unrelated. A judgement that is subjective in sense 2 may be about something that is objective in sense 1 and therefore objective in sense 3.

Sense 2 is off to one side - and it's the one you mess up later in the post. An ideal to aim for (like a frictionless surface) may not be possible. But that doesn't make it less of an ideal.

quote:
I am attempting to define terms to achieve clarity. Not to claim victory.

"reality is what the believer in subjective morality says it is" sounds like definition to me.

quote:
And no, you haven't even started to make it clear what the terms as you use them mean.
If you are referring to your sentence, "If taste isn't subjective then nothing involving the senses is." then that is nothing more than a sentence using the word 'subjective'. It certainly doesn't do anything to make it clear whether you're distinguishing between senses 2 and 3.

Sense 3. Sense 2 is the one that's best expressed as an ideal.

quote:
If combining subjective and objective is a Boolean operation then it doesn't matter how little distortionary impact your senses have. If they have even the most miniscule idiosyncratic impact at all - and as the mass spectrometer is not wired directly into your brain they do - the entire operation is just as subjective as if you'd hallucinated the whole thing.

The output of a mass-spec is, I believe, digital - meaning that you are objectively right or objectively wrong with respect to what you are reporting from it. And one of the points of scientific apparatus is to get as close as possible to the objective. Objectively wrong is possible. It is possible for your reading of the screen to not match the objective numbers displayed. The second you throw in a value judgement the whole thing becomes subjective.

quote:
A case study. Vince Cable is studying whether to allow News International to take over BSkyB. It turns out that he already believes that News International has too much influence on public life already, and on the basis that he has a prior prejudice, the task is taken away from him and given to Jeremy Hunt. Jeremy Hunt it turns out is best pals with News International executives.
So there would have been subjective factors (his prior opinions about News International) entering into Vince Cable's decision. Either his decision was distorted by subjective factors or it was undistorted. 0 or 1, subjective or objective. There were subjective factors, so 0.
There were subjective factors (his pallyness with News International) entering into Jeremy Hunt's decision. Either his decision was distorted by subjective factors or it was undistorted. 0 or 1, subjective or objective. There were subjective factors, so 0.
Conclusion: if you are right that objectivity is either 0 or 1 then Jeremy Hunt's decision was no more distorted by subjective factors than Vince Cable's would have been. So I reject your application of Boolean algebra to subjectivity and objectivity.

And you do so by the fallacy of the excluded middle. There were subjective factors involved and the decision was ultimately made on a subjective basis. That is why you need to take precautions to minimise the impact of those factors. What matters is not just whether it was subjective (yes it was) but what the subjective factors were and how much impact they had.

Any claim that it was objective is spurious. Any claim that they tried to be objective (i.e. objective as in sense 2) backed up by evidence for this is to be lauded.

quote:
If there are no degrees of objectivity it is impossible for the mainstream media to be any more objective than Fox News. And certainly that's what Fox News says. I disagree. So I reject your application of Boolean algebra to subjectivity and objectivity.

Tell me that when the rest of the mainstream media goes to court to support its right to lie on air. Fox News doesn't even attempt to be objective.

That something is subjective means that it is flawed and may be wrong. This is not a call to give up all hope of mitigating the errors that will inevitably creep in - an attempt to be objective despite the fact it is doomed to fail still has meaning. It is an acceptance that you will be wrong and should continually be on guard against it. In Christian terms it is a statement about this being a fallen world.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
When we say that morality is subjective we mean it is not the kind of thing that can be false or in error.
But it also cannot be true! You're focusing on the part of it that means we can't say anyone else is definitely wrong, while ignoring the part that means we can't say we are definitely right!

Yes! Somebody who disagrees with me understands me. [Axe murder]

Yes, up to a point. If you put it the other way round you get we can't say we might be wrong and we can't say that they might be right.

The argument goes like this: what does it mean to say that somebody else is right? Or that what they say is true. Basically, according to the argument it is just repeating what the other person says. 'When Alice says, "penguins waddle" Alice is right' means the same as 'penguins waddle'. So saying that something is right is just saying something equivalent to 'I agree' or 'I endorse that' or 'I recommend you adopt that opinion' or '+1' or 'hooray'.
So 'When I say "David Cameron is Prime Minister" I'm right,' is just an emphatic way of saying 'David Cameron is Prime Minister'.
And so, by the same token, 'When I say "killing kittens is bad" I'm right' means exactly the same as 'killing kittens is bad'.
And 'wrong' if you accept that argument means 'I disagree'.

So the argument goes that since by definition you agree with yourself by definition you must think you are right.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Of course I'd also point out that religion, being a matter for faith and belief rather than proof and knowledge, is itself a subjective thing.
A point with which I would disagree (especially considering that "faith and belief" are not necessarily opposed to "proof and knowledge").

By the way... you seem to be implying that "knowledge" is something objective. But knowledge can only exist in minds. So how can it be objective, if "objectivity" is defined as that which is external to human minds?

quote:
You haven't successfully argued that there is a need for an objective basis for both morality and reason yet.
Apparently I have, if the lack of refutation is anything to go by.

Or you just haven't been paying attention. I've refuted that in my exchanges with Dafyd.

Subjective + Objective = Subjective

Your reasoning is subjective. The world is objective. So is what is written in any given copy of the Bible. How you interpret that is subjective. (Yes, even if you call yourself a literalist). And unless you have a code of morality big enough to encode every decision you will ever make your reasoning is a necessary part of your morality.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian
Or you just haven't been paying attention. I've refuted that in my exchanges with Dafyd.

Subjective + Objective = Subjective

Your reasoning is subjective.

If you say that reasoning is subjective, then how can you claim to have refuted another person's position. What are you appealing to in order to claim a refutation?

That looks to me like a total absurdity. You want to have it both ways, which demonstrates to me that your argument has collapsed.

As for your claim that "subjective + objective = subjective": this can easily be shown to be false.

Let me take an example from the Olympics.

There are basically two methods of scoring: the "objective" method, such as that used in the timing of the 100m sprint; and there is the method influenced by a certain degree of subjectivity for sports such as gymnastics. There is clearly a fundamental difference between these two methods of scoring: the former relies on a device that is external to any human judge, whereas the latter involves an element of discretion and opinion on the part of each judge on the panel.

Now is it true that the latter method is 100% subjective? Clearly not. That is absurd. It's a mixure of "objective + subjective". There are set moves in gymnastics that are scored in a certain way, and the judges would all have been selected on the basis of some recognised experience in this sport - and that track record is something "objective", because it actually occurred. If the scoring method was 100% subjective, then the judges would just be picked randomly from members of the public, who are then invited to give scores without any reference to the particular moves and disciplines. Furthermore, such a totally subjective scoring method would not inspire any kind of confidence and recognition.

So here is an example of "objective + subjective = objective + subjective".

Therefore I fail to see how you have refuted anything I have written.

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian
Or you just haven't been paying attention. I've refuted that in my exchanges with Dafyd.

Subjective + Objective = Subjective

Your reasoning is subjective.
If you say that reasoning is subjective, then how can you claim to have refuted another person's position. What are you appealing to in order to claim a refutation?

Wait, isn't it your position that all reasoning is subjective since it takes place inside the mind?

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
Wait, isn't it your position that all reasoning is subjective since it takes place inside the mind?

No, it's not. That is a misreading of the comment you linked to. "Subjective" relates to what is limited to a person's mind without reference to any external objective factor.

Furthermore, you fail to take into account my affirmation of the role of the mind of God, which establishes the objective validity of reason.

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
Wait, isn't it your position that all reasoning is subjective since it takes place inside the mind?
No, it's not. That is a misreading of the comment you linked to. "Subjective" relates to what is limited to a person's mind without reference to any external objective factor.

Doesn't this refute your original post on this subject regarding broccoli preference.? After all, broccoli and broad beans are both external factors whose existence can be objectively verified. Under your reasoning, this would make any preference for one over the other "objective", contra your orignal position.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
Doesn't this refute your original post on this subject regarding broccoli preference.? After all, broccoli and broad beans are both external factors whose existence can be objectively verified. Under your reasoning, this would make any preference for one over the other "objective", contra your orignal position.

You are talking about the existence of broccoli and broad beans, a fact which is "binding" on every person (because no sane and informed person can deny the existence of these foods), but I am talking about their taste, which does vary from one person to the next, and is not verifiable externally to any person's claim.

Clearly therefore I have not contradicted myself at all, whereas you are conflating two completely different things.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:

On reflection I do not think any further exchange between us is likely to be either constructive or enjoyable. The only reason I can think of to continue is this. I suggest we accept that we differ.

If anybody else wants to take up any of Justinian's points feel free.

Posted by George Spigot (# 253) on :

@EtymologicalEvangelical

If you don't mind indulging me I'd like to repost something I said in the "Can Atheism develop an epistemology to live by?" thread.

This is not so much me trying to argue my corner but more me highlighting my difficulty in understanding the argument.

Saying morals exist is an interesting one for me because they don’t exist in the same way as a brick exists. You can't say there is a big solid block of moral that God breaks chunks off of and hands out to us when we are born. Morals are just a label not a thing. A person is affected by their upbringing, environment and brain chemistry. They are confronted by a situation, make a decision and act on it. Other people can then label that action as moral or immoral. (Sometimes their judgement will depend on the long term results of the action and often people will disagree on whether it was right or wrong). So what actually happened here? Did God fashion the environment? Construct and tweak the brain chemistry causing the bout of depression or over confidence that biased the decision?, control the parents?

What I'm trying to get at is that I get confused when people describe morality as given by God as it makes morality sound like a solid thing where as morality is the label given by other people to the results of actions taken by people caused by not one but many variables.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:

quote:
1. existing independently of perception or an individual's conceptions: are there objective moral values?
2. undistorted by emotion or personal bias
3. of or relating to actual and external phenomena as opposed to thoughts, feelings, etc
Now, EE and I are using 'objective' in senses 1 and 3, which are closely related. That is, when I talk about 'objective morality' I'm using it in sense 1; when I talk about 'objective judgements' I'm using it in sense 3.
OK then, if morality exists independently of any individual's perception and/or conception, then show me some of it. Just one molecule of morality would be enough to persuade me that it's something that can exist independently of human thought. Or maybe it's a fundamental force like gravity or magnetism - can you demonstrate its strength? Which SI unit is it measured in?

I don't think anybody has suggested that logic and mathematics are anything other than objective. (Well, I suggested that there are people who believe that earlier in the thread, but I personally find the idea hard to even start swallowing.)
Morality, if it has objective existence, presumably has it in the same way as logic or rationality or mathematics do. Can you show me a particle of rationality or mathematics? Or measure logic as a fundamental force?

quote:
But if there were no people around to believe morality exists, there would be no such thing as morality.

To the extent that you're not begging the question by saying that...
Trivially, if there were no people around there would be no such thing as people. That doesn't mean that people have no objective existence or that human medicine is a matter of subjective preference. Morality is presumably some kind of truth about people just as medicine, and therefore there's no real objection to saying that morality wouldn't survive the existence of people any more than medicine or psychology.

Also...

There once was a man who said 'God
Must think it exceedingly odd
If he finds that this tree
Continues to be
When there's no one about in the Quad.'

Dear Sir,
Your astonishment's odd.
I am always about in the Quad.
And that's why the tree
Will continue to be,
Since observed by,
Yours faithfully,
God.

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
Doesn't this refute your original post on this subject regarding broccoli preference.? After all, broccoli and broad beans are both external factors whose existence can be objectively verified. Under your reasoning, this would make any preference for one over the other "objective", contra your orignal position.
You are talking about the existence of broccoli and broad beans, a fact which is "binding" on every person (because no sane and informed person can deny the existence of these foods), but I am talking about their taste, which does vary from one person to the next, and is not verifiable externally to any person's claim.

Actually I was referring to your assertion that something is "objective" if it exists outside the mind. I can't see any way short of solipsism that the flavor of various vegetables don't exist in the vegetables themselves and not the mind.

Posted by Unreformed (# 17203) on :

quote:
We, in the west, have our moral views about certain practices in parts of the Muslim word, such as FGM and the ban on female education

This is a little unfair to Islam since FGM predates it, and also because it is only practiced on section of the Muslim world (and in these sections, some Christians and Jews practice it too). It's cultural, not religious.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Of course I'd also point out that religion, being a matter for faith and belief rather than proof and knowledge, is itself a subjective thing.
A point with which I would disagree (especially considering that "faith and belief" are not necessarily opposed to "proof and knowledge").

By the way... you seem to be implying that "knowledge" is something objective. But knowledge can only exist in minds. So how can it be objective, if "objectivity" is defined as that which is external to human minds?

I was contrasting "belief" and "knowledge". The two are essentially the same mental process, but one relates to subjective things and the other relates to objective things.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
So the argument goes that since by definition you agree with yourself by definition you must think you are right.

Well yes, of course people believe their opinions are right. But that doesn't mean they are, and I think we should all be very very aware of that fact.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
I don't think anybody has suggested that logic and mathematics are anything other than objective.

They are also concepts that exist only within the human mind. If there were no people then there would be no logic or maths.

quote:
Morality is presumably some kind of truth about people just as medicine

No. No no no no no. Medicine concerns the real-life interactions of various chemicals and/or the real-life effects of chopping various bits of a body up and sewing them back together.

Morality, on the other hand, is nothing more than a bunch of people arguing about whose opinion should be considered normative. It's a good thing to have, IMO, but it's not "truth" in anything like the same way medicine is.

quote:
Also...

There once was a man who said 'God
Must think it exceedingly odd
If he finds that this tree
Continues to be
When there's no one about in the Quad.'

Dear Sir,
Your astonishment's odd.
I am always about in the Quad.
And that's why the tree
Will continue to be,
Since observed by,
Yours faithfully,
God.

How quaint. Of course, the existence of God is itself something that may or may not be true and cannot be proved, so is a subjective issue.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
You are talking about the existence of broccoli and broad beans, a fact which is "binding" on every person (because no sane and informed person can deny the existence of these foods), but I am talking about their taste, which does vary from one person to the next, and is not verifiable externally to any person's claim.

Morality is very much equivalent to "taste" in that example, though, as I explored here.

Except, of course, that "taste" still has some chemical basis - the interaction of food and taste bud - and so can be said to be far more "real" than morality which has no such basis.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
Well yes, of course people believe their opinions are right. But that doesn't mean they are, and I think we should all be very very aware of that fact.

What would make somebody's moral opinions wrong?

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Morality is very much equivalent to "taste" in that example, though, as I explored here.

Except, of course, that "taste" still has some chemical basis - the interaction of food and taste bud - and so can be said to be far more "real" than morality which has no such basis.

I suppose if it is just a matter of "personal taste" to regard the actions of the madman in Denver as wrong, then so be it, if that's what you really insist on believing. It seems almost impossible to get through to people who are determined to think along these lines.

But you may perhaps understand why I won't be going along with that particular delusion.

The thing is... I prefer something called "reality".

(And it does seem rather rough to have a justice system based entirely on personal "taste", doesn't it?! Let's incarcerate all those horrid bean eaters!!)

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
Actually I was referring to your assertion that something is "objective" if it exists outside the mind. I can't see any way short of solipsism that the flavor of various vegetables don't exist in the vegetables themselves and not the mind.

How about classical empiricism?

(Advance apologies if I'm teaching you to suck eggs.)

According to John Locke, the qualities we perceive with our senses can be divided into primary qualities and secondary properties. Primary qualities are shape, extension, weight, and so on. Secondary qualities are colour, sound, taste, aroma, etc. The distinction is roughly that if it can be perceived by more than one sense it's probably primary. If only one, secondary.
Now Locke proposed that secondary qualities are caused by the primary qualities of things but themselves have no existence outside the mind.

For example, colour perceptions are caused by light waves of different frequencies entering the eye. Frequency is a primary quality. But the wavelengths are too small for us to recognise them as primary qualities. Instead we perceive them as colours. But those colours are entirely subjective. Likewise, flavours are caused by the interactions of chemicals in the food with receptors in our tongue and nose. Those reactions are determined by the primary qualities of the molecules in the food and the receptors. The flavour sensation is secondary and subjective.

Locke didn't know anything about either of those two mechanisms. But all our current explanations of the mechanism of sense perception - how it gets from the perceived object through the sense organ to the brain - depend upon his distinction. (One of the things that needs to be explained to explain consciousness is how the brain constructs the secondary qualities. Also, there are some problems in explaining how we learn what colour terms mean which I won't bore you with.)

The flavour of vegetables is a secondary quality. It has no real existence outside the mind. It is caused by molecules - but the properties of the molecules that cause it themselves are not flavours but arrangements of atoms interacting with arrangements of molecules in our receptors.

[ 21. July 2012, 09:43: Message edited by: Dafyd ]

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
I don't think anybody has suggested that logic and mathematics are anything other than objective.
They are also concepts that exist only within the human mind. If there were no people then there would be no logic or maths.

The thing is, logic and maths seem to be very good at predicting what will happen outside the human mind. In fact, they seem to be the best tools they have.
Newton's laws of motion (and Einstein's and quantum mechanics) are expressed in mathematical terms. Saying that they would cease to apply once there were no people around because there would no longer be any mathematics seems counterintuitive.

quote:

quote:
Morality is presumably some kind of truth about people just as medicine
No. No no no no no. Medicine concerns the real-life interactions of various chemicals and/or the real-life effects of chopping various bits of a body up and sewing them back together.

Morality, on the other hand, is nothing more than a bunch of people arguing about whose opinion should be considered normative. It's a good thing to have, IMO, but it's not "truth" in anything like the same way medicine is.

Well, yes, that's restating the disagreement between us.
But my point stands: if there were no longer any people there would cease to be any true statements about medicine. But medicine is objective. So it does not follow that from 'if there were no longer any people there would cease to be any true statements about morality' that morality is not objective.

quote:
Of course, the existence of God is itself something that may or may not be true and cannot be proved, so is a subjective issue.

In what sense are you using 'subjective' in that sentence?
Suppose a car crash happens in the rain, and three eyewitnesses each remember it differently, and the rain has washed away any forensic evidence that could decide between the eyewitnesses. So what actually happened is something that may or may not be true and cannot be proved. Is it therefore subjective in the same sense that you argue morality is subjective?

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Newton's laws of motion (and Einstein's and quantum mechanics) are expressed in mathematical terms. Saying that they would cease to apply once there were no people around because there would no longer be any mathematics seems counterintuitive.

Hmm. I don't know that saying Newton's laws can be expressed in mathematical terms is exactly the same thing as saying that Newton's laws "are mathematics".

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Morality is very much equivalent to "taste" in that example, though, as I explored here.

Except, of course, that "taste" still has some chemical basis - the interaction of food and taste bud - and so can be said to be far more "real" than morality which has no such basis.
I suppose if it is just a matter of "personal taste" to regard the actions of the madman in Denver as wrong, then so be it, if that's what you really insist on believing. It seems almost impossible to get through to people who are determined to think along these lines.

But you may perhaps understand why I won't be going along with that particular delusion.

The thing is... I prefer something called "reality".

(And it does seem rather rough to have a justice system based entirely on personal "taste", doesn't it?! Let's incarcerate all those horrid bean eaters!!)

The example you've raised is a very interesting one.

Because it really does kind of beg the question: is "reality" simply your word for "most people's opinion"?

It's very difficult to say that "everyone" views the actions of the shooter as wrong, because I can think of at least one person who quite probably didn't think the actions were wrong: the shooter. And it's entirely possible that there are other people who don't think is actions were wrong, either. Not a large percentage of the population, I would grant you, but the difficult is that it is a percentage more than zero.

The great difficulty with your propositions about objective morality are not so much happens when 99.9% of the population agree. What happens when 5% of the population don't agree with a proposition? 10%? 45%?

In fact, what happens if the vast majority of the population DON'T agree with a proposition? In fact, even if there isn't a single person on the planet that agrees with the objectively morally correct position, it's still the correct position.

The whole difficulty I have with moral objectivism is not so much the theory that something can be morally correct, but how you discover which propositions are the correct ones. Because majority opinion can't do it, even 99.9% majority. How do you rule out the notion one 'madman' in Denver isn't the one that has discovered the real truth and acted on it?

One answer is "God". But again, that tends to only theoretically solve the problem, not practically solve it, because different people look at God and at what God is saying and reach quite different conclusions. Even taking the same religious text, the same exact version/translation, people don't reach the same conclusions about what it means.

I find myself feeling that objectivism is an attractive theory that's of no practical use whatsoever. Because the fact that nearly everyone agrees with you that shooting cinema patrons is a terrible thing is a consensus, not a proof.

Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo:

One answer is "God". But again, that tends to only theoretically solve the problem, not practically solve it, because different people look at God and at what God is saying and reach quite different conclusions. Even taking the same religious text, the same exact version/translation, people don't reach the same conclusions about what it means.

I find myself feeling that objectivism is an attractive theory that's of no practical use whatsoever.

Yep - that's exactly what I said, way up the thread when you all scooted past me. :objective sulk:

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot
@EtymologicalEvangelical

If you don't mind indulging me I'd like to repost something I said in the "Can Atheism develop an epistemology to live by?" thread.

This is not so much me trying to argue my corner but more me highlighting my difficulty in understanding the argument.

Saying morals exist is an interesting one for me because they don’t exist in the same way as a brick exists. You can't say there is a big solid block of moral that God breaks chunks off of and hands out to us when we are born. Morals are just a label not a thing. A person is affected by their upbringing, environment and brain chemistry. They are confronted by a situation, make a decision and act on it. Other people can then label that action as moral or immoral. (Sometimes their judgement will depend on the long term results of the action and often people will disagree on whether it was right or wrong). So what actually happened here? Did God fashion the environment? Construct and tweak the brain chemistry causing the bout of depression or over confidence that biased the decision?, control the parents?

What I'm trying to get at is that I get confused when people describe morality as given by God as it makes morality sound like a solid thing where as morality is the label given by other people to the results of actions taken by people caused by not one but many variables.

The existence of a brick is objective, but it doesn't follow that the only "objective" realities are physical. That seems to me to be the assumption behind your comment.

In fact, the idea that there could exist dimensions of reality above or alongside what we know as "physical nature" is not contrary to the scientific method (here's an example).

If scientists accept that our view of reality is not "set in stone" as per the philosophy of naturalism, then it really is not too much of a stretch to accept that immaterial realities can have an objective basis (such as "information" at the basis of reality, mentioned in the above article I linked to). Why should it be considered inherently illogical to consider that an ultimate mind, reason and conscience exists which gives both reason and morality its objective validity? This does not mean that reason and morality are physical objects somewhere. But it does mean that they can be objectively real - i.e. possess a reality external to any human mind.

Please understand that I am not saying that those who do not believe in this ultimate moral reality cannot possess any kind of legitimate moral sense (that is an extremely important point), just in the same way that no one needs to believe a certain theory of the origin of life in order to live! I am talking about explanation not necessarily practice. But, of course, our view of reality has a direct influence on our practice.

There is a constant appeal to a basic human moral sense, which informs our daily lives - both individually and corporately. To suggest that this "often unspoken agreement" is simply nothing more than a consensus that does not reflect something necessary about reality is, in my view, fallacious. This is the whole point of this thread. If our entire moral structure is nothing more than a labelling exercise or a description of human psychology, that just happens to have developed in a certain way, then there is no rationale to our sense of indignation at those whose morality differs - no matter how obnoxious that morality may seem to us.

Those who think that morality is subjective have no rational justification for talking about "global values" or "universal human rights". This is the kind of language of the UN (see example here), and it really is a nonsense unless there is an objective basis to morality. Interestingly the document I linked to complains about "the strong bonds of western hegemonic monologue and cultural imperialism", and suggests that this should be replaced by a universal concept of human rights resulting from "democracy and consensus". The problem with that reasoning is that a morality based on democracy and consensus cannot be universal unless a unanimous agreement has been achieved by a totally free and fair means. "Democracy and consensus", however, almost always means "dictatorship by the majority" - no matter how benign this dictatorship may be (whatever the word "benign" means within a subjectivist morality).

It's a travesty of the word "universal" to say that it is a result of a less than unanimous consensus. But that is what moral subjectivists often appeal to. The recognition of "universal human rights" is a tacit acknowledgment that there does actually exist an objective basis to morality, and is therefore testament to the truth of the worldview that makes objective morality possible.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo:
The whole difficulty I have with moral objectivism is not so much the theory that something can be morally correct, but how you discover which propositions are the correct ones.

I think the thing is that there are a whole slew of ideas that are derived from areas that people either agree are objective or used to think were objective. And we would like to be able to apply them to moral discussion.

For example, fallacious reasoning. Fallacies are a bad thing because they lead us to the wrong conclusion instead of the right conclusion. But if there is no such thing as a right conclusion then there's nothing wrong with fallacies.
If somebody argues, Hitler was a vegetarian, Hitler was evil, therefore Vegetarians are evil we want to be able to rule that out of discussion. But we still want to discuss the matter so we don't want to rule everything out of discussion. If moral debate is about something objective then that gives us leave to rule out fallacious argument.

Ditto, the idea that I could be wrong. I can't be wrong if there's nothing there for me to be wrong about. So if morality is not objective, then there's nothing there for me to be wrong about and it becomes meaningless to say that I could be wrong.

Ditto, the idea that there's a distinction between some legitimate forms of persuasion and others. We think persuading people by offering them reasons is legitimate; persuading them by offering them bribes or brainwashing them is not. Legitimate modes of persuasion lead us towards the truth; illegitimate modes of persuasion do so at best only coincidentally. But if there is no truth to be led towards then the distinction collapses.

And so on. The idea that morality is determined by subject-independent truths doesn't of itself help determine any subject-independent truths. But it licenses us to use those methods of reasoning that apply in areas where we can. This may never yield a fully correct result, but it might get us to something that is better than we would otherwise get to.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo:
I don't know that saying Newton's laws can be expressed in mathematical terms is exactly the same thing as saying that Newton's laws "are mathematics".

I don't think it's just that Newton's laws can be expressed in mathematical terms; I don't think they can be expressed in any way that isn't dependent upon the mathematics.
No, I don't think they "are mathematics", whatever that would mean; but they require that there are true mathematical statements.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd
The idea that morality is determined by subject-independent truths doesn't of itself help determine any subject-independent truths. But it licenses us to use those methods of reasoning that apply in areas where we can. This may never yield a fully correct result, but it might get us to something that is better than we would otherwise get to.

This reminds me of something CS Lewis wrote:

quote:
Apparently the way to advance from our imperfect apprehension of justice to the absolute justice is not to throw our imperfect apprehensions aside but boldly to go on applying them. Just as the pupil advances to more perfect arithmetic not by throwing his multiplication table away but by working at it for all it is worth.

(From De Futilitate, a chapter from "Christian Reflections")

Also, it is worth reading another essay from Christian Reflections entitled "The Poison of Subjectivism" on the very subject we have been discussing on this thread.

Posted by irish_lord99 (# 16250) on :

quote:
Originally by C.S. Lewis:

quote:
Apparently the way to advance from our imperfect apprehension of justice to the absolute justice is not to throw our imperfect apprehensions aside but boldly to go on applying them. Just as the pupil advances to more perfect arithmetic not by throwing his multiplication table away but by working at it for all it is worth.
(From De Futilitate, a chapter from "Christian Reflections")

That works only so long as the direction you're heading is the right one in the first place.

You seem to agree that if there is an objective morality present, that our understanding of that morality is still flawed to various degrees? Even if you feel you are advancing in the right direction, your still dealing with an 'imperfect apprehension.'

It seems to me that an objective moral code that is improperly perceived by all is really a defacto subjective moral code. It's out there, be we can't really, fully know what it is.

Surely we should each follow our understanding of that code as far as we are able, but at the same time we need to be aware of how we are prone to misunderstandings and misinterpretation.

I see great danger in combining the idea of objective morality with a certainty of what that morality is.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by irish_lord99
You seem to agree that if there is an objective morality present, that our understanding of that morality is still flawed to various degrees? Even if you feel you are advancing in the right direction, your still dealing with an 'imperfect apprehension.'

It seems to me that an objective moral code that is improperly perceived by all is really a defacto subjective moral code. It's out there, be we can't really, fully know what it is.

A man wants to look after his family to the best of his ability and seek the wellbeing of his wife and children. But he is not completely certain of the right way to go about this in the particular circumstances in which he finds himself.

Another man can't decide whether it's right to look after his family or abuse them.

I can see a fundamental difference between these two positions. The former is based on a basic moral goal, but an uncertainty as to the right methodology to achieve it; the latter is based on complete amorality.

Objective morality is like the first example. We affirm a basic moral code, but that does not mean that we know the precise right thing to do in every given situation. So this morality needs to be worked on.

Subjective morality is like the second example. There is no firm foundation on which to make any moral decision at all, other than one's own whim.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Subjective morality is like the second example. There is no firm foundation on which to make any moral decision at all, other than one's own whim.

That's a bit of a straw man. I know in theory that my love for my wife is subjective although based on objective traits. I am really quite happy for other men (and women so inclined) to recognise the objective traits but not to feel my subjective feeling that she's the most special person in the world (excepting my daughter). But it would be wrong to say that my love for my wife was therefore a whim. I can't just change it because I feel like it; nor would I want to.

No - the problem with treating morality as subjective is that I can't be wrong. Anyone who tells me that my love for my wife could be wrong is a) talking nonsense and b) liable to get their head bitten off.

Posted by irish_lord99 (# 16250) on :

Well EE, I guess it depends on if you're considering a mono-cultural or multicultural setting.

In much of Turkey for example, the perceived objective morality is that occasionally beating your wife is a good thing because it keeps her faithful and diligent and she might fall into the sin of adultery or laziness if she's not kept in line. I've heard men openly tell each-other as much.

To them this is the objective morality and they can 'prove' it every bit as much as you can 'prove' it's objectively immoral.

The distinction is not based on 'amorality', as you put it, but rather on vastly different perceptions of the 'basic moral code.'

All that to say, I tend to agree with your most recent post to an extent, but I think that you may have understated the degree to which the basic moral code can be disagreed upon.

So again, I'll say that your C.S. Lewis quote works, but only if you're heading in the right direction already.

I would argue that our understanding of the (presumably) objective morality is very subjective and mostly based on our culture, religion, etc... again creating a morality that is subjective in practice.

Now, if there were a way to 100% prove what the objective morality is, then that would be a different story. To an extent, that may be theoretically possible in a mono-cultural setting, but IMO nigh impossible in a multicultural setting.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by irish_lord99
Well EE, I guess it depends on if you're considering a mono-cultural or multicultural setting.

In much of Turkey for example, the perceived objective morality is that occasionally beating your wife is a good thing because it keeps her faithful and diligent and she might fall into the sin of adultery or laziness if she's not kept in line. I've heard men openly tell each-other as much.

To them this is the objective morality and they can 'prove' it every bit as much as you can 'prove' it's objectively immoral.

The distinction is not based on 'amorality', as you put it, but rather on vastly different perceptions of the 'basic moral code.'

This comes back to a point I made earlier in this thread, and let me quote the relevant paragraph:

quote:
But suppose we hold to a philosophical view that morality is actually ultimately entirely subjective? And yet we also wish to express moral indignation at the practices of others? Are we not then admitting that we need to deceive ourselves in order to be logically consistent? We could say to ourselves: "We know morality is entirely subjective, but we are going to convince ourselves that certain moral viewpoints are objectively valid, so that we can express indignation and therefore pursue policies to oppose that which we regard as immoral."

If moral practices are simply an expression of culture, and therefore they are defined by the subjective consensus pertaining to that culture, then on what basis can someone from another culture protest against them? If Turkish men feel it's morally right to beat their wives into submission, then what's wrong with that? I may personally find it distasteful, but I would have to accept that this is due to the influence of my own culture. If I had the power to intervene in that culture and crack down on such practices, while still accepting that morality was entirely subjective, then would I not be admitting that "might is right"? I would simply be imposing my personal taste on others.

And the same argument is true within a so called multicultural society. In fact, it could even be argued that the government of my own country is "another culture" distinct from the governed, and therefore we should not protest against any of their decisions (and even if those decisions adversely affect me, I could only protest on the basis of self-interest and not by appealing to any concept of "right and wrong").

