Don't worry - I have no doubt that you're better than your philosophy...
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quote:Exactly. This is why I don't believe we live in a materialist universe.
Oscar the Grouch: When you look around, I think it is clear that we DO have the ability to make choices and hence morality DOES have a meaning.
quote:
"I found that I just couldn't believe in the Bible any more. I brought my children up without religion. Four children - never one's been in any trouble. Morally, they're second to none. Moral teachings have nothing to do with religion at all. Morals are social in their origin, I've always found. I used to teach my children this: if you hurt society, you're hurting yourself, for the simple reason that you're a member of society. And that's the only way to teach children. Teach them: if they want to do a bad thing, let them do it, but don't kid themselves it's a good thing. Make them face up to it - they're part of society, and whatever they do, it must have some bearing on the happiness or otherwise of society."
quote:No, it doesn't imply that. What quantum randomness does, it just introduces a random variable over which we don't have control either. The wave function of an atom will either collapse into state A or into state B (as you well know, given our user name). This doesn't give us a choice.
Schroedinger's cat: a lack of a deterministic universe at any level does imply that our actions are decisions that we make, using our free will, our choices.
quote:It depends on how the brain does that. In a materialistic universe, by its turn it would do so either by a deterministic process following the laws of physics, or by a stochastical process involving quantum randomness. There wouldn't be a choice here either.
que sais-je: Still, we may believe we make free choices but be wrong. Perhaps our brains evaluate alternatives (possibly including options we aren't conscious of) and on the basis of that a choice is made by its chemistry and/or computational abilities. Is that free will?
quote:I'm not sure morality can exist in a completely non-deterministic universe either, if "choice" is a necessary component of morality. Given that the outcome of any choice would be unknown and unknowable due to the non-deterministic nature of reality (two plus two equals five for the next sixty seconds!), choosing between a series of unknowable outcomes lacks a moral dimension.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
quote:No, it doesn't imply that. What quantum randomness does, it just introduces a random variable over which we don't have control either. The wave function of an atom will either collapse into state A or into state B (as you well know, given our user name). This doesn't give us a choice.
Schroedinger's cat: a lack of a deterministic universe at any level does imply that our actions are decisions that we make, using our free will, our choices.
quote:Sorry, what I wrote was unclear. I agree with you. What I was trying to say was that believing you make free choices doesn't mean you actually do.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
There wouldn't be a choice here either.
quote:I agree. If our free will is an illusion, then so is our morality.
que sais-je: What I was trying to say was that believing you make free choices doesn't mean you actually do.
quote:We sometimes lack the language to say this, or at least I do. I want to say that it is "hard wired" into us, which then is a materialist metaphor. Even if I say it's built into the fabric of the universe, I'm using materialist language.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
quote:Exactly. This is why I don't believe we live in a materialist universe.
Oscar the Grouch: When you look around, I think it is clear that we DO have the ability to make choices and hence morality DOES have a meaning.
quote:Yes, this would be the illusion of free will we were talking about. But it doesn't lead to morality. Only if we'd put "morality" between scare quotes too.
Lyda*Rose: If you don't know what deterministic decision you will make, it's "free" to you.
quote:I agree. A completely deterministic universe and a completely non-deterministics would be the two ends of the scale. Fortunately, I believe there is something in between too.
Crœsos: I'm not sure morality can exist in a completely non-deterministic universe either
quote:Where do you draw the line, and how? As near as I can tell the only methodology employed is philosophical convenience, which is never a very good way at arriving at accurate conclusions.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
quote:I agree. A completely deterministic universe and a completely non-deterministics would be the two ends of the scale. Fortunately, I believe there is something in between too.
Crœsos: I'm not sure morality can exist in a completely non-deterministic universe either
quote:What I meant was, the universe is not deterministic, at some level. The quantum randomness means that there are events that are indeterminable. It raises a possibility for choice - not, as you say quite correctly, demonstrates the existence of choice.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
quote:No, it doesn't imply that. What quantum randomness does, it just introduces a random variable over which we don't have control either. The wave function of an atom will either collapse into state A or into state B (as you well know, given our user name). This doesn't give us a choice.
Schroedinger's cat: a lack of a deterministic universe at any level does imply that our actions are decisions that we make, using our free will, our choices.
quote:Ok, I agree. It raises a possibility for choice. But in a materialistic universe, the existence of choice would still need to be shown.
Schroedinger's cat: The quantum randomness means that there are events that are indeterminable. It raises a possibility for choice - not, as you say quite correctly, demonstrates the existence of choice.
quote:I'm sorry, I don't understand what you're saying here.
no prophet: I want to say that it is "hard wired" into us, which then is a materialist metaphor. Even if I say it's built into the fabric of the universe, I'm using materialist language.
quote:I said the two things are the opposite extremes of a scale. I'm not aware that there's a line that needs to be drawn here.
Crœsos: Where do you draw the line, and how?
quote:You stated that "I believe there is something in between", implying that certain aspects of the Universe are deterministic and others are not (and, implicitly with your other assertions, that the non-deterministic portions of the Universe can be altered by the exertion of human will). So the obvious question is which bits of the Universe are materialistic/deterministic and which bits aren't?
Originally posted by LeRoc:
quote:I said the two things are the opposite extremes of a scale. I'm not aware that there's a line that needs to be drawn here.
Crœsos: Where do you draw the line, and how?
quote:Ah, I see. I personally believe there is something between the physical working of our brain and our thoughts that is not materialistic / deterministic.
Crœsos: So the obvious question is which bits of the Universe are materialistic/deterministic and which bits aren't?
quote:Agreed. Which is pretty much how I see things. And for me I've been lucky and mostly enjoyed how things turned out. But that's only the first 64 years of course ....
Originally posted by Lyda*Rose:
If you don't know what deterministic decision you will make, it's "free" to you.
quote:As it would in a non materialist, say, theistic universe. The thing about these conversations is that those on the theistic side of the fence just think that the concept of God given free will is all they need to wave about before laying into the materialist problems. The last time we talked about this on the ship I asked you in what sense is your concept of free will free. If it is contra causal, and your experience and environment and biology are not enough for it to be free, just what is it that makes the critical choices? You ended up saying something like, "It is something to do with God."
Ok, I agree. It raises a possibility for choice. But in a materialistic universe, the existence of choice would still need to be shown.
quote:Of course.
Grokesx: As it would in a non materialist, say, theistic universe.
quote:Exactly.
Grokesx: Well, that is just as problematic as anything on the materialist side of the divide.
quote:By "our" I'm guessing you mean human brains. What about similar brains in other species? Other primates? Other mammals? Other vertebrates? Are they also exempt from the usual laws of reality?
Originally posted by LeRoc:
quote:Ah, I see. I personally believe there is something between the physical working of our brain and our thoughts that is not materialistic / deterministic.
Crœsos: So the obvious question is which bits of the Universe are materialistic/deterministic and which bits aren't?
quote:I'm not saying we're exempt from any laws. All the physical things inside our brain still follow the laws of physics. But I believe that these physical things don't completely determine our thoughts.
Crœsos: By "our" I'm guessing you mean human brains. What about similar brains in other species? Other primates? Other mammals? Other vertebrates? Are they also exempt from the usual laws of reality?
quote:And the internet.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
And yes, I believe that there is something non-deterministic in 'higher' animals too, although less than in us. It sort of fades out when you get to the bacteria.
quote:Perhaps the Priest and Levite acted on free will but the Samaritan "when he saw him, he had compassion". Compassion I would say is unwilled, you cannot intellectually decide to feel compassion. In which case would you say that what the Samaritan did, though in some sense praiseworthy, wasn't a moral act?
Originally posted by no prophet:
Empathy? could it be based on that?
quote:A similar argument applies to deeply ingrained beliefs and attitudes such as those absorbed in early childhood. If the belief became so ingrained that we instinctively did good would our acts cease to be 'moral' - though, as in the emotion example, still praiseworthy in some lesser sense?