Therefore (to come back to the OP) anyone who wishes to protest against the moral decisions of others can only do so if he believes that there does actually exist some objective moral reality to which he can appeal. But if he also holds to a philosophy which denies an objective basis to morality, then he would need to deny that philosophy in practice.

Now I would agree that I am approaching this issue in general metaphysical terms, and I acknowledge that this gets us no nearer to ascertaining what this "objective morality" is. Clearly there is a necessity for an objective morality - or a necessity to believe that there is (which therefore may involve wilful self-deception) - but we are left to discover the details of it.

If the philosophy of naturalism is true, and therefore the only reality that exists outside of the human mind is the amoral physical realm, then morality has to be entirely subjective - merely the result of the way human life has happened to develop. But, as I have argued, morality simply does not work without some acknowledgment of its universal validity - hence someone like Richard Dawkins getting angry about child abuse in the Catholic Church while acknowledging that morality is entirely arbitrary (scroll down to the relevant sections about ethics in this page I linked to). Therefore the (philosophical) naturalist would have to pretend that something is true which he knows is not true: the very attitude so many of a naturalistic persuasion claim to hate, since that is what they think religious people do!

Clearly the central importance of morality to our lives speaks against its subjective nature, as I have argued. But we are still left with the question: well what particular moral principles are "objectively moral" and which are not? This question cannot be divorced from the more fundamental question of worldview, and so once we get to the position of acknowledging the necessity of the existence of a moral reality external to any human mind, then we need to seek to know more about that reality. And from this flows insights into specific moral issues.

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
Subjective morality is like the second example. There is no firm foundation on which to make any moral decision at all, other than one's own whim.
That's a bit of a straw man. I know in theory that my love for my wife is subjective although based on objective traits. I am really quite happy for other men (and women so inclined) to recognise the objective traits but not to feel my subjective feeling that she's the most special person in the world (excepting my daughter). But it would be wrong to say that my love for my wife was therefore a whim. I can't just change it because I feel like it; nor would I want to.

Admittedly I could have worded my example a bit better. I was not suggesting that love for one's wife was a mere whim, but it would be if morality was totally subjective, since all love and care for others would be entirely a matter of taste. Furthermore, one can have an objectively based moral attitude of love towards one's wife, and on that is built subjective feelings that are exclusive to the husband, and would be inappropriate when felt - and certainly expressed - by anyone else. But I think we have established that objective + subjective = objective + subjective.

I am certainly not arguing against some measure of subjectivity in morality. But the "subjective" has to be grounded in the "objective".

Perhaps a better example would be an archery contest. Some of the contestants try their utmost to hit the bull; they look at the target, aim their arrows in the right direction and do all they can to achieve a perfect result. But inevitably most - if not all - of them miss the dead centre of the target. Some of them may even miss the target altogether.

But there are other "contestants" who refuse to recognise the target, and decide that they can fire their arrows in any direction they like - even into the spectators. They are not even trying to hit the target, because they just make up the target as they see fit, and so they will always hit their appointed target, won't they? They can never fall short of their goal; they can never be wrong, because they make up the rules as they go along!

The CS Lewis quote was clearly referring to the kind of morality associated with the first group of archers.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Perhaps a better example would be an archery contest. Some of the contestants try their utmost to hit the bull; they look at the target, aim their arrows in the right direction and do all they can to achieve a perfect result. But inevitably most - if not all - of them miss the dead centre of the target. Some of them may even miss the target altogether.

But there are other "contestants" who refuse to recognise the target, and decide that they can fire their arrows in any direction they like - even into the spectators. They are not even trying to hit the target, because they just make up the target as they see fit, and so they will always hit their appointed target, won't they? They can never fall short of their goal; they can never be wrong, because they make up the rules as they go along!

Your example simply demonstrates the difference between organised sport and casual games. Organised sport has a committee that establishes the rules - and indeed changes the rules, as every sporting code I know of has gradually over time changed aspects of its rules.

A contestant/player can of course decide to play by their own rules, but they won't get any prizes. The judges/umpires/referees won't reward them for picking different goals to the ones that are stated in the rules expressed by the organisation.

Now contrast that to the games that children make up from time to time. They're in charge of the rules. They make up different goals on different days. If it's not a solo activity, then they'll argue amongst themselves about the rules, and quite frequently they will suddenly make up new ones as they go along.

None of which enables you establish that morality is an organised sport with an external arbiter rather than a casual game with internally determined rules. Your analogy presumes the answer, rather than proving it. The only reason your analogy shows any kind of objectivity is because you selected a contest with an externally determined set of rules. By definition, archery will do what you want it to do.

Nor does it enable you to establish there is anything "objective" about the rules of archery, because it's not self-evident that the goal is to shoot straight rather than to shoot as far as possible or as high as possible. Is archery a "higher" form of bow-and-arrow contest just because it's the particular set of rules that got codified?

And which form of football is the objectively right one? Take a ball that's of the right kind of size and weight to be handled. What am I "supposed" to do with it? Soccer, rugby league, rugby union, Gaelic football, gridiron, Australian rules football, futnet (yeah I just learnt about that one). Which is the closest to being an objectively right football game?

Your analogy isn't working for me. Sorry.

[ 22. July 2012, 13:09: Message edited by: orfeo ]

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
Your analogy isn't working for me. Sorry.

No need to apologise. I happen to think it's a great analogy. Allow me to apply it...

Let's suppose that morality is entirely subjective. And let's assume that there is a general consensus in society that "it is wrong to abuse children".

So the rule of the "archery contest" is: "don't abuse children". Now some people may struggle with the temptation to abuse children, but they have signed up to this "moral consensus" and so they try their utmost not to give in to their desires. They want to play the game. They may seek help, and if they succumb, then they confess to their crime and submit to the appropriate punishment.

Now let's say that a certain group of people are accused of abusing children (for example, certain paedophile priests). There is a great outcry against these men and people are calling for them to be arrested and charged. But these priests defend themselves by saying: "What's the problem? We have not signed up to your game. We are not participating in your 'archery contest', but we are playing our own game, according to our rules. Our target is different from yours. So leave us alone."

If morality is entirely subjective, then in what sense are these priests "wrong" to say this?

I think I know the answer to that question.

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

To be fair (given the subjective) a rational/consistent response could be "why should there be a problem", our contest just happens to include shooting arrows at people who do what you did, and mime artists.

On the other hand most people don't say this, they act like there is a contest. They use the objective morality vocabulary. (which I'm glad about, it doesn't prove it, things might be subjective and they are inefficiently evolved)

[ 22. July 2012, 14:13: Message edited by: Jay-Emm ]

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

The point of your analogy is that the real question is: what power does "society" actually have to punish the priests in spite of their assertion that they didn't sign up to the rules?

It might be worth you having a think about international law. Rather fascinating area which frankly doesn't bear that much resemblance to law as we normally know it in domestic circles, precisely because of the difficulties of actually disciplining/punishing a country for "breaking the rules". Whereas in a domestic context, a person who gets hauled before a court and says "I don't recognise your authority, I don't recognise your rules" is unlikely to get away with it.

Which one does morality behave more like?

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

to be honest, often as you say. But if that is the case we have to totally change our vocabulary (unless and there's no reason we want to deceive ourselves and others).

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

I don't know. I think there are certain benefits that come from acting as if it's all objective, even if we can't actually demonstrate that it's the case. Most of the time we need to operate with a certain amount of assumption in our lives.

I don't know. I'm in two minds about that.

Once upon a time, Christian morality was a kind of unifying force precisely because everyone recognised its legitimacy. And then more and more people started to question its legitimacy and it's lost its social persuasion. I'm not entirely sure what's replaced it. Adherence to the written law? To some extent, yes, but then you get events like the UK riots last year (was it last year) and you can see that the hold is very thin indeed there.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
If moral practices are simply an expression of culture, and therefore they are defined by the subjective consensus pertaining to that culture, then on what basis can someone from another culture protest against them? If Turkish men feel it's morally right to beat their wives into submission, then what's wrong with that? I may personally find it distasteful, but I would have to accept that this is due to the influence of my own culture.

In their culture it's morally right to beat up their wives, and in my culture it's morally right to protest against them. That's easy. Who needs a basis?

Imagine my culture says it's morally ok to bomb foreigners to bring them democracy. Protesting that this is only the influence of my culture doesn't matter. You say, you oughtn't to bomb other cultures on something that's only the influence of your culture. Well, that may be true for you, but nothing in my culture says that. My culture says I have a perfect right to do so on the basis of my culture alone.

As you pointed out on the first page of this thread, the problem with thinking morality is subjective is not that it makes us less likely to intervene in other cultures. The problem (one of the problems) is that it makes us more likely to resort to force when we intervene.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd
In their culture it's morally right to beat up their wives, and in my culture it's morally right to protest against them. That's easy. Who needs a basis?

Of course we don't need a "basis", if we are happy not to live like mature adults. If we want the politics of the playground and we wish to bully others because they are "different", then fine.

And if international law is based on an entirely subjective culturally-driven morality, then we have to accept a return to a form of colonialism: Might is Right.

Alternatively (on the basis of subjective morality), we can accept that we should not intervene in the internal affairs of another country or culture, and we should therefore wave goodbye to human rights campaigns, Amnesty International etc. For example, if North Korea wants to oppress its own people, then what's wrong with that?

And if we want to give up - once and for all - the pretence at being "rational", then let's go for it. Prof Dawkins can try to arrest the Pope as much as he likes, while claiming morality is entirely arbitrary. But it does seem rather daft for him to claim the rational high ground in so doing!

I have simply been observing human behaviour and it tells me that the vast majority of people assume that a basic moral sense (do not murder, do not steal, do not exploit others etc) has universal validity. For me this constitutes evidence that the naturalistic view - that morality is simply a product of the human mind - is impossible to apply consistently, and that we have to believe in the objective validity of a certain basic morality (whether subconsciously or not) in order to make it work.

I have not seen any compelling argument on this thread to change my view about this.

Having said that, I acknowledge that I am arguing in very general terms, and that "objective morality" does not mean what Marvin claimed it meant in this post:

quote:
Objective morality says "these laws shall be the ones we use, regardless of whether anyone likes them or the impact they have on society, and they can never ever change regardless of any new ideas or evidence that might come along."

A point I answered here.

Posted by tclune (# 7959) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
I have simply been observing human behaviour and it tells me that the vast majority of people assume that a basic moral sense (do not murder, do not steal, do not exploit others etc) has universal validity.

You seem to confuse morality and denotation of language. Of course, it is wrong to murder -- that's all part of what murder means. "Honor killings" aren't murder in one culture, though, while they are in another. Of course, it's wrong to steal -- that's part of what stealing means. But, in one culture, it is theft to charge interest on a loan, and in another it is just good business to get as high interest as you possibly can. Of course, it's wrong to exploit others -- that's part of what exploit means. But, on Wall Street, suckering people into buying worthless paper is shrewd business, while for the rest of the country (excepting POTUS, apparently) it is a felony.

--Tom Clune

Posted by irish_lord99 (# 16250) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
If moral practices are simply an expression of culture, and therefore they are defined by the subjective consensus pertaining to that culture, then on what basis can someone from another culture protest against them? If Turkish men feel it's morally right to beat their wives into submission, then what's wrong with that? I may personally find it distasteful, but I would have to accept that this is due to the influence of my own culture. If I had the power to intervene in that culture and crack down on such practices, while still accepting that morality was entirely subjective, then would I not be admitting that "might is right"? I would simply be imposing my personal taste on others.

(Side note: I never said morality was 'entirely subjective', just that our apprehension of it is not accurate.)

You keep coming back to "might is right". I fail to see how anyone who believes that their understanding of morality is 'the correct one' and goes around forcing people to comply is acting in any other way.

Most of the great tragedies in history from the holocaust, to colonialism, to the crusades were perpetrated by those who felt they had a monopoly on what is objectively moral. We look back at all of them and nobody says "well, their arrow didn't quite his the bullseye, glad they kept on trying though!" No, we look back and ask how (among other things) they could have been so arrogant as to assume that they had a total and complete grasp of morality?

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Now I would agree that I am approaching this issue in general metaphysical terms, and I acknowledge that this gets us no nearer to ascertaining what this "objective morality" is. Clearly there is a necessity for an objective morality - or a necessity to believe that there is (which therefore may involve wilful self-deception) - but we are left to discover the details of it.

I would agree with that, but again, I think you may understate the distance between how two groups of people can approach objective morality.

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Perhaps a better example would be an archery contest. Some of the contestants try their utmost to hit the bull; they look at the target, aim their arrows in the right direction and do all they can to achieve a perfect result. But inevitably most - if not all - of them miss the dead centre of the target. Some of them may even miss the target altogether.

But there are other "contestants" who refuse to recognise the target, and decide that they can fire their arrows in any direction they like - even into the spectators. They are not even trying to hit the target, because they just make up the target as they see fit, and so they will always hit their appointed target, won't they? They can never fall short of their goal; they can never be wrong, because they make up the rules as they go along!

The CS Lewis quote was clearly referring to the kind of morality associated with the first group of archers.

Apart from radical relativists, I think your second group is a straw man.

As for the first group, I think that the bulls-eye is there, but hidden under a sheet. Everyone shoots where they think the bulls-eye is, but until the sheet is lifted up we don't really know how everyone scored.

If the bulls-eye is visible, then it can be fully defined, quantified, plotted, etc. However, what we have is a group of Christian archers putting their shots in the upper left, Muslim placing their shots in the lower right, etc.

Until you can find a way to lift up that sheet and reveal the location of the bulls-eye, morality (thought objective in fact) is subjective in practice.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by irish_lord99
You keep coming back to "might is right". I fail to see how anyone who believes that their understanding of morality is 'the correct one' and goes around forcing people to comply is acting in any other way.

Most of the great tragedies in history from the holocaust, to colonialism, to the crusades were perpetrated by those who felt they had a monopoly on what is objectively moral. We look back at all of them and nobody says "well, their arrow didn't quite his the bullseye, glad they kept on trying though!" No, we look back and ask how (among other things) they could have been so arrogant as to assume that they had a total and complete grasp of morality?

Actually these tragedies were perpetrated by people who felt that morality only served the good of their group, and not all people everywhere. Objective morality involves an acknowledgement of universal human rights, therefore that Jews have as much right to life as so called "Aryans", for example. So even though these groups thought that their morality was correct, it was fundamentally subjective since it only served the interests of their group.

But if someone were perhaps to suggest that the antidote to these horrors is subjective morality, then I fail to see what rationale can be appealed to in order to criticise, say, the Nazis. After all, no one can be wrong within subjectivism. If I get my bow and fire my arrow into the body of a spectator, that is not wrong, because I decided at that moment that that spectator was my legitimate target. That is what subjectivism means: whatever I decide is right without reference to any objective and binding standard.

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

quote:
Originally posted by irish_lord99:
Apart from radical relativists, I think your second group is a straw man.

As for the first group, I think that the bulls-eye is there, but hidden under a sheet. Everyone shoots where they think the bulls-eye is, but until the sheet is lifted up we don't really know how everyone scored.

If the bulls-eye is visible, then it can be fully defined, quantified, plotted, etc. However, what we have is a group of Christian archers putting their shots in the upper left, Muslim placing their shots in the lower right, etc.

Until you can find a way to lift up that sheet and reveal the location of the bulls-eye, morality (thought objective in fact) is subjective in practice. [/QB]

I like that image*, I'm happy to sign up to it, I think Dafyd made a similar statement earlier.

I don't know about the claim about the straw man, a fair number of posters are claiming to think that (perhaps the analogy could be improved, but somethings there).

*although there is something intuitive** we might disagree where murder starts, but we know it's wrong. It's almost like we know where the bullseye is but are aiming for an unseen irregular outer ring.

**which might be totally wrong, or a human fiction or the equivalent of talking about sun-rise.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by irish_lord99:
You keep coming back to "might is right". I fail to see how anyone who believes that their understanding of morality is 'the correct one' and goes around forcing people to comply is acting in any other way.

In an earlier post I quoted a dictionary definition distinguishing between two sense of 'objective/subjective'.

1. 'Objective' means there is some set of facts about morality that do not depend upon what we believe about morality. 'Subjective' means that there are no such facts: morality is nothing other than what we believe it to be.

2. 'Objective' means that unbiased. 'Subjective' means influenced by personal considerations.

I am going to propose something counterintuitive:

If you believe morality is objective in sense 1, then you are committed logically to believing that your personal moral opinions are subjective in sense 2.
If on the other hand you believe morality is subjective in sense 1, then you are logically committed to believing that your personal opinions are objective in sense 2.

The intuitive thesis is that the correlation is between objective in each sense and subjective in each sense. The intuitive thesis is poppycock. People assume it's true solely because the words are the same. It's a good example of reason being led astray by the vagaries of language.

Defending the counterintuitive thesis:
Part 2: If you believe morality has subjective existence, then you ought to believe your opinions about it are perfectly objective.
That's easy: the concept of bias only has application to things where there is a standard outside oneself to which one ought to adhere. Bias only applies when I ought to be making a judgement on the facts. So bias has no application if morality is subjective; therefore my opinions are unbiased and so perfectly objective.
Part 1: If you believe morality has objective existence, then you ought to believe your opinions about it are only imperfectly correct and partly subjective.
If morality has objective existence then by definition morality is not the same thing as what you think about morality. At the very least they differ as a record of a speech and the speech itself. And if they are different then there's a gap into which error can happen. Or to put it another way, if morality has objective existence then I can be wrong about it; and the balance of probabilities is that I am virtually certain to be wrong about at least some of it. Therefore, at least some of my moral beliefs may be led astray by personal factors and therefore subjective.

So someone who believes that their understanding of morality is certainly the 'correct one' is acting as if they believe that morality has only subjective existence.

Counterintuitive conclusion 2: people who believe morality has only subjective existence are more likely to impose their morality on other people.

What is the point of believing in morality?

A believer that morality has objective existence believes at the very least that he or she ought to regulate his or her own conduct by it. In so far as they want other people to do the same they ought to want other people to do the same because they believe it's morally right rather than because they're coerced.

Now, for someone who believes morality is purely subjective what is the point of talking about morality at all? What does talking about morality do that talking about enlightened self-interest or whatever doesn't, given that talking about morality risks people condemning and imposing their values on other people? And the answer is that imposing values on other people is a feature not a bug.
Consider fox hunting. If I just don't like the idea of foxes suffering I won't hunt foxes. But if I really don't like the idea of foxes suffering then I'll try to stop other people hunting foxes. I'll condemn people who hunt foxes. And if I really really don't like the idea of foxes suffering then not only will I condemn people who hunt foxes, but I'll also condemn people who refuse to share my condemnation. At that point, the argument goes(*), I am using moral language. So the whole point of saying 'fox hunting is wrong' instead of 'I don't like the idea of hunting foxes' is that I'm condemning other people.
So, if someone believes that fox hunting is objectively wrong they think that the primary point of talking about morality is that he or she shouldn't hunt foxes; but if someone believes fox hunting is subjectively wrong they think that the primary point of talking about morality is stopping other people from hunting foxes.

(*) The argument comes from Simon Blackburn who is I think the most prominent defender of a non-realist account of ethics that aims to leave everything as it is as much as possible. My paraphrase obviously (Blackburn has another step in there that I can't remember).

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
After all, no one can be wrong within subjectivism. If I get my bow and fire my arrow into the body of a spectator, that is not wrong, because I decided at that moment that that spectator was my legitimate target.

Er... I can't be wrong within subjectivism. If you disagree with me, you certainly can be wrong. (And of course vice versa from your point of view.)

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Counterintuitive conclusion 2: people who believe morality has only subjective existence are more likely to impose their morality on other people.

I don't think this necessarily follows. (personally I feel most of the argument is mostly valid)
However the logic would be trivially valid with a clearly false conclusion if Subjective's kept quiet about fox hunting(or said 'it would be in mine and yours interest if..., I don't like...').

That's clearly not what happens, I haven't met on who hasn't used a moral argument sometimes.
But it shows you need to show that Objectivist's aren't intrinsically more likely to make them.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by irish_lord99
You seem to agree that if there is an objective morality present, that our understanding of that morality is still flawed to various degrees? Even if you feel you are advancing in the right direction, your still dealing with an 'imperfect apprehension.'

It seems to me that an objective moral code that is improperly perceived by all is really a defacto subjective moral code. It's out there, be we can't really, fully know what it is.
A man wants to look after his family to the best of his ability and seek the wellbeing of his wife and children. But he is not completely certain of the right way to go about this in the particular circumstances in which he finds himself.

Another man can't decide whether it's right to look after his family or abuse them.

I can see a fundamental difference between these two positions. The former is based on a basic moral goal, but an uncertainty as to the right methodology to achieve it; the latter is based on complete amorality.

Objective morality is like the first example. We affirm a basic moral code, but that does not mean that we know the precise right thing to do in every given situation. So this morality needs to be worked on.

Subjective morality is like the second example. There is no firm foundation on which to make any moral decision at all, other than one's own whim.

Complete and utter balderdash. The second isn't any form of morality, objective or subjective. The second is literal sociopathy. Conversations go a lot better if you don't go into them with the impression that the other side is quite literally mentally ill.

The difference between objective and subjective morality on the other hand is that the foundation of subjective morality is "This is where we are". And that "People are hurting." This is not a complete lack of foundations. It's a lack of there being something "over there".

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian
Or you just haven't been paying attention. I've refuted that in my exchanges with Dafyd.

Subjective + Objective = Subjective

Your reasoning is subjective.
If you say that reasoning is subjective, then how can you claim to have refuted another person's position. What are you appealing to in order to claim a refutation?

Because there is an objective component to anything subjective.

quote:
Now is it true that the latter method is 100% subjective? Clearly not.

That is because there is literally nothing that is 100% subjective by your definition. Artistic merit marks are subjective. So is appreciation of art. But both have an objective component.

The way you want to define subjective makes it quite literally meaningless. Nothing in your world is, or indeed, can be subjective.

quote:
There are set moves in gymnastics that are scored in a certain way, and the judges would all have been selected on the basis of some recognised experience in this sport

Now you're talking about the technical merit marks. Which are an attempt to separate the purely objective component from the largely subjective component of the performance.

quote:
If the scoring method was 100% subjective, then the judges would just be picked randomly from members of the public, who are then invited to give scores without any reference to the particular moves and disciplines.

Even that wouldn't be 100% subjective. They couldn't make it 100% subjective without removing all sight of the performance and anonymising the competitors.

quote:
Furthermore, such a totally subjective scoring method would not inspire any kind of confidence and recognition.

That is because the 100% subjective method would be quite literally insane. It would have to be done without reference to the objective fact of the gymnastic or athletic performance. Because what the people did is objective and that impacts the judgement.

Your definition of subjective is meaningless. Which is why you have problems.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
And if international law is based on an entirely subjective culturally-driven morality, then we have to accept a return to a form of colonialism: Might is Right.

AHA! You have studied international law, then!

Posted by irish_lord99 (# 16250) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Actually these tragedies were perpetrated by people who felt that morality only served the good of their group, and not all people everywhere.

Their understanding of morality was that good must triumph over evil, they were good the others were evil. It wasn't subjective morality.

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Objective morality involves an acknowledgement of universal human rights...

How do you figure? Where is that written? God seemed to show little concern for the human rights of anyone other than the Hebrews in the OT. Is God a fan of subjective morality?

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
But if someone were perhaps to suggest that the antidote to these horrors is subjective morality, then I fail to see what rationale can be appealed to in order to criticise, say, the Nazis.

But I'm not suggesting that (if I were, then you'd be right), I'm suggesting that the antidote is to understand just how potentially flawed our own understanding of objective morality is.

Until you can show me objective way of explaining what the moral code actually is, then I'm afraid it's still defacto subjective.

In other words, how can you be sure that you know where the bulls-eye is under the sheet?

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
That is because there is literally nothing that is 100% subjective by your definition. Artistic merit marks are subjective. So is appreciation of art. But both have an objective component.

Taking this as a post to hang a point of information on:

Among professional philosophers, moral subjectivists believe that you can neatly separate out the 100% subjective component from any judgement. Moral objectivists believe it's impossible.
Justinian's quote above would have pretty much all academic philosophers mark him down as a believer in objective morality.

[ 23. July 2012, 08:48: Message edited by: Dafyd ]

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Counterintuitive conclusion 2: people who believe morality has only subjective existence are more likely to impose their morality on other people.
However the logic would be trivially valid with a clearly false conclusion if Subjective's kept quiet about fox hunting(or said 'it would be in mine and yours interest if..., I don't like...').

Sorry, I'm not following. Could you explain?

The argument needs to control for the number of moral prohibitions somebody has. It's more likely for historical reasons that a believer in objective morality will object to a wider range of specific behaviours, whereas a believer in subjective morality will tend to object on more general principles.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Moral objectivists believe it's impossible.

Sorry - this should be 'those who believe it's impossible are moral objectivists'. There are positions believing that morality has objective existence who think that the separation can be made. (Intuitionists and Kantians, for example.)

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian
The second isn't any form of morality, objective or subjective. The second is literal sociopathy. Conversations go a lot better if you don't go into them with the impression that the other side is quite literally mentally ill.

And the definition of "sociopathy" which you linked to is:

quote:
Sociopathy is the result of social conditioning which leads to a lack of natural human values. It refers strictly to a social condition where a person knows, yet has been socially conditioned to disregard, the intrinsic human values which are believed to be universal.

"natural human values"?

"the intrinsic human values which are believed to be universal"?

So you are a believer in objective morality after all!

Well I never.

And if you still deny this, then please could you explain what the hell "natural human values" and "universal intrinsic human values" are, if all morality is simply the product of the human mind?

Please tell me who decides which values should be "intrinsic" and "universal"?

Who speaks on behalf of the entire human race and imposes these values on everyone, in a world of subjective morality?

If someone decides that he thinks it is right to beat up his wife (as happens in Turkey, as irish_lord informed us), then in what sense is this practice not a legitimate moral value within subjective morality? You may think it's a result of mental illness, but that is just your subjective opinion, isn't it? How can you prove that this husband is "wrong" without appealing to some objective universal standard of morality that must exist external to any particular person's opinion??

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by irish_lord99

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
Objective morality involves an acknowledgement of universal human rights...
How do you figure? Where is that written? God seemed to show little concern for the human rights of anyone other than the Hebrews in the OT. Is God a fan of subjective morality?

At the risk of getting involved in a "text war", allow me to quote a couple of verses from the OT:

quote:
(God's promise to Abraham): "I will make you a great nation ... and in you all the families of the earth shall be blessed."

Genesis 12:2-3

And...

quote:
(When the Jews were in captivity in Babylon): "And seek the peace of the city where I have caused you to be carried away captive, and pray to the LORD for it; for in its peace you will have peace."

Jeremiah 29:7

And if you feel tempted to retort that God executed judgments on these other nations, then perhaps you may consider that that is precisely because these nations were morally responsible in the sight in God - in other words, the whole world operated according to the same moral code, hence the legitimacy of God's judgments.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
How can you prove that this husband is "wrong" without appealing to some objective universal standard of morality that must exist external to any particular person's opinion??

This thread is going round in circles. You're still stuck on the idea that without some objective universal standard we cannot set laws to govern our society, but I've already answered that argument back on page 2.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
natural human values"?

"the intrinsic human values which are believed to be universal"?

So you are a believer in objective morality after all!

Well I never.

And if you still deny this, then please could you explain what the hell "natural human values" and "universal intrinsic human values" are, if all morality is simply the product of the human mind?

You have a nervous system, don't you? If I prick you will you not bleed? If I hit you will you not be in pain? These are natural and pretty much universal. As is not wanting to be in pain.

These are objective facts, and our response to seeing others experience them is subjective. Subjective by a definition that isn't your completely incoherent mess that would rely on us not actually being able to look at reality to remain subjective.

What you are continually avoiding is that this is an argument between two different frames of reference and understanding. And what I have been saying throughout is that your definition of "subjective" is quite literally incoherent.

Under your definition of subjective and objective, to be subjective you need to deny you know anything, even reality. Your subjectivists are incoherent. To remain subjective about a performance they need to ignore the facts of that performance itself. I therefore reject your definition as meaningless.

Under mine there is a meaningful distinction and I can point to people who fit the description of objective morality. People who follow "objective morality" normally have Deontological Ethics -
"the normative ethical position that judges the morality of an action based on the action's adherence to a rule or rules." Two people in the same situation under a system of objective morality will consider exactly the same thing to be right because the moral thing is always to follow the rules which can be written down and pointed to.

Your morality under my definitions is subjective because you do not have such a set of external rules you can point to. On the other hand a significant subset of Roman Catholics follow deontological ethics. (I've been told on these boards that Roman Catholic ethics are deontological, period).

Shorter me:

Under your definitions:
Objective Morality: The belief that there is anything
Subjective Morality: The belief we can't even talk to each other

I think even Creosus would agree that the world exists and that pain is bad. You have defined subjective morality to be almost meaningless. And are then wondering what the point of holding it is.

Under my definitions:
Objective Morality: You can point to an external source that will tell you what is moral
Subjective Morality: You have to do the best you can under guidelines you and others have worked out

And I can point to people with an objective morality.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
You're still stuck on the idea that without some objective universal standard we cannot set laws to govern our society...

I never said any such thing!

Of course, a subjective moralist can set laws. A group of people can subjectively decide to agree on a set of principles and frame them as laws.

Trouble is... what if some people don't agree with those laws?

The lawgivers can only tell those people that they are "wrong" by using the following definition of "wrong": What fails to conform to our opinion.

So such laws are therefore imposed without any reference to any kind of objective standard of morality. So this goes back to one of my earlier points: Might is Right under subjective morality.

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian
You have a nervous system, don't you? If I prick you will you not bleed? If I hit you will you not be in pain? These are natural and pretty much universal. As is not wanting to be in pain.

The moral point you are making from this observation is nonsensical. If morality is based on the avoidance of pain, then we would not require anyone to go out to work - especially jobs of a necessary but onerous nature; we would have no justice system; there would no discipline of any kind anywhere (and I am not necessarily talking about corporal punishment, because any discipline involves a certain degree of pain); there would few medical procedures. Most sports would be banned at schools...

But I suppose you could argue that it's OK to kill unborn babies, because some wise head somewhere probably reckons they don't feel pain. (/ despair)

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
You're still stuck on the idea that without some objective universal standard we cannot set laws to govern our society...
I never said any such thing!

Of course, a subjective moralist can set laws. A group of people can subjectively decide to agree on a set of principles and frame them as laws.

Trouble is... what if some people don't agree with those laws?

The lawgivers can only tell those people that they are "wrong" by using the following definition of "wrong": What fails to conform to our opinion.

So such laws are therefore imposed without any reference to any kind of objective standard of morality. So this goes back to one of my earlier points: Might is Right under subjective morality.

You keep saying this as if we're all supposed to respond with "Gasp! NO!"

The State enforces its laws by various means of force. Yes. And?

When some people don't agree with those laws, conflict arises. Yes. And?

If the conflict is severe enough, the State may resort to overt force to quell the dissent. Yes.

None of this is especially revelatory or shocking. It's what actually happens. From the existence of a police force onwards, there are mechanisms that authority uses to enforce compliance with its laws.

[ 23. July 2012, 11:54: Message edited by: orfeo ]

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
You keep saying this as if we're all supposed to respond with "Gasp! NO!"

If you say so, orfeo.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
You're still stuck on the idea that without some objective universal standard we cannot set laws to govern our society...
I never said any such thing!

Of course, a subjective moralist can set laws. A group of people can subjectively decide to agree on a set of principles and frame them as laws.

Trouble is... what if some people don't agree with those laws?

The lawgivers can only tell those people that they are "wrong" by using the following definition of "wrong": What fails to conform to our opinion.

So such laws are therefore imposed without any reference to any kind of objective standard of morality. So this goes back to one of my earlier points: Might is Right under subjective morality.