Originally posted by Oscar the Grouch:
... that's the only way to teach children.
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lilBuddha: And the internet.
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quote:That's a fair charge. And Classical Christian thinking has a more complex answer than some imagine.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:As it would in a non materialist, say, theistic universe. The thing about these conversations is that those on the theistic side of the fence just think that the concept of God given free will is all they need to wave about before laying into the materialist problems. The last time we talked about this on the ship I asked you in what sense is your concept of free will free. If it is contra causal, and your experience and environment and biology are not enough for it to be free, just what is it that makes the critical choices? You ended up saying something like, "It is something to do with God."
Ok, I agree. It raises a possibility for choice. But in a materialistic universe, the existence of choice would still need to be shown.
Well, that is just as problematic as anything on the materialist side of the divide.
quote:This sentence is self-refuting.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
As near as I can tell the only methodology employed is philosophical convenience, which is never a very good way at arriving at accurate conclusions.
quote:I agree with Martin. We feel that some things are better for us and others worse. One can imagine different deterministic worlds in which which we would rather/rather not find ourselves. But if by 'real' right and wrong you mean having some objective standard beyond the individual experience of well being, I'd say no.
Originally posted by Martin PC not & Ship's Biohazard:
If I really hurt you, that's really wrong.
quote:There's a certain ambiguity here. 'Feel' is a metaphor drawn from the sense of touch; it seems to me that the usual usage of 'I feel that' or 'we feel that' is to imply some tentative access to some objective state, or candidate objective state, that escapes rigourous empirical or logical demonstration. Merely subjective states are usually described without 'that': 'I feel happy'.
Originally posted by que sais-je:
We feel that some things are better for us and others worse.
quote:I agree - but never the less I prefer walking in the country on a sunny day with beautiful views and a crisp breeze blowing to being kicked in the teeth.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
There's a certain ambiguity here. 'Feel' is a metaphor drawn from the sense of touch; it seems to me that the usual usage of 'I feel that' or 'we feel that' is to imply some tentative access to some objective state, or candidate objective state, that escapes rigourous empirical or logical demonstration. Merely subjective states are usually described without 'that': 'I feel happy'.
Likewise, 'better' and 'worse' imply some normative evaluation. You can make them work a certain distance up Maslow's hierarchy of needs, but after you've dealt with biological needs they begin to lose purchase if you can't ground their normative judgements in something. For that reason, classical economics avoids judgements about better and worse in favour of what people want and what people don't want.
quote:(I realise we went off on a tangent about determinism, but I don't think determinism is relevant to morality. There is a certain kind of moral accountability that only applies in non-deterministic worlds.)
Originally posted by que sais-je:
I agree - but never the less I prefer walking in the country on a sunny day with beautiful views and a crisp breeze blowing to being kicked in the teeth.
I'm not claiming my normative judgements are comparable with yours or looking for some sort of universal ordering. Just that one can imagine deterministic worlds in which beings feel themselves to be happy and ones where they don't. Following on from Martin's post, worlds where I am frequently hurt are bad worlds to me. Referring back to ChastMastr's 'a real right and wrong' seems to mean more than that, perhaps an external system/rule/measure to which we logically must all be committed. I'm doubtful such a thing exists.
quote:I'm not setting out to nit-pick about the way you phrased the question. But it seems pretty clear that right and wrong only have meaning at the level of Mind, which is software. And Matter as such can only ever be hardware. Matter cannot choose right or wrong, only Mind can.
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
Also, what about whether or not there can be a real right and wrong in a purely materialist universe?
quote:Not sure. But if so there could, presumably, be more than one correct solution in some cases. So two people might come up with different answers, each actually optimal. Not sure what, if any, significance that has. If morality is about 'what is to be done' there may be multiple answers to a question.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
... if a 'real right and wrong' exist, then moral problems must have correct solutions.
quote:I agree, but that isn't evidence that there is an objective solution to the problem. Your answer is in terms of human psychology: "we care". Wanting something to be the case, how ever strongly we feel, doesn't make it so, though it is evidence for a naturalistic moral sense.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
And yet we do care: we think that if faced with a moral dilemma we ought to treat it as if the outcome matters, and lightly tossing a coin doesn't seem to pass muster.
quote:Ah. Yes, that is indeed what I mean.
Originally posted by que sais-je:
But if by 'real' right and wrong you mean having some objective standard beyond the individual experience of well being, I'd say no.
quote:I believe in such a thing, but then I am not a materialist.
Originally posted by que sais-je:
Referring back to ChastMastr's 'a real right and wrong' seems to mean more than that, perhaps an external system/rule/measure to which we logically must all be committed. I'm doubtful such a thing exists.
quote:Certainly correct responses, though our ability to perceive them may be quite imperfect.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Me too, (doubt such a thing exists). One thing that puzzles me is, that if a 'real right and wrong' exist, then moral problems must have correct solutions. That's not my experience, but maybe it is some people's.
quote:Whether or not it is software, or something more than that, would be part of what's at issue, I believe.
Originally posted by Russ:
I'm not setting out to nit-pick about the way you phrased the question. But it seems pretty clear that right and wrong only have meaning at the level of Mind, which is software.
quote:I agree.
And Matter as such can only ever be hardware. Matter cannot choose right or wrong, only Mind can.
quote:That might also be a different matter.
We observe a relationship between the two - software seems to require hardware on which to run.
quote:Actually, I'm not convinced that Mind can arise from nothing but an arrangement of Matter. That does appear to be the beliefs of many who believe in a materialist universe.
By "a materialist universe" I take it that you mean one in which Mind can arise from an arrangement of Matter - that for example a sufficiently complex computer program with the power to amend its own code can be considered a Mind.
quote:As something with meaning beyond just being an aspect of software, then, yes, I believe it does.
If it turns out that what we are is minds (software) running on organic computers (brains), does that invalidate morality ? Or do we still have all the capacity for hope, fear, suffering, nobility etc that we always had, back when we didn't know what we were ? If in a hypothetical future we manage to prove somehow that this is what a human being is, does morality suddenly vanish in a puff of logic ?
quote:Yes.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
In a materialist universe, there is no software. Any 'programs' are just the outworking of the physical things interacting with eachother according to physical laws, either in a determined way or according to a random process.
quote:Agreed, though whether it is a sense that actually perceives something the way that our ability to do math allows us to perceive mathematical truths is perhaps a different issue.
Originally posted by que sais-je:
Wanting something to be the case, how ever strongly we feel, doesn't make it so, though it is evidence for a naturalistic moral sense.
quote:If I took you literally, I would conclude (having written software) that we do not live in a "materialist universe".
Originally posted by LeRoc:
In a materialist universe, there is no software. Any 'programs' are just the outworking of the physical things interacting with eachother according to physical laws, either in a determined way or according to a random process.
quote:There's a difference between eliminable wanting and non-eliminable wanting. That somebody wants there to be food doesn't make it the case that there is food. It is however evidence that the species evolved to take in food. One can't rearrange human psychology to not need food.
Originally posted by que sais-je:
quote:I agree, but that isn't evidence that there is an objective solution to the problem. Your answer is in terms of human psychology: "we care". Wanting something to be the case, how ever strongly we feel, doesn't make it so, though it is evidence for a naturalistic moral sense.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
And yet we do care: we think that if faced with a moral dilemma we ought to treat it as if the outcome matters, and lightly tossing a coin doesn't seem to pass muster.
quote:Or we saw morality differently. Even without free-will many social animals have ways of dealing with 'cheats', limiting aggression between group members, providing mutual support, helping the young etc. Some of this may be genetic, some may just be what you need to get by as a group at risk from predators (and if it didn't develop, the group is no longer here). Couldn't that be the start of morality?
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Either one can rearrange human psychology to not care about moral dilemmas, or one can't. If one can't then that makes it comparable to being hungry: it implies that at some point in human development we had at least some fallible access to objective moral truths.
quote:In a materialistic universe where we only thought we had free will the difference would not be so great.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
.. although it would be odd (and false) to describe such animals as moral beings.
quote:I would call it objective. It's also the foundation on which morality is built. It's not yet enough to say that humans have an objective morality.
Originally posted by que sais-je:
Such morality was objective (it was grounded in things which objectively did enhance survival chances) but I guess that's not what you would mean by the word. None the less, wanting to survive is a "non-eliminable want".
quote:Exactly. I draw the same conclusion.
Russ: If I took you literally, I would conclude (having written software) that we do not live in a "materialist universe".
quote:Once again, I don't believe in this universe. I'm not defining or modifying things here, I'm just taking the definition of the materialist universe. The way it's been told to me either it's a Newtonian clockwork universe, or it has quantum randomness added.
Russ: What you're describing seems to be a "clockwork universe" that runs on Newtonian physics, where everything is determined by the initial state of the system. (Hence the confusion between materialism and determinism). Which concept you've then modified by the addition of a "random process" - not sure how you think that works.
quote:That model is inadequate in describing a materialist universe. Someone wrote software.
Russ: I'm suggesting that a more contemporary model of how stuff works is "mind is to brain as computer software is to computer hardware".
quote:I didn't express such an idea.
Russ: The idea that you only have to be moral to your neighbour as long as you conceive them to be scientifically inexplicable seems nonsensical to me.
quote:Yes, that's interesting. I was wondering if some theists think that animal proto-morality is a sign of objective morality, and thus some kind of divine creation? I don't know really. It's particularly interesting since presumably proto-morality can also be explained via evolution, (so ants can be seen as proto-cooperative), but then that is not inconsistent with theism, although we seem to be getting close to creationism, e.g. God made the bee-swarm.
Originally posted by que sais-je:
quote:In a materialistic universe where we only thought we had free will the difference would not be so great.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
.. although it would be odd (and false) to describe such animals as moral beings.
quote:I assume you mean that the model is more true, not just more recent?
Originally posted by Russ:
I'm suggesting that a more contemporary model of how stuff works is "mind is to brain as computer software is to computer hardware".
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quote:But why? If they are purely mechanical objects, with nothing else, then why obey those moral laws?
The idea that you only have to be moral to your neighbour as long as you conceive them to be scientifically inexplicable seems nonsensical to me.
quote:How would that work? No god, but spirits/minds existing as part of the universe?
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
He seems doubtful that consciousness has evolved, which seems surprising maybe, so I suppose he is going to say that it existed from the beginning of the universe.
But of course he is an an atheist!
quote:It is definitely not what I mean by "morality."
Originally posted by que sais-je:
Such morality was objective (it was grounded in things which objectively did enhance survival chances) but I guess that's not what you would mean by the word.
quote:How do we know that? They may not be fallen in the way that human beings are, but that's not the same thing.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Animal proto-morality is certainly relevant here, although it would be odd (and false) to describe such animals as moral beings.
quote:Their consciousness, and perhaps even their spiritual nature, may be different from ours in various ways, but I don't know that it would not have meaning for them on one level or another. They're part of a fallen world, certainly, but not, as I understand it, sinful the way humans or fallen angels are.
None the less, they demonstrate co-operation, empathy, a sense of fairness and so on.
I suppose such behaviour does not 'have meaning' for the animals concerned, in the sense of a self-conscious ethical stance; well, this is a nice riff on 'meaning' itself.
quote:I would say more simply that, unless biological survival of the group is already morally "right," then it is not sufficient to establish even the beginnings of an objective morality, full stop.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
And so behaviour that enhances the biological survival of the group is not sufficient to establish an objective morality for human beings.
quote:That is the way it is for me as well.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
Once again, I don't believe in this universe. I'm not defining or modifying things here, I'm just taking the definition of the materialist universe. The way it's been told to me either it's a Newtonian clockwork universe, or it has quantum randomness added.
quote:I would perhaps go further, and suggest that if "we" are merely software, then we'd still just be doing whatever we're programmed to do--as opposed to being programmers on the other side of the screen, as it were, moving our avatars around in the virtual reality of the material universe, having to work with the software at hand.
That model is inadequate in describing a materialist universe. Someone wrote software.
quote:
"AND SUDDENLY all was changed. I saw a great assembly of gigantic forms all motionless, all in deepest silence, standing forever about a little silver table and looking upon it. And on the table there were little figures like chessmen who went to and fro doing this and that. And I knew that each chessman was the idolum or puppet representative of some one of the great presences that stood by. And the acts and motions of each chessman were a moving portrait, a mimicry or pantomime, which delineated the inmost nature of his giant master. And these chessmen are men and women as they appear to themselves and to one another in this world. And the silver table is Time. And those who stand and watch are the immortal souls of those same men and women. ..."
quote:The sacrifices we make ...
que sais-je: (I have to go on holiday to Brighton).
quote:Yes, I do. Perhaps I could say, "In Christian theology, they are..." etc.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I wish you would not say things like, 'they are part of a fallen world, certainly ...'. How is it certain? Maybe you certainly believe that.
quote:I'd say that's not quite it. He for instance says that qualia (individual conscious experiences such as the pain of a headache, the experience of red etc) are illusory, not that the whole phenomenon of consciousness is illusory. But, even so, all illusory means is that these things aren't in actuality what we perceive them to be. It still leaves a lot of work to do and doesn't make the problem go away, but it does change the nature of it if Dennett is correct. There's a discussion of some common objections to his approach here (If pdf links are allowed, that is.)
Of course, nobody (except Dennett) has a clue as to how experience flows from the brain. And Dennett just seems to dissolve the problem by saying that consciousness is an illusion.
quote:The one thing above all others that sets Dennett apart from most of his critics, is that he is actually looking for an explanation. The "hard problem" to him is a (very, very large) number of easy problems, unlike your Searles, Nagels, Chalmers, McGinns etc who to me are like spectators at a David Copperfield show saying over and over, "That's amazing, we'll never know how he did that," and then go on to discuss at length just how amazing it is and how impossible it would be to even begin to figure it out.
If we understand “consciousness” to mean some special, ineffable, all-or-nothing property, we will find nothing like that in Dennett’s explanation. If, on the other hand, we take “consciousness” to mean a sophisticated sensitivity to the world around us, a sense of self, and the having of a train of thought, Dennett’s account does include these things.
quote:But if you are talking about morality in a materialist universe, Christian Theology is neither here nor there. What you seem to be banging on about here and the other thread is the supposed impossibility of "real" morality, whatever that might be, in a materialist universe. To make that case - if you want it to be taken seriously by a non supernaturalist - you need to make it in materialist terms. Then you can then say, "At this point there is a problem." To be fair, you do that here:
Yes, I do. Perhaps I could say, "In Christian theology, they are..." etc.
quote:What you seem to be saying is that our ability to learn is set apart from our software and ne'er the twain shall meet. Well, CS Lewis could be forgiven for not having heard of machine learning, and indeed, how far it could go.
I would perhaps go further, and suggest that if "we" are merely software, then we'd still just be doing whatever we're programmed to do--as opposed to being programmers on the other side of the screen, as it were, moving our avatars around in the virtual reality of the material universe, having to work with the software at hand.
quote:I'd say this is the crux of the thing. The meaning of a concept only has - ahem - meaning within the group of people, agents whatever, to which the concept in question applies to. It has scope. To the materialist/physicalist/naturalist the scope of morality is human beings, their biology, brains, psychology, interactions, cultures, societies and the rest of it. To Chast, the scope includes - not only includes, but seems to be entirely dependent on - something else. The trouble is, traditionally, that something is so defined as to deny any attempt to understand it fully and yet can be appealed to to answer any difficult question.