And as Might is Right is an objective standard, subjective morality is always objective. [Yipee]

But show me your objective standard of morality. Line by line. Or are you saying that you have a subjective standard of morality and just can't understand why it works.

quote:
The moral point you are making from this observation is nonsensical. If morality is based on the avoidance of pain, then we would not require anyone to go out to work - especially jobs of a necessary but onerous nature; we would have no justice system;

No. Your hypersimplistic understanding is nonsensical. First that is a factor not the only factor. Second people would farm - starvation is painful. People would have a justice system - it's less painful than having certain unjust factors happen. People would build shelters and treat patients. Because the alternatives are painful. Likewise discipline. It is needed in part to prevent further pain.

quote:
But I suppose you could argue that it's OK to kill unborn babies, because some wise head somewhere probably reckons they don't feel pain. (/ despair)

For about the fourth time in this one thread, if you want to talk about abortion take it to Dead Horses.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

It's just that I don't know what you want us to do with the "Might is Right" proposition. All you're saying is that rules can be imposed upon people without their consent.

To me as a lawyer/legislative drafter, this is pretty much self-evident. There is a process for formulating laws and for changing laws, and it involves elections and political lobbying and so forth, but at the end of the day if you're on the losing side of that kind of argument, the law gets made over your personal objections.

And there is nothing in legal systems that recognises a kind of 'conscientious objection' right so that you can get a law to not apply to you on the grounds you don't agree with it. When the criminal law changes, the government doesn't do a mail-out with a return envelope asking "are you okay with this? Please tick Yes or No and we'll put it on your file". There is one statute book in a jurisdiction that sets out the rules for everyone in that jurisdiction.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian
But show me your objective standard of morality. Line by line. Or are you saying that you have a subjective standard of morality and just can't understand why it works.

If "subjective" simply describes "what an individual believes to be true", then of course my morality could be described as "subjective". In the same way, my belief that the earth is not flat is also "subjective". In fact, the entire content of human cognition is subjective, according to that definition - including the word "objective".

But I am using the term "subjective" to denote ideas that cannot exist in any form outside of any human mind (and by "human mind" I include all humanly devised information storage and retrieval systems, such as books, computers etc.). In other words, the ideas have originated in the human mind.

Of course, it is true (within my view of reality) that an idea can exist both in the human mind and outside it (i.e. in the mind of God). So therefore it can be "subjective - objective" (using the term "subjective" in the definition of my first paragraph above).

Now it seems to me that the philosophical naturalist also affirms objective ideas, but he would define those as ideas which are confirmed by nature: what works within the external physical world. Hence the claims of science. If this is not true, then, of course, the claims of science are nonsense.

Now you seem to be promoting a form of morality which is "objective" in the naturalistic sense. You seem to be suggesting that our morality should be based on the principle of the avoidance of pain, even if there is an unavoidable trade off between different levels of pain. This is based on the natural functioning of the human nervous system.

Even if this principle could be considered "objective" from a natural point of view, I fail to see how it could possibly cover every moral eventuality. Take freedom of speech and psychological pain. What a Christian or an atheist says, for example, could cause pain to certain people hearing these views. We could argue that freedom of speech trumps the inflicting of psychological pain, on the basis that censorship causes pain. But how would we measure the greater pain? What standard is used to judge whether the pain of having one's beliefs derided is greater or less than the pain of censorship? Clearly that standard is entirely arbitrary.

So your idea of "what works" based on the pain principle is entirely subjective, and therefore unworkable, other than by fiat of authority.

But it is clear from this thread that we see the need for some concept of universal values. Nature cannot provide these, so it follows that we need a worldview which can provide them. The reason why certain "subjective" moral principles work is precisely because they are grounded in a higher moral reality. That is why many Christians argue that our moral sense is evidence for God (but... and this is extremely important... that is not the same as saying that unbelievers have no moral sense. In fact, that is the very opposite of what is being said.)

As for abortion... yes, I understand the policy of the Ship re DH. All I can do therefore is leave the matter with you. This is a vitally important issue which calls into question the integrity of atheistic morality, and appealing to internal procedure to pretend it isn't is rather bad form, in my view. Of course, we could discuss it in DH, but are we really up for swimming in that never ending whirlpool?

Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
That is why many Christians argue that our moral sense is evidence for God (but... and this is extremely important... that is not the same as saying that unbelievers have no moral sense. In fact, that is the very opposite of what is being said.)

Yes - I agree with this statement 100%

But, once again, what practical value does it have? No-one can be sure what the mind of God is on morality - especially in the grey areas (and there are many, many more grey areas than the DH you keep sneaking into the discussion)

So we still have to go with what the majority believes to be right.

Don't we?

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Boogie:
So we still have to go with what the majority believes to be right.

Don't we?

All moral change in society starts with somebody doing something that the majority doesn't yet believe to be right, or protesting at something that the majority doesn't yet believe to be wrong.
(Also, which majority? Humanity, nation state, local community?)

There's a comparison with change in scientific doctrine. Experiments that have been universally (among practicing scientists) truly and decisively refuted a theory or decided between two theories have been vanishingly rare. Scientific change happens because people change their minds for a variety of reasons. And such things as the interests of people funding scientific research, control over scientific journals, and so on, have a great influence over which theories are accepted. Nevertheless, one would think that something of the point of scientific enquiry would be loss if we decided to talk about scientific theories as if the interests of the people who fund them was all that determined which ones were accepted.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Of course, a subjective moralist can set laws. A group of people can subjectively decide to agree on a set of principles and frame them as laws.

Trouble is... what if some people don't agree with those laws?

Then they can lobby, argue, cajole and otherwise try to persuade society to change the laws. And if they can make a good and persuasive enough case for their beliefs then they will succeed.

But what happens under an objective system of law? If you define your laws as being true regardless of what anyone happens to believe, then you are ruling out the possibility of someone who disagrees being able to change them.

So I'm going to turn the question round and ask you: what if some people don't agree with those objective laws? What happens to them then?

Posted by George Spigot (# 253) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Of course, a subjective moralist can set laws. A group of people can subjectively decide to agree on a set of principles and frame them as laws.

Trouble is... what if some people don't agree with those laws?
Then they can lobby, argue, cajole and otherwise try to persuade society to change the laws. And if they can make a good and persuasive enough case for their beliefs then they will succeed.

But what happens under an objective system of law? If you define your laws as being true regardless of what anyone happens to believe, then you are ruling out the possibility of someone who disagrees being able to change them.

So I'm going to turn the question round and ask you: what if some people don't agree with those objective laws? What happens to them then?

Can someone just clarify. Is the argument in this thread "Morality is not subjective" or is it "life would be unfair if morality were subjective"?

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Then they can lobby, argue, cajole and otherwise try to persuade society to change the laws. And if they can make a good and persuasive enough case for their beliefs then they will succeed.

Define what you mean by "good and persuasive". What would such people appeal to, if there is no objectively valid rationale to appeal to?

quote:
But what happens under an objective system of law? If you define your laws as being true regardless of what anyone happens to believe, then you are ruling out the possibility of someone who disagrees being able to change them.

So I'm going to turn the question round and ask you: what if some people don't agree with those objective laws? What happens to them then?

You're asking the wrong person, because I have already explained that this is not my understanding of objective morality. Therefore your comment is a straw man.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
If "subjective" simply describes "what an individual believes to be true", then of course my morality could be described as "subjective".

Newsflash: Unless you can point to a literal list of rules that could be read by a third party who would, if he followed those rules, come to exactly the same moral conclusions you did then your morality is subjective.

quote:
But I am using the term "subjective" to denote ideas that cannot exist in any form outside of any human mind (and by "human mind" I include all humanly devised information storage and retrieval systems, such as books, computers etc.). In other words, the ideas have originated in the human mind.

In short you are making up your own definitions. And given you are making up your own definitions no wonder you are projecting things.

quote:
Of course, it is true (within my view of reality) that an idea can exist both in the human mind and outside it (i.e. in the mind of God).

In the mind of God from my perspective would not be functionally different from in a human mind if God actually existed. So you're creating a distinction without a difference. Further, as God is a completely sucky communicator, it is irrelevant to us on earth.

That is unless you are going all out and saying that the only basis for morality is following what God says is good.

quote:
Even if this principle could be considered "objective" from a natural point of view, I fail to see how it could possibly cover every moral eventuality.

When you can show me that your God has literally given you doccuments covering every possible moral eventuality this will be a distinction with a difference. Until then you are in exactly the same position.

quote:
As for abortion... yes, I understand the policy of the Ship re DH. All I can do therefore is leave the matter with you.

No. All you can do is abide by the policy. Rather than knowing that I won't respond to your attempt to derail the thread here attempt to use what you consider a massacre to score some cheap rhetorical points. Or is this a civil disobedience campaign to attempt to get the policy changed?

If you want to take up abortion as an issue, we have Dead Horses. If not, why do you persistently and willfully keep bringing it up outside Dead Horses? (If the Ship had a report button I would be using it).

And @Dafyd, there's one thing we can agree on in this thread anyway. "All moral change in society starts with somebody doing something that the majority doesn't yet believe to be right, or protesting at something that the majority doesn't yet believe to be wrong."

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Then they can lobby, argue, cajole and otherwise try to persuade society to change the laws. And if they can make a good and persuasive enough case for their beliefs then they will succeed.
Define what you mean by "good and persuasive". What would such people appeal to, if there is no objectively valid rationale to appeal to?

Again? They would appeal to whatever shared moral assumptions they happen to have.

Go on, ask what happens if there are absolutely no shared moral assumptions at all. We haven't had that part of this discussion for at least a day...

quote:
You're asking the wrong person, because I have already explained that this is not my understanding of objective morality. Therefore your comment is a straw man.

Perhaps, but I'm struggling to see how your definition of objective morality isn't, in fact, subjective. In practice if not by definition.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot
Can someone just clarify. Is the argument in this thread "Morality is not subjective" or is it "life would be unfair if morality were subjective"?

Of course life would not be "unfair" if morality were subjective, because "unfair" would then be defined in whatever way people liked. "Fair" would simply describe the morality of the day. So for those who, as per Godwin's Law, should not be mentioned, killing the members of a certain race is "fair". This is what "subjective morality" means. If that is not the case, then morality is not subjective, but defined by an objective standard of fairness. And then we would need to ask how this concept of "fairness" is justified.

As for this thread, I think it's a matter of taking from it what you will. As for me, given that I am responsible for the OP, I am trying to make the point that if morality is subjective - and believed to be subjective - then protesting against other people's morality is absurd. Even those who are trying to defend subjective morality are talking as though morality is anything but, because they are assuming a moral rationale to which we can appeal and around which we can come to a consensus.

In fact, I would like to ask Marvin and Justinian how they define the word "fairness" and with what justification.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian
Newsflash: Unless you can point to a literal list of rules that could be read by a third party who would, if he followed those rules, come to exactly the same moral conclusions you did then your morality is subjective.

Well thank goodness for that! At last we're getting somewhere. You acknowledge that my morality is objective, because there are millions of people who agree that it is wrong to commit murder, adultery, to exploit others, to steal etc etc.

It seems that there is an objective basis to morality after all.

quote:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
But I am using the term "subjective" to denote ideas that cannot exist in any form outside of any human mind (and by "human mind" I include all humanly devised information storage and retrieval systems, such as books, computers etc.). In other words, the ideas have originated in the human mind.
In short you are making up your own definitions. And given you are making up your own definitions no wonder you are projecting things.

Subjective: 1. belonging to, proceeding from, or relating to the mind of the thinking subject and not the nature of the object being considered. 2. of, relating to, or emanating from a person's emotions, prejudices, etc. 3. relating to the inherent nature of a person or thing; essential. 4. existing only as perceived and not as a thing in itself. (Collins)

In other words, subjective ideas are not valid outside the perception of the thinking subject.

quote:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
Of course, it is true (within my view of reality) that an idea can exist both in the human mind and outside it (i.e. in the mind of God).
In the mind of God from my perspective would not be functionally different from in a human mind if God actually existed. So you're creating a distinction without a difference.

Well clearly there is an objective difference between the perfect mind of the creator of the whole universe, and fallible human minds. In fact, without this perfect mind there is no basis to rationality at all, it being merely a subjective emergent property of an entirely materialistic, and therefore mindless, process.

quote:
Further, as God is a completely sucky communicator, it is irrelevant to us on earth.

It takes two for communication to succeed.

quote:
That is unless you are going all out and saying that the only basis for morality is following what God says is good.

Given that God is the creator of our rationality, then there can actually be no concept of "good" contrary to the mind of God. It's not about arbitrary definitions; it's about the nature of something called "reality".

quote:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
Even if this principle could be considered "objective" from a natural point of view, I fail to see how it could possibly cover every moral eventuality.
When you can show me that your God has literally given you doccuments covering every possible moral eventuality this will be a distinction with a difference. Until then you are in exactly the same position.

"Documents covering every possible moral eventuality"?? Where the hell did that straw man argument come from? You really have a very strange view of God. No wonder you don't believe in him. In fact neither do I believe in such a "God". In case it hadn't occurred to you, God is the creator of the human mind, which he expects us to use in concert with the moral conscience he has also given to us. (There is also the influence of the Holy Spirit, but since you're an atheist, it's pointless trying to talk about that.)

quote:

quote:
Originally posted by Etymological Evangelical
As for abortion... yes, I understand the policy of the Ship re DH. All I can do therefore is leave the matter with you.
No. All you can do is abide by the policy. Rather than knowing that I won't respond to your attempt to derail the thread here attempt to use what you consider a massacre to score some cheap rhetorical points. Or is this a civil disobedience campaign to attempt to get the policy changed?

I am abiding by the policy, which is why I wrote "I will leave the matter with you". What is it about those words that you don't understand?

In fact, it might be a good idea if you also decided to abide by the policy, given that you have included some commentary on what you think my view of abortion is, hence you are discussing a DH subject here. Naughty naughty.

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Of course life would not be "unfair" if morality were subjective, because "unfair" would then be defined in whatever way people liked. "Fair" would simply describe the morality of the day. So for those who, as per Godwin's Law, should not be mentioned, killing the members of a certain race is "fair". This is what "subjective morality" means.

It should be noted that the folks you cite as an example believed that their actions were objectively morally right, which is more or less central to the problem of claiming morality is objective. That claim is essentially the pretense that your own moral code was picked fresh off the morality tree (or dug up from the morality mines or condensed from morality vapor or wherever you're supposed to extract this stuff) rather than the product of human thought and artifice.

For example, you imply that there is uniform agreement on what constitutes murder (honor killings don't count, do they?), adultery (oral doesn't count, does it?), or exploitation (wage slavery isn't exploitive, is it?). This doesn't seem to be the case when you get into the details.

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

quote:

Marvin The Martian
Perhaps, but I'm struggling to see how your definition of objective morality isn't, in fact, subjective. In practice if not by definition.

In practice, the difference is that we can debate it. In the worst case at least we can fight over it properly (we might not, because we might be sincerely wrong, and we often choose 'evil').

We might end up fighting on the 'wrong side', we might even win, but it's meaningful to say that. We can realise that and undo our mistakes, we may not, others may have to.

If it's subjective, we can debate the favourable consequences (to us and them). Fighting (and atrocities) are just a tool, and there's no reason not to use them (except pragmatism and hormones). There's no wrong side except 'the losing one'.
If we win there's no mistakes to undo, possibly ways to adapt to a changing situation.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Croesos

quote:
Of course life would not be "unfair" if morality were subjective, because "unfair" would then be defined in whatever way people liked. "Fair" would simply describe the morality of the day. So for those who, as per Godwin's Law, should not be mentioned, killing the members of a certain race is "fair". This is what "subjective morality" means.
It should be noted that the folks you cite as an example believed that their actions were objectively morally right, which is more or less central to the problem of claiming morality is objective.

I believe that it is objectively true that the earth orbits the sun.

Certain other people believe that it is objectively true that the sun orbits the earth.

Because they hold their beliefs as objectively true, does that make my claim invalid?

I think not.

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
I believe that it is objectively true that the earth orbits the sun.

Certain other people believe that it is objectively true that the sun orbits the earth.

Because they hold their beliefs as objectively true, does that make my claim invalid?

I think not.

I'm not sure how this analogy works. Do you just use the morality-scope to check the moral trajectory of your moral code, or what?

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Of course life would not be "unfair" if morality were subjective, because "unfair" would then be defined in whatever way people liked. "Fair" would simply describe the morality of the day. So for those who, as per Godwin's Law, should not be mentioned, killing the members of a certain race is "fair". This is what "subjective morality" means.
It should be noted that the folks you cite as an example believed that their actions were objectively morally right, which is more or less central to the problem of claiming morality is objective. That claim is essentially the pretense that your own moral code was picked fresh off the morality tree (or dug up from the morality mines or condensed from morality vapor or wherever you're supposed to extract this stuff) rather than the product of human thought and artifice.

The first part is (effectively) true, (or course with that group, any question about their beliefs is a bit hazy).

However the second part does not follow, necessarily. In an Objective situation.

It could be the case that they we've committed the greatest injustice of history and stopped the glorious project to ...
It could be the case that the allies heroically stopped some incredibly wrong people doing incredibly wrong things.
It could the case that the allies, for selfish reasons and with bad methods stopped something evil.
(etc..., I don't believe the first of these, and would tend to the third, but we can debate that later)

In a Subjective viewpoint (pretending I lived in 1940ish)

If I support the allies, and the allies win (I get to live my Grandfather's life :| )
If I support the germans and the germans win (I get to have my pick of the loot, women, slaves etc.. [Smile]

or possibly shot for having the wrong hair [Frown]

)
If I support the allies and the germans win (i don't want to get shot [Frown]

)
If I support the germans and the allies win (i won't be very popular, that's a bit [Frown]

)
Now what are the probabilities..., how do I maximise my [Smile]

/ minimise my [Frown]

whatever utility function...
[or the vaguely equivelent, I find killing 6m Jews, xm gays, ym gypsies a bit not my style]

[ 23. July 2012, 17:50: Message edited by: Jay-Emm ]

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
I'm not sure how this analogy works. Do you just use the morality-scope to check the moral trajectory of your moral code, or what?

I tend to base my views on the reality of what actually works. The only kind of morality that makes any sense at all in the real world is one which appeals to a general sense of fairness and compassion, where these concepts actually have an accepted meaning. If everyone's just making up their moral definitions as they go along, then morality per se doesn't work. It's a bit like logic: if logic is merely subjective then it doesn't work as logic. Some things have to have universal validity in order to have any validity at all.

So this constitutes evidence that morality cannot simply be an emergent property of a purely materialistic process, but is grounded in objective reality. In other words, reality is moral and that is why we are moral beings. None of this makes any sense in the absence of God.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
But what happens under an objective system of law? If you define your laws as being true regardless of what anyone happens to believe, then you are ruling out the possibility of someone who disagrees being able to change them.

That, surely, is a bit of a straw man. Saying that the laws are objective, in that they try to reflect some values that exist independently of the legislature, is not the same as saying that they reflect those values infallibly.

The question isn't whether people who want to change the laws can lobby, argue, cajole and otherwise try to persuade society to change the laws. The question is the range of permissible techniques. If the laws are supposed to reflect objective values then the permissible techniques will involve reasoned argument and debate, and appeals to evidence.
If the laws do not reflect objective values then the permissible techniques may also include such things as contentless emotional rhetoric, whipping up hatred against minorities, bare-faced lies, and slipping backhanders to the legislature. That is a 'may'. The laws can of course forbid those. The difference I suppose is that if the laws try to reflect something objective then such techniques are so-to-speak forbidden by the Constitution while if they don't then such techniques are only forbidden by other laws.

A case study: Universal Declaration of Human Rights

quote:
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

The words 'recognition' and 'inherent', imply that the rights which it's describing are objectively there independently of the countries signing the charter. But Declaration of Human Rights therefore saying that it cannot be in error? No, I don't think it is. What it's saying is that the required standard for deciding whether it's in error is rational argument, and not, say, political advantage or financial interest.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
In practice, the difference is that we can debate it.

How can you debate objective morality? That's like saying you can debate rock. If it's objective then it just is, no debate is required.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
The only kind of morality that makes any sense at all in the real world is one which appeals to a general sense of fairness and compassion, where these concepts actually have an accepted meaning.

Sounds pretty subjective to me.

quote:
If everyone's just making up their moral definitions as they go along, then morality per se doesn't work. It's a bit like logic: if logic is merely subjective then it doesn't work as logic. Some things have to have universal validity in order to have any validity at all.

The existence of nearly-universal definitions doesn't mean those definitions came from anywhere other than the human mind. It just means that a hell of a lot of us happen to agree about those issues.

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
In practice, the difference is that we can debate it.
How can you debate objective morality? That's like saying you can debate rock. If it's objective then it just is, no debate is required.

Is it possible for it to be sedimentary and to have small crystals?

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
How can you debate objective morality? That's like saying you can debate rock.

You mean, like geology?

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
I'm not sure how this analogy works. Do you just use the morality-scope to check the moral trajectory of your moral code, or what?
I tend to base my views on the reality of what actually works. The only kind of morality that makes any sense at all in the real world is one which appeals to a general sense of fairness and compassion, where these concepts actually have an accepted meaning.

If that's the case, then why do other people, who presumably live in the same real world you do, have different moral codes? The example you cited previously, for instance?

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
The only kind of morality that makes any sense at all in the real world is one which appeals to a general sense of fairness and compassion, where these concepts actually have an accepted meaning.
Sounds pretty subjective to me.

You're not wrong. And I happen to hold a contrary view, and I'm not wrong either!!

quote:
The existence of nearly-universal definitions doesn't mean those definitions came from anywhere other than the human mind. It just means that a hell of a lot of us happen to agree about those issues.

As in... "We know that we ought to try to help starving children in Africa, but there's no ultimate reason why we ought to do it. We can't say whether it is actually 'right' to do this, and if anyone objects to this practice we cannot feel the slightest indignation towards that person, because that person is not wrong. And if we think it's right to arrest the Pope for the child abuse cover ups, we are only doing it because of what we happen to feel like, not because there was anything 'wrong' with what certain Catholic priests did."

Yeah. Good one.

Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
As in... "We know that we ought to try to help starving children in Africa, but there's no ultimate reason why we ought to do it. We can't say whether it is actually 'right' to do this, and if anyone objects to this practice we cannot feel the slightest indignation towards that person, because that person is not wrong.

I can say that I think they are wrong and explain why, of course.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Croesos

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
I tend to base my views on the reality of what actually works. The only kind of morality that makes any sense at all in the real world is one which appeals to a general sense of fairness and compassion, where these concepts actually have an accepted meaning.
If that's the case, then why do other people, who presumably live in the same real world you do, have different moral codes? The example you cited previously, for instance?

What, you mean that I am supposed to accept ideas that don't work?

How strange.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Boogie
I can say that I think they are wrong and explain why, of course.

Of course you can try. But if it is accepted that morality is entirely subjective, the views of the one who holds a contrary view cannot be wrong. That is an epistemological fact, if subjectivity means anything at all. And it would be completely irrational for you to think otherwise.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Boogie
I can say that I think they are wrong and explain why, of course.
Of course you can try. But if it is accepted that morality is entirely subjective, the views of the one who holds a contrary view cannot be wrong. That is an epistemological fact, if subjectivity means anything at all.

Not so. If you adopt a deflationary account of truth then you take 'x is wrong' to mean that 'x is contrary to my opinion' or 'reject x'. On that analysis, the views of someone who holds a contrary opinion are automatically 'wrong'.

It is true that you explaining to the other person why they're wrong is just a matter of telling them over and over again that they're wrong in different words.

Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Boogie
I can say that I think they are wrong and explain why, of course.
Of course you can try. But if it is accepted that morality is entirely subjective, the views of the one who holds a contrary view cannot be wrong. That is an epistemological fact, if subjectivity means anything at all. And it would be completely irrational for you to think otherwise.

Maybe morality itself is irrational?

Surely there is more to caring for one's neighbour than mere rationality?

Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on :

quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot:
Because sometimes when enough people protest the powers that be take note and and protesters get what they wanted. So the answer is practical results.

Thank you. Does the OP want us to discuss the ultimate basis for morality, or the effectiveness of petitioning and protesting? I doubt that the two questions are as related as he assumes. Even if morality is relative, as long as we have the ability (and indeed the duty) to vote for our rulers, we can make these choices on any basis we like. It is only necessary for a would-be protester to believe that his actions will enlighten and persuade others likely to be sympathetic, who will then vote for B rather than A, and take other steps in influencing public policy. No universal standard of morality is required to explain this.

That said, I admire the adage, "hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue." Some bankers and stock market schemers have become relatively brazen of late, especially when a journalist can catch them off-guard. But by and large, they are too smart to trumpet their avarice as openly as the protesters camp out in a park. They must resort to innumerable subterfuges while making a pretence of respecting the public interest. If morality is relative, then why would this be so?

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Boogie
Surely there is more to caring for one's neighbour than mere rationality?

Absolutely.

By the way... what's "mere rationality"?

And who said anything about "caring for one's neighbour" rather than hating one's neighbour? I thought morality was supposed to be subjective, and therefore we can behave how we like?

Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
So to take an example, from the middle ages to the nineteenth century, war rape was widely (though by no means universally) regarded as socially acceptable. Now it's quite possible that such a practice could have become universlly acceptable. If no one ever dissented from the view, war rape would be morally acceptable. It could have been regarded universally (as it was widely) as the right of a victorious army.

Unless your point is more subtle than I can see, this is not a good example. Rape could never be universally acceptable by definition, since it involves an unwilling person. If it were universally acceptable for victorious soldiers to have sex with whomever they fancied among the conquered, then the conquered would consent and there would be no need to describe it as rape.

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
If that's the case, then why do other people, who presumably live in the same real world you do, have different moral codes? The example you cited previously, for instance?
What, you mean that I am supposed to accept ideas that don't work?

How strange.

Depends on what you're defining as "what works". To return to your cited example, an adherent of that ideology would reject your morality as "not working" because you don't have a solution to the "Jewish Question". Defining what you believe as what works and defining what works as what you believe is nice and circular, but it doesn't really give us anything to go on.

Or is this simply pragmatism, with actions being considered "moral" if they're effective and "immoral" if they fail?

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Alogon
Even if morality is relative, as long as we have the ability (and indeed the duty) to vote for our rulers, we can make these choices on any basis we like. It is only necessary for a would-be protester to believe that his actions will enlighten and persuade others likely to be sympathetic, who will then vote for B rather than A, and take other steps in influencing public policy. No universal standard of morality is required to explain this.

Of course, it's possible to protest at something for all sorts of reasons, especially the simple "what's in it for me?" motive.

However, I do think that moral discourse and debate is farcical without a belief in objective morality. I have just been watching an episode of the British political debating programme Question Time, which, on 22nd October 2009, featured Nick Griffin of the British National Party, which, as you may know is labelled as "far right" (although their economic policies are more to the left). This party (which I certainly oppose) has been described as racist, with considerable justification. You can find this programme (broken into various segments) on Youtube, just search: nick griffin question time.

The other panelists and most of the audience expressed their revulsion at the BNP and were outraged at Griffin's statements. There were also angry protests outside BBC Television Centre objecting to Griffin's participation in the debate.

But it got me thinking... if morality is subjective, and this is the general view of the panelists, the audience and the protesters, then it would follow that all their expressions of outrage were just play acting. The entire debate would have been a pantomime. How can someone believe that all moral positions are essentially equally valid (because there is no objective standard by which to judge them), and yet give the impression - supported by vehement expressions of emotion - that their view is right and the morality of the BNP is wrong?

Surely all the anger expressed at this debate was driven by and justified by a deep-seated belief that what Griffin believed and represented was objectively "wrong"!

And if subjective morality states that some moral positions are more valid than others, then on what basis - or by what means - does it draw that conclusion?

Of course, I realise that the "belief" that one's own morality is objective is not the same as morality actually being objectively valid. But if morality is ultimately merely the product of the human mind, which itself is merely the result of matter being configured in a blind, unguided and mindless process, then it seems that we have to believe a lie in order to make morality work. This makes a complete mockery of the claim of the philosophy of naturalism to be "rational".

Posted by tclune (# 7959) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
What, you mean that I am supposed to accept ideas that don't work?

Whether or not this is a moral imperative for you, it appears to be an empirical fact...

--Tom Clune

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
But it got me thinking... if morality is subjective, and this is the general view of the panelists, the audience and the protesters, then it would follow that all their expressions of outrage were just play acting. The entire debate would have been a pantomime. How can someone believe that all moral positions are essentially equally valid (because there is no objective standard by which to judge them), and yet give the impression - supported by vehement expressions of emotion - that their view is right and the morality of the BNP is wrong?

You seem to be making a jump of logic that anything subjective doesn't really exist, or that it's impossible to come to an opinion about anything subjective, vehement or otherwise. (To go back to your original example, that it's literally impossible for someone to prefer one vegetable over another.) Care to expand on this premise?

[ 23. July 2012, 20:15: Message edited by: Crœsos ]

Posted by Drewthealexander (# 16660) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Alogon:

quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
So to take an example, from the middle ages to the nineteenth century, war rape was widely (though by no means universally) regarded as socially acceptable. Now it's quite possible that such a practice could have become universlly acceptable. If no one ever dissented from the view, war rape would be morally acceptable. It could have been regarded universally (as it was widely) as the right of a victorious army.
Unless your point is more subtle than I can see, this is not a good example. Rape could never be universally acceptable by definition, since it involves an unwilling person. If it were universally acceptable for victorious soldiers to have sex with whomever they fancied among the conquered, then the conquered would consent and there would be no need to describe it as rape.

I wouldn't make any pretensions to subtlety. You've assumed that any act on an unwilling person is unacceptable. And I agree - we have a moral sense through which we understand rape to be objectively wrong.

But if there is *no* objective morality then what we now describe as 'rape' (as you say, a moral description) could conceivably be defined as war booty, and be considered as entirely morally acceptable.

Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
You've assumed that any act on an unwilling person is unacceptable.

No, I've merely assumed that an act on an unwilling person is unacceptable to that person. And being so, it can never be said to be universally acceptable. This seems to be an elementary deduction.

Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
You've assumed that any act on an unwilling person is unacceptable.

No, I've merely noted that an act on an unwilling person is unacceptable to that person. And being so, it can never be said to be universally acceptable. This looks like elementary logic to me.

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Alogon:

quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot:
Because sometimes when enough people protest the powers that be take note and and protesters get what they wanted. So the answer is practical results.
Thank you. Does the OP want us to discuss the ultimate basis for morality, or the effectiveness of petitioning and protesting? I doubt that the two questions are as related as he assumes. Even if morality is relative, as long as we have the ability (and indeed the duty) to vote for our rulers, we can make these choices on any basis we like. It is only necessary for a would-be protester to believe that his actions will enlighten and persuade others likely to be sympathetic, who will then vote for B rather than A, and take other steps in influencing public policy. No universal standard of morality is required to explain this.

True (except the use of 'enlighted', which begs the question), but it means debates should be different. Your no longer trying to persuade people to vote for a policy because it's right.

To take racism, you'd be persuading whites to protest/vote/set policy because otherwise 'the blacks' might take violent action*, or you might take violent action, or because 'free blacks' would be more productive, or they'd buy more shoes than the owners did whips.

Unless you are using 'morality' as an opiate of the people.

*actually this is pretty much why we have official rights in England.

[ 23. July 2012, 21:02: Message edited by: Jay-Emm ]

Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
True (except the use of 'enlighted', which begs the question),

I tried to find a better word. What I meant was making a fact or facts common knowledge that had not been common knowledge before-- or in more current lingo, "consciousness-raising." Even if I opposes, for instance, new regulations on banking, my ethics and morality would be very strange indeed if I opposed in principle people learning facts.

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Alogon:

quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
You've assumed that any act on an unwilling person is unacceptable.
No, I've merely noted that an act on an unwilling person is unacceptable to that person. And being so, it can never be said to be universally acceptable. This looks like elementary logic to me.

That's a good point. Although it still leaves the question of why her opinion should count, especially if she's about to be murdered anyway? (so there are no tangible timeline effects).

It should have been phrased as the universally acceptable view of all those with the power to change it.

Of course in some ways there's not much difference between me standing impotently in the future going 'because, it bloody well does, she's a flipping person isn't she?' while some 14thC bishop quotes some scripture out of context for the other side to tell me I'm wrong.
And you saying 'We really don't like this, i value her as a person', and being told 'Well I don't care for you either'.
But in others, there's a world of difference.