So I mean really, what does it mean, to say that morality has meaning? If animals behave in certain ways to each other, which we might label 'proto-moral', how is that not meaningful to them? I suppose we might surmise that they don't sit around discussing ethics - is that what 'having meaning' means? But that is meta-communication, isn't it? Is meaning a meta-function
quote:I like your phrase, 'it has scope'. Yes, morality is intellectualized in human beings, so that it becomes abstract, but at base, looking back at proto-morality, meaning is pragmatic and relational.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:I'd say this is the crux of the thing. The meaning of a concept only has - ahem - meaning within the group of people, agents whatever, to which the concept in question applies to. It has scope. To the materialist/physicalist/naturalist the scope of morality is human beings, their biology, brains, psychology, interactions, cultures, societies and the rest of it. To Chast, the scope includes - not only includes, but seems to be entirely dependent on - something else. The trouble is, traditionally, that something is so defined as to deny any attempt to understand it fully and yet can be appealed to to answer any difficult question.
So I mean really, what does it mean, to say that morality has meaning? If animals behave in certain ways to each other, which we might label 'proto-moral', how is that not meaningful to them? I suppose we might surmise that they don't sit around discussing ethics - is that what 'having meaning' means? But that is meta-communication, isn't it? Is meaning a meta-function
quote:Yes and no. Animals have a lot of instincts. What they don't have (*) is any way to bundle together empathy and co-operation on the one hand and aggression and the libido dominandi on the other hand, and call the one bundle morality and the other bundle not morality.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I keep thinking that if animals do have empathy, OK, proto-empathy, and if they show proto-cooperation, and a proto-sense of fairness, and so on, then we are some of the way to a theory of morality in a materialist universe, aren't we?
quote:Yes, I rather think it is some sort of meta-function.
So I mean really, what does it mean, to say that morality has meaning? If animals behave in certain ways to each other, which we might label 'proto-moral', how is that not meaningful to them? I suppose we might surmise that they don't sit around discussing ethics - is that what 'having meaning' means? But that is meta-communication, isn't it? Is meaning a meta-function?
quote:Hm. Elephants seem to feel grief. Economists, not so much.
What neither animals nor economists can feel is grief - the sense of irreplaceable loss. What is irreplaceable is meaning.
quote:I suppose so. God can turn up in a lot of different places in meta-ethical theory.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I suppose that for some theists the gap between animal proto-morality and human morality, is so gaping, that it can, or maybe must, be infilled by a divine creative presence.
quote:That's the beauty of theology, it can point to God from anywhere.
That's not directly connected with God, though I've heard it argued by Rowan Williams, that one can point to God from there.
quote:The why of obeying moral "laws" is hard to express, whichever side of the argument you come from. As many small children discover, asking "but why?" to the previous answer ad infinitum can at least sound like a meaningful series of questions.
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
quote:But why? If they are purely mechanical objects, with nothing else, then why obey those moral laws?
Originally posted by Russ:
[The idea that you only have to be moral to your neighbour as long as you conceive them to be scientifically inexplicable seems nonsensical to me.
quote:So religious conservatives aren't moral beings ?
Originally posted by Dafyd:
In order for proto-morality to take that step into full morality I think it has to have that additional ability to assess the troops' biological instincts or inherited behaviour and find a better way
quote:This is true; mea culpa.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
But if you are talking about morality in a materialist universe, Christian Theology is neither here nor there. What you seem to be banging on about here and the other thread is the supposed impossibility of "real" morality, whatever that might be, in a materialist universe.
quote:Um... no, because the programming's incorporation of new data into some sort of revision would still be determined by the programming. It would just be more complicated.
To make that case - if you want it to be taken seriously by a non supernaturalist - you need to make it in materialist terms. Then you can then say, "At this point there is a problem." To be fair, you do that here:
quote:What you seem to be saying is that our ability to learn is set apart from our software and ne'er the twain shall meet.
I would perhaps go further, and suggest that if "we" are merely software, then we'd still just be doing whatever we're programmed to do--as opposed to being programmers on the other side of the screen, as it were, moving our avatars around in the virtual reality of the material universe, having to work with the software at hand.
quote:I wonder if part of the issue might be how people have been defining "what makes us human" in the last couple of centuries, especially in terms of the nature of Reason?
This is one of the things that was thought to separate us from the great majority of animals, although there are claims that dogs, higher primates, even corvids, posses it.
quote:But would that morality have any meaning, or would it just be programming to behave in a certain way?
I would argue that this is the first requirement for empathy, which in a materialist/physicalist account is in turn the key to morality. If the little robot does indeed turn out to have developed this ability, then this might be evidence that you don't need access to some exalted metaphysical plane for the building blocks of a rudimentary morality.
quote:Join us! We have cookies!
Of course, it doesn't answer the question of how the learning software got written into humans in the first place, but it turns the debate back towards, I dunno, the Intelligent Design scenario. Oh, fuck, what am I saying?
![[Two face]](graemlins/scot_twoface.gif)
quote:Not me; I go precisely the other direction--that indeed animals have a proto-spirituality, or perhaps just spirituality full stop. (Christian insert here: Lots of passages in the Scriptures, lives of the saints and how they interact with animals, and the like seem to me to fit with this notion, and I personally trust that God is taking care of every deceased cat, dog, and dinosaur, waiting for the day when the lions and lambs and passenger pigeons and dodos shall all lie down together...)
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I keep thinking that if animals do have empathy, OK, proto-empathy, and if they show proto-cooperation, and a proto-sense of fairness, and so on, then we are some of the way to a theory of morality in a materialist universe, aren't we?
quote:I most definitely don't. I think there are people who do that, but I think they are wrong. There's a kind of notion among some Christians of the world as being basically materialist, but with God, angels, demons, and human souls sort of tacked on, with animals and all other life being treated as mainly organic machines--our human bodies just have ghosts in them. Again, this is not my view, and my view differing doesn't make it so, but I thought I should distinguish my approach from this one. (I also think that the view of animals as basically organic machines is certainly one reason many Christians, sadly in my view, see them as things to do pretty much anything to without any concern for being humane or merciful...)
I suppose you could cavil here, and argue that animals may show such proto-moral tendencies, but don't have a sense that these tendencies have meaning, or indeed, 'real meaning'.
quote:I think the question would then be "what is meaning?" To me, for something to have genuine meaning, it needs to be more than a pattern of atoms merely inside a human (or other) head. It needs to actually, well, mean something. I believe it is at this point that many people start winding up groping for words like "transcendent," or "real but I mean really real," or the like. In semiotics it's called the "transcendent signified"--the idea that there is a meaning which is independent of our human array of notions about it, which is simply "there," rather than an endless array of signifiers that reflect ultimately only on themselves.
So I mean really, what does it mean, to say that morality has meaning? If animals behave in certain ways to each other, which we might label 'proto-moral', how is that not meaningful to them? I suppose we might surmise that they don't sit around discussing ethics - is that what 'having meaning' means? But that is meta-communication, isn't it? Is meaning a meta-function?
quote:Well, that's because (at least in my theology) God is everywhere.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
That's the beauty of theology, it can point to God from anywhere.
![[Yipee]](graemlins/spin.gif)
quote:Not at all; but I am saying that if people are "purely mechanical objects," then yes, that is "explaining them away." Ditto animals, by the way. Or, for that matter, works of art. If everything is literally nothing but (I Can't Believe It's Not Nothing Buttery?) a mechanical dance of atoms, even if it's a very complicated mechanical dance of atoms, if there is no meaning beyond that, then yes, I'd say that kind of explanation is by definition explaining them away. If there is no "real" morality, something other than just atoms, it wouldn't be really morally wrong to do terrible things to a work of art, an animal, a human being, an inhabited planet, a world...
Originally posted by Russ:
quote:You seem to be confusing "explain" with "explain away", using all those "nothing but" words like "merely".
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
But why? If they are purely mechanical objects, with nothing else, then why obey those moral laws?
quote:Oh, I do. I think if I lived as my philosophy teaches me, I'd be a much better person than I am.
Don't worry - I have no doubt that you're better than your philosophy...
![[Frown]](frown.gif)
quote:As I tried to say above, I think meaning comes down to something which is only itself. Real meaning, not only "perceptions" of meaning.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I must admit I'm baffled now by what you mean by 'meaning'. When you say 'does morality have meaning?', what exactly do you mean?
quote:But is that first person more than an illusion, a pattern of the neurons?
I could say that my brain generates meanings, which I experience. Thus the meanings are not neurons in motion, but the experiences generated by those neurons. This is the shift from third person to first person.
quote:So are you saying that real meaning somehow comes into being when organic life is complex enough to ... to do what, exactly? What is this emergence?
So I still think you have a caricature of meaningless atoms being the basis of life for the materialist. I don't think this is correct. Emergence is the key.
Does this emergence make the world non-materialist, and does it therefore travel back and forth through (or transcend) time?
quote:I would say that meaning is perceived by the brain, or else it's not "real meaning."
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
It's generated in the brain, isn't it?
![[Ultra confused]](graemlins/confused2.gif)
you know how when you look at a word over and over again for too long, it starts to look like gibberish? (looks it up) Ah, it's called semantic satiation, I knew there had to be a term for it...)
quote:Again, I would say that it communicates meaning, rather than generates it. Just as the eyes can perceive light, rather than generate it.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Well, this convinced me that the brain generates meanings, since if you damage the brain, it doesn't, or does it poorly.
quote:That's certainly an interesting claim, since you seem to be saying that the meaning of this sentence, which I am writing, is generated elsewhere, and not in the brain. Can you demonstrate anything about this 'elsewhere'? How does this semantic function take place, what are the operations involved, and how is it transmitted to the brain?
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
quote:Again, I would say that it communicates meaning, rather than generates it. Just as the eyes can perceive light, rather than generate it.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Well, this convinced me that the brain generates meanings, since if you damage the brain, it doesn't, or does it poorly.
quote:Clearly the meaning isn't generated in your brain. I understand it, I assume. At least, you have a reasonable expectation that we will understand it, because otherwise you wouldn't write it. Therefore, the meaning is accessible to people other than you. Now, none of us have direct access to the state of your brain, so the act of meaning must be somewhere other than in your brain.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
That's certainly an interesting claim, since you seem to be saying that the meaning of this sentence, which I am writing, is generated elsewhere, and not in the brain. Can you demonstrate anything about this 'elsewhere'? How does this semantic function take place, what are the operations involved, and how is it transmitted to the brain?
quote:I don't understand that view. It's like saying the Mona Lisa is just a bunch of pigments on canvas - technically true, but missing the point somewhat!
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
If everything is literally nothing but (I Can't Believe It's Not Nothing Buttery?) a mechanical dance of atoms, even if it's a very complicated mechanical dance of atoms, if there is no meaning beyond that, then yes, I'd say that kind of explanation is by definition explaining them away.
quote:It depends on what you mean by "really" morally wrong. I mean, would the fact that most people would agree that something is wrong be enough to make it "really" wrong?
If there is no "real" morality, something other than just atoms, it wouldn't be really morally wrong to do terrible things to a work of art, an animal, a human being, an inhabited planet, a world...
quote:And that's your belief and you are very happy with it, obviously. But there is nothing you have said that privileges this belief above another belief that involves meaning arising in brains and their interactions with other brains. So, you don't like reductionist explanations, you don't think emergence is satisfactory and you don't like the idea that what we see is what we get. That doesn't render the materialist/physicalist/naturalist putative explanation incoherent, especially since you struggle to even find words for your preferred position.
It needs to actually, well, mean something. I believe it is at this point that many people start winding up groping for words like "transcendent," or "real but I mean really real," or the like. In semiotics it's called the "transcendent signified"--the idea that there is a meaning which is independent of our human array of notions about it, which is simply "there," rather than an endless array of signifiers that reflect ultimately only on themselves.
quote:Actually, I don't think the 'endless array of signifiers' (from ChastMastr's post), only relate to each other. If you raise a child, you start off by pointing to stuff, with the accompanying words, doggy, pussy, choo-choo; this indicates that some signifiers have a referential function.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:And that's your belief and you are very happy with it, obviously. But there is nothing you have said that privileges this belief above another belief that involves meaning arising in brains and their interactions with other brains. So, you don't like reductionist explanations, you don't think emergence is satisfactory and you don't like the idea that what we see is what we get. That doesn't render the materialist/physicalist/naturalist putative explanation incoherent, especially since you struggle to even find words for your preferred position.
It needs to actually, well, mean something. I believe it is at this point that many people start winding up groping for words like "transcendent," or "real but I mean really real," or the like. In semiotics it's called the "transcendent signified"--the idea that there is a meaning which is independent of our human array of notions about it, which is simply "there," rather than an endless array of signifiers that reflect ultimately only on themselves.
quote:Why do you think so many people are saying that the best thing The West can do about that whole situation is to get the hell out of there and stop giving them reason to suppose that their survival actually is in jeopardy?
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Why, for example, would we feel indignant at the actions of Islamic State, when, after all, they could argue that they are simply doing what they need to do to secure their own survival in a world of infidels?
quote:If the meanings are generated in our brains (or immaterial minds), we can't be taught them. In order to successfully correlate word and meaning we would have to have independent access to the meaning apart from the word, in order to say that that word means that meaning. And that is not possible if the meaning is confined to the brain or immaterial mind.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Why can't we say that the meanings are also generated in your brain? With language, these meanings are highly predictable, since we are taught the meanings of words, which are a shared (social) asset.
quote:The meaning of the ideas would be taken from reality--your sentence is presumably not "globol obol obol oob." For example, above you are describing my claim as interesting--you are describing something which is not just inside your own head. If I am rendered deaf or unable to hear your comment, or if I become brain-damaged and cannot understand it, the meaning of your comment remains even if I cannot receive it.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
That's certainly an interesting claim, since you seem to be saying that the meaning of this sentence, which I am writing, is generated elsewhere, and not in the brain. Can you demonstrate anything about this 'elsewhere'? How does this semantic function take place, what are the operations involved, and how is it transmitted to the brain?
quote:Yes. I would go further than that--if we had to make up a new language for some reason, we'd still be trying to express concepts that are meaningful. Even imaginary notions (let's imagine a "squark," which would be a horned flying tentacled insect) would still be referring to the qualities of having horns, flying, having tentacles, and being insectoid.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
You are putting together words. And we are reading, and we hope understanding them. But in order for that communication to happen the words must have a shared meaning that (largely) preexists your use of them.
I need to eat food. My brain has trouble accessing meaning when I don't eat food, so if some of this is getting jumbly, my apologies...
quote:Yes, exactly. That's my point.
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
I don't understand that view. It's like saying the Mona Lisa is just a bunch of pigments on canvas - technically true, but missing the point somewhat!
quote:Yes.
It's almost as if you can't accept that morality can be "real" unless it would continue to exist without any life forms to perceive it - so even at the heat death of the universe when only a few stray subatomic particles remain, it would still be "immoral" to steal one of them. Impossible, of course, but still immoral.
Although in this case there would not be anyone to steal them from either, but the principle remains.
quote:Actually, since materialism's own meaning is called into question, as well as any reasons to believe in it, I think it does render it incoherent in the long run, but since our focus is on morality specifically...
Originally posted by Grokesx:
That doesn't render the materialist/physicalist/naturalist putative explanation incoherent, especially since you struggle to even find words for your preferred position.
quote:I do think I here agree
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
The necessity of moral consciousness therefore constitutes evidence that there is another dimension of reality (a moral dimension) in operation, which is independent of, but interacts with, the material. To call this consciousness merely an emergent property of matter sounds like special pleading for the philosophy of naturalism, but even if it isn't that, it suggests that our sense of moral rightness and indignation is an illusion. ... Within materialism there is no "right and wrong", but just material reactions and configurations of atoms and molecules.
quote:I don't either, but that's part of why I am not a materialist nor a deconstructionist.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Actually, I don't think the 'endless array of signifiers' (from ChastMastr's post), only relate to each other.
quote:By definition (as I understand it, as a non-materialist) it is not and cannot be "located" in a physical place, like the arrangement of neurons in a brain. It's its own thing. Meaning simply is.