(and similarly if we could take back a gun (and could use it) to change the event, they'd be some similarities but some fundemental difference).

[sorry I didn't realise I was replying to you twice on different tacks-otherwise I'd have put them together]

[ 23. July 2012, 21:17: Message edited by: Jay-Emm ]

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

(and yes, I struggle to find the right word, and I'm a little aware my dialogue above isn't properly balanced)

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
You seem to be making a jump of logic that anything subjective doesn't really exist, or that it's impossible to come to an opinion about anything subjective, vehement or otherwise.

In what sense are you using 'subjective' and what kind of entities are you describing using 'anything'?
Subjective opinions exist. But the things that the subjective opinions are about by definition don't really exist.

To the best of my understanding on this particular point I agree with what you're trying to say and disagree with Etymological Evangelical. But I can't be sure, because as far as I can tell you're using 'subjective' in two completely different senses within the same sentence.

Posted by George Spigot (# 253) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
The entire debate would have been a pantomime. How can someone believe that all moral positions are essentially equally valid (because there is no objective standard by which to judge them)

In this case they didn't think all moral positions are essentially equally valid they thought their own moral position was higher than the BNP's. The standard by which to judge them
was their own standard. Another way of putting this, as you have already put it, is that might makes right or in other words more people voting for other political parties keeps the BNP out of power.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
How can someone believe that all moral positions are essentially equally valid (because there is no objective standard by which to judge them), and yet give the impression - supported by vehement expressions of emotion - that their view is right and the morality of the BNP is wrong?

What do you mean by 'equally valid' here? Someone who believes morality is subjective knows that there's a subjective standard by which to judge positions: namely their own. Maybe there's no such standard looking from the view from nowhere but someone who is acting on their subjective moral opinions isn't looking from the view from nowhere. They're looking from their own position. It's not as if they believe that there's any objective standard saying that they have to treat their viewpoint as being as valid as anyone else's.

quote:
And if subjective morality states that some moral positions are more valid than others, then on what basis - or by what means - does it draw that conclusion?

My subjective morality states that my moral position is more valid than others on the basis that that's what it means to say it's my subjective morality.
If there's no objective basis stating that it's wrong for me to draw that conclusion why can't I draw that conclusion?

The problem with declaring morality is subjective is not that it rules vehement displays of emotion out of court: it's that it says that they are all there is to morality.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian
Newsflash: Unless you can point to a literal list of rules that could be read by a third party who would, if he followed those rules, come to exactly the same moral conclusions you did then your morality is subjective.
Well thank goodness for that! At last we're getting somewhere. You acknowledge that my morality is objective, because there are millions of people who agree that it is wrong to commit murder, adultery, to exploit others, to steal etc etc.

It seems that there is an objective basis to morality after all.

I haven't read past this post of yours yet, but there is a GLARING error here. You've taken Justinian's remark of "a" third party as meaning "Yes, I can find one of them. I can find lots of third partys".

It doesn't mean that at all. It means that ANY, utterly random third party, is guaranteed to get you the result. It doesn't matter how many millions are on your side re murder, adultery and so on. It means that any rational third party would get there.

Because otherwise you've turned "objective" into precisely the same 'playing the odds' game that you accuse the 'subjective' side of playing with Might is Right. You've got enough people on your side, so you win. You've just collapsed both sides of the argument into the exact same scenario.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Alogon:

quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
You've assumed that any act on an unwilling person is unacceptable.
No, I've merely assumed that an act on an unwilling person is unacceptable to that person. And being so, it can never be said to be universally acceptable. This seems to be an elementary deduction.

Well, actually it isn't.

Because it's perfectly possible to have a situation where it's accepted practice that consent isn't required.

I don't have to go past your rape case, actually, because for a very long time the view was taken that a husband COULDN'T RAPE HIS WIFE. Once she's said 'I do', there was no capacity for her to say on a given night that she didn't.

It is also perfectly possible in any particular case to have a situation where a woman is so beaten down psychologically, or even a whole group of women are beaten down psychologically, that they've accepted the idea that their consent doesn't really matter and that if a man wants what he wants, he'll just take it.

In both instances, you have a situation where the person who doesn't consent has accepted that their lack of consent doesn't morally matter.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
The entire debate would have been a pantomime. How can someone believe that all moral positions are essentially equally valid (because there is no objective standard by which to judge them)
In this case they didn't think all moral positions are essentially equally valid they thought their own moral position was higher than the BNP's. The standard by which to judge them was their own standard.

Of course, they thought their moral position was higher than the BNP's. But with what justification? What concepts were they appealing to in order to consider that their morality was superior to that of the BNP? And are those concepts defined objectively or subjectively?

In the first comment by the panel, Jack Straw condemned the position of the BNP with reference to "a recognisable moral compass" which the mainstream political parties possess, which enables them to show "respect"; and this "moral compass" is based on "long-standing, cultural, philosophical and religious values of western society".

To which I feel tempted to reply: So what?

So the BNP (whom, I must stress, I do NOT support) are condemned on the basis that they do not conform to "long-standing, cultural, philosophical and religious values of western society."

Does that mean that we should all respect a morality which is "long-standing"? OK. So any moral principle that has longevity should be respected, therefore "old-fasioned" is best, yes?

What about "cultural"? That means nothing, because one could talk about Fascist culture. The same goes for philosophical, and, indeed "religious".

And what about the morality of "western society"? It seems rather ironic that Jack Straw should refer to this in his comments against racism. Is he condemning non-western values?

So it's clear that Straw has no basis by which to justify his comments, unless he thinks that his particular version of morality is universally valid. If he knows that it's not, then he is just expressing his personal distaste at the morality of the BNP, and it has no more meaning than a person expressing distaste for a particular type of food, which others may find delicious.

That is why I say that it is not possible to express outrage at another person's moral position unless you think that your own moral position is objectively "right". "Subjectively right" is a phrase with no meaning at all, other than "it tastes good to me, but not necessarily to anyone else".

Of course, one could express outrage in the sense of selfish petulance. That would indeed be based on one's own "subjective standard". God help us if that is the basis of our moral discourse - especially in public life.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
I haven't read past this post of yours yet, but there is a GLARING error here. You've taken Justinian's remark of "a" third party as meaning "Yes, I can find one of them. I can find lots of third partys".

It means that ANY, utterly random third party, is guaranteed to get you the result. It doesn't matter how many millions are on your side re murder, adultery and so on. It means that any rational third party would get there.

Yeah, and what do you mean by "rational"?

I would also like to throw the word "honest" into the mix.

After all, a moral universe includes freedom; therefore an apparently "rational" person is free to reject objective moral principles. So Croesos' challenge doesn't really get us anywhere. We have to look at the bigger picture to ascertain the nature of the innate moral sense which God has created us with, given that a random selection of an individual could land us with an Ian Brady, a Peter Sutcliffe or a Robert Black.

So your criticism of my post was clearly rather hasty.

(By the way... what mechanism would you use to pick a random RATIONAL person? I'm intrigued.)

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

It seems to me that the subjective/objective split is not the real disagreement in these exchanges. Rather the line is between moral or ethical naturalists and non naturalists. The ethical naturalist is a moral realist and is happy to agree that morality has an objective basis, but thinks that it can be reduced to non moral facts. The ethical non naturalists think that morality has a basis that is not reducible to non moral facts, or, in EE’s case, that if it doesn’t then it jolly well should do.

In practice, as far as I have seen, the non naturalist claims that morality is either God (or a property thereof) or some sort of Platonic moral sense available to our intuitions. A moral naturalist rejects this dualism and may speaks of facts about human in terms of the natural world – evolution, genetics, culture, psychology, neuroscience and the rest. This, of course, is a messy mixture of the objective, the intersubjective and the subjective.

There are problems with both positions, many of which have been played out on this thread. Luckily for us, we live in a society that has struggled with these sorts of questions for centuries and has come up with a messy compromise that sort of works: how you think is your affair, how you behave could well be mine.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
I haven't read past this post of yours yet, but there is a GLARING error here. You've taken Justinian's remark of "a" third party as meaning "Yes, I can find one of them. I can find lots of third partys".

It means that ANY, utterly random third party, is guaranteed to get you the result. It doesn't matter how many millions are on your side re murder, adultery and so on. It means that any rational third party would get there.
Yeah, and what do you mean by "rational"?

I would also like to throw the word "honest" into the mix.

After all, a moral universe includes freedom; therefore an apparently "rational" person is free to reject objective moral principles. So Croesos' challenge doesn't really get us anywhere. We have to look at the bigger picture to ascertain the nature of the innate moral sense which God has created us with, given that a random selection of an individual could land us with an Ian Brady, a Peter Sutcliffe or a Robert Black.

So your criticism of my post was clearly rather hasty.

(By the way... what mechanism would you use to pick a random RATIONAL person? I'm intrigued.)

I'm not for a minute suggesting it's that simple to pick who is 'rational'. But the answer can't just be "whoever agrees with my position on murder, etc" because that becomes circular.

And no, the idea that a 'rational' person is free to 'reject' objective moral principles misses the point completely. If your notion of an 'objective' principle is to have any real meaning, what Justinian says is correct: they have to be principles that everyone of sound mind can derive from the same set of initial building blocks. If it's possible for a person to rationally reject the principle and choose another one, then how can you say they're objective?

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
If it's possible for a person to rationally reject the principle and choose another one, then how can you say they're objective?

Well, I would want to know why such a person, supposedly of "sound mind", wanted to reject the principle of, say, "do not commit murder". I suspect Harold Shipman was "rational" in a way, otherwise his crimes would not have eluded detection for so long. He was clearly able to think logically about how to cover his tracks.

Just because a concept can be rejected does not mean that it is not objectively valid.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
As in... "We know that we ought to try to help starving children in Africa, but there's no ultimate reason why we ought to do it.

What, you don't think wanting children to avoid starvation is a good enough reason?

quote:
We can't say whether it is actually 'right' to do this, and if anyone objects to this practice we cannot feel the slightest indignation towards that person, because that person is not wrong.

Well, we certainly shouldn't force people who disagree to chip in. But that doesn't stop us from doing what we can.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
What, you don't think wanting children to avoid starvation is a good enough reason?

I certainly think that that is a very good reason, because I want children to avoid starvation.

But suppose I didn't think like that? Suppose I held to a "morality" that thought that it was actually quite a good idea for African children to starve to death (perhaps because of a commitment to a world population reduction agenda)? If you think that morality is entirely subjective, then there is no way that you could tell me that my morality is "wrong". In fact, you would have to acknowledge that my reason is just as "good" as the other one. (When I say "you would have to", I am, of course, saying that in the context of: "if you care about being rational".)

So if you are going to bandy around the word "good" to describe moral positions, then perhaps you may like to explain - on the basis that morality is entirely subjective - why the opposing position is "not good". And perhaps you may like to justify that conclusion with reference to the rationale to which you are appealing.

I am very interested to read what you have to say, to see whether it really does conform to your claim that morality is subjective.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Suppose I held to a "morality" that thought that it was actually quite a good idea for African children to starve to death (perhaps because of a commitment to a world population reduction agenda)? If you think that morality is entirely subjective, then there is no way that you could tell me that my morality is "wrong".

OK, let's start with the basic assumptions. Why do you suppose I would want to tell you your morality is wrong in that situation? Why waste time trying to change the minds of those who disagree when that time could be more productively used in helping with the efforts of those who do agree?

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
OK, let's start with the basic assumptions. Why do you suppose I would want to tell you your morality is wrong in that situation? Why waste time trying to change the minds of those who disagree when that time could be more productively used in helping with the efforts of those who do agree?

I am looking at the phenomenon of morality, and human behaviour in relation to morality, and asking what it tells us about which worldview is true. I guess I am coming at the whole issue of morality from the point of view of theistic apologetics.

I think it is true that many (most?) people hold their philosophical position (their view of reality) subconsciously and rarely articulate it. If someone is committed to feeding the hungry of, say, Africa, that person may not waste their time reflecting on matters of moral philosophy. They simply assume that what they are doing is right.

But the point is that there are some people who make philosophical claims about the nature of reality, whose views need to be analysed, challenged and investigated.

It is not unreasonable in a discussion about moral philosophy to subject viewpoints to intellectual challenge. So let's imagine that you are a fundraiser for a charity seeking to feed starving children in the developing world. You are invited to a panel discussion on television to put your views to potentially millions of viewers. But you are required to debate your case with someone who holds to a particular Spencerian understanding of Social Darwinism, who argues that it is immoral for us to intervene in the sufferings of the poor, because that is nature's way of culling the world population, and keeping the gene pool "pure", by weeding out the weak.

In the absence of this kind of direct challenge to your moral position, then, of course, you will go through life assuming that your position is correct and this will give you the confidence to persuade others that this is the case. In other words, you hold your belief in the "rightness" of your position subconsciously. This subconscious position may perhaps only become conscious when it is challenged, as in this panel debate.

Now you can hardly object to this kind of scenario, given that you - on this thread - have actually recommended this very practice of openly discussing the "rightness" of moral issues, hence:

quote:
I would phrase it more as "I think you should do this because I think it is better than what you're currently doing, and here are my reasons for thinking so. But I'm interested in hearing your reasons for thinking the things you do are better - let's have a chat about it and see if one of us can't persuade the other that they're right."

Now in this debate, you are challenged as to your fundamental view of morality. You admit that you believe morality is entirely subjective, and you are challenged to acknowledge that the views of your opponent are intrinsically as valid as yours. If you fail to acknowledge this, then you are effectively admitting that morality is not subjective, because you would be appealing to some objective concept to judge that your opponent's views are "wrong". If you do acknowledge this, then it makes a mockery of your moral appeal to the viewers to support your position: "Please help me to keep these children alive, but I admit it's perfectly OK and good to let them die." Such a position makes a farce of any expression of moral outrage against what is perceived to be evil.

Now I suppose it could be argued that you could appeal to people's personal taste: "All you who love Marmite can give money to this cause, and all you who hate Marmite can support the opposing position."

I'm afraid reality doesn't work like that. I am looking at something called "reality". I observe human behaviour, and draw appropriate conclusions. The conclusion that I draw is that morality simply doesn't work unless the person who holds a moral position believes that it is actually "right" and the opposing position is "wrong". Of course, context has to be taken into account, but contextualised morality is not the same as subjective or relative morality, because one believes that a certain principle is universally right within a particular context (i.e. within the "whole" of that particular context).

Furthermore, I agree that while different people believe that their moral position is objectively right, their moral principles may differ. This is due to human fallibility. But it seems very strange indeed to hold to a view that all morality is simply the emergent property of an ultimately mindless materialistic process, and yet to have to deny the implications of that (whether subconsciously or not) in order to make morality work on a practical level. This is clear and undeniable evidence that the philosophy of naturalism is out of kilter with reality. (Why was Dawkins so angry with the Pope, when he has admitted that morals are entirely arbitrary? What, in his philosophy, did he imagine the Pope had done "wrong"??)

I agree entirely that the kind of "objective morality" that always prescribes certain fixed principles that are binding in every context, is wrong. Even the Bible does not promote that kind of morality, hence Jesus acknowledging that David was right to eat the shewbread that only the priests were permitted to eat, because he was hungry (the alleviation of hunger therefore trumping religious law). Or the nation of Israel being founded on the twelve tribes descended from men who were the product of bigamy and (technically according to NT teaching) adultery (i.e. Jacob's sexual liaisons). Or Rahab being praised in the New Testament for having performed a work, which involved lying with regard to the spies in Jericho. I could go on and on in the same vein...

I agree that we need to have discussions about morality, and that we need to try to understand why adultery is wrong, for example, instead of just flinging Bible verses around or some other injunction, in order to kill discussion. But I simply cannot see how the naturalistic - subjectivist view of morality accords with human practice and attitudes in the real world.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian
Newsflash: Unless you can point to a literal list of rules that could be read by a third party who would, if he followed those rules, come to exactly the same moral conclusions you did then your morality is subjective.
Well thank goodness for that! At last we're getting somewhere. You acknowledge that my morality is objective, because there are millions of people who agree that it is wrong to commit murder, adultery, to exploit others, to steal etc etc.

It seems that there is an objective basis to morality after all.

No. I acknowledge that it is possible to point to the bible as an objective basis for morality. And if you do so, every moral decision should be decided with reference to the bible. It doesn't take two people to agree. It takes any person as long as they honestly follow the same rules even as a thought experiment.

Now personally I believe trying to follow biblical morality would be perverse.

But yes, you can point to the bible as an objective basis on which to make your moral decisions because it is objectively there. And if you do so, that (assuming the bible covers all eventualities) is how you can have an objective morality.

Which doesn't mean that a morality found by following the dictates of Confucius or the Qua'ran isn't equally objective.

quote:

quote:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
But I am using the term "subjective" to denote ideas that cannot exist in any form outside of any human mind (and by "human mind" I include all humanly devised information storage and retrieval systems, such as books, computers etc.). In other words, the ideas have originated in the human mind.
In short you are making up your own definitions. And given you are making up your own definitions no wonder you are projecting things.
Subjective: 1. belonging to, proceeding from, or relating to the mind of the thinking subject and not the nature of the object being considered. 2. of, relating to, or emanating from a person's emotions, prejudices, etc. 3. relating to the inherent nature of a person or thing; essential. 4. existing only as perceived and not as a thing in itself. (Collins)

In other words, subjective ideas are not valid outside the perception of the thinking subject.

Congratulations. You're worse than Dafyd. At least he tried to differentiate the meanings of the word.

1: God is a thinking subject.

2: Without a thinking being there are facts but no meaning. All meaning by your definition is subjective. Even God's unless God is so much less than a human that God does not think.

3: Even if you take "God's ideas" as objectively moral, that means absolutley nothing unless God communicates them clearly and unambiguously.

quote:
Well clearly there is an objective difference between the perfect mind of the creator of the whole universe, and fallible human minds. In fact, without this perfect mind there is no basis to rationality at all, it being merely a subjective emergent property of an entirely materialistic, and therefore mindless, process.

1: There is. The perfect mind does not and indeed can not logically exist.

2: Who the hell says that the mind can not emerge? Your logic misses more steps than usual here.

quote:
akes two for communication to succeed.

So what do we have from God? A book that does not factually match Creation and a collection of myths round one man. As a communicator, God sucks.

quote:
Given that God is the creator of our rationality, then there can actually be no concept of "good" contrary to the mind of God. It's not about arbitrary definitions; it's about the nature of something called "reality".

Given that my parents created me, there can be no concept of good that I can hold that is contrary to the mind of my parents.

Bollocks to that! It's called growing up.

quote:
[b]"Documents covering every possible moral eventuality"?? Where the hell did that straw man argument come from? You really have a very strange view of God.[/qb]

That is what you need to have an objective morality rather than subjectively using your perceptions to attempt to muddle through. You do not have an objective morality if you can not point to such a list of rules. You do if you can. It is as simple as that, and not about the nature of God.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Now in this debate, you are challenged as to your fundamental view of morality. You admit that you believe morality is entirely subjective, and you are challenged to acknowledge that the views of your opponent are intrinsically as valid as yours.

No. Just because I don't believe that morality has any existence outside the human brain doesn't mean I have to say all possible moral stances are on an equal footing.

quote:
If you fail to acknowledge this, then you are effectively admitting that morality is not subjective, because you would be appealing to some objective concept to judge that your opponent's views are "wrong".

Again, no. I can judge my opponent's views wrong based on my own morality, just as he can judge mine wrong based on his.

quote:
If you do acknowledge this, then it makes a mockery of your moral appeal to the viewers to support your position: "Please help me to keep these children alive, but I admit it's perfectly OK and good to let them die."

For a third time, no. I would appeal to the audience's compassion, empathy and love for others to make my case - but I would recognise that the decision to help or not is theirs to make, I wouldn't claim any power to compel obedience or force them to give if they don't want to.

And, as I said before, just because morality doesn't exist outside the human mind doesn't mean I have to think everything is good.

quote:
Such a position makes a farce of any expression of moral outrage against what is perceived to be evil.

False.

quote:
Now I suppose it could be argued that you could appeal to people's personal taste: "All you who love Marmite can give money to this cause, and all you who hate Marmite can support the opposing position."

I'm afraid reality doesn't work like that.

Oh yes, it bloody well does. Every charity pamphlet featuring a hungry child is aimed solely at those who don't like the idea of children being hungry. No charity stall featuring a poster of an abused puppy is aimed at dog haters. Political fundraisers from any party going know they're only going to get donations from those who already support their party's stance. Every advert ever put on a billboard, in a newspaper or on TV has a specific target audience, and marketing analysts can get very rich by working out who those target audiences are so that the companies don't waste money throwing adverts at people who simply aren't ever going to be interested.

That is reality, my friend.

Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
I would want to know why such a person, supposedly of "sound mind", wanted to reject the principle of, say, "do not commit murder".

What do you mean by murder? Is capital punishment murder? What about shooting enemy soldiers attempting to invade your country?

The historic meaning of the word "murder" = a secret killing. It looks like a simple, black and white prohibition to say "do not commit murder" because these gray areas have been removed by definition. This leaves us with little more than a tautology. Of course we have a sense that maybe we'd better not do something, when we know that others in society so strongly disapprove of it that we must sneak around and "cover our tracks." But include other types of human killing: enemy military, execution, euthanasia, abortion?, under the term-- which in most places people can do quite openly, get paid for it, and even get medals pinned to their chests, and suddenly we are in a roiling sea of controversy.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Now in this debate, you are challenged as to your fundamental view of morality. You admit that you believe morality is entirely subjective, and you are challenged to acknowledge that the views of your opponent are intrinsically as valid as yours.
No. Just because I don't believe that morality has any existence outside the human brain doesn't mean I have to say all possible moral stances are on an equal footing.

I was arguing on the assumption that you are a rational being. Of course, you can think what you like, based on what you had for breakfast. But if you want to be logically consistent, then I guess it's not too much to expect you to reveal what your criteria are to judge the status of different moral positions. I've asked for this numerous times, but all I get is: "Because that's what I think. Period."

Fine. You can say that, but at least it assures me that the philosophy which you espouse is irrational.

quote:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
If you fail to acknowledge this, then you are effectively admitting that morality is not subjective, because you would be appealing to some objective concept to judge that your opponent's views are "wrong".
Again, no. I can judge my opponent's views wrong based on my own morality, just as he can judge mine wrong based on his.

See my answer above.

quote:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
If you do acknowledge this, then it makes a mockery of your moral appeal to the viewers to support your position: "Please help me to keep these children alive, but I admit it's perfectly OK and good to let them die."
For a third time, no. I would appeal to the audience's compassion, empathy and love for others to make my case - but I would recognise that the decision to help or not is theirs to make, I wouldn't claim any power to compel obedience or force them to give if they don't want to.

Who said anything about "forcing" people?!?

I am talking about putting a rational case, not putting a gun to anyone's head.

I really find it hard to understand how someone, in this scenario, could admit philosophically that his opponent's morality is just as valid as his own (which is what subjective morality actually implies), and then carry on trying to appeal to his audience to support his position.

Going back to my example of Question Time with Nick Griffin: just imagine if Jack Straw or Bonny Greer came out with the following: "Nick Griffin's moral views are perfectly valid, because morality is entirely subjective and relative, but we just appeal to you to reject his policies and his party as evil and vile, even though we know that we cannot appeal to your minds, because we have no philosophical basis for condemning his outlook."

Yeah, sure. What were you saying about "reality" again?

quote:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Such a position makes a farce of any expression of moral outrage against what is perceived to be evil.
False.

Errm... nope.

See comment above.

quote:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Now I suppose it could be argued that you could appeal to people's personal taste: "All you who love Marmite can give money to this cause, and all you who hate Marmite can support the opposing position."

I'm afraid reality doesn't work like that.
Oh yes, it bloody well does. Every charity pamphlet featuring a hungry child is aimed solely at those who don't like the idea of children being hungry. No charity stall featuring a poster of an abused puppy is aimed at dog haters. Political fundraisers from any party going know they're only going to get donations from those who already support their party's stance. Every advert ever put on a billboard, in a newspaper or on TV has a specific target audience, and marketing analysts can get very rich by working out who those target audiences are so that the companies don't waste money throwing adverts at people who simply aren't ever going to be interested.

That is reality, my friend.

'Fraid not, pal.

I have never yet seen a charity produce a leaflet that says something along the lines of this (even implicitly):

"Please support us in our work to combat child abuse, even though we know - and you also know - that child abuse isn't necessarily wrong. But we just appeal to you to take our side in this unresolvable issue, based on what you happen to feel like right now."

No. Charities push their case by claiming that their moral position is RIGHT, and therefore the opposing position is WRONG.

Now THAT IS REALITY!!

Sorry if you don't like it.

Posted by Mockingale (# 16599) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
... if morality is entirely subjective (as has been suggested here, and elsewhere on this thread)?

If morality is merely a matter of opinion, merely a matter of taste

It seems that you've set up something of a strawman. There are some bits of morality that are essentially universal - homicide (generally), slander, rape (generally) and cowardice are condemned the world 'round, regardless of a society's religious grounding or lack thereof, though the exact details may vary (I think C.S. Lewis talks about this early on in Mere Christianity).

But beyond the specifics, a lot of rules are just made up and vary by culture. Observant Muslims consider the consumption of alcohol to be inherently immoral, as do some Christians, but other Christians and, generally speaking, Jews have no prohibition on alcohol consumption beyond a warning against excess. Christians consider remarriage after divorce to be a sin, but the Jews and the Muslims and most other cultures do not. Polygamy was once broadly accepted, and still is in some cultures, but is now condemned by most in the West.

Slavery was seen as permissible until only about 200 years ago, and now it is considered the height of moral depravity to profit in any way from forced labor.

Not even the biggies are universal moral absolutes. Every society prohibits as "murder" certain kinds of killings, but the devil is in the details. Is killing in combat 'murder'? State executions? As recently as the 20th century in countries who base their laws on the English tradition, it was impossible to rape one's own wife, because she had no right to refuse sex to her husband.

The law, even from a "natural law" standpoint, is fluid because at various times in history we view certain behaviors as immoral and at other times we view them as no big deal.

The moral laws that are the longest-lasting and most ubiquitous are those without which civil order is impossible. We can't have order when people regularly engage in vendetta killings with impunity, or where a person's home, possessions and family can be taken from him by a stronger neighbor without recourse. Those laws can just as easily be explained by some sociological or biological imperative to maintain group cohesion and cooperation as they can be explained by the existence of a natural law created by God.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Mockingale
Those laws can just as easily be explained by some sociological or biological imperative to maintain group cohesion and cooperation as they can be explained by the existence of a natural law created by God.

If the former explanation is true, then I assume you agree that any concept of "universal human rights" is a myth?

And that any expression of outrage at the morality of another culture - and indeed of another person - has no rational basis? If it does have a rational basis, then presumably there must exist some set of criteria independent of any culture by which we can judge whether any particular moral code is right or not? And if there is no such thing as "right" concerning morality, then what exactly could we become outraged about?

By the way... on the subject of details, context and application, I did actually write the following:

quote:
I agree entirely that the kind of "objective morality" that always prescribes certain fixed principles that are binding in every context, is wrong. Even the Bible does not promote that kind of morality, hence Jesus acknowledging that David was right to eat the shewbread that only the priests were permitted to eat, because he was hungry (the alleviation of hunger therefore trumping religious law). Or the nation of Israel being founded on the twelve tribes descended from men who were the product of bigamy and (technically according to NT teaching) adultery (i.e. Jacob's sexual liaisons). Or Rahab being praised in the New Testament for having performed a work, which involved lying with regard to the spies in Jericho. I could go on and on in the same vein...

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
I was arguing on the assumption that you are a rational being. Of course, you can think what you like, based on what you had for breakfast. But if you want to be logically consistent, then I guess it's not too much to expect you to reveal what your criteria are to judge the status of different moral positions. I've asked for this numerous times, but all I get is: "Because that's what I think. Period."

I mentioned two such criteria here. There are others.

quote:
Fine. You can say that, but at least it assures me that the philosophy which you espouse is irrational.

If you want to define rationality as only that which is codified in an objective external manner, then I proudly claim the title.

quote:
I am talking about putting a rational case, not putting a gun to anyone's head.

I wouldn't be putting forward a rational case in the interview you devised. I would be appealing to the moral sense of the audience in the hope that more of them agreed with me than with my opponent.

quote:
I really find it hard to understand how someone, in this scenario, could admit philosophically that his opponent's morality is just as valid as his own (which is what subjective morality actually implies), and then carry on trying to appeal to his audience to support his position.

Subjective morality does not imply that all moral stances are equal, it merely states that there is no morality outside of the human mind.

Besides which, even if I know that there's no external objective proof for my own moral code, I can still believe in it.

quote:
Going back to my example of Question Time with Nick Griffin: just imagine if Jack Straw or Bonny Greer came out with the following: "Nick Griffin's moral views are perfectly valid, because morality is entirely subjective and relative, but we just appeal to you to reject his policies and his party as evil and vile, even though we know that we cannot appeal to your minds, because we have no philosophical basis for condemning his outlook."

Why on earth would they say something like that, as opposed to "we believe the policies of the BNP are evil and vile"?

Though I'll agree with you on one thing - we can't convince people of our morality with reason. Morality is more of an emotional thing.

quote:
"Please support us in our work to combat child abuse, even though we know - and you also know - that child abuse isn't necessarily wrong. But we just appeal to you to take our side in this unresolvable issue, based on what you happen to feel like right now."

For fuck's sake. If I believe something is wrong then I believe it is wrong. That doesn't change just because I also adknowledge that there is no objective standard of morality to back it up or prove it. [Roll Eyes]

Posted by Drewthealexander (# 16660) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Alogon:

quote:
Originally posted by Drewthealexander:
You've assumed that any act on an unwilling person is unacceptable.
No, I've merely noted that an act on an unwilling person is unacceptable to that person. And being so, it can never be said to be universally acceptable. This looks like elementary logic to me.

I'm with you. Since the person being done to is part of the universe, an act on them against their wishes cannot be universally acceptable. It would have been clearer to suggest that war rape (as currently defined) could theoretically become an acceptable social norm in all societies in the the absence of objective morality.

If you have a better illustration Alogon, I would welcome it.

Posted by Mockingale (# 16599) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
If the former explanation is true, then I assume you agree that any concept of "universal human rights" is a myth?

I think that there can be, and is broad consensus on certain human rights. But I don't think the consensus is timeless or immutable. No society (with the exception perhaps of pure authoritarian hellholes like North Korea) around today views slavery as a permissible human state, or torture as an acceptable treatment of prisoners. But in the sixteenth century torture and slavery were commonplace and condoned openly by the churches and powers-that-were. Like I said, murder and theft are both universal and long-standing taboos, but with considerable flexibility regarding what killings were justified.

quote:

And that any expression of outrage at the morality of another culture - and indeed of another person - has no rational basis? If it does have a rational basis, then presumably there must exist some set of criteria independent of any culture by which we can judge whether any particular moral code is right or not? And if there is no such thing as "right" concerning morality, then what exactly could we become outraged about?

A vegetarian who abstains from consuming meat because he considers animal slaughter to be anathema has a rational basis for his outrage, in that as he perceives right and wrong, animals are entitled to a right to live. I don't think that animal slaughter is wrong and I feel no guilt or remorse for enjoying a hamburger. We can safely assume that the vegetarian isn't arbitrarily feigning outrage and that I am not a sociopath. There is no universal moral position on killing animals for food. Does that mean that neither of us is rational?

My moral beliefs are informed in part because of my upbringing, in part because of my Christian faith, and in part because of the society I grew up in. I'm sure that the Holy Spirit guides me to discern right from wrong, but I don't think that Christianity is "proved" by the existence of universal moral principles to which all people subscribe regardless of religion. To the small extent that all of humanity agrees on moral principles, those principles are equally susceptible of secular explanations as they are of appeal to a notion of "natural law."

Posted by Mockingale (# 16599) on :

I'll qualify my previous statements. I don't think there is such a thing as universal, immutable rights, but I think that there are certain qualities that are universal. Compassion, honesty, humility, courage, integrity, fairness/justice, temperance, wisdom, etc. are universal values to which a person can appeal to any other person when promoting certain moral and ethical policies.