Anyway, I am still curious where this 'real meaning' hangs out, and how it is constructed. Please don't say that God does it, or I shall thkweam and thkweam.
quote:I would think that morality would be part of the reason there--the question would be how best to apply it to help the innocents trapped there, but that's another thread...
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
Why do you think so many people are saying that the best thing The West can do about that whole situation is to get the hell out of there and stop giving them reason to suppose that their survival actually is in jeopardy?
quote:I'm not sure about language being a human creation, but that gets into an array of other issues. I'm also talking about meaning here beyond "meanings of words"--the question of the intrinsic nature of things and of abstract things as well as material ones. And certainly Platonism could be relevant here, or some variant of Platonism.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Not that many of the leading philosophical alternatives to materialism are much better off here. Language is a human creation, so Platonism about meaning is a bit of a non-starter - one can't suppose there are meanings out there independent of any human activity. Language and meaning are presumably activities of humans rather than things, but that doesn't really help the materialist, since the passages of words still have to mean.
quote:There can be an element of that, though some of that would be the brain picking up transmissions from our minds--and yes, that our minds are more than just our brains.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I don't know if Chast would say that the 'real play' is going on elsewhere, and the brain is like a radio receiver, picking it up.
quote:Since you can't give a definition of what you mean by meaning, this is saying nothing at all.
Actually, since materialism's own meaning is called into question,
quote:What is this necessity of moral consciousness of which you speak?
The necessity of moral consciousness therefore constitutes evidence...
quote:So what we have been talking about over the two threads is "How can morality have something that simply is in a materialist universe?" Forty two.
By definition (as I understand it, as a non-materialist) it is not and cannot be "located" in a physical place, like the arrangement of neurons in a brain. It's its own thing. Meaning simply is.
quote:Try living life without any kind of moral sense. And see what happens.
Originally posted by Grokesx
What is this necessity of moral consciousness of which you speak?
quote:At the moment it is just two statements and a therefore.
...therefore constitutes evidence that there is another dimension of reality (a moral dimension) in operation, which is independent of, but interacts with, the material.
quote:Platonism about concrete things seems unnecessary - the meaning of 'cat' is just some set of actual felix domestica. (All the cats that have ever been talked about using the word 'cat' by English language users seems to me a good candidate set.) Abstract things are more complex, although I'd resist any theory that creates more abstract entities than are really necessary.
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
quote:I'm not sure about language being a human creation, but that gets into an array of other issues. I'm also talking about meaning here beyond "meanings of words"--the question of the intrinsic nature of things and of abstract things as well as material ones. And certainly Platonism could be relevant here, or some variant of Platonism.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Not that many of the leading philosophical alternatives to materialism are much better off here. Language is a human creation, so Platonism about meaning is a bit of a non-starter - one can't suppose there are meanings out there independent of any human activity.
quote:Oddly, Grokesx agrees with you here, and you're both wrong.
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
We look at events occurring around us and say "This is right and that is wrong". That is how a moral sense works. But if morality has no universal validity, then we cannot say that.
quote:I thought your point was that the mere arrangement of the particles of paint couldn't possibly be meaningful - so there must be a supernatural constituent of the picture somewhere to serve as the source of the meaning...
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
quote:Yes, exactly. That's my point.
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
I don't understand that view. It's like saying the Mona Lisa is just a bunch of pigments on canvas - technically true, but missing the point somewhat!
quote:It might be to you.
Well, the important question is: does morality have to be universally valid in order to be valid at all?
quote:My goodness, you've upped the ante a bit here. Chast has just gone for a few "nothing buts" and "merelies" to try and conceal the fact he has such thin arguments. Now we've got puke, excretion and bile. All of which have perfectly valid functions, btw.
The philosophy of naturalism cannot account for the universal validity of morality (or reason, for that matter). It is merely how the human brain has puked it up, so to speak. Such an excretion has no more validity than the bile produced by our livers.
quote:We have no choice but to de-couple them. If there were indeed such a thing as universal moral truth, we have not as yet found any epistemological access to it. So we have to do the best we can. The problem is those who think they actually do have the epistemological access.
It is only if we decouple universal truth and epistemological access that we are given reason to hesitate in imposing our morals on other people.
quote:We certainly do have a choice. One can couple them in two directions. You can either couple access to truth, as it seems EtymologicalEvangelical is doing, in that it seems he thinks the existence of truth is sufficient to guarantee that we can know it. (This has problems explaining moral disagreement.) Or we can couple truth to access, as relativism largely does, or various forms of emotivism or subjectivism.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:We have no choice but to de-couple them. If there were indeed such a thing as universal moral truth, we have not as yet found any epistemological access to it. So we have to do the best we can. The problem is those who think they actually do have the epistemological access.
It is only if we decouple universal truth and epistemological access that we are given reason to hesitate in imposing our morals on other people.
quote:Relativism doesn't, because it denies the existence of universal moral truth. We can't couple or decouple access to something that doesn't exist. You're still not getting relativism, but that's another discussion and one I'm not getting into again. I have a rule of one set of pointless wibblings at a time.
Or we can couple truth to access, as relativism largely does, or various forms of emotivism or subjectivism.
quote:Now that made me laugh; is this irrelevant? By no means, as St Paul is fond of saying (in translation). For laughter is the best medicine for ailments of bad humour, and maybe indeed, it leads us to moral insights. He who laughs least, is led to lackadaisical lethargy.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:Relativism doesn't, because it denies the existence of universal moral truth. We can't couple or decouple access to something that doesn't exist. You're still not getting relativism, but that's another discussion and one I'm not getting into again. I have a rule of one set of pointless wibblings at a time.
Or we can couple truth to access, as relativism largely does, or various forms of emotivism or subjectivism.
quote:That's what I mean by coupling: you merge the two issues into one. Denying that one pole exists is just an extreme form of merging.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:Relativism doesn't, because it denies the existence of universal moral truth. We can't couple or decouple access to something that doesn't exist.
Or we can couple truth to access, as relativism largely does, or various forms of emotivism or subjectivism.
quote:If you want to believe that go ahead.
You're still not getting relativism
quote:Or insisting one pole exists when there is no epistemological access to it is just making shit up.
That's what I mean by coupling: you merge the two issues into one. Denying that one pole exists is just an extreme form of merging.
quote:I am only being consistent with what materialism actually is. Matter - and the laws governing it - does not have the magical properties that you are trying to load onto it.
Originally posted by Grokesx
quote:My goodness, you've upped the ante a bit here. Chast has just gone for a few "nothing buts" and "merelies" to try and conceal the fact he has such thin arguments. Now we've got puke, excretion and bile. All of which have perfectly valid functions, btw.
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical
The philosophy of naturalism cannot account for the universal validity of morality (or reason, for that matter). It is merely how the human brain has puked it up, so to speak. Such an excretion has no more validity than the bile produced by our livers.
quote:That doesn't mean it's completely worthless.
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Matter - and the laws governing it - does not have the magical properties that you are trying to load onto it.
quote:I don't think it has any magical properties at all. That's the theist's department. I'm just saying the properties it does have will probably turn out to be enough to account for the results we experience. Only that.
I am only being consistent with what materialism actually is. Matter - and the laws governing it - does not have the magical properties that you are trying to load onto it.
quote:In other words, you don't know. Materialism of the gaps.
Originally posted by Grokesx
I don't think it has any magical properties at all. That's the theist's department. I'm just saying the properties it does have will probably turn out to be enough to account for the results we experience. Only that.
quote:Almost as vacuous and non-challenging as your pizza comment.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl
Full stops = assertionism.
This is true, because I say it is.
Note also the fake apology: sorry. Like hell.
quote:That's your opinion, not any kind of fact.
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
Since matter cannot account for morality and logic
quote:It comes with equating science with religion. That any criticism aimed at religion can also be applied to science.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
To call this 'materialism of the gaps' seems bizarre to me.
quote:The assertion presented in the two threads has been that in a materialist paradigm, morality has no meaning. That is, it is somehow incoherent and illogical to say it has and that there cannot be a materialist/physicalist/naturalist explanation for morality. All I am arguing for is that this is not the case, that there indeed can be such an explanation, and that a materialist can make moral choices that actually mean something.
There is no logical reason why we should assume that there has to be a materialistic explanation.
quote:Sorry, but I'm not at this moment sure how to help there. I would say that meaning is one of those rock-bottom "first principle" things on which everything (including the validity of logic and reason themselves) rests. If there is no meaning, there is no logic (which is, itself, a statement which relies on logic to be valid).
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I find this all very slippery and unsatisfying. 'Meaning simply is'. I might as well say that meanings are being transmitted into our brains from an alien intelligence in Alpha Centauri.
quote:Probably, yes. But as I've said, I can't see how meaning can be in a purely materialist universe. Maybe this is the rock-bottom level where those first principles differ, and maybe that's frustrating, but OK.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
So what we have been talking about over the two threads is "How can morality have something that simply is in a materialist universe?"
quote:I think it may depend on what you mean by "supernatural." I don't mean that, I don't know, that the Art Fairy drops by with a magic wand and infuses an otherwise meaningless array of particles with Meaning! (tm), perhaps visible as a sort of bluish glow around it if one can see things like that. I suppose in a sense it could be considered supernatural but not in that sense.
Originally posted by Russ:
I thought your point was that the mere arrangement of the particles of paint couldn't possibly be meaningful - so there must be a supernatural constituent of the picture somewhere to serve as the source of the meaning...
quote:It needn't be Newtonian; it could include quantum physics and the like or any other sort of thing.
If you're trying to argue that morality depends upon the supernatural (in some way which you haven't made at all clear), you can't assume that the only alternative to the traditional Christian metaphysics of the soul is a deterministic Newtonian universe where no choices occur.
quote:But I don't deny that animals make choices--nor that they have a spiritual essence. Computer software is something else, and in that case, the question of whether or not its choices could be meaningful or if its nature excludes that possibility remains, perhaps, where it us unless this software comes into being. (And if it turns out to make moral choices and be, basically, a person, then we'd damn well better treat it like one, though I think that's a pretty rough line for anyone to step over--like conceiving a child in order to do experiments on it... yikes.)
If you deny that animals make choices (do you have a dog ? Ever said "bad dog" to it ?) or that computer software may soon make choices, you're ducking the question rather than answering it.
quote:I'm literally not understanding what you mean here.
If the naturalistic worldview were true - if animals have the capacity to make real choices (in proportion to their intelligence) and future software will someday make real choices, and humans are something like animals and minds something like software...
...then why is it meaningful or not meaningful to talk about the morality of such choices ?
Russ
quote:The difference between this and evolution is that when a biologist proposes different possible paths for the evolution of organisms they are proposing actual paths. Whereas when materialists say they can make an explanation they seldom ever propose anything beyond just a handwavy 'geneticsdidit / reasondidit / socialcontractdidit / anythingjustsolongasitsnotgoddidit'.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
That is, it is somehow incoherent and illogical to say it has and that there cannot be a materialist/physicalist/naturalist explanation for morality. All I am arguing for is that this is not the case, that there indeed can be such an explanation, and that a materialist can make moral choices that actually mean something.
quote:Well, to be fair, on the other thread I went right for the Lovecraft, though I don't believe my arguments are thin, and certainly I am not trying to conceal anything, as that would be dishonest and morally wrong.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
My goodness, you've upped the ante a bit here. Chast has just gone for a few "nothing buts" and "merelies" to try and conceal the fact he has such thin arguments. Now we've got puke, excretion and bile. All of which have perfectly valid functions, btw.
quote:But then what is its source? If you mean something like a mind, then it's essentially theism again, and if you don't mean something like a mind, then how is it a genuinely moral order?
Originally posted by Alt Wally:
I think the question being asked is can a moral order that gives meaning to human existence itself exist without God or a divine power behind it. the answer I believe is yes.
quote:And here E.E.
Originally posted by EtymologicalEvangelical:
I am only being consistent with what materialism actually is. Matter - and the laws governing it - does not have the magical properties that you are trying to load onto it.
I.t. J.u.s.t. D.o.e.s. N.o.t.
Sorry.
quote:Oh for heaven's sake I don't think anyone thinks he was trying to say "sorry" in the sense of believing he'd committed a moral or social fault. It's more like, "Sorry, but I think you're mistaken here."
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Note also the fake apology: sorry. Like hell.
quote:molecules are happy being molecules obeying the rules tat are laid down for molecular behaviour. They don't have a moral discussion because they have no concept of trying to be something that contradicts their fundamental nature. Whereas humans have a lot more choice, and are so loosely coupled to other parts of nature that we can imagine we are capable of acting separately with only reference to ourselves, not to the total order we exist in.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Ah but, Grokesx, two molecules can't have a moral discussion with each other, whereas we can.
Therefore God! Yay, triumph of theism.
quote:Though I should add to this wee verse
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
And here E.E.
Doth speak for me.
quote:But this isn't about science--this is about philosophy.
Originally posted by lilBuddha:
It comes with equating science with religion. That any criticism aimed at religion can also be applied to science.
quote:Agreed.
Ignorance and defensiveness do not help the conversation, but do not seem likely to go away.
That makes me want to thkweam and thkweam.
quote:"Almost, thou persuadest me..."
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Ah but, Grokesx, two molecules can't have a moral discussion with each other, whereas we can.
Therefore God! Yay, triumph of theism.
![[Hot and Hormonal]](icon_redface.gif){kind=icon}
quote:Well, there are clearly strong correlations between brain and mental activity; for example, it's well known that injury to the brain, whether from disease or accident, will produce deficits in cognition, for example, memory and speech.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:The difference between this and evolution is that when a biologist proposes different possible paths for the evolution of organisms they are proposing actual paths. Whereas when materialists say they can make an explanation they seldom ever propose anything beyond just a handwavy 'geneticsdidit / reasondidit / socialcontractdidit / anythingjustsolongasitsnotgoddidit'.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
That is, it is somehow incoherent and illogical to say it has and that there cannot be a materialist/physicalist/naturalist explanation for morality. All I am arguing for is that this is not the case, that there indeed can be such an explanation, and that a materialist can make moral choices that actually mean something.
Which isn't actually any better than 'goddidit'.
quote:If you spiked a radio receiver set so that it stopped receiving information properly or it received but distorted the output to speakers so that they sounded garbled, or it no longer functioned on certain wavelengths, or stopped properly controlling the devices attached to it - you wouldn't claim to have destroyed the main transmitter, would you?
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
quote:Well, there are clearly strong correlations between brain and mental activity; for example, it's well known that injury to the brain, whether from disease or accident, will produce deficits in cognition, for example, memory and speech.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:The difference between this and evolution is that when a biologist proposes different possible paths for the evolution of organisms they are proposing actual paths. Whereas when materialists say they can make an explanation they seldom ever propose anything beyond just a handwavy 'geneticsdidit / reasondidit / socialcontractdidit / anythingjustsolongasitsnotgoddidit'.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
That is, it is somehow incoherent and illogical to say it has and that there cannot be a materialist/physicalist/naturalist explanation for morality. All I am arguing for is that this is not the case, that there indeed can be such an explanation, and that a materialist can make moral choices that actually mean something.
Which isn't actually any better than 'goddidit'.