Where people disagree is the application of these universal virtues to certain behaviors, in part because we come with different cultural assumptions about the character of our behaviors.

Posted by Alogon (# 5513) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo:
I don't have to go past your rape case, actually, because for a very long time the view was taken that a husband COULDN'T RAPE HIS WIFE. Once she's said 'I do', there was no capacity for her to say on a given night that she didn't.

It was taken as a matter of law, I suppose (perhaps as an effect of divorce being difficult to get and a great social stigma), but I doubt that the average husband was ever that insensitive.

And as a matter of law, I'm not so sure that it's a problem for my statement, as there are other examples. Do they refute me, or merely point up the great importance attached to certain decisions, one of which is marriage? It is understandable if a spouse would rather decline sex on certain occasions; but if these become the rule rather then the exception, he or she should has no right to count on staying married. An old friend, recently deceased on the verge of his hundredth birthday, once told me that long ago his wife had refused to have sex with him ever again. What's a guy to do? I have no idea why this happened, but that he continued to care for her until her dying day, if only for the kids, made him something of a saint IMHO.

If we don't think that we can keep a promise, then don't make it. Buying a house is a similar example. How much patience should a bank have with a borrower who explains that he just doesn't feel like paying his mortgate this month?

quote:
It is also perfectly possible in any particular case to have a situation where a woman is so beaten down psychologically, or even a whole group of women are beaten down psychologically, that they've accepted the idea that their consent doesn't really matter and that if a man wants what he wants, he'll just take it.

The way you put it demonstrates your disagreement with such subjugation, which I share. But there is considerable wiggle room in whom that statement would apply to. Some feminists hold that no woman would ever have sex with a man unless she had been beaten down or deceived psychologically. Age-of-consent has also been grist for some remarkable exercises in Newspeak.

[ 24. July 2012, 19:26: Message edited by: Alogon ]

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Mockingale

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
And that any expression of outrage at the morality of another culture - and indeed of another person - has no rational basis? If it does have a rational basis, then presumably there must exist some set of criteria independent of any culture by which we can judge whether any particular moral code is right or not? And if there is no such thing as "right" concerning morality, then what exactly could we become outraged about?
A vegetarian who abstains from consuming meat because he considers animal slaughter to be anathema has a rational basis for his outrage, in that as he perceives right and wrong, animals are entitled to a right to live. I don't think that animal slaughter is wrong and I feel no guilt or remorse for enjoying a hamburger. We can safely assume that the vegetarian isn't arbitrarily feigning outrage and that I am not a sociopath. There is no universal moral position on killing animals for food. Does that mean that neither of us is rational?

If I were a committed vegetarian, I would probably feel and express outrage at the practice of animal slaughter. I may not have thought through my views in a philosophical way, and I may be driven entirely by my emotions. But emotions can be conceptualised; in other words, there are ideas behind emotions, even if those ideas are subconscious. So this is what my feelings would be saying: "I am personally repulsed by the practice of animal slaughter. I believe that 'meat is murder'. I find it outrageous and horrifying that animals should be used as food for humans."

As I say, these ideas - whether articulated to myself or not - would drive my feelings. Now let's just draw out the logic of these ideas. Would I be saying that I am outraged at the practice of animal slaughter but only as it pertained to me? Would I be expressing revulsion merely at the thought of me eating meat, but I would be quite happy for others to eat it? Of course not! My moral outrage is driven by a deep-seated belief that animal slaughter is wrong for anyone and in any situation. In other words, the legitimacy of my outrage is based on my belief that the slaughter of animals (especially for food) is universally wrong.

And the converse is true. As a non-vegetarian (which is, in fact, what I am), I am (mildly) outraged at the idea that anyone should be banned from eating meat (other than for legitimate medical reasons). In other words, my outrage is based on a belief that it is universally right that everyone should have the freedom to eat meat, while respecting the freedom of those who choose not to. It would be absurd for me to say the following: "I am outraged at the imposition of vegetarian ethics on people, but actually my outrage only applies to me and not to anyone else." How self-centred.

Now, of course, both these rationally held "universal moral principles" are contradictory and they both cannot therefore be true. One of them must be false. And it is quite possible that neither party has any evidence at all to prove that either of these principles is, in fact, universally valid. I guess you could say that the respective principles are held "by faith" - or perhaps "by intuition".

Nevertheless, they are both universal principles within the minds of those who hold them. So I guess you could say that they are "subjectively held universal principles", which sounds self-contradictory.

This is clearly a paradox. How do we make sense of it?

If we believe that morality is merely an emergent property of matter being configured in a certain way by an entirely blind, mindless and amoral process, then it is, by necessity, subjective, since the only conceivable source of morality is the human mind - or brain (to put it materialistically). Since different minds think different things, then this does not help us to perceive a consistent moral position, and even if a universally consistent moral position did emerge materialistically, there would be no necessity for it to do so.

But the reality of our lives shows us that moral convictions make no sense unless those with such convictions believe that their moral position is objectively "right", as I have shown in my vegetarianism example.

In other words, the philosophical naturalist either can have no moral convictions, or he has to lie in relation to his philosophy in order to make his moral convictions work (by claiming that some principles are right and others wrong while believing that morality is essentially subjective). I am well aware that someone like Marvin will say that such a person can just say "I am right about this" while claiming that morality is subjective. Anyone can say anything if they like, just in the same way that I can write here that "Elvis Presley is the Queen of England"! There is no law against that absurd sequence of letters! But I can hardly pretend to be rational by writing this.

This paradox suggests to me that there is indeed an objective basis to morality, but we fallible human beings have to work it out. So we have a strong sense that there must be objective and universal right and wrong (at the level of basic principles), but we disagree on what those principles are - or how they should be applied in most if not all situations.

This arrangement may not seem particularly satisfactory to many people - whether on the naturalistic side or the religious fundamentalist and especially theocratic side, but it seems that this is the reality that God has given us. Reality is inescapably moral, but we have to work out how to live out that morality. I don't pretend that it's easy.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
It seems to me that the subjective/objective split is not the real disagreement in these exchanges. Rather the line is between moral or ethical naturalists and non naturalists.

You may well be right. Certainly I'm coming to the conclusion that the argument is really over whether the letter O is better than the letters SU.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx
It seems to me that the subjective/objective split is not the real disagreement in these exchanges. Rather the line is between moral or ethical naturalists and non naturalists.

Am I arguing against naturalism in these exchanges? Is that my agenda?

Answer: Yes, most certainly. Guilty as charged.

(BTW... I assume you're the Grokesx from the Beeb?

If so, then you may or may not know that I am your old sparring partner. You know - the Dunning-Kruger one with the stupid Latin name!
[Big Grin]

Anyway... whether you are or not, welcome to the Ship.)

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

@LSV/EE

Thanks for the welcome

Yeah, you mentioned this place once a while back. Now Will's blog seems to have shut up shop, I thought I'd wibble here instead. I dare say we'll manage to argue long and boringly at the arse end of a good few threads as per usual.

Without the Auntie's moderation policy, I'll try to watch my potty mouth. The typos will be just as bad, though.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Alogon:

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo:
I don't have to go past your rape case, actually, because for a very long time the view was taken that a husband COULDN'T RAPE HIS WIFE. Once she's said 'I do', there was no capacity for her to say on a given night that she didn't.
It was taken as a matter of law, I suppose (perhaps as an effect of divorce being difficult to get and a great social stigma), but I doubt that the average husband was ever that insensitive.

I doubt that the average husband a few centuries back thought there was the slightest need to check whether his wife was in the mood this evening. Being available for sex was part of her job description.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
If it's possible for a person to rationally reject the principle and choose another one, then how can you say they're objective?
Well, I would want to know why such a person, supposedly of "sound mind", wanted to reject the principle of, say, "do not commit murder". I suspect Harold Shipman was "rational" in a way, otherwise his crimes would not have eluded detection for so long. He was clearly able to think logically about how to cover his tracks.

Just because a concept can be rejected does not mean that it is not objectively valid.

Murder is a dreadful example to pick, because the word 'murder' simply means unlawful killing. It's circular.

Try 'do not kill'. And you will find a variety of opinions as to the exceptions to this rule, and which ones are justifiable so that the killing is not murder. Self-defence. Defence of others. Capital punishment. War. Provocation (an excuse which is now being eliminated in many places).

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
Murder is a dreadful example to pick, because the word 'murder' simply means unlawful killing. It's circular.

Well waddya know! You're right! My bad.

But since you clearly tacitly acknowledge that logic is objectively valid (otherwise you would not have been able to call me out on my little bit of circularity), perhaps you may also like to preach the gospel of logic to those on this thread who are implicitly saying: "I adamantly believe this is right. I express my moral indignation at those who hold a contrary position. But actually I admit that they're not wrong!" (Which is what the protests and moral indignation of the moral subjectivist boils down to).

Yes, you've got me on a little error. Now show some integrity and go for the biggy.

Or are there different rules for different people?

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Nevertheless, they are both universal principles within the minds of those who hold them. So I guess you could say that they are "subjectively held universal principles", which sounds self-contradictory.

What you're really describing is the subjectively-held belief that something should be a universal principle. There's no contradiction or paradox when it's phrased that way.

quote:
If we believe that morality is merely an emergent property of matter being configured in a certain way by an entirely blind, mindless and amoral process, then it is, by necessity, subjective, since the only conceivable source of morality is the human mind - or brain (to put it materialistically).

Indeed

quote:
Since different minds think different things, then this does not help us to perceive a consistent moral position, and even if a universally consistent moral position did emerge materialistically, there would be no necessity for it to do so.

1) why do we need to percieve a universally consistent moral position?

2) if such a position does in fact exist (as I think can be argued for morals like "don't murder"), does it matter whether it was necessary for it to do so?

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
...those on this thread who are implicitly saying: "I adamantly believe this is right. I express my moral indignation at those who hold a contrary position. But actually I admit that they're not wrong!"

I adamantly believe that sweetcorn is disgusting. I cannot understand how anyone could find it to be delicious. Nevertheless, I do not think those who do find it delicious are wrong to do so - but that doesn't stop me wanting to rid the world of its hideousness!

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
Murder is a dreadful example to pick, because the word 'murder' simply means unlawful killing. It's circular.
Well waddya know! You're right! My bad.

But since you clearly tacitly acknowledge that logic is objectively valid (otherwise you would not have been able to call me out on my little bit of circularity), perhaps you may also like to preach the gospel of logic to those on this thread who are implicitly saying: "I adamantly believe this is right. I express my moral indignation at those who hold a contrary position. But actually I admit that they're not wrong!" (Which is what the protests and moral indignation of the moral subjectivist boils down to).

Yes, you've got me on a little error. Now show some integrity and go for the biggy.

Or are there different rules for different people?

I actually think Marvin has addressed this as well as it can be addressed. There's a subtle but logically critical difference between arguing for your favoured point of view because of what you consider to be its advantages, and arguing for your favoured point of view because it's objectively right.

And that word 'believe' in there is also important. 'I believe' is a subjective statment. It can be a really, strong, passionate belief, but the form of words 'I believe' is at its core about your opinion.

And the reverse of that is inevitably to say 'I believe you're wrong' not to flat out say 'you're wrong'. For you to turn that into 'I admit they're not wrong' is really just to turn it into a form of 'they're not objectively wrong because I don't think there's an objective standard'. In no way would it preclude arguments along the lines of 'I think you should change your mind and here's why'.

The fundamental difference here is simply that the goal of a subjective argument is to persuade, and the goal of an objective argument is to prove.

PS Logic is 'objectively' valid... that's a whole other can of worms right there. And it's giving me minor flashbacks to previous conversations, because logic, like so many other fields, relies on axioms - things that are assumed and not capable of being separately proved.

Also, it's not clear to me that my argument was one of 'logic' so much as one of definition...

PPS How exactly do you measure the size of logical errors, anyway?...

[ 25. July 2012, 09:13: Message edited by: orfeo ]

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
"I adamantly believe this is right. I express my moral indignation at those who hold a contrary position. But actually I admit that they're not wrong!"

There is only a logical inconsistency there if you insist on taking 'right' and 'wrong' in antithetical senses. But that's not what the moral subjectivist does. The moral subjectivist means by 'right' 'right according to my moral standards', and by 'wrong' 'wrong according to the view from nowhere's moral standards'. And so there is no inconsistency.

There is, of course, an inconsistency from the point of view of the listener - who doesn't need to care about the moral subjectivist's moral standards - which is a problem for moral subjectivism. But that's a different problem.

Posted by Pre-cambrian (# 2055) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo:
I actually think Marvin has addressed this as well as it can be addressed. There's a subtle but logically critical difference between arguing for your favoured point of view because of what you consider to be its advantages, and arguing for your favoured point of view because it's objectively right.

This mention of favoured views and advantages also points to another aspect which is perhaps why EE so often ends up where he does. He seems to be painting questions of morality as a black and white duality of absolutes where one answer is "right" and the other "wrong". But actually in most scenarios we hold a position because we think it is better than alternative views. In that case there is every chance that we may be persuaded that a further, new, alternative may be better still, or than one of the existing alternatives may seem better with reconsideration of the evidence (or stronger tugging on the emotions).

If you look at things as comparatives rather than as absolutes such as best, worst, right or wrong then you are much less likely to conclude that morality is objective.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Pre-cambrian:
If you look at things as comparatives rather than as absolutes such as best, worst, right or wrong then you are much less likely to conclude that morality is objective.

No - that doesn't follow (at least not in the sense that EE is using 'objective' and 'subjective').
Comparatives and absolutes are just as meaningful or not if you think morality is independent of you as a moralist or if you think it isn't.

A moral subjectivist is somewhat less likely to think that certain actions should be avoided for their own sake: moral imperatives - e.g. you may not torture even terrorists, you may not ever have sex with someone other than your spouse, etc - are less likely to appeal to a subjectivist. But that's not a hard and fast rule.

Counterintuitively, I think the most likely kinds of deontological rule to be adopted by asubjectivist might adopt are those where an action is accompanied by a strong 'yuk' reaction. So, subjectivists, abstracting from historical reasons, are just as likely as moral objectivists to have stringent rules about what kinds of sexual activity are acceptable.

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:

quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
It seems to me that the subjective/objective split is not the real disagreement in these exchanges. Rather the line is between moral or ethical naturalists and non naturalists.
You may well be right. Certainly I'm coming to the conclusion that the argument is really over whether the letter O is better than the letters SU.

Something like that. In fact I see three camps here and a lot of fire from within the middle camp (the third one below) that more or less agrees with itself.

1: "True Moral Objectivists". Deontologists. People who believe that there is an explicit and codified set of rules that we can follow and the act of following those rules makes it right because those rules are right.

2: "True Moral Subjectivists". People from the extreme school of post-modernism that threw the baby out of the bathwater and believe that there is no such thing as objective reality - everything is a social construction. (Or one or two other possibilities).

3: "The muddling through". People who believe that some things are objectively true, but that we can not ever have enough knowledge ourselves to be able to objectively behave perfectly morally in every situation. We can just do the best we can. We're both part of the muddling through.

Oh, and
4: Nihilists. People who don't believe in morality at all. Or that there's any code that matters beyond "Want, take, have, avoid punishment"

And @Drewthealexander, the rape example is not theoretical. See the example of "conjugal rights"/marital rape.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
1: "True Moral Objectivists". Deontologists. People who believe that there is an explicit and codified set of rules that we can follow and the act of following those rules makes it right because those rules are right.

A deontologist needn't believe that there's an explicit and codified set of rules. See Kant, for an obvious counterexample, or Scanlon or Rawls. For that matter, there's nothing logically preventing a non-realist ('subjectivist') from being a deontologist. (Emotivists generally won't be; contractarians generally will be.)
Other ethical realists ('objectivists') include classical utilitarians and eudaimonists. G E Moore was a consequentialist intuitionist.

The archetypal non-realist ('subjectivist') is David Hume.

I propose talking about realism vs non-realism instead of objectivism vs subjectivism since I think 'objectivism' vs 'subjectivism' raise too many irrelevant associations for most people.

Ethical non-realists:
1. Contractarians(*). Believe moral statements are rules constructed to keep society going. (? Constructed by which part of society for whose benefit?)
2. Emotivists. Believe moral statements are expressions of emotion (approval or disapproval) or else are implicit commands. (? Isn't the point of doing so voided if the other party recognises this?)
3. Fictionalists. Believe that moral statements are fictional as if statements. (? As if what? It's hard to see how you can have fictional moral statements that aren't derived from something non-fictional.)

Ethical realists:
1. Divine Command theorists. Good and evil or right and wrong are what God says they are. (? Which revelation do you pick? Also, few revelations have much in the way of detailed casuistry attached.)
2. Formalists. Believe that moral rules are derived from basic properties of rationality. (? Runs the risk of being purely empty, or set up to give the required answer.)
3. Intuitionists. Believe moral properties or values are out there and we can just sense them. (? How? And how do we explain disagreement then?)
4. Naturalists. Believe moral properties are derived from natural facts of some kind. (? How do we get across the is-ought divide? And what natural facts determine is moral is highly ambiguous.)

The above are meta-ethical divisions: they say what kind of thing ethics is and what it's talking about. Substantive ethics - whether ethics is deontological or consequentialist or virtue-based - is to at least some extent logically independent of most of the above.

(*) Contractarianism and contractualism are used interchangeably to describe what I think are two quite different types of metaethical theory. There are those who think ethics describes what an ideal community of rational agents would decide - Rawlsian contractarians, and then there are those who think ethics describes what a real world group of human beings have implicitly decided - Hobbesian contractarians. I'm referring here to the Hobbesian type. I think it's better viewed as a form of non-realism, although I can see arguments the other way.

[ 26. July 2012, 15:38: Message edited by: Dafyd ]

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
Something like that. In fact I see three camps here and a lot of fire from within the middle camp (the third one below) that more or less agrees with itself.

I'd be tempted to (put/)split 4 with True Nihilists as a subgroup of 2.
And have a subgroup of 1 for Richard III and Huck Finn ("since I have determined to be a villain", "fine I'll go to hell") and other people who believe in a real right and wrong but go against what they perceive it to be.

But there's definitely many agreement over the actual actions, (in analogy) we might disagree as to whether the earth goes round the sun or the sun round the earth but we can tell which constellation Jupiter is going to be in.

Posted by angelfish (# 8884) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
...those on this thread who are implicitly saying: "I adamantly believe this is right. I express my moral indignation at those who hold a contrary position. But actually I admit that they're not wrong!"
I adamantly believe that sweetcorn is disgusting. I cannot understand how anyone could find it to be delicious. Nevertheless, I do not think those who do find it delicious are wrong to do so - but that doesn't stop me wanting to rid the world of its hideousness!

Say that again, but substitute "child rape" for sweetcorn. Really? You want to compare moral outrage to food preference?

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
1: "True Moral Objectivists". Deontologists. People who believe that there is an explicit and codified set of rules that we can follow and the act of following those rules makes it right because those rules are right.
A deontologist needn't believe that there's an explicit and codified set of rules. See Kant, for an obvious counterexample, or Scanlon or Rawls. For that matter, there's nothing logically preventing a non-realist ('subjectivist') from being a deontologist. (Emotivists generally won't be; contractarians generally will be.)

Point.

quote:
Other ethical realists ('objectivists') include classical utilitarians and eudaimonists.

It might be wise to avoid the term Objectivist when talking about ethics and philosophy as it also refers to a philosophical school of thought - and not one most philosophers want to be associated with.

quote:
I propose talking about realism vs non-realism instead of objectivism vs subjectivism since I think 'objectivism' vs 'subjectivism' raise too many irrelevant associations for most people.

Might be better [Smile]

My critique of the categories you outline may just be a personal one - but I'm simulataniously a Contractarian, a Formalist, an Intuitionist, and a Naturalist.

Actually what I am, I think, is a pragmatist. I believe that there are ultimately two schools of ethics - those seeking moral guidance and those seeking moral justification (or "the search for a superior justification for self interest" - I'm sure I'm quoting someone but can't google it).

And ultimately from my observation it doesn't matter where those seeking moral guidance set out from. They almost all appear to end up at a version of The Golden Rule. I get there numerous ways, including atheist epistemology (and know of other ways there that I don't follow; notably Divine Command theory).

And the very diversity of routes there that reassures me that it's the right place for a foundation. (I also distrust the Divine Command group because it appears to only be by coincidence that many of ended up here, and they are scattered all over the map).

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
...those on this thread who are implicitly saying: "I adamantly believe this is right. I express my moral indignation at those who hold a contrary position. But actually I admit that they're not wrong!"
I adamantly believe that sweetcorn is disgusting. I cannot understand how anyone could find it to be delicious. Nevertheless, I do not think those who do find it delicious are wrong to do so - but that doesn't stop me wanting to rid the world of its hideousness!
Say that again, but substitute "child rape" for sweetcorn. Really? You want to compare moral outrage to food preference?

There is at least a theoretical argument that even deciding that child rape is important and that food choices aren't is a moral choice. Heck, look at the Bible. Quite a bit of text spent on foods that mustn't be eaten. Not much text on the age of consent that I can recall.

Our priorities have shifted. What is it that makes current priorities 'right' and theirs 'wrong'?

[ 26. July 2012, 22:40: Message edited by: orfeo ]

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
Say that again, but substitute "child rape" for sweetcorn. Really? You want to compare moral outrage to food preference?

In terms of the mental processes that cause us to come to conclusions about what is right and wrong, yes.

Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo:
There is at least a theoretical argument that even deciding that child rape is important and that food choices aren't is a moral choice. Heck, look at the Bible. Quite a bit of text spent on foods that mustn't be eaten. Not much text on the age of consent that I can recall.

Our priorities have shifted. What is it that makes current priorities 'right' and theirs 'wrong'?

Progress?

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
Say that again, but substitute "child rape" for sweetcorn. Really? You want to compare moral outrage to food preference?
In terms of the mental processes that cause us to come to conclusions about what is right and wrong, yes.

There's the little issue of consent here and the one of protecting children - and there are a lot of ways, both empirical and logical, to get to the idea that consent is pretty damn important, and more to the idea that children should be protected.

There is, on the other hand, precisely one mental process that gets you to the idea that sweetcorn should be wiped out.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Justinian:
There's the little issue of consent here and the one of protecting children - and there are a lot of ways, both empirical and logical, to get to the idea that consent is pretty damn important, and more to the idea that children should be protected.

There is, on the other hand, precisely one mental process that gets you to the idea that sweetcorn should be wiped out.

Absolutely. There are many reasons why child rape is wrong (many of which are themselves products of several individual moral processes (and so ad infinitum)), and only one reason why sweetcorn is wrong. That, I am sure, goes a long way to determining the difference in severity that we perceive between the two issues.

Nevertheless, when all the rationalising has been stripped away it still eventually comes back to "I don't like this" in both cases.

Posted by angelfish (# 8884) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
There are many reasons why child rape is wrong (many of which are themselves products of several individual moral processes (and so ad infinitum)), and only one reason why sweetcorn is wrong. That, I am sure, goes a long way to determining the difference in severity that we perceive between the two issues.

Nevertheless, when all the rationalising has been stripped away it still eventually comes back to "I don't like this" in both cases.

I think you are being disingenuous here. If you saw a child being raped, every fibre of your being would be screaming for the perpetrator to stop. You wouldn't have that reaction to seeing a person eating sweetcorn, or even to a person encouraging a child to eat sweetcorn. The fact that you dislike both things to varying degrees, does not mean that they are of the same category.

Posted by tclune (# 7959) on :

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
I think you are being disingenuous here. If you saw a child being raped, every fibre of your being would be screaming for the perpetrator to stop.

Tell that to the Penn State coaching staff...

--Tom Clune

Posted by Justinian (# 5357) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
Nevertheless, when all the rationalising has been stripped away it still eventually comes back to "I don't like this" in both cases.

Like hell it does! In the baby's case it comes back to "This is hurting a living baby." And I consider that to matter more than whatever revulsion I may (and indeed do) have about the abuse.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

An awful lot of you are using circular reasoning to tell Marvin what he would feel, without articulating WHY he would feel it.

That's his point, really.

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Boogie:

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo:
There is at least a theoretical argument that even deciding that child rape is important and that food choices aren't is a moral choice. Heck, look at the Bible. Quite a bit of text spent on foods that mustn't be eaten. Not much text on the age of consent that I can recall.

Our priorities have shifted. What is it that makes current priorities 'right' and theirs 'wrong'?
Progress?

Arguably, yes. Although 'change' would be a more neutral term that wouldn't involve outright asserting that our priorities are the 'better' ones. Just because we're sure that they are.

For one thing, our food supply is a lot safer. Less to worry about there.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo:
An awful lot of you are using circular reasoning to tell Marvin what he would feel, without articulating WHY he would feel it.

That's his point, really.

For sure.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Pre-cambrian
This mention of favoured views and advantages also points to another aspect which is perhaps why EE so often ends up where he does. He seems to be painting questions of morality as a black and white duality of absolutes where one answer is "right" and the other "wrong". But actually in most scenarios we hold a position because we think it is better than alternative views.

A rather simplistic and naive reading of my comments, which fails to acknowledge that I have affirmed that there are many moral issues which are relative to context, and I have clearly explained that objective morality does not imply any kind of legalistic straitjacket that is imposed without reference to circumstances.

I have also asked (in my post which I linked to above) how it's possible to ascertain whether one moral principle is "better" than another in the absence of any kind of objective criteria by which we can make such a judgment.

I am all for improvement. But what is "improvement"? How is it defined? On what basis, if that basis itself is also entirely subjective?

It's ludicrous to say that "a" is better than "b" if there is no independent standard by which to measure one against the other. I would have thought that was obvious.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
It's ludicrous to say that "a" is better than "b" if there is no independent standard by which to measure one against the other. I would have thought that was obvious.

Clearly it isn't obvious. Probably because it's complete rubbish.

Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good music is? No. But people still think one band is better than another.

Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good art is? No. But people still think one painting is better than another.

Is there an independent standard by which to measure fashion? No. But people still think one outfit is better than another.

Need I go on? It is quite clearly possible to say that "a" is better than "b" without having an independent standard by which to measure one against the other.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
It's ludicrous to say that "a" is better than "b" if there is no independent standard by which to measure one against the other. I would have thought that was obvious.
Clearly it isn't obvious. Probably because it's complete rubbish.

Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good music is? No. But people still think one band is better than another.

Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good art is? No. But people still think one painting is better than another.

Is there an independent standard by which to measure fashion? No. But people still think one outfit is better than another.

Need I go on? It is quite clearly possible to say that "a" is better than "b" without having an independent standard by which to measure one against the other.

Yes, you do need to go on, because you have not bothered to give an example that actually concerns morality.

Funny, but I thought that that was what this thread was supposed to be about!

I quite agree that you can dream up all sorts of examples that have no moral relevance, which, as you may remember, was what I referred to in the OP concerning taste for different foods. I explained right at the beginning of this thread that it is nonsense to compare moral issues with personal tastes.

Personal taste is something of no relevance to anyone else. Morality is.

So clearly your analogies are totally irrelevant.

Do feel free to have another go...

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Yes, you do need to go on, because you have not bothered to give an example that actually concerns morality.

You said it's ludicrous to say that "a" is better than "b" if there is no independent standard by which to measure one against the other. I provided three examples of situations where it is not, in fact, ludicrous to say that at all.

Perhaps you should explain why morality is an exception?

quote:
I explained right at the beginning of this thread that it is nonsense to compare moral issues with personal tastes.

No you didn't. What you said in the OP boils down to "because we feel really strongly about (some) moral issues, they must therefore be based on an independent and objective standard".

The logic there is sketchy, to say the least.

quote:
Personal taste is something of no relevance to anyone else. Morality is.

This is an interesting thing for you to have said. Why is your personal moral code any more relevant to me than your taste in clothes or music?

I've long suspected that the underlying question behind all this is not so much "how can we know what's good if morality is all in our heads", but "how can we get others to convert to our moral code without an external authority with which to convince them". This comment of yours seems to support that view.

Posted by angelfish (# 8884) on :

Isn't EE's point that a personal moral code is of no relevance to others, whereas we mostly all agree that morality is relevant to the whole of society, which itself points to morality being of a different category to matters of taste.

The quesion then is, how has this category of feelings/behaviour arisen? And one of the proposed answers is that there is an objecive standard, to which we all feel bound in some unconscious way, and this in turn points to the existence of God.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
we mostly all agree that morality is relevant to the whole of society

Only in as much as we want to have a society at all. Having a society requires set rules (laws), and as those rules will apply to everyone everyone will be interested in how they are structured.

Posted by tclune (# 7959) on :

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
The quesion then is, how has this category of feelings/behaviour arisen? And one of the proposed answers is that there is an objecive standard, to which we all feel bound in some unconscious way, and this in turn points to the existence of God.

Of course, there has been active research into more naturalistic foundations of a moral compass. One of my favorite authors on this topic is Frans de Waal. His book, The Age of Empathy is a wonderful read that I have recommended before. FWIW

--Tom Clune

[ 30. July 2012, 17:05: Message edited by: tclune ]

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
Isn't EE's point that a personal moral code is of no relevance to others, whereas we mostly all agree that morality is relevant to the whole of society, which itself points to morality being of a different category to matters of taste.

From what I can understand of EE's point, it's that there's no such thing as a "personal moral code", there's just one universal morality that everyone follows to a greater or lesser extent.

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
The quesion then is, how has this category of feelings/behaviour arisen?

A more interesting question is how EE manages to distinguish between categories. For instance, he holds dietary preferences (kosher, halal, etc.) or clothing (modesty codes) to be amoral in nature. Yet others consider such things to have a moral dimension. In many cases, a moral dimension dictated by God. What non-arbitrary criteria are used to make this distinction?

Posted by angelfish (# 8884) on :

Obviously I can't speak for EE, but to my mind, there is a very clear distinction between moral rules (eg put God first) and how they are expressed (eg don't eat bacon, even though it tastes amazing because God wants you to stand out from other people groups).

There is widespread agreement about moral rules (which basically boil down to the golden rule) but loads of disagreement over the detail of how they are to be applied. Hence, some think state execution is fine, others think not; some enjoy bacon sandwiches without guilt or fear, others abstain.

Incidentally, ther is a moral dimension to food amd clothing, but not in relation to what I find tasty or beautiful. The moral dimension lies in how those things affect others. So I would say it is immoral for me to eat your pet poodle, and also immoral for me to wear clothing that would tempt somebody
to sin. Not because eating dogs or showing off my shapely thighs is wrong in itself, but failing to love others, causing them grief or spiritual harm is morally wrong.

[ 30. July 2012, 18:59: Message edited by: angelfish ]

Posted by tclune (# 7959) on :

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
There is widespread agreement about moral rules (which basically boil down to the golden rule) but loads of disagreement over the detail of how they are to be applied.

As I suggested upstream, this seems to confuse language and morality. If you say that everybody agrees that murder is wrong, what you are really saying is that everybody agrees that the word murder includes an aspect of moral opprobrium. To say that murder is right is to fail to understand the language.

If people don't agree on what counts as murder, it is precisely the morality that they do not agree about. This isn't an agreement on a moral principle and disagreement on how to apply it -- it is a disagreement on a moral principle. If you think that honor killings are right and true and I find them to be murder, we disagree on basic moral principles.

--Tom Clune

Posted by angelfish (# 8884) on :

But it seems to me that people who engage in such practices as honour killings don't think they are right and good. Isn't it regarded as a sorry end to a sorry affair, rather than something to delight in? Doesn't a father need to steel himself to do it? Wouldn't they rather not be in the position where they believe it is their duty to perpetrate this act? I don't know anyody who thinks this is a good thing to do, but I just don't believe it would give anyone but the most warped of people any joy or delight.

Posted by tclune (# 7959) on :

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
But it seems to me that people who engage in such practices as honour killings don't think they are right and good. Isn't it regarded as a sorry end to a sorry affair, rather than something to delight in? Doesn't a father need to steel himself to do it? Wouldn't they rather not be in the position where they believe it is their duty to perpetrate this act? I don't know anyody who thinks this is a good thing to do, but I just don't believe it would give anyone but the most warped of people any joy or delight.

So you think that joy and delight are the hallmarks of moral behavior? We really have nothing in common.

--Tom Clune

Posted by angelfish (# 8884) on :

No, they are the hallmarks of somebody thinking something is, as you put it, "right and true". My point really is that we all from time to time do things that we actually don't feel are moral, due to pressure from others, circumstances etc. I postulate that honour killings fall into this category. If there is squeamishness at carrying out an honour killing, that points to a universally held view that they are, fundamentally, wrong - even though people may be conditioned to think they are necessary.

Posted by tclune (# 7959) on :

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
No, they are the hallmarks of somebody thinking something is, as you put it, "right and true".

No they are not. Anyone who, e.g., took delight in executing a murderer would probably be seen as unfit for the job, even by those people who believe that executing, say, the Colorado shooter is right and true.

The plain fact is that anything that we find delightful is not moral. It may not be immoral, but morality only applies to those things that we would not care to do otherwise. If we have no interest in stealing a fancy sports car, it is not a moral act for us to refrain from doing so -- it is simply a matter of not being interested in the car.

Those folks who would really love to take that puppy for a spin, and are confident that they would not be caught if they did so, but nonetheless refrain from taking the car are acting morally (you may not share their morality on this, but they are clearly not motivated by narrow self-serving in their behavior). Doing what you want to do anyway is hardly a virtue -- it's just a pleasure.

--Tom Clune

Posted by angelfish (# 8884) on :

quote:
Originally posted by tclune:

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
[qb] No, they are the hallmarks of somebody thinking something is, as you put it, "right and true".
No they are not. Anyone who, e.g., took delight in executing a murderer would probably be seen as unfit for the job, even by those people who believe that executing, say, the Colorado shooter is right and true.

That's because anyone who takes delight in the death of another human is sick and goes against the instincts of even those who espouse the view that state execution is right, which proves my point nicely, thank you.

quote:
The plain fact is that anything that we find delightful is not moral. It may not be immoral, but morality only applies to those things that we would not care to do otherwise.

By your definition, it would be impossible for a saint, being one who delights in God's ways, to do anything moral, ever. Was Jesus amoral when he endured the cross "for the joy set before him"? God has made us in His image, so we rightly delight in that which is good and are repelled by that which is evil. This is the very basis of our moral compass. That isn't to say that we cannot enjoy immoral acts (obviously we all do), but greater joy is found in doing what is right.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by tclune:
Doing what you want to do anyway is hardly a virtue -- it's just a pleasure.

The definition of acting out of a virtue is that you do the moral thing and the moral thing is what you want to do. Someone who doesn't want to do the moral thing but does it anyway is merely enkratic, that is, self-controlled or strong-willed.
There are moral systems that disagree - basically ones influenced by stoicism - but they're not moral systems that have much use for the concept of virtues.

It comes down to what you think morality is about. Those who stoically think it's about the exercise of the individual soul in a corrupt world tend to think that acting against inclination is virtuous. Those who Aristotelianly think that morality is about seeking the common good think that the common good is better sought when it's enjoyed as a good rather than merely adhered to grudgingly.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Crœsos:
From what I can understand of EE's point, it's that there's no such thing as a "personal moral code", there's just one universal morality that everyone follows to a greater or lesser extent.

It only makes sense to talk about a personal moral code if a personal moral code is an attempt to follow a universal morality.

If something is personal but not an attempt to follow a universal morality, then it's not a moral code. A vegetarian who doesn't eat meat because he's uncomfortable with the idea of eating things with faces is in exactly the same boat as a vegetarian who doesn't eat meat because she doesn't like the taste of meat. Unless the first vegetarian thinks other people should also be following his code it makes no sense to say that he is following a moral code any more than the second vegetarian is.

Posted by tclune (# 7959) on :

quote:
Originally posted by angelfish:
Was Jesus amoral when he endured the cross "for the joy set before him"?

Rather than relying on the weird logic of Hebrews, I would prefer to look to the words of Christ Himself. They reflect a pretty direct expression of what moral action is about. Or so ISTM.

BTW, I would readily agree that, as we move toward theosis, we have less need of morality -- we choose what is Godly as being what is our pleasure. But I hasten to add that my personal sense of a Godly source of what is right is just that -- my personal sense. I continue to argue that we need not have such a sense to be able to claim that morality need not be either Godly or just an individual bias. EE's position continues to be without merit, even if I agree with him... [Big Grin]

--Tom Clune

[ 30. July 2012, 21:41: Message edited by: tclune ]

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Unless the first vegetarian thinks other people should also be following his code it makes no sense to say that he is following a moral code any more than the second vegetarian is.

Are you suggesting that we can only be said to have a moral code if we seek to make others follow it? Is it not enough to simply follow it ourselves without seeking to convert anyone else?

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Perhaps you should explain why morality is an exception?

Morality concerns how people relate to one another. Therefore personal taste, which is individualistic, is irrelevant to the argument.

But even if your examples are relevant, I still can't see why you can't give at least one moral example, given that this is what the thread is actually about. It does seem odd - and rather telling - that you are not able to do this.

quote:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
I explained right at the beginning of this thread that it is nonsense to compare moral issues with personal tastes.
No you didn't. What you said in the OP boils down to "because we feel really strongly about (some) moral issues, they must therefore be based on an independent and objective standard".

The logic there is sketchy, to say the least.

Actually I did. Allow me to quote the relevant section:

quote:
If morality is merely a matter of opinion, merely a matter of taste (even "collective taste", aka consensus), then moral indignation could be likened to my feeling incensed at someone for eating broad beans (which I happen to dislike) and not broccoli (which I happen to like). And those greedy bankers committing fraud are only "eating their broad beans", and therefore it seems rather childish and churlish of me to feel any kind of indignation at their behaviour, if morality really is nothing more than a matter of personal opinion!

How is that not an example of saying that it is "nonsense to compare moral issues with personal tastes"?

quote:

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
Personal taste is something of no relevance to anyone else. Morality is.
This is an interesting thing for you to have said. Why is your personal moral code any more relevant to me than your taste in clothes or music?

OK, so someone says to me that he prefers Coldplay to Keane. Big deal. I may be interested in his preference, and I may be interested in his reasons for it. But his preference makes no difference to me or my life for good or for ill.

Now suppose he then says that he holds to a particular view of, say, censorship, which is different from mine (let's say that he favours greater restrictions). And suppose his particular view directly affects me and my freedom of speech (for example, suppose he is in some form of leadership in the church I attend). Clearly his moral preference - or "moral taste" - is in a completely different category to his opinion about the respective musical merits of Coldplay and Keane!

And suppose his moral position does not affect me directly? Well, it can still affect me indirectly, because we all make moral contributions to the way society is. So his moral view is of far more importance to me personally than his taste in music or art (unless that also has a moral dimension, for example, he expresses delight in songs whose lyrics mock something which is important to me).

quote:
I've long suspected that the underlying question behind all this is not so much "how can we know what's good if morality is all in our heads", but "how can we get others to convert to our moral code without an external authority with which to convince them". This comment of yours seems to support that view.

You are, of course, free to suspect whatever you like. But I'm afraid I can't understand your concern. How on earth am I "trying to get others" to do anything? I can't force anyone to do anything, and neither do I want to.

As a matter of fact, I am arguing against the coherence of naturalistic moral thinking. The target is the philosophy of naturalism, which I regard as utterly untrue, and I am seeking to show how the reality of our moral sense and actions underlines the falsity of this philosophy. I am satisfied in my own mind as to the legitimacy of my viewpoint, because I have not seen any convincing argument to the contrary. If others happen to disagree, then that is their right. I cannot "force" others to think as I do, and the reverse is also true.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
Are you suggesting that we can only be said to have a moral code if we seek to make others follow it? Is it not enough to simply follow it ourselves without seeking to convert anyone else?

Somebody has some code of conduct. What makes their code of conduct a moral code and not some other kind of code?
Or why, apart from inertia, would someone who thinks that moral codes are personal preferences talk about morality at all?

I don't like wearing shorts. I might rationalise this by saying that I don't think my legs look good in them, but as I haven't worn shorts since I was at primary school I wouldn't know. I just don't like them. But nobody would call that part of my moral code. But why isn't it part of my moral code? By contrast we can imagine someone who thinks shorts cause lust in the onlookers or are disrespectful and are therefore immoral and for whom that is a moral code. What makes their objection part of their moral code and my objection not part of mine?

If you're a realist about morality the answer is in principle straightforward: opinions are moral if they're trying rightly or wrongly to be about moral facts whatever constitutes those. But if there are no moral facts other than what people think there are, why would people start talking as if there were in the first place? Especially given all the inconveniences if people then start going around seeking to make other people follow their moral codes? The only plausible non-realist answer is that seeking to make / persuade other people follow your moral code is not a bug of moral codes but a feature. It's the explanation and justification for talking about morality at all.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Perhaps you should explain why morality is an exception?
Morality concerns how people relate to one another. Therefore personal taste, which is individualistic, is irrelevant to the argument.

Why is it? One person prefers to be related to in one way, another in another. That's just a matter of taste, but it's also a fundamental part of how people relate to one another.

quote:
But even if your examples are relevant, I still can't see why you can't give at least one moral example, given that this is what the thread is actually about. It does seem odd - and rather telling - that you are not able to do this.

Sigh. Ok fine.

Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good charity is? No. But people still think one charity is better than another.

Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good contraception is? No. But people still hold strong views on both sides.

Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good the death penalty is? No. But people still hold strong views on both sides.

Is there, for that matter, an independent standard by which to measure how good religion is? No. But people still hold very strong views on all sides.

quote:
Actually I did. Allow me to quote the relevant section:

quote:
If morality is merely a matter of opinion, merely a matter of taste (even "collective taste", aka consensus), then moral indignation could be likened to my feeling incensed at someone for eating broad beans (which I happen to dislike) and not broccoli (which I happen to like). And those greedy bankers committing fraud are only "eating their broad beans", and therefore it seems rather childish and churlish of me to feel any kind of indignation at their behaviour, if morality really is nothing more than a matter of personal opinion!
How is that not an example of saying that it is "nonsense to compare moral issues with personal tastes"?

You're saying it's rather childish and churlish to insist on your own moral code being seen as universal, and I agree with you.

But "childish and churlish" isn't the same thing as "nonsense". Not by a long chalk.

quote:
OK, so someone says to me that he prefers Coldplay to Keane. Big deal. I may be interested in his preference, and I may be interested in his reasons for it. But his preference makes no difference to me or my life for good or for ill.

Now suppose he then says that he holds to a particular view of, say, censorship, which is different from mine (let's say that he favours greater restrictions). And suppose his particular view directly affects me and my freedom of speech (for example, suppose he is in some form of leadership in the church I attend). Clearly his moral preference - or "moral taste" - is in a completely different category to his opinion about the respective musical merits of Coldplay and Keane!

Why would you let such a person be in a position of power over you? Ignore them. Find a new church. Organise enough like-minded people from the church to oust the censorship-loving leader.

And I'm not sure, in the example you've cited, that it is any different to his views on music. What if you're an avid Keane fan but the Coldplay-loving church leader declares Keane to be Abomination and commands you to burn your concert tickets and all your CDs?

quote:
The target is the philosophy of naturalism, which I regard as utterly untrue, and I am seeking to show how the reality of our moral sense and actions underlines the falsity of this philosophy.

You're backing the wrong horse then. Nobody in this argument is denying that our moral senses and actions exist. We're arguing about where they come from.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
The only plausible non-realist answer is that seeking to make / persuade other people follow your moral code is not a bug of moral codes but a feature. It's the explanation and justification for talking about morality at all.

I understand the definition that you're putting forth there, but I'm not sure it tells the whole story. I mean, part of my moral code is the belief that it's good to go to church regularly, but I'm not seeking to make/persuade anyone else to do so if they don't want to. Does that mean my belief about churchgoing isn't actually a moral one?

In essence, by drawing this distinction between codes of conduct and morality you're implicitly coming down on my side of the argument about whether morality is objective or subjective. After all, if the only difference between morality and personal preference is whether we think others should agree with us or not then there's no actual difference in kind between the two types of preference. If I were to insist that everyone in the world should like Coldplay that would be a moral opinion, and if I happen to prefer not robbing people but don't care whether anyone else does then that wouldn't be a moral opinion!

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Perhaps you should explain why morality is an exception?
Morality concerns how people relate to one another.

Eh?

Oh good. Any sins I commit in the privacy of my own home (I live alone), aren't actually sins any more.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
Oh good. Any sins I commit in the privacy of my own home (I live alone), aren't actually sins any more.

And what "sins" would they be, that really do not and could not have any effect whatsoever on anyone else?

Stealing from yourself, perhaps?

Envying yourself?

Beating yourself up?

I wouldn't want you to embarrass yourself by actually answering my question, but I do find it hard to comprehend how an action that has absolutely no negative effect on another person could be called a sin. In fact, my third example above would most likely affect others, because such an action, if discovered, could upset and grieve a loved one.

Of course, there is also the question of whether to count God as a person in this argument.

"No man is an island..."

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
Sigh. Ok fine.

Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good charity is? No. But people still think one charity is better than another.

Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good contraception is? No. But people still hold strong views on both sides.

Is there an independent standard by which to measure how good the death penalty is? No. But people still hold strong views on both sides.

Is there, for that matter, an independent standard by which to measure how good religion is? No. But people still hold very strong views on all sides.

Aren't you begging the question a little there?

To take the trivial case there might be no independent standard for how good religion is, but there might be (for want of a crude character if I die and come back a tortoise, Christianity wasn't a good religion, if I die and that's it it's a bit more complicated). We don't know that it exists and we definitely don't know what it is (else we wouldn't be arguing).

Charity (if we're arguing about which charities are better) you can measure by money getting to it's target, lives improved. The platonic perfect charity would be one where you gave your penny and world hunger was solved, cat's lived a perfect life...).
In reality we have to guess our position (and kind of by definition at equilibrium all charities should be equal, and we have 'fraudsters' and the world is constantly changing and ... so we'd expect a tough choice).

That kind of relates to how good A charity is.
Of course we have to decide that giving some money is 'better' than spending it in the pub or funding a law against charity posters. Which is pretty much a subset of "Is morality objective" in particular "is the statement 'morality is objective and there exists a situation in which it is better to give than not to give'".
You may be right in your assertion (if the A was intentionally absent) but the debate is happening because people are behaving as though they are acting as if they expect others believe you are wrong. This could be because this behaviour gives the 'nicest' outcomes than a more cynical view.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
I mean, part of my moral code is the belief that it's good to go to church regularly, but I'm not seeking to make/persuade anyone else to do so if they don't want to. Does that mean my belief about churchgoing isn't actually a moral one?

I don't see why it would be a moral belief or part of a moral code. I also think it's a good thing to go to church regularly but I don't think merely going makes me or anyone else who goes regularly a better person than someone who doesn't go.

quote:
In essence, by drawing this distinction between codes of conduct and morality you're implicitly coming down on my side of the argument about whether morality is objective or subjective.

I was explicitly postulating that your side of the argument is correct.
As I said, if morality is 'objective' or realist then you can draw the distinction by reference to what the code is about. There is morality; moral codes are different from aesthetic codes etc by the person who has then thinking that they're about morality. It's only if we suppose that morality is not 'objective' that the question arises.

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

quote:
As a matter of fact, I am arguing against the coherence of naturalistic moral thinking. The target is the philosophy of naturalism, which I regard as utterly untrue, and I am seeking to show how the reality of our moral sense and actions underlines the falsity of this philosophy.

Not the toughest of gigs given the demographics here and even then you've not been conspicuously successful. Your argument rests on a simple appeal to consequence - you say (albeit dressed up in a rhetorical question) that there has to be an objective standard of morality because without it moral judgements are incoherent. Well, reality, sorry, REALITY, doesn't have to abide by your "subjective" desire for coherence. If it turns out that there is no "objective" standard (not that we'll ever be sure one way or another) then we would just have to get by without one. Pretty much as we do now, as it goes. [Biased]

Posted by orfeo (# 13878) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:

quote:
Originally posted by orfeo
Oh good. Any sins I commit in the privacy of my own home (I live alone), aren't actually sins any more.
And what "sins" would they be, that really do not and could not have any effect whatsoever on anyone else?

Stealing from yourself, perhaps?

Envying yourself?

Beating yourself up?

I wouldn't want you to embarrass yourself by actually answering my question, but I do find it hard to comprehend how an action that has absolutely no negative effect on another person could be called a sin. In fact, my third example above would most likely affect others, because such an action, if discovered, could upset and grieve a loved one.

Of course, there is also the question of whether to count God as a person in this argument.

"No man is an island..."

If I spend an extra 5 minutes in bed giving myself an orgasm while lusting after Brad Pitt, who gets hurt?

And yes I did make this example up.

Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
Well, reality, sorry, REALITY, doesn't have to abide by your "subjective" desire for coherence. If it turns out that there is no "objective" standard (not that we'll ever be sure one way or another) then we would just have to get by without one. Pretty much as we do now, as it goes.

Exactly!

We get by whether we believe God is the origin of morality or not. And those without a faith get by just as well as those with one (often better).

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
Aren't you begging the question a little there?

I don't think so, no.

quote:
To take the trivial case there might be no independent standard for how good religion is, but there might be (for want of a crude character if I die and come back a tortoise, Christianity wasn't a good religion, if I die and that's it it's a bit more complicated).

There might be an independent standard for anything. It's theoretically possible that such a standard could exist for whether you should put your right shoe on before your left shoe. But I think most people would agree that it doesn't.

quote:
We don't know that it exists and we definitely don't know what it is (else we wouldn't be arguing).

Which is functionally the same as saying "there isn't one".

quote:
Charity (if we're arguing about which charities are better) you can measure by money getting to it's target, lives improved.

You could. You could also measure art by how accurate a representation of the subject it is, but nobody would suggest that that's a genuine objective standard by which all art should be measured.

quote:
You may be right in your assertion (if the A was intentionally absent) but the debate is happening because people are behaving as though they are acting as if they expect others believe you are wrong. This could be because this behaviour gives the 'nicest' outcomes than a more cynical view.

People generally act as if it can be assumed that others will agree with them because that's actually the case. Lots of people agree about lots of things to do with morality, but that in itself doesn't tell us anything other than the fact that lots of people agree about those things. Something can be a near-universal standard without it implying anything about the existence of independent standards.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
OK, so someone says to me that he prefers Coldplay to Keane. Big deal. I may be interested in his preference, and I may be interested in his reasons for it. But his preference makes no difference to me or my life for good or for ill.

Now suppose he then says that he holds to a particular view of, say, censorship, which is different from mine (let's say that he favours greater restrictions). And suppose his particular view directly affects me and my freedom of speech (for example, suppose he is in some form of leadership in the church I attend). Clearly his moral preference - or "moral taste" - is in a completely different category to his opinion about the respective musical merits of Coldplay and Keane!
Why would you let such a person be in a position of power over you? Ignore them. Find a new church. Organise enough like-minded people from the church to oust the censorship-loving leader.

And I'm not sure, in the example you've cited, that it is any different to his views on music. What if you're an avid Keane fan but the Coldplay-loving church leader declares Keane to be Abomination and commands you to burn your concert tickets and all your CDs?

The original point was whether there is a fundamental difference between an issue of personal taste and a moral issue. That is the point I was making.

The question of how I would relate to the censorious church leader concerns my response to the moral issue, and you are absolutely right in saying that I should not let such a person have any influence over me (which, as it happens, is the approach I have taken in my various dealings with manipulative church leaders over many years). This kind of moral issue therefore provokes a response from me.

But his view on music is entirely different unless he turns that into a moral issue that really has nothing to do with the two bands in question. If our taste in music differed and he tried to impose his personal view on me, then it's no longer a mere matter of personal taste, but a question of his view of authority over me within the context of the life of the church.

If this person believed that he was "right" to relate to me in this way, then presumably he would not accept my argument that my moral position was different and therefore as valid as his. No. He would "universalise" his moral position, in order to justify imposing it on me.

And this is the whole point of what I have been trying to say. If someone has a moral position and seeks to apply it, and to protest against the contrary position, then that person must believe that his position is universally "right" (even if "universal" is taken to mean "within the entirety of a particular context"). To say that "I believe my position should be adopted by others, and I am angry, frustrated and indignant that it is not" while at the same time believing that all moral positions are ultimately entirely subjective, is a nonsense. A person has to universalise his moral position in order to apply it and argue for it.

Now, of course, all moral positions cannot be objectively true, because many positions contradict each other - even within the same context. But a moral position has to be believed to be universally valid (taking context into account) in order for it to work as a moral position. You clearly don't see this.

Let me give you an example from America (and it's a moral issue you suggested in the post to which I am responding).

As you know, there are states which have abolished the death penalty and others which have not.

A person living in, say, North Dakota may believe that it is right that his state has abolished the death penalty, because he believes in the validity of moral consensus, but he also respects the right of the people of South Dakota to retain this punishment. Perhaps he holds to a view of morality which is ultimately subjective, and he is someone who has the integrity to try to live consistently with his philosophy.

Now suppose this person is a campaigner for the abolition of the death penalty and he frequently travels to South Dakota to argue his case. I can accept that he could campaign consistently with his moral philosophy by saying that the abolition of the death penalty is merely a matter of opinion, and that the alternative is morally just as valid (which is the implication of his philosophy of morality), but he is acting in a way that is consistent with democracy (but actually this implies that the idea of democracy has become his moral absolute). In other words, he just wants other people to choose to agree with his opinion. Yes, I can see the logic of that. Such a campaign would be about as morally insipid as having a friendly chat about the relative merits of Coldplay or Keane.

But what makes no sense at all is the idea that one can hold to a subjectivist moral philosophy, and then move from the mere expression of an opinion to serious protest and moral outrage. It really is absurd for the North Dakotan anti-death penalty campaigner to start waving placards around south of the state line and shouting and screaming about how utterly vile and appalling the death penalty is, while also holding to a moral philosophy which implies that such an "unacceptable" opinion is actually just as valid as his own. Perhaps you just don't see the cognitive dissonance in this, which to me is as clear as daylight!

Such a situation would be as absurd as protesting and expressing moral outrage that anyone should prefer Keane to Coldplay or should prefer broad beans to broccoli.

I can see that we're going nowhere fast with this discussion, but I just can't see what argument anyone could present to me that would persuade me that the above "protest scenario" is remotely valid.

Now let us suppose that the philosophy of naturalism is true (not something I accept), and that we are what we are because of the way matter has happened to organise itself over millions of years - a process which is inherently amoral and mindless. If this is the case, then any moral viewpoint is subjective (unless it can be shown that there is a moral code imprinted on the fundamental structure of matter - good luck to anyone who thinks they can prove that idea!).

But morality can only work in reality if there is a belief (whether held subconsciously or not) that there exists some kind of universal validity to it. Moral outrage and a strong sense of what constitutes "fairness" is essential to the proper functioning of morality (which is clearly in evidence in the attitudes of many die hard atheists, such as Dawkins). But such a moral sense at least tacitly implies an acceptance that morality is not entirely subjective, as I have argued above.

This is a paradox if naturalism is true. It seems strange that a philosophy can be true which is unworkable (and this is especially true of naturalism, which bases its validity on what works - hence the epistemology of the scientific method at the heart of the claim of this philosophy). This worldview just does not fit reality. If the entire population of the world suddenly converted to philosophical naturalism overnight, you can be sure that some kind of "religious" - or metaphysically authoritative - viewpoints would emerge by necessity over a period of time. It just does not make sense to say that everybody can just "do their own thing" and society would function. Of course, one could argue that naturalism could function with a "might is right" ethic, but I thought that was supposed to be the problem with religious morality! Anyway, imposed morality does not resolve the philosophical problem, so it's irrelevant from the point of view of apologetics.

My conclusion is that the functioning of morality constitutes evidence that the philosophy of naturalism (and the moral subjectivism that necessarily flows from it) does not fit reality, which thus calls into question its truth claim.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
And this is the whole point of what I have been trying to say. If someone has a moral position and seeks to apply it, and to protest against the contrary position, then that person must believe that his position is universally "right" (even if "universal" is taken to mean "within the entirety of a particular context"). To say that "I believe my position should be adopted by others, and I am angry, frustrated and indignant that it is not" while at the same time believing that all moral positions are ultimately entirely subjective, is a nonsense.

I see no inconsistency between claiming that moral positions are purely the product of the human mind and saying that some moral positions are better than others.

You seem to be arguing that "subjective" means "everything is of equal value". That argument simply is not true.

I said that on page 1.

quote:
Now, of course, all moral positions cannot be objectively true, because many positions contradict each other - even within the same context. But a moral position has to be believed to be universally valid (taking context into account) in order for it to work as a moral position. You clearly don't see this.

On the contrary, I see that perfectly well. But it says nothing about whether morality is purely the product of the human mind or the reaction of the human mind to an externally-defined standard.

quote:
A person living in, say, North Dakota may believe that it is right that his state has abolished the death penalty, because he believes in the validity of moral consensus, but he also respects the right of the people of South Dakota to retain this punishment.

That's not even a hypothetical. I live in a country that has abolished the death penalty, and am very glad to do so. But I don't campaign for those countries that retain it to abolish it as well - I respect their right to vote to retain it.

quote:
Now suppose this person is a campaigner for the abolition of the death penalty and he frequently travels to South Dakota to argue his case.

OK.

quote:
I can accept that he could campaign consistently with his moral philosophy by saying that the abolition of the death penalty is merely a matter of opinion, and that the alternative is morally just as valid

Why would he have to do so in order to remain consistent? Does someone who likes Keane have to adknowledge that liking other bands is just as valid in order to express his opinion?

quote:
In other words, he just wants other people to choose to agree with his opinion. Yes, I can see the logic of that. Such a campaign would be about as morally insipid as having a friendly chat about the relative merits of Coldplay or Keane.

"Morally insipid"? What, you mean it wouldn't interest you?

quote:
It really is absurd for the North Dakotan anti-death penalty campaigner to start waving placards around south of the state line and shouting and screaming about how utterly vile and appalling the death penalty is, while also holding to a moral philosophy which implies that such an "unacceptable" opinion is actually just as valid as his own. Perhaps you just don't see the cognitive dissonance in this, which to me is as clear as daylight!

There is no cognitive dissonance, because "morality is subjective" does not mean "all moral opinions are equally valid".

quote:
Now let us suppose that the philosophy of naturalism is true (not something I accept), and that we are what we are because of the way matter has happened to organise itself over millions of years - a process which is inherently amoral and mindless.

Yes.

quote:
If this is the case, then any moral viewpoint is subjective

Yes.

quote:
But morality can only work in reality if there is a belief (whether held subconsciously or not) that there exists some kind of universal validity to it.

Yes. But that belief is itself subjective - it is itself a product of the human mind.

quote:
Moral outrage and a strong sense of what constitutes "fairness" is essential to the proper functioning of morality (which is clearly in evidence in the attitudes of many die hard atheists, such as Dawkins).

Yes.

quote:
But such a moral sense at least tacitly implies an acceptance that morality is not entirely subjective, as I have argued above.

No it doesn't.

quote:
It just does not make sense to say that everybody can just "do their own thing" and society would function.

Nobody has said that.

quote:
Of course, one could argue that naturalism could function with a "might is right" ethic, but I thought that was supposed to be the problem with religious morality!

If you mean "consensus", then yes that's how society works in reality.

quote:
My conclusion is that the functioning of morality constitutes evidence that the philosophy of naturalism (and the moral subjectivism that necessarily flows from it) does not fit reality, which thus calls into question its truth claim.

Your conclusion, based as it is on false premises, is flawed.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

And don;t think I haven't noticed that, after making such a ludicrously big issue out of my "inability" to provide (what you class as) moral examples of situations where it's ludicrous to say that "a" is better than "b" if there is no independent standard by which to measure one against the other, you have completely ignored the ones I did give.

I shall take that as acceptance that it is not ludicrous to say such a thing.

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
But morality can only work in reality if there is a belief (whether held subconsciously or not) that there exists some kind of universal validity to it. Moral outrage and a strong sense of what constitutes "fairness" is essential to the proper functioning of morality (which is clearly in evidence in the attitudes of many die hard atheists, such as Dawkins). But such a moral sense at least tacitly implies an acceptance that morality is not entirely subjective, as I have argued above.

The idea that agreement on anything must necessarily mean that thing is imprinted in the fabric of the Universe is something you've consistently asserted, yet never really explained.

For example, one could claim that football is a sport with severe restrictions on the players' use of their hands and arms in most circumstances. Most people would regard this kind of rule as both subjective and arbitrary, yet valid within the context of football. Under your logic, this would mean that a player should be perfectly free to claim that football actually allows extensive use of hands and that his team should actually be awarded six point for the touchdown he just scored rather than suffering a penalty for use of hands.

If football is subjective, by your argument there would seem to be no impediment to officials accepting this argument. Taking it a step further, you seem to be arguing that the fact that they don't do so must mean that True Football is embedded in the underlying fabric of the Universe. In short, your argument boils down to the idea that if people can think something, it must be an underlying reality of the Universe. While this can be consistently argued, it does destroy any distinction between the categories "objective" and "subjective", with literally everything falling into the former category.

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
[qb]Aren't you begging the question a little there?
I don't think so, no.

quote:
To take the trivial case there might be no independent standard for how good religion is, but there might be (for want of a crude character if I die and come back a tortoise, Christianity wasn't a good religion, if I die and that's it it's a bit more complicated).
There might be an independent standard for anything. It's theoretically possible that such a standard could exist for whether you should put your right shoe on before your left shoe. But I think most people would agree that it doesn't.

True, but also people don't behave as though it does. Which is the difference.
I can quote pretty much anyone, notably, Justanian&Boogie trivially, and with some ferreting you, although you've been very consistent here) saying things that assume the independent standard.
There are plenty of cases where our natural feelings are wrong (I'm going to mention Heliocentricism a lot).
But we can't simultaneously hold that view and sincerely campaign against a rocket to Mars because it will be hit by the Sun.

quote:

quote:
We don't know that it exists and we definitely don't know what it is (else we wouldn't be arguing).
Which is functionally the same as saying "there isn't one".

To some extent (possibly) true, but only if you define functionally to be limited.
It's a bit like saying a Ptolemic Universe is functionally the same as a Heliocentric one (or vice versa). Both are similar for what we can see, but are worlds apart if we are taken to Mars.

quote:

People generally act as if it can be assumed that others will agree with them because that's actually the case. Lots of people agree about lots of things to do with morality, but that in itself doesn't tell us anything other than the fact that lots of people agree about those things. Something can be a near-universal standard without it implying anything about the existence of independent standards.

True, which is why I put so many caveats.
people may say "it is good to give to charity*" and people may be speaking non-sense, but if it is meaningless to say "it is good to give to charity" then it is meaningless to say "it is good to give to charity".
If "it is good to give to charity" then "it is good to give to charity" and there is an objective standard that "things that are good includes giving to charity".
But if your argument with someone with someone who is arguing that "'it is good to give to charity' is a valid statement" is based around "the statement 'it is good to give to charity' is meaningless". Then I don't see how it isn't begging the question. You might be right, but it's not an argument, it's an assertion.

As well as your art comment, there was a good example about music earlier, language has some other more interesting elements. It would be interesting to examine, but I don't have the brains or the years of study for that. Though I don't intend to wimp out so will definitely think and perhaps post some scrappy thoughts later.

*You could think of plenty of situations where that statement as a blanket rule feels almost certainly false, so it does need qualifying. And as such would be an unlikely candidate as is for entry, but it was an example.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Croesos
The idea that agreement on anything must necessarily mean that thing is imprinted in the fabric of the Universe is something you've consistently asserted, yet never really explained.

Where have I asserted this??

I have never said any such thing, and this just shows that you have not understood my argument at all. Of course, there can be such a thing as a consensus, which is the result of subjectivism - in fact, if you had bothered to read my last post carefully you would have seen that I was acknowledging the possibility that someone could accept that the contrary positions on the death penalty that obtain in the two Dakotas were the result of subjective moral positions.