I can vouch for the latter, having worked in a stroke clinic!
There is also evidence that some kinds of brain damage result in 'dysmoral behaviour', e.g. lack of empathy, petty crime, and so on.
Of course, none of this demonstrates that brain causes mental activity, but it's all beginning to add up to strong evidence, isn't it?
quote:Oh, you remember that one, do you? (I do so miss Will and Testament).
Originally posted by Grokesx
Creationist responds: "That proves nothing. Just because something could happen doesn't mean it did."
![[Razz]](tongue.gif)
quote:For what it's worth I have no problem with materialism about minds. (To be precise, I can't see any problem that exists only for materialism about minds.)
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Well, there are clearly strong correlations between brain and mental activity; for example, it's well known that injury to the brain, whether from disease or accident, will produce deficits in cognition, for example, memory and speech.
quote:Materialism is based on science. This I tell you, brother you can't have one without the other.
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
quote:But this isn't about science--this is about philosophy.
Originally posted by lilBuddha:
It comes with equating science with religion. That any criticism aimed at religion can also be applied to science.
quote:Well, in that case, it's just decided to reveal its whereabouts via a small internet chat board
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
itsarumdo wrote:
If you spiked a radio receiver set so that it stopped receiving information properly or it received but distorted the output to speakers so that they sounded garbled, or it no longer functioned on certain wavelengths, or stopped properly controlling the devices attached to it - you wouldn't claim to have destroyed the main transmitter, would you?
I used to know a gnostic theist who put forward the radio receiver argument; I don't think it can be refuted, so it is possible. But then I could argue for a giant alien intelligence in Alpha Centauri transmitting to our brains. How would you tell the difference? (I mean, it's not falsifiable).
quote:Except that which we choose to give them, that is.
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
There is no meaning in thoughts
quote:Colourless green ideas sleep furiously.
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
Is it so much of a leap to think that morality is just one more idea that we have created? That meaning is just something we came up with as part of our developing ability to analyse the world in which we live?
quote:You mean that it could be abused? Yes, it's possible.
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
the problem with technological fixes like that is that they teeter at the top of a very slippery slope - both in terms of experimentation/proving and application
quote:I saw a documentary recently about the dangers of using a drug to cure Alzheimers.
But surgery and drugs seem to carry so many risks.
quote:Just stringing together words such as 'meaning could be something we came up with' doesn't necessarily result in an intelligible sentence. What does it mean to come up with 'meaning'?
Originally posted by Marvin the Martian:
Your point being?
quote:Is there a real need to be snarky about all of this?
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Oh no, Marvin, that is heretical, for meaning and morality just are; they exist as transcendent thingybobs, which we must not investigate, but must worship from afar. Heaven forbid, that nasty neurologists and others should actually begin to correlate brain activity and mental activity.
quote:I find I agree here quite a lot with
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Just stringing together words such as 'meaning could be something we came up with' doesn't necessarily result in an intelligible sentence. What does it mean to come up with 'meaning'?
It's intelligible to say that 'matter cannot produce meaning' fails to adequately define meaning, and therefore is just too vague to be a refutation of materialism. But saying that we could have come up with meaning is just as vague as that, if not more so; it fails to even make the process described intelligible.
quote:My doctor told me that my absolute mental health requires snark several times a day. Well, what can I do, snark just is.
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
quote:Is there a real need to be snarky about all of this?
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Oh no, Marvin, that is heretical, for meaning and morality just are; they exist as transcendent thingybobs, which we must not investigate, but must worship from afar. Heaven forbid, that nasty neurologists and others should actually begin to correlate brain activity and mental activity.
quote:FFS, on this thread we've been trying to get Chast to define what he's talking about when he says "meaning". So far we've had meaning as significance/purpose. Human beings finding their own apparently does pass muster because its not ultimate enough. We've had, "I can't describe it or define it, it just is and I know it when I see it and it's not molecules." And now we've got meaning as in semantics. Hopefully it will go down a DH black hole of specified complexity and creationist information theory, which is nearly as entertaining a subject as mystic quantum woo.
What does it mean to come up with 'meaning'?
quote:I think they'd say, in what sense are we talking here? The meaning of life? Meaning in linguistics? They might even recommend looking up the word, "equivocation".
Do we have any philosophers here who can tie themselves into a Klein Bottle in order to explain it?
quote:I concur with both your moral judgment, and your point that we don't yet know whether it is emprically possible to create person-grade artificial intelligence.
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
Computer software is something else, and in that case, the question of whether or not its choices could be meaningful or if its nature excludes that possibility remains, perhaps, where it us unless this software comes into being. (And if it turns out to make moral choices and be, basically, a person, then we'd damn well better treat it like one
quote:Put it another way - what do you mean by a "materialist universe" ? I know that you don't think we live in one. The obvious meaning is a universe just like our present one except that the atheists are right and the Christians deluded (instead of vice versa). Is that what you mean ?
quote:I'm literally not understanding what you mean here.
If the naturalistic worldview were true - if animals have the capacity to make real choices (in proportion to their intelligence) and future software will someday make real choices, and humans are something like animals and minds something like software...
...then why is it meaningful or not meaningful to talk about the morality of such choices ?
quote:Data-processing? That covers all living organisms, I think. Look at the waggle dance of the honey bee, which communicates a ton of information about food sources. It's symbolic communication, it seems to me. The individual forager bee has been able to process all the data about the food he has found, and then he can communicate it to the other bees, who can process that.
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
What does "meaning" mean?
Do we have any philosophers here who can tie themselves into a Klein Bottle in order to explain it?
quote:A key feature of meaning is that whatever kind of reality we want to classify it as, it is inseparable from human perception. If anything means something, it means it to/for someone. Take away that association and the meaning does not exist.
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
What does "meaning" mean?
quote:Part of me is tempted to say, "what are you talking about? Meaning is meaning is meaning," but I shall try...
Originally posted by Grokesx:
FFS, on this thread we've been trying to get Chast to define what he's talking about when he says "meaning".
quote:Finding, as in discovering real meaning that exists, yes. Inventing in a sort of pretend way, no.
Human beings finding their own apparently does pass muster because its not ultimate enough.
quote:Why "hopefully"?
Hopefully it will go down a DH black hole of specified complexity and creationist information theory, which is nearly as entertaining a subject as mystic quantum woo.
quote:So what the word "dog" means is "that barking furry thing I'm pointing to over there." But I'm talking more about something's basic essence, especially when it comes to the non-physical world.
noun
1.
what is intended to be, or actually is, expressed or indicated; signification; import:
the three meanings of a word.
2.
the end, purpose, or significance of something:
What is the meaning of life? What is the meaning of this intrusion?
3.
Linguistics.
the nonlinguistic cultural correlate, reference, or denotation of a linguistic form; expression.
linguistic content (opposed to expression ).
quote:Yes, that is part of the problem.
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
What does "meaning" mean?
Do we have any philosophers here who can tie themselves into a Klein Bottle in order to explain it?
![[Killing me]](graemlins/killingme.gif)
"It depends on what the meaning of 'is' is." ![[Overused]](graemlins/notworthy.gif)
quote:I don't believe I'm doing that, thank you; I'm trying to be honest and clear and direct.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
They might even recommend looking up the word, "equivocation".
quote:Er... no, I didn't say that at all. Indeed, I believe that, if this thing we've never encountered, which we don't even know if it could happen at all, ever happens, then something would be at work beyond mere arrangement of the atoms, for reasons expressed here and elsewhere.
Originally posted by Russ:
But you seem here to be admitting that this is a not-logically-inconsistent scenario. That there is no reason in principle why a mere arrangement of the atoms inside a computer should not give rise to a moral obligation.
quote:Well, an obligation to more than that, but yes.
An obligation to the software, not the hardware.
quote:This is true, yes--the essence of what makes it the Mona Lisa would be, at least on a physical level, gone.
Just as it would be a sort of moral crime to destroy the Mona