But there is a difference between accepting the rules of a consensus, which may not reflect anything about ultimate reality* and engaging in a vigorous protest against what other people have agreed is morally right. I think back to my example of the progamme Question Time, in which all but one of the panelists expressed revulsion at the views of the remaining panelist. The idea that such outrage could be built on a deep-seated belief that the objectionable panelist's views were actually as valid as their own (which would be the case if they believed morality was entirely subjective), is clearly raving lunacy.

If I take your example of football: yes, we agree that a certain code of football should be played according to certain rules. It is the nature of sport that there have to be consistent rules, otherwise fair competition is impossible. But behind this lies a consistent and universal concept of "fairness", which does reflect something about ultimate reality (nothing to do with the physical universe, of course). I have not disputed at all that there are agreed principles and methods by which this concept of fairness is expressed (and these rules may be the result of nothing more than a human consensus). But you seem intent on distorting my words in order to give the impression that I am saying something that I am clearly not saying at all. Football players accept the rules of the game, because they understand that no game would be possible without rules. That understanding flows from an acknowledgement of the universal moral concept of fairness.

Allow me also to take an example from sport. There is the very recent controversy at the Olympics concerning some badminton teams who were deliberately trying to lose games in a round robin competition in order to secure a more favourable draw in the knockout stage. This provoked outrage, although some people expressed their view online that this was legitimate, because it was a cunning tactic to try to secure the ultimate prize of a gold medal. The moral issue here does not concern the particular rules of badminton, which do not necessarily reflect anything about the fundamental nature of reality, but rather the concept of "fairness" expressed through "fair play". Why would anyone be angry with these players if everyone accepted that even the concept of fairness was entirely subjective?

If you want to try to refute my argument, at least try to resist the temptation to use a false analogy, which is what you have done.

*"Ultimate reality" is not the same as "the fabric of the universe" - this being a naturalistic concept. You must surely know that a theist does not regard "the universe" as the ultimate reality, unless you happen to be using the term in the loosest possible sense to mean "everything that exists, whether physical, spiritual, temporal and eternal".

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

@EE

quote:
This worldview just does not fit reality. If the entire population of the world suddenly converted to philosophical naturalism overnight, you can be sure that some kind of "religious" - or metaphysically authoritative - viewpoints would emerge by necessity over a period of time.

Which would pretty much disqualify the inventors of the new metaphysical authority from being philosophical naturalists, by definition. And if we are playing a game of predicting a theoretical future, we might expect it wouldn't be long before some men among the re-converted supernaturalists donned themselves fancy clothes and claimed a hotline to the authority, whose moral strictures might well be expected to uncannily reflect their pre-existing prejudices.

I just love half arsed thought experiments.

quote:
lies a consistent and universal concept of "fairness

Universal? In the badminton example there are at least 8 people who don't have it.

This is the most distinctive thing about the moral sense - it's a slippery customer. Most of us are considerably more aware of the failures of morality in other people than ourselves. We can act uber morally on some occasions and blatantly immorally on others. We rationalise and excuse our own failings and heap opprobrium on others for theirs. And that's before we even get to the massive disagreements about what constitutes moral behaviour.

It's almost as if we have a bunch of emotions, beliefs and behaviours that are a complex mixture of millions of years of evolution of a social species that has endowed us with an amazingly complex brain - which continues to change in reaction to its environment throughout its life - that is very effective at some things and not so effective at others; a brain that shares many characteristics with other peoples' but is also unique.

Philosophical naturalism has a problem with normative ethics - is/ought and all that. But that is not the same thing as saying it can't ever account for the presence in human beings of a somewhat inconsistent moral sense and the urge to exercise it. And whether as a philosophy it ever does will make no difference at all to the ultimate reality or the fabric of the universe, because as Justinian has said on here a few times recently, the map is not the territory.

But that's another argument.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
people may say "it is good to give to charity*" and people may be speaking non-sense, but if it is meaningless to say "it is good to give to charity" then it is meaningless to say "it is good to give to charity".

"Subjective" does not mean "meaningless".

quote:
If "it is good to give to charity" then "it is good to give to charity" and there is an objective standard that "things that are good includes giving to charity".

Some people think it's good to give to charity. Others think it's not good. There are more people in the first category, which means that an internal societal standard that it's good to give to charity becomes established. Once said internal societal standard is established, people start arguing that it's good to give to charity as if that's a given - as if it's an independent objective standard, if you will. But that doesn't mean it is an independent objective standard - it's just an internal subjective standard that lots of people happen to agree with.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
...a deep-seated belief that the objectionable panelist's views were actually as valid as their own (which would be the case if they believed morality was entirely subjective)...

How many times do I have to refute this interpretation of what "subjective" means before you'll stop asserting it as if it were an obvious truth? It's been the bedrock of your argument since page 1, but it's quite simply false.

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
people may say "it is good to give to charity*" and people may be speaking non-sense, but if it is meaningless to say "it is good to give to charity" then it is meaningless to say "it is good to give to charity".
"Subjective" does not mean "meaningless".

No, but it means that a statement such as that is meaningless without reference to a subject. There may be an implicit one (but there has to be one).
Unless you are using an odd definition of subjective/objective. Maybe we should restart defining terms. But your last phrase is indicative of us using the same language
(if it is subjective) "it's just an internal subjective standard that lots of people happen to agree with"

quote:

quote:
If "it is good to give to charity" then "it is good to give to charity" and there is an objective standard that "things that are good includes giving to charity".
Some people think it's good to give to charity. Others think it's not good. There are more people in the first category, which means that an internal societal standard that it's good to give to charity becomes established. Once said internal societal standard is established, people start arguing that it's good to give to charity as if that's a given - as if it's an independent objective standard, if you will. But that doesn't mean it is an independent objective standard - it's just an internal subjective standard that lots of people happen to agree with.

It's a good (and not unlikely) story as to how we've come to (mistakenly) treat a subjective criteria as objective and true. Like how we see converging lines as going in the distance. However it has consequences. Basically it's asserting we're wrong,

Or to use your words we are treating "as if it's an independent objective standard" what is "just an internal subjective standard that lots of people happen to agree with".

". Giving to charity is (without reference to anyone) good" is now meaningless (or false). We are referring to a reference that doesn't exist. Therefore anyone saying it is either ignorant, deceitful, or lazy.
". Giving to charity is (from my point of view) good"
is ok, "I find giving to charity is good", "(I predict that) X will find giving to charity is good" is ok, or ....
Which are subtly different statements.

[ 02. August 2012, 18:44: Message edited by: Jay-Emm ]

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
...a deep-seated belief that the objectionable panelist's views were actually as valid as their own (which would be the case if they believed morality was entirely subjective)...
How many times do I have to refute this interpretation of what "subjective" means before you'll stop asserting it as if it were an obvious truth? It's been the bedrock of your argument since page 1, but it's quite simply false.

No, it's not false (although I'm not quite sure what the word "false" is supposed to mean within a subjective epistemology).

Sooo... I'll pretend that I believe that morality is subjective, but I believe that my views are more valid than someone else's without being logically inconsistent. Hmmm. Can't quite see how that works, unless I have some objective standard by which to assess the validity of our respective views. If that "standard" is merely "me", then fine. That would make me a solipsist, and I am sure I would have a very good time talking to myself. However, I am not quite sure how I would fare in the real world (that strange realm inhabited by that phenomenon known as "other people"). "Reality" is actually what I am concerned about here.

Going back to my example... so Jack Straw slams the BNP for being immoral and so on, but, of course, we all understand that "that's just Jack"! I really don't think that's a coherent basis for trying to persuade anyone. Of course, dear Jack could impose his personal, subjective, feelings-based, "what-he-had-for-breakfast-based" views on other people, but I thought that the practice of "might is right" is what you were complaining about.

So, no, you haven't refuted my argument. Not even remotely.

But if you want to claim victory, go ahead. After all... your "feelings" are obviously more valid than mine!!

[brick wall]

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Sooo... I'll pretend that I believe that morality is subjective, but I believe that my views are more valid than someone else's without being logically inconsistent. Hmmm. Can't quite see how that works, unless I have some objective standard by which to assess the validity of our respective views.

For the life of me I can't see how this is less logically consistent than believing your views are more valid than someone else's by referencing an "objective" standard that is only available for consultation in a mind. A standard is something that relies on inter-subjective agreement for it to function, but you reject intersubjective agreement as a basis of morality.

quote:
Going back to my example... so Jack Straw slams the BNP for being immoral and so on, but, of course, we all understand that "that's just Jack"! I really don't think that's a coherent basis for trying to persuade anyone.

But if there is, as you claim, an available objective standard to work to, Jack wouldn't need to persuade, because everyone would use it to come to the same conclusion. Now, you may argue, like many before you, that the objective standard is there, but our wonky reason interprets it differently. But if in the end that interpretation is all we have to go on, how does that differ from a bunch of people arguing for their own "subjective" opinion?

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by grokesx
But if there is, as you claim, an available objective standard to work to, Jack wouldn't need to persuade, because everyone would use it to come to the same conclusion.

... assuming everyone was an automaton.

It's interesting that you should use this argument, because you know that not everyone comes to the same conclusion on matters which philosophical naturalism argues are objectively valid, such as certain scientific "facts". Are we really to believe that worldwide unanimity (without exception) is a necessary condition for the establishment of absolutely any fact?

If there is no objective basis to our moral sense, then when Jack Straw expressed his outrage at the views of the BNP, and sought to persuade others of the rightness of his own position, what exactly was he appealing to?

Each listener's personal moral "taste"?

or...

Each listener's basic acknowledgment of the concept of "right" and "wrong" (concepts which actually have genuine meaning)?

If the former, then what was the basis of his outrage, given that no one can be blamed for finding the views of the BNP more appetising than those of Mr Straw? In fact, it's interesting that Straw drew a distinction between the views of the BNP, on the one hand, and the differences of opinion of the "mainstream" parties, on the other. What exactly was the basis of this distinction if he was not appealing to an objective standard of morality?

Clearly the consensus behind the discussion on Question Time was that the BNP had transgressed a moral boundary, which the other parties had not done. That makes absolutely no sense if the boundary itself was merely a matter of personal taste. So it supports my point that moral discussion only makes sense with the (at least tacit) acknowledgment that there is an objective basis to our moral sense. It seems very odd that a philosophy could be true that so contradicts this requirement of reality.

quote:
Now, you may argue, like many before you, that the objective standard is there, but our wonky reason interprets it differently. But if in the end that interpretation is all we have to go on, how does that differ from a bunch of people arguing for their own "subjective" opinion?

Yes, we have different interpretations, but interpretations of what exactly?

There has to exist something objective in order for any interpretation to take place. This objective fact is our moral sense, which cannot be explained simply with reference to the laws of physics and chemisty.

Furthermore, we have freedom. But freedom has to operate within certain bounds, even if only within the limit of the principle of freedom itself.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
Basically it's asserting we're wrong,

In the sense that there is no objectively-measurable way to prove that we're right, yes. But not in any other sense.

quote:
Or to use your words we are treating "as if it's an independent objective standard" what is "just an internal subjective standard that lots of people happen to agree with".

". Giving to charity is (without reference to anyone) good" is now meaningless (or false). We are referring to a reference that doesn't exist.

Not quite, we're referring to the 'standard' of lots and lots of people agreeing with us. Such a societal consensus can itself become a standard by which to judge individual morality, even though it's not an objective one.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Sooo... I'll pretend that I believe that morality is subjective, but I believe that my views are more valid than someone else's without being logically inconsistent.

Why use the phrase "more valid"? I've only ever used "better".

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
If there is no objective basis to our moral sense, then when Jack Straw expressed his outrage at the views of the BNP, and sought to persuade others of the rightness of his own position, what exactly was he appealing to?

Each listener's personal moral "taste"?

Yes.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
But if there is, as you claim, an available objective standard to work to, Jack wouldn't need to persuade, because everyone would use it to come to the same conclusion. Now, you may argue, like many before you, that the objective standard is there, but our wonky reason interprets it differently. But if in the end that interpretation is all we have to go on, how does that differ from a bunch of people arguing for their own "subjective" opinion?

I think you're being as unfair to realist theories as EE is being to non-realist theories.

The difference is surely in the means one can use for argument.
On a realist theory there are some methods that are agreed to be error-reducing: identifying and removing logical contradiction, becoming aware of personal bias, becoming aware of other points of view or of how one's views affect other people who have to live with them, and so on. Further, if someone is trying to persuade me to change my mind using such methods I have a reason to pay attention (they may be right and I wrong). So a group of realists are not reduced to just repeating themselves over and over. But some methods of persuasion are not legitimate: logical fallacies, coercion, bribery, and so on.

For non-realists everything is legitimate. That is, there are two methods of persuasion: rhetorical force (which may use the methods that realists consider reasonable or may not), and appeals to either bribery or force, carrots or sticks. If they use rhetorical force, including appeals to rational means of argument, I have reason not to listen in so far as I care about my moral opinions. It's only if the other party is capable of either rewarding me or threatening that I have reason to listen.

So thinking that realists and non-realists are in the same boat here is to claim that error-reducing moves are simply not available to the realist.

Posted by George Spigot (# 253) on :

@EtymologicalEvangelical

So imagine I'm arguing with the BNP

If as you say morals come from an objective, universal standard then what's the information flow. How does the standard get into my head?

Posted by Ramarius (# 16551) on :

quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot:
@EtymologicalEvangelical

So imagine I'm arguing with the BNP

If as you say morals come from an objective, universal standard then what's the information flow. How does the standard get into my head?

It can get into your head from a number of sources - revelation, religion, atheism... The point is that there *is* an objective moral standard with concomitant repsonibilities, which continues to exist regardless of how it's found, who finds it or, indeed, if no-one finds it. Which is the other point - moral standards are discovered, and rather imperfectly at that since they are discovered through the filter of imperfect human beings. That we may have problems perfectly finding the perfection of objective morality doesn't in any way weaken the claim that objective moral duties and responsibilities are there to be found.

Personally I'd recommend some sources more than others.

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
I think you're being as unfair to realist theories as EE is being to non-realist theories.

Well, one grossly simplistic caricature deserves another.

quote:
On a realist theory there are some methods that are agreed to be error-reducing: identifying and removing logical contradiction, becoming aware of personal bias, becoming aware of other points of view or of how one's views affect other people who have to live with them, and so on.

I think you're doing a bit of over simplification of your own here. How does the subjectivist view that there are moral facts, but that they inhere in our minds, preclude one from removing logical contradiction or being aware of personal bias and the rest?

quote:
So a group of realists are not reduced to just repeating themselves over and over.

You might try telling one particular moral realist on here that.

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
It's interesting that you should use this argument, because you know that not everyone comes to the same conclusion on matters which philosophical naturalism argues are objectively valid, such as certain scientific "facts".

Which ones would they, be, then? Scientific facts, that is, that are argued as "objectively valid" in the sense you are using it? (That might give us a bit of a clue about what you actually mean in all this word salad.)

quote:
Each listener's personal moral "taste"?

or...

Each listener's basic acknowledgment of the concept of "right" and "wrong" (concepts which actually have genuine meaning)?

How are you distinguishing between the two?

quote:
This objective fact is our moral sense, which cannot be explained simply with reference to the laws of physics and chemisty.

Bare assertion. Argument from ignorance. Take your pick.

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
[qb]Basically it's asserting we're wrong,
In the sense that there is no objectively-measurable way to prove that we're right, yes. But not in any other sense.

I can understand that (after all it's pretty much my perspective -and EE's?). I can understand how you call it subjective*.
*it would be rather ironic as those claiming it too be subjective would be taking the basic objective reality for granted and those claiming it to be objective would be taking the subjective assessment for granted.

Alternatively I can understand your story.
But then there IS an objectively-measurable way to prove it's the majority opinion (or the enforceable opinion, or whatever...)!?
And then how are we not wrong (or speaking nonsense), in every other sense? Either you have to slavishly follow the crowd or you have a sentence like "I feel it is the desired group option of most individuals that the desired group option not held by most individuals is the desired group option held most people" or "I know my desires go against morality, which you've defined, but I don't care" or say a sentence that is in point of fact untrue.

But how do you get the two sentences together...I really don't get it and you just seem to be asserting it.

Posted by Crœsos (# 238) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
If I take your example of football: yes, we agree that a certain code of football should be played according to certain rules. It is the nature of sport that there have to be consistent rules, otherwise fair competition is impossible. But behind this lies a consistent and universal concept of "fairness", which does reflect something about ultimate reality (nothing to do with the physical universe, of course). I have not disputed at all that there are agreed principles and methods by which this concept of fairness is expressed (and these rules may be the result of nothing more than a human consensus).

So two teams of eleven facing off against each other is "objectively fair", but twelve vs. twelve or ten vs. ten is "unfair" in some objective sense derived from underlying reality?

I'm having trouble with the concept that thing which seem to be the products of the human mind (moral codes, the rules of football, the Law of the Sea Treaty, etc.) are really akin to physical artifacts, not invented but "discovered". It's especially hard to take given that you don't seem to have any consistent method of recognizing such artifacts. You seem consistent in your assertion that Jack Straw's morality is "real" but the BNP's isn't but don't give us any explanation as to how you arrived at that conclusion other than personal preference, something the BNP speaker could claim just as easily.

Posted by George Spigot (# 253) on :

I think it's more likely that morals come from people who decided to live together in groups as has been mentioned before in this thread. You start way back in time with people who decided to live together in community's for obviously reasons. You can defend against animals and bandits, work the environment to get greater returns of food etc.

The community where members help each other is going to thrive while the community where people murder each other in the streets is going to die off.

Eventually as community's get larger and larger people realise that certain modes of behaviour have big advantages and people start to talk about actions that are good or bad.

In short first comes the community from which grows a moral standard rather than the moral standard existing first then people forming a community.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
On a realist theory there are some methods that are agreed to be error-reducing: identifying and removing logical contradiction, becoming aware of personal bias, becoming aware of other points of view or of how one's views affect other people who have to live with them, and so on.
How does the subjectivist view that there are moral facts, but that they inhere in our minds, preclude one from removing logical contradiction or being aware of personal bias and the rest?

A subjectivist isn't prevented from doing so. But why should he or she? The subjectivist doesn't believe that they're error reducing moves, since they believe that there is no such thing as error. They're just basically ways of changing my mind about things, among all the other ways of changing my mind about things. And if I choose to dignify some of my likes and dislikes with the name of morality, those could very well be things that I'm motivated not to change my mind about.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
But then there IS an objectively-measurable way to prove it's the majority opinion (or the enforceable opinion, or whatever...)!?
And then how are we not wrong (or speaking nonsense), in every other sense?

Sorry, what? All I'm saying is that we can say stuff like "it's good to give to charity" because we have an established (but still subjective) societal norm that says that is the case. And the only reason I'm saying it is to argue against the claim that the only way we can say stuff like that without being illogical or dishonest is if there's an external objective moral code that tells us so.

quote:
Either you have to slavishly follow the crowd or you have a sentence like "I feel it is the desired group option of most individuals that the desired group option not held by most individuals is the desired group option held most people" or "I know my desires go against morality, which you've defined, but I don't care" or say a sentence that is in point of fact untrue.

But how do you get the two sentences together...I really don't get it and you just seem to be asserting it.

I suspect you're still coming at this from a perspective that says there should only be one morality (however derived), and everybody must follow it. I'm not arguing from that perspective.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
A subjectivist isn't prevented from doing so. But why should he or she?

Because he or she wants to be part of society?

quote:
The subjectivist doesn't believe that they're error reducing moves, since they believe that there is no such thing as error.

"Error" in what sense, though? Are you talking about the "error" that comes from making a moral decision in a society that slightly disapproves of it, the "error" of making such a decision in a society that really detests it, or some sort of cosmic "error" where the transgression is against something completely outside of and alien to society itself? It's only the last type of error that subjectivists deny the possibility of.

"How should we live our lives" is still a valid question in the subjectivist paradigm. Being aware of ones biases and avoiding contradiction are still valuable tools in answering that question.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
A subjectivist isn't prevented from doing so. But why should he or she?
Because he or she wants to be part of society?

It is not at all obvious to me that as a matter of empirical fact people who restrict themselves to rational-like means of persuasion manage to be more part of society than people who use threats or bribery or emotional rhetoric to get what they want. Are politicians who restrict themselves to rational-like methods of persuasion going to be more or less successful in running for office? (I presume successful politicians are part of society by any meaningful definition.)

quote:

quote:
The subjectivist doesn't believe that they're error reducing moves, since they believe that there is no such thing as error.
"Error" in what sense, though? Are you talking about the "error" that comes from making a moral decision in a society that slightly disapproves of it, the "error" of making such a decision in a society that really detests it, or some sort of cosmic "error" where the transgression is against something completely outside of and alien to society itself? It's only the last type of error that subjectivists deny the possibility of.

I see no reason (assuming that there are no real moral facts) to suppose that the kind of error-reducing moves that I'm talking about will track what a society really detests, let alone what a society slightly disapproves of. A society in the grip of a periodic fit of morality is not notably consistent or equitable. I'd say the social consensus tends to be even more inconsistent than any given individual.

quote:
"How should we live our lives" is still a valid question in the subjectivist paradigm. Being aware of ones biases and avoiding contradiction are still valuable tools in answering that question.

The word 'bias' is meaningless in the subjectivist paradigm, surely? How can my opinions be biased when there's nothing for them to be biased from? If I say that I prefer chocolate cake to victoria sponge, what would it mean to ask me whether I'm biased?

On a subjectivist paradigm, 'how should we live our lives?' means either (a) 'how would I like us to live our lives?' or else - if you bring in intersubjectivity - (b) 'how do we end up living once we've all pooled our answers to (a)?' Note that the method of pooling our preferences is one of the things up for grabs. And so long as the result is practically feasible it really doesn't matter whether there are any contradictions in the manner in which we get there. (For example, 'All animals are equal but some are more equal than others' is a perfectly feasible political principle, however logically incoherent.)

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by Jay-Emm:
But then there IS an objectively-measurable way to prove it's the majority opinion (or the enforceable opinion, or whatever...)!?
And then how are we not wrong (or speaking nonsense), in every other sense?
Sorry, what?

quote:
...
But how do you get the two sentences together...I really don't get it and you just seem to be asserting it.
I suspect you're still coming at this from a perspective that says [that if such a thing exists there is -jayemm / there should be -MtM] only be one morality (however derived), and everybody must follow it. I'm not arguing from that perspective.

Possibly. In any case it appears we're not going to understand each others full perspective*.

With that in mind I'm going to leave it, as soon as polite, till the next thread which will come up sooner or later. (assuming that takes a different start and that's ok with you and I have the willpower to shut up).

*I've put a starting qualification on your post, actually I'd turn it round and inside out (before I was happy with it). But it's close enough that you wouldn't be using that if your perspective was close enough to mine (and given the way we can't see the difference between what you say and what we say you say, I'm guessing you'd see it as being the same).

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Croesos

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
If I take your example of football: yes, we agree that a certain code of football should be played according to certain rules. It is the nature of sport that there have to be consistent rules, otherwise fair competition is impossible. But behind this lies a consistent and universal concept of "fairness", which does reflect something about ultimate reality (nothing to do with the physical universe, of course). I have not disputed at all that there are agreed principles and methods by which this concept of fairness is expressed (and these rules may be the result of nothing more than a human consensus).
So two teams of eleven facing off against each other is "objectively fair", but twelve vs. twelve or ten vs. ten is "unfair" in some objective sense derived from underlying reality?

The number of players on each side is completely irrelevant! I think the vast majority of people would accept that it is "fair" to have the SAME number of players on each side, but, of course, the particular number is incidental and arbitrary. You seem to be conflating the underlying moral concept of fairness with the arbitrary method by which that concept is expressed. That is a category error.

The key concept is the word "same", not "eleven", "ten" or "twelve".

quote:
I'm having trouble with the concept that thing which seem to be the products of the human mind (moral codes, the rules of football, the Law of the Sea Treaty, etc.) are really akin to physical artifacts, not invented but "discovered".

Well you are not alone, because I am not claiming that moral concepts are akin to physical artifacts. It's nothing to do with the physical world, as I have explained before. I am not a materialist.

But as for the distinction between "inventing" and "discovering", as it happens, nothing is ever technically "invented" by man, but "discovered", given that all the possibilities already exist outside the mind of man in potential form. But I guess that what you mean is: are certain ideas arbitrary or necessary?

Clearly the concept of "fairness" is necessary, otherwise morality cannot function at all. Try organising the Olympics by declaring that each nation can compete under its own arbitrary understanding of "fairness"! It's pretty obvious to all but the most deluded fantasist that there exists a universal moral sense of fairness to which people appeal (even though some individuals in their self-centredness - and free will - try to undermine it, as in the case of doping). That is the nature of reality.

quote:
You seem consistent in your assertion that Jack Straw's morality is "real" but the BNP's isn't but don't give us any explanation as to how you arrived at that conclusion other than personal preference, something the BNP speaker could claim just as easily.

Actually what I have consistently asserted in this thread is that human behaviour implies the "belief" (whether subconscious or not) that morality has an objective basis. My argument is that people have to live (at least tacitly) as though the philosophy of naturalism is not actually true in order to make morality work, given that such a philosophy implies that morality is a merely human invention - a theory that all ideas are the emergent property of a merely physical brain, itself constructed entirely by mindless and amoral matter.

Let us suppose that the philosophy of naturalism is true, and that this is the prevailing view of the education system in, say, the UK (in fact, it probably is the tacitly prevailing view, more or less). Let us also suppose that everyone is highly educated in "critical thinking" according to this philosophy. Therefore everyone is encouraged to think through the logical implications of this philosophy. Let us suppose that all those who participated in the Question Time discussion (including the audience) adhered to this philosophy and were educated accordingly in the way I have just described. Wouldn't the discussion have been entirely different?

So we would have Jack Straw saying something like this: "We all know that morality is entirely a human construct, and that matter is amoral. Since we are all just material beings - products of nature and nothing more - we understand that our respective moral positions are just a matter of opinion, since there does not exist any kind of absolute morality. So we all recognise that philosophically the views of the BNP are logically valid. However, I am completely outraged and disgusted with their position, and regard their moral position as being in a different category to the differences between the mainstream parties."

If he had said that then the only logical conclusion one could draw from this is that Jack Straw's sense of outrage and disgust was for him nothing more than an expression of personal taste, of no more significance than a personal distaste for a particular food. (Of course, Jack Straw could be - or have been - a philosophical naturalist - I don't know. But my point is that, if he was, he was not acting like one. He was clearly appealing to a sense of "right" and "wrong", by which he condemned the BNP. Such condemnation is nonsense, if morality is merely subjective).

Now if people want to believe that an appeal to personal taste is the basis of moral discussion in the real world, then there is nothing I can say that could dissuade such a person. But I have come on here to express my view that such a position has nothing to do with the way reality actually works. It is almost universally the case that people do not express moral outrage on this basis, irrespective of their own personal philosophy. All moral protests are based on an appeal to what is believed to be objectively "right" and "wrong" and not "we are angrily marching in our thousands through the streets of London to appeal to you to love Marmite"! That kind of protest is just pure fantasy.

That is why I say that the philosophy of naturalism does not fit reality. The logical implications of that philosophy are not reflected in the reality of human behaviour.

Therefore the fundamentally moral sense we all have can only be explained with reference to a moral reality which is outside and above nature. Having said that, this does not mean that we don't have the freedom to find the best way to make morality work. But "best" implies a standard by which this goal is defined.

There is, of course, another explanation that could fit naturalism: might is right. Morality is entirely subjective, but some people decide to impose their particular taste on everyone else by fiat of authority. But I thought that was the great complaint about religion!! If morality is entirely subjective then you cannot appeal to people's reason, because that implies an appeal to something objective. Therefore "naturalistic morality" is inevitably imposed, which makes any complaint about religious moral authority obviously completely hypocritical!

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot
@EtymologicalEvangelical

So imagine I'm arguing with the BNP

If as you say morals come from an objective, universal standard then what's the information flow. How does the standard get into my head?

OK, so let me assume that moral subjectivism is right, and that there is no objective moral reality. What's the alternative? How does it work in reality?

On the assumption that you disagree with the "values" of the BNP, and on the assumption that morality is entirely a matter of personal opinion and taste, then how would you argue with them?

What would you say to them, other than "I disagree with you. Period."??

If there is no information flow from an objective standard of morality, then how does naturalistic morality work?

Can a (philosophical) naturalist actually engage in a moral debate? If so, how?

If you can't actually show me how subjective morality can work, then this implies that there is an objective moral reality that informs our moral discourse. Having established that, we then need to accept (or at least have the courage to "come to terms with") a world view that explains it, and this, of course, has practical implications, as Ramarius has hinted at in his reply to you.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd
I think you're being as unfair to realist theories as EE is being to non-realist theories.

"Unfair"??

What does that word mean?

Any idea (other than a realist one)?

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:

quote:
"How should we live our lives" is still a valid question in the subjectivist paradigm. Being aware of ones biases and avoiding contradiction are still valuable tools in answering that question.
The word 'bias' is meaningless in the subjectivist paradigm, surely? How can my opinions be biased when there's nothing for them to be biased from? If I say that I prefer chocolate cake to victoria sponge, what would it mean to ask me whether I'm biased?

There's no bias when you're talking about what you individually prefer, of course. But in the context of a societal conversation about what we should all do it's an important consideration.

If you're eating alone, it matters not whether you choose chocolate cake or victoria sponge. Nobody else is affected by that decision. But the discussions on morality we're referring to are more like us all being at the same table, and only being able to choose one type of dessert that we'll all have to eat. In that context - where we're trying to figure out what is best for all of us - we have to be aware of our biases, so that we're genuinely deciding what's best for everyone rather than just what's best for us.

Posted by Boogie (# 13538) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

If you're eating alone, it matters not whether you choose chocolate cake or victoria sponge. Nobody else is affected by that decision. But the discussions on morality we're referring to are more like us all being at the same table, and only being able to choose one type of dessert that we'll all have to eat. In that context - where we're trying to figure out what is best for all of us - we have to be aware of our biases, so that we're genuinely deciding what's best for everyone rather than just what's best for us.

True - but other purely personal food choices do affect others. If someone's Dad eats very unhealthy food all his life and dies aged 55 it will affect his whole family. My friend's husband did just that. Lovely bloke - left a huge hole in many people's lives.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Let us suppose that the philosophy of naturalism is true, and that this is the prevailing view of the education system in, say, the UK (in fact, it probably is the tacitly prevailing view, more or less). Let us also suppose that everyone is highly educated in "critical thinking" according to this philosophy. Therefore everyone is encouraged to think through the logical implications of this philosophy. Let us suppose that all those who participated in the Question Time discussion (including the audience) adhered to this philosophy and were educated accordingly in the way I have just described. Wouldn't the discussion have been entirely different?

So we would have Jack Straw saying something like this: "We all know that morality is entirely a human construct, and that matter is amoral. Since we are all just material beings - products of nature and nothing more - we understand that our respective moral positions are just a matter of opinion, since there does not exist any kind of absolute morality. So we all recognise that philosophically the views of the BNP are logically valid. However, I am completely outraged and disgusted with their position, and regard their moral position as being in a different category to the differences between the mainstream parties."

Actually, if all those qualifications were held to be true by all concerned then he wouldn't have to say them at all. They'd be taken for granted.

quote:
He was clearly appealing to a sense of "right" and "wrong", by which he condemned the BNP. Such condemnation is nonsense, if morality is merely subjective.

I have spent considerable time in the last few days explaining why it is not nonsense, and why an appeal to shared morality does not imply an appeal to objective morality. If you're going to continue to ignore my arguments and just repeat the same bald assertions you've been parroting since the start of this thread then frankly I'm not sure I can be bothered to continue wasting my time.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
If you can't actually show me how subjective morality can work

You clearly have no interest in what anyone else has to say on this thread. If you did, you'd have realised that we've spent seven fucking pages explaining how it works.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
You clearly have no interest in what anyone else has to say on this thread. If you did, you'd have realised that we've spent seven fucking pages explaining how it works.

And you have spent "seven fucking pages" miserably failing to convince me, because of the total lack of logic in your "argument". Most of your replies are just bare assertions.

In fact, I could just as easily ask you why after "seven fucking pages" you are still coming back with your assertions after all I have written, and therefore have bugger all interest in what I have to say!

It works both ways, mate. (Or doesn't it work like that in the world of "subjectivism"? Oh, of course, it wouldn't do, would it?!)

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
And you have spent "seven fucking pages" miserably failing to convince me, because of the total lack of logic in your "argument". Most of your replies are just bare assertions.

The juxtaposition of these two sentences is freakin' hilarious.

Oh, by the way: just because something doesn't make sense to you doesn't make it illogical.

Posted by EtymologicalEvangelical (# 15091) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian
Actually, if all those qualifications were held to be true by all concerned then he wouldn't have to say them at all. They'd be taken for granted.

So we all know that the expression of moral outrage is just play acting, yes?

If we all understand - and take for granted - that the moral position of the BNP is just as intrinsically valid as our position (which must be the case, if morality is entirely subjective and merely a matter of personal opinion and nothing more), then why the big deal at hectoring someone like Nick Griffin, who is only exercising his moral freedom.

In other words, moral freedom is banned in the world of moral subjectivism!! Which backs up my point about "might is right".

And if the argument is that Griffin's argument is not as valid on the basis that our argument is "better", then WTF do you mean by "better"?

I have asked you this question numerous times, and you just ignore it. How do you arrive at the concept of "better" if you do not have an objective standard by which to judge whether one thing is "better" than another?

It's a bit like telling the gymnasts at the Olympics that they can perform whatever actions they like - as there are absolutely no rules - and we'll all just decide which performance is the "best" on the basis of what we feel like at the time. Total bullshit, like moral subjectivism.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
My argument is that people have to live (at least tacitly) as though the philosophy of naturalism is not actually true in order to make morality work, given that such a philosophy implies that morality is a merely human invention - a theory that all ideas are the emergent property of a merely physical brain, itself constructed entirely by mindless and amoral matter.

Non-realism is not the same as naturalism. Naturalism in ontology is one of the motivations for non-realism in ethics, but it doesn't necessarily require non-realism in ethics.
Classical utilitarianism is naturalistic yet realist about moral questions. For that matter, Thomist ethics is naturalistic yet realist about those parts of ethics that can be known without revelation.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
If you're eating alone, it matters not whether you choose chocolate cake or victoria sponge. Nobody else is affected by that decision. But the discussions on morality we're referring to are more like us all being at the same table, and only being able to choose one type of dessert that we'll all have to eat. In that context - where we're trying to figure out what is best for all of us - we have to be aware of our biases, so that we're genuinely deciding what's best for everyone rather than just what's best for us.

But there is, assuming subjectivism, no such thing as what is best for everyone.

Let's assume twelve people are trying to decide on cake. (None of them have any prior opinions on voting systems.)
Five of them like coffee cake but failing that victoria sponge.
Three of them like victoria sponge but failing that chocolate cake.
Four of them like chocolate cake but failing that victoria sponge.
(To keep things simple, we'll assume that everyone will still eat their third choice cake. If someone announces that they won't eat one type of cake then that's an extra layer of complication.)

What does 'best for everyone' mean here? We could define as what would win if everybody voted. There are problems with that I'm going to discuss, but I don't think there is any other way to define it.

What happens if somebody decides to be aware of their bias so that instead of deciding what they prefer they're deciding what's best for everyone? That means that instead of voting for what they want they try to second guess the outcome of the vote. And that's pointless - if people try to second guess the outcome of the vote the outcome will be less accurate than if they don't.
Being aware of your bias here is meaningless. All you're doing if you try is pointlessly second-guessing other people.

Unfortunately, voting is not straightforward. Because there are sensible voting systems that will give each of the three cakes as the answer. (First past the post gives coffee; single transferable vote gives chocolate; condorcet gives victoria sponge.) Now assuming nobody has any opinions on the superiority of any voting system over any other, which voting system should each voter advocate? Why shouldn't they go for the voting system that results in the kind of cake that they want? It's not as if there's any other reason to pick a voting system. Again, it's not bias to favour the voting system that gives you the result you want; favouring a voting system because you think it's 'the best' is just second guessing the eventual decision.

Of course there are ways to resolve the situation: if Ann who favours chocolate cake fancies Ben who favours coffee cake and Ben hints that he might take Ann out if he's in a good mood, but won't if he's been forced to eat victoria sponge, then Ann has a reason to favour first past the vote as a voting system. You could call that bias, except that it's not as if there is any reason for not doing so that she's ignoring.

Conclusion:
there's no such thing as 'the best for everyone' until you've decided how you put together what everyone wants;
allowing for one's personal bias is just second-guessing the result.

Deciding what moral system gives us the best for everyone is effectively choosing between voting systems where the only reason for favouring one voting system over another is that it gives me what I want.

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

quote:

Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical

My argument is that people have to live (at least tacitly) as though the philosophy of naturalism is not actually true in order to make morality work, given that such a philosophy implies that morality is a merely human invention - a theory that all ideas are the emergent property of a merely physical brain, itself constructed entirely by mindless and amoral matter.

How does it follow that mindless, amoral matter can't result in morality given the right conditions? To me it's like saying hydrogen and oxygen cannot result in water because they are not wet.

As to your challenge for others to show how subjective/naturalistic/non realist morality can work, why should anyone waste their time? Your arguments betray a woeful misunderstanding of the positions you are criticising. Read a book. Google. It's never been easier to be well informed.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
If we all understand - and take for granted - that the moral position of the BNP is just as intrinsically valid as our position (which must be the case, if morality is entirely subjective and merely a matter of personal opinion and nothing more), then why the big deal at hectoring someone like Nick Griffin, who is only exercising his moral freedom.

Because we are still free to exercise our own moral codes.

You're coming across like someone who defends themselves in Hell by saying "I'm free to say what I want on this board". To which the response is "yes, you are - but we are also free to say what we think of it".

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
What happens if somebody decides to be aware of their bias so that instead of deciding what they prefer they're deciding what's best for everyone? That means that instead of voting for what they want they try to second guess the outcome of the vote. And that's pointless - if people try to second guess the outcome of the vote the outcome will be less accurate than if they don't.
Being aware of your bias here is meaningless. All you're doing if you try is pointlessly second-guessing other people.

I was kind of assuming that the people concerned would actually talk about it, rather than operating in total isolation and trying to second guess one another.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Being aware of your bias here is meaningless. All you're doing if you try is pointlessly second-guessing other people.
I was kind of assuming that the people concerned would actually talk about it, rather than operating in total isolation and trying to second guess one another.

The same applies, surely? If people are going to talk about it, then what happens when people talk about it is they advocate for their own opinions. They don't try to advocate what they guess will be the final consensus opinion before that consensus has emerged.

A voting system just is a way to summarise the overall preferences of a group of people. If what happens when people talk about it isn't what would have happened if they'd all voted in isolation according a voting system that met their consensual criteria, that implies that they weren't very good at talking about it, or somebody who thought he knew what everybody else wanted hogged the conversation, etc.
(That said, 'one man, one vote; the somebody who thinks he knows what everybody else wants is the man, and he has the vote,' produces a decision as efficiently any other voting system if everybody else can be persuaded to go along with it.)

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
If people are going to talk about it, then what happens when people talk about it is they advocate for their own opinions.

It depends on how much they care about achieving an end result that everyone will be happy with.

I mean, I've had conversations like that. Everyone wants to go out for dinner, but some want curry and others want pizza and others want steak, and some really don't want curry, and some aren't keen on steak but will put up with it for the sake of the group, and so forth. And we all talk about it and eventually it's decided to go for pizza because that's the only option that everyone is content to go along with. This isn't a hypothetical conversation, it's the one I was in last Saturday evening.

Of course, that only works if everyone's first priority is keeping the group together. At the societal level there will always be assholes who want to sod the whole thing and go home if they can't have exactly what they want, but as long as they're in the minority the rest of us can continue to have a good time.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
If people are going to talk about it, then what happens when people talk about it is they advocate for their own opinions.
It depends on how much they care about achieving an end result that everyone will be happy with.

But caring about achieving an end result that everyone will be happy with does not mean that the people who really can't stand curry should not mention that. The only way to find out what result everyone will be happy with is for everyone to say what they personally do or don't want. If somebody says that they really can't stand curry it's not biased of them to say so.

Look: what I'm talking about is a model. It doesn't describe the actual procedure by which people come to a joint decision. It doesn't have the bit where two people go off on a tangent about the Olympic opening ceremony. It models the procedure formally.
The bit where people care about achieving an end result that everyone will be happy with either comes in when everyone agrees to the voting system they use to summarise the results; or else is formally equivalent to Ann voting with Ben so that Ben will be in a good mood to take her out.

But do note - caring about achieving an end result that everyone will be happy with is already a moral principle. If your procedure for agreeing upon moral principles presupposes a moral principle in order to start working then you've got a bit of a circular problem with justification.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
But caring about achieving an end result that everyone will be happy with does not mean that the people who really can't stand curry should not mention that. The only way to find out what result everyone will be happy with is for everyone to say what they personally do or don't want. If somebody says that they really can't stand curry it's not biased of them to say so.

I've not suggested otherwise, have I? It's when a preference for pizza is treated as if it were "pizza or nothing" that it becomes a bias.

quote:
But do note - caring about achieving an end result that everyone will be happy with is already a moral principle. If your procedure for agreeing upon moral principles presupposes a moral principle in order to start working then you've got a bit of a circular problem with justification.

Yes, I adknowledged that in my last post.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
I've not suggested otherwise, have I? It's when a preference for pizza is treated as if it were "pizza or nothing" that it becomes a bias.

I think that is stretching the definition of 'bias' beyond what it will reasonably bear. What it is is a negotiating tactic that the person may or may not be allowed by the rest of the party to get away with.

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd
Look: what I'm talking about is a model. It doesn't describe the actual procedure by which people come to a joint decision. It doesn't have the bit where two people go off on a tangent about the Olympic opening ceremony. It models the procedure formally.

Why would you do that? You outlined way up the thread the different meta-ethical positions and pointed up the problems with all of them, showing that it is an impossible task to nail down a logically coherent position on any one view. The only difference I can see between your position and that of the latest hero of Hell is one of tone.

It is trivially simple to point out inconsistencies in simplified versions of meta-ethical positions that have been debated for centuries, rather more difficult to defend a view.

IMO there are broadly two types of people adopting the subjectivist position. There are those who believe that to think of morality in terms of right or wrong, good and bad, is an error - the moral nihilists. A much larger group, though, and containing many people who couldn't give a toss about moral philosophy, contends that whatever the metaphysical (or lack thereof) reality of the origin of morality, every moral action we take and every moral judgment we make, happens in minds, and mainly effects other minds. It seems sensible, then, that moral conversations are held in that context.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd
Look: what I'm talking about is a model. It doesn't describe the actual procedure by which people come to a joint decision. It doesn't have the bit where two people go off on a tangent about the Olympic opening ceremony. It models the procedure formally.
Why would you do that?

Why model the procedure formally? To get a clearer idea of what moral argument formally amounts to on a subjectivist view.

quote:
You outlined way up the thread the different meta-ethical positions and pointed up the problems with all of them, showing that it is an impossible task to nail down a logically coherent position on any one view.

I pointed up that they were problems. I did nothing to show that they all had insurmountable problems. Personally I think that a theistically inflected naturalism can surmount the problems I outlined (different thread maybe). But even if all positions have problems that we don't yet have widely convincing answers to, so that adopting any position means biting a bullet, it's still worth getting clear about what bullet people are choosing to bite.
There are some differences in emphasis between EE and me. (I've told him a couple of times where I think he's making a mistake.) I would like to believe that I have been actually responding to other people's arguments and not merely repeating myself over and over again.

quote:
IMO there are broadly two types of people adopting the subjectivist position. There are those who believe that to think of morality in terms of right or wrong, good and bad, is an error - the moral nihilists. A much larger group, though, and containing many people who couldn't give a toss about moral philosophy, contends that whatever the metaphysical (or lack thereof) reality of the origin of morality, every moral action we take and every moral judgment we make, happens in minds, and mainly effects other minds. It seems sensible, then, that moral conversations are held in that context.

I don't think you're right about the beliefs of the first group - there may be some in the first group who give up on morality altogether. But so long as they haven't they still talk about right and wrong and good and bad - they just don't talk about correct and incorrect or true and false. (And even then they may find ways to do so.)

I'm really not sure what you're saying is true of the second group. At face value what you're saying is either false or trivial. False, for example: the statement that any action happens in minds seems to me mostly false, and morally relevant actions by people who aren't telepaths affect other people only because they have effects in non-mental reality. Trivial, for example: if moral conversations take place in that context, then that's just where they take place whether we're sensible or not. If you mean that our moral discourse should be altered by that recognition, then I refer you back to the model you questioned at the start of your post. That was my attempt at making clear how I think moral discourse would be altered.
But I'm not confident that what I take you to have said at face value was what you were trying to communicate.

Posted by Marvin the Martian (# 4360) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Why model the procedure formally? To get a clearer idea of what moral argument formally amounts to on a subjectivist view.

Formally, with all emotion and empathy stripped away, it amounts to "this is my preference, and I would like you to share it".

But that's not the sum total of how it works in reality because reality has emotion and empathy included.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Why model the procedure formally? To get a clearer idea of what moral argument formally amounts to on a subjectivist view.
Formally, with all emotion and empathy stripped away, it amounts to "this is my preference, and I would like you to share it".

But that's not the sum total of how it works in reality because reality has emotion and empathy included.

Preferences are emotions. For that matter, empathy is a preference. While empathy may not influence our basic preferences in cake much it may well have an effect upon our ethical preferences.
But...
Are you saying that groups of people who feel empathy for each other are more likely to converge on the same answer than groups of people that don't? That is on afternoon one group A who feel empathy and group B who don't turn up at a cafe; on afternoon two group C who feel empathy and group D who don't turn up. By coincidence the cake preferences of the people in each group are the same. Are A and C significantly more likely to come up with the same answer than B and D are? If groups A and C are more likely to converge then that suggests that there is a realist answer to the problem to which empathy gives access. If they don't, then I don't think invoking empathy solves the problem. If there's no objective answer then all possible answers are compatible with empathy in some way or another, and empathy can't distinguish between them.

[ 10. August 2012, 18:35: Message edited by: Dafyd ]

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

I think the above post can probably be summarised by saying: the effects of empathy on the decision making process are sufficiently allowed for by saying that everyone has decided to vote and abide by the results of the vote.

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd
Why model the procedure formally? To get a clearer idea of what moral argument formally amounts to on a subjectivist view.

As Marvin says, to formalise this subject strips out nearly everything of importance about it. I once had a long and pointless discussion with a bloke who was convinced that Godel's Incompleteness Theorems proved that our morality comes from God. He maintained that we could in principle formalise any system of morals, and the fact such a system would then contain true but unprovable statements - only resolvable at a higher level - proved God. Aside from being a total crock of shite, the argument overlooked the obvious fact that any such formalisation could not fully model moral facts since most of them, as Hume said, don't spring from any formal, rational process.

I think you are making a similar mistake.

quote:
The statement that any action happens in minds...

Sloppy language on my part. Originates in minds, and the consequences are played out in minds. If I bang my shin, the pain has no moral dimension. If you kick me in the shin, well that's a different matter entirely, and all the moral activity happens in our respective minds.

And yes, what I'm saying is trivial, because the alternative seems to me to be incoherent. An objective standard that can't be shown to be objective or a standard? How does that work?

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd
Why model the procedure formally? To get a clearer idea of what moral argument formally amounts to on a subjectivist view.
Aside from being a total crock of shite, the argument overlooked the obvious fact that any such formalisation could not fully model moral facts since most of them, as Hume said, don't spring from any formal, rational process.

I'm sorry if we've got a bit bogged down in what was supposed to be an illustration. I was trying to argue to a contradiction: Marvin was asking why ethics, on a non-realist account, can't be an attempt to converge upon a best result - I was trying to show that there's no way of defining a best result.
The point I was trying to make was that concepts like 'removing bias' and 'removing contradiction' only belong in ethical debate if ethics has a realist subject matter. You and Marvin asked me why ethics can't include them. To which my response is now, because removing contradiction only has a place in a formal rational process, and on your account ethics is not a formal rational process. Likewise, becoming aware of bias only applies if ethics is a formal rational process, which on your account it is not.

quote:
An objective standard that can't be shown to be objective or a standard? How does that work?

As I say, we have one way into it which is that we can treat our debates as if they are about an objective standard.

I also suggest you look at some philosophy of science, which takes its start from the fact that we have no direct access to the objective standard described by the scientific theory. All scientific theories are our constructions from the data points. Yet we seem to think that they can be objective enough.

[ 11. August 2012, 09:32: Message edited by: Dafyd ]

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

@Dafyd

I'm getting a feeling of shifting sands now. If we are to have moral discourse as if it were about an objective standard, then I don't see your problem with defining the standard as some sort of intersubjective agreement. The problems of voting and such are then simply corollaries of the self deception of claiming an objective standard that actually isn't one. That would put it in the same boat as defining the standard as a metaphysical entity channeled through revelation, scripture, moral intuition or whatever.

In other words, your position is, as I think someone up the thread commented, a distinction without a difference.

quote:
I also suggest you look at some philosophy of science, which takes its start from the fact that we have no direct access to the objective standard described by the scientific theory. All scientific theories are our constructions from the data points. Yet we seem to think that they can be objective enough.

Well, I'm with Feynman on that one. Science is, in essence, a series of pretty simple questions. Does the theory explain the data? How would we know if the theory were wrong? Does the theory make predictions? Can we test the predictions? Did the predictions turn out to be correct? And last but not least, does the theory fit in with the wider body of science?

But, since you bring science into the mix, Sam Harris's proposal of a science of morality could easily provide your standard that is not a standard. We take a decision to act as if the wellbeing of conscious creatures is our yardstick, and we use psychology, neuroscience and the rest to work out the details. Job done.

Except that it can't do the job. At least not yet. Our knowledge is not good enough to give a sufficient account. It's like the science of weather prediction - good enough to be useful, bad enough to be misleading at crucial times. Still, the philosophers and theologians hate the idea, so it can't be all bad. [Devil]

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:

quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd
Why model the procedure formally? To get a clearer idea of what moral argument formally amounts to on a subjectivist view.
As Marvin says, to formalise this subject strips out nearly everything of importance about it.

We* don't really have many options:

We can keep repeating the same assertions, and wondering why the other side doesn't think it is obvious.
Or we can abandon the discussion (politely** or not).
Or we can push the bounderies, what does each model give in the extreme cases (reductio a against Hitler, reductio with Hitler, reductio a cake, a more abstract view, a history, etc...).

Or put crudely we can 'say the same', 'say nothing', 'say something slightly different'.

If it does indeed take everything of importance (from your PoV), that's interesting in it's own right. What we're each failing to say might be there.

*'we' as in 'both sides' rather than 'our side' throughout.
**which requires pretty much everyone at the same time.

[ 12. August 2012, 12:56: Message edited by: Jay-Emm ]

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
I'm getting a feeling of shifting sands now. If we are to have moral discourse as if it were about an objective standard, then I don't see your problem with defining the standard as some sort of intersubjective agreement. The problems of voting and such are then simply corollaries of the self deception of claiming an objective standard that actually isn't one. That would put it in the same boat as defining the standard as a metaphysical entity channeled through revelation, scripture, moral intuition or whatever.

The difference is that we know (assuming my arguments hold up to scrutiny) that intersubjective agreement can't do that kind of work, because when we try to make it do that kind of work it falls apart on us. Claiming that it's therefore in the same boat as some metaphysical entity is I think rather begging the question against intuitionism. (Actually, I'd favour naturalism as a base of ethics with theistic flavouring.)

quote:
Well, I'm with Feynman on that one. Science is, in essence, a series of pretty simple questions. Does the theory explain the data? How would we know if the theory were wrong? Does the theory make predictions? Can we test the predictions? Did the predictions turn out to be correct? And last but not least, does the theory fit in with the wider body of science?

As usual with questions described as pretty simple, they turn out not to be as soon as you try thinking them through.
(The data that eventually falsified Newton's theory - the irregularities in the orbit of Mercury - had been known about pretty much since Newton. It's just that in the absence of any better theory the scientific community just assumed that some explanation would be eventually forthcoming. There are still unexplained irregularities in the orbit of Neptune that weren't explained by the discovery of Pluto.)

Besides I think conservationism is more likely to be of use of birds if done with some knowledge of ornithology. Feynman, I'm afraid, is just being anti-intellectual.

quote:
But, since you bring science into the mix, Sam Harris's proposal of a science of morality could easily provide your standard that is not a standard.

Bomber Harris' proposal, as far as I gather, is an example of the odd tendency to believe that you wade into philosophy bypassing centuries of argument by sticking the label IT'S SCIENCE on your newly invented philosophical wheel. All Bomber Harris has done is to reinvent classical utilitarianism two hundred odd years after Jeremy Bentham. It's a basic example of parascience - bad philosophy that tries to trade on the prestige of the word 'science'.

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

quote:

Originally posted by Dafyd
As usual with questions described as pretty simple, they turn out not to be as soon as you try thinking them through.

The questions are simple, the answers are fiendishly complicated and provisional. Which is why it's more profitable to concentrate on the answers rather than wibble on about the questions.

quote:
Feynman, I'm afraid, is just being anti-intellectual.

The anti-intellectualism of a Nobel prize winner for physics and all round top bloke is fine by me. And I think maybe this opinion was related to another of his that says, essentially, outside of the area of expertise, a specialist's opinion is just as dumb as the next guy's. Philosophy has a habit of treating every other discipline as grist to its mill, often without a conspicuously deep understanding, but if someone has the temerity to encroach on philosophical territory, it's a different story completely. Philosopher's are then apt to react in much the same dismissive way as you have about Harris.

Anyway, that's the horse doofers, main course to follow.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:

quote:

Originally posted by Dafyd
As usual with questions described as pretty simple, they turn out not to be as soon as you try thinking them through.
The questions are simple, the answers are fiendishly complicated and provisional. Which is why it's more profitable to concentrate on the answers rather than wibble on about the questions.

That, if you don't mind my saying so, is a discussion stopper. If you're going to say 'science is a series of pretty simple questions' you oughtn't then forbid people from questioning your proposition by saying 'no wibbling'. ('Wibbling' to be defined as any question you don't personally want to think about for any reason.)

quote:

quote:
Feynman, I'm afraid, is just being anti-intellectual.
The anti-intellectualism of a Nobel prize winner for physics and all round top bloke is fine by me. And I think maybe this opinion was related to another of his that says, essentially, outside of the area of expertise, a specialist's opinion is just as dumb as the next guy's.

Just as an aside, was philosophy of science Feynmann's area of expertise? How many peer reviewed papers had he published in philosophy of science journals?
As you've just pointed out the fact that Feynmann was a specialist in quantum physics wouldn't necessarily stop him from being just as dumb and anti-intellectual as the next guy in other areas.

However, on consideration I took his saying too much at your valuation of it. Because he's (almost) certainly not saying that ornithology is valueless. In fact, to anyone not a bird who has reason to deal with birds it's pretty important. So what Feynmann is actually saying about the philosophy of science is pretty important to anyone who isn't a scientist who wants to understand scientists. For that matter, birds can't talk about being a bird to non-birds. But if they could do so, what they'd be doing is ornithology.

What scientists do when they talk about 'science' in general to non-scientists is philosophy of science. (That is, not someone trying to explain the results of their specific field.) When scientists talk about 'science' to non-scientific audiences, what they tend to talk at the current cultural moment is a somewhat confused mix of John Locke and Karl Popper. For example, if Louis Wolpert says in public that only science provides genuine knowledge, then what he's doing is not only philosophy of science but also philosophy of history, hermeneutics, epistemology etc etc, and questioning him about it is not to be dismissed a priori as wibbling.

quote:
Philosophy has a habit of treating every other discipline as grist to its mill, often without a conspicuously deep understanding, but if someone has the temerity to encroach on philosophical territory, it's a different story completely. Philosopher's are then apt to react in much the same dismissive way as you have about Harris.

When you say 'often without a conspicuously deep understanding' on what basis do you make that statement?
It's a bit odd to say that outside people's area of expertise specialists are just as dumb as the next guy, and then complain that philosophers oughtn't to point out that this is true of people for whom philosophy is outside their area of expertise.

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

quote:

Originally posted by Dafyd
and then complain that philosophers oughtn't to point out that this is true of people for whom philosophy is outside their area of expertise.

This is a conversation that could go on forever. But I was just pointing out a double standard.

quote:
When you say 'often without a conspicuously deep understanding' on what basis do you make that statement?

Fodor on What Darwin Got Wrong, Nagel's enthusiasm for Signature in the Cell, Plantinga on evolution, science and religion, Ruse on science and religion, even Eliot Sober, who has actually done some interesting stuff, on science and religion. Pretty much everyone - including, it has to be said, scientists - that wax philosophical about quantum physics. And every armchair philosopher on the intertubes, including me.

quote:
If you're going to say 'science is a series of pretty simple questions' you oughtn't then forbid people from questioning your proposition by saying 'no wibbling'.

I'm not forbidding (how would I do that, carve Thou Shalt not Wibble on a tablet of stone?) but saying is less profitable. For example while Popper was deciding whether he thought natural selection was testable or not, evolutionary biology carried on in its own sweet way working stuff out. And since then, other philosophers have chewed the fat about the epistemic status of theory making, theory laden facts and such and such, while scientists have carried on working stuff out. Still, I suppose it's not an either or, so hey ho.

But in the context of our discussion of meta-ethics, or should I say meta-meta-meta ethics... You know what, I can't remember a thing. I'll try and marshall some wibbling anon.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:

quote:

Originally posted by Dafyd
When you say 'often without a conspicuously deep understanding' on what basis do you make that statement?
Fodor on What Darwin Got Wrong, Nagel's enthusiasm for Signature in the Cell, Plantinga on evolution, science and religion, Ruse on science and religion, even Eliot Sober, who has actually done some interesting stuff, on science and religion.

Fodor, Nagel and Plantinga aren't philosophers of science.
From what I can tell, the fact that the noisy end of the pool doesn't like Ruse on science and religion says nothing about the intrinsic value of Ruse's views. (The noisy end of the pool being Dawkins, who seems to think that his ability to market popular science entitles him to criticise people who are much better biologists than he is, and admirers.) Elliott Sober, I see, worked with Lewontin, so the same applies.

[ 15. August 2012, 12:22: Message edited by: Dafyd ]

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

@Dafyd

quote:
Fodor, Nagel and Plantinga aren't philosophers of science.

Indeed, which is probably why the sentence in question starts with "Philosophy has a habit of treating every other discipline..."

Anyway, if I was marginally more of a saddo than I actually am - wibbling on as I do about shit on the internet when I could be having a life - I'd do a version of bingo, along the lines of creationist bingo for sophisticated theistic argumentation. High minded dismissal of Sam Harris would be in there, as would assertions of the mediocrity of Dawkins's biology. This is the nearest I can find.

But back to the subject we were actually talking about back in the day, I'm still fascinated by this idea that we examine ethical realism by treating it as if an objective standard exists. Well, I don't know about anybody else, but I foresee that if we did such a thing, we'd get no contradictions and error and we'd have ourselves a nice meta-ethical theory that would stand up to formal scrutiny. We could reason our way to an imagined world where the question of morality is done and dusted. But does it fit the data?

To me, the important argument against the objectivist position is that it is in practical terms impossible to distinguish between a world where an objective standard is absent and one where it exists but is - even partially - hidden. I can't see how your approach brings anything to the table.

And how does theistically inflected naturalism differ from theism?

Posted by George Spigot (# 253) on :

Quick question. Does objective morality allow for an action to be good or bad depending on the circumstances?

Posted by Gildas (# 525) on :

Of course: it is wrong to pour water over the head of a visiting Bishop generally but not when he has inadvertently set fire to his mitre!

Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :

and the beliefs of the participants involved are one of the circumstances.

(potentially even a dominating one, potentially a near negligible, potentially it varies on how reasonable those beliefs are. but that's a question for another day)

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
High minded dismissal of Sam Harris would be in there, as would assertions of the mediocrity of Dawkins's biology.

You say that as if people oughtn't to dismiss Bomber Harris at every opportunity. I admit that the sideswipe at Dawkins was only partially relevant and was somewhat unfair.

quote:
To me, the important argument against the objectivist position is that it is in practical terms impossible to distinguish between a world where an objective standard is absent and one where it exists but is - even partially - hidden.

Reality is (among other things) what we can't leave out of our best action-guiding explanation of the way we act. If we find that our best way of thinking morally is as if we're realists about morality then that is realism about morality.

But the argument you put forward has problems in other ways. It may be in practical terms impossible to distinguish between a realm in which there are is no objective 'standard' for past statements and one in which the 'standard' is even partially hidden. But does that amount to an argument for last-Thursdayism? If not, then your argument doesn't actually justify the adoption of non-realism about morality.

quote:
And how does theistically inflected naturalism differ from theism?

Theism is a position in philosophy of religion and naturalism is a position in metaethics.

The main strength of naturalist positions in metaethics is that they allow us to base ethics in facts about the ways in which humans live our lives. The problem is that we can't decide between naturalist positions without interpretation. So we need to pick an interpretive key, and then see if it holds up to criticism (as with any hermeneutic problem). And Christianity seems at least as able to argue off rival interpretations as any.

[ 16. August 2012, 18:27: Message edited by: Dafyd ]

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot:
Quick question. Does objective morality allow for an action to be good or bad depending on the circumstances?

Classical utilitarianism is an example of an objective morality. And according to classical utilitarianism the consequences are all that make an action good or bad. So, yes.

Posted by leo (# 1458) on :

It is subjective in that what constitutes 'the greatest good for the greatest number' is a subjective point of view.

That is why utilitarianism is a flawed medium for making moral decisions. (The extinction of Jews was viewed as being for the greater good of Germany - doesn't make it right.)

Posted by Ramarius (# 16551) on :

quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot:
Quick question. Does objective morality allow for an action to be good or bad depending on the circumstances?

Not according to divine command theory where the relationship is between the act, and the God to whom we are responsible for our actions. So under this understanding of morality we talk about moral values and responsibilities. An objective moral responsibility must be to someone to whom everyone is morally responsible.

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

quote:
You say that as if people oughtn't to dismiss Bomber Harris at every opportunity.

An amusing example of the People's Front of Judea versus The Judean People's Front. Like you, I've not read The Moral Landscape, but from his response to critics and his TED talk, Harris is very much the moral realist. And any accusations of warmed over Bentham wouldn't bother him over much. Neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology etc give us a wealth of information about the well-being of conscious creatures unavailable two hundred years ago. The irony here is that the main difference between you and him is that you've both subjectively decided different objective standards.

quote:
If we find that our best way of thinking morally is as if we're realists about morality then that is realism about morality.

I know this is only wibbling on the internet, but your are failing to show that it is the best way. Pointing out the problems on the other side is only half the story. And besides, the main stumbling block is if - as I believe to be the case - whatever moral realism there is lies in our meat computers, we have a real problem thinking about it without driving ourselves scatty.

quote:
So we need to pick an interpretive key, and then see if it holds up to criticism (as with any hermeneutic problem). And Christianity seems at least as able to argue off rival interpretations as any.

Well, it might to you, since you have a Christian metaphysical belief. Another interpretive key might be the naturalistic belief (in a wider sense than the ethical dimension) that our moral intuitions and our ability to subject them to rational analysis (and more importantly to rationalise them) are the result of non moral, non rational processes and that we are stuck with muddling our way through the conundrum somehow.

Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :

quote:
Originally posted by Grokesx:
Harris is very much the moral realist.

Of course Harris is a moral realist. So?
Being a moral realist means, among other things, that you don't think morality is about picking and supporting sides. It's not about Jews vs Romans.

[ 17. August 2012, 14:35: Message edited by: Dafyd ]

Posted by Grokesx (# 17221) on :

quote:
Of course Harris is a moral realist. So?

It's the splitter thing. From where I'm standing you and Harris hardly differ in approach.

quote:
Being a moral realist means, among other things, that you don't think morality is about picking and supporting sides. It's not about Jews vs Romans.

The apophatic theory of morality?

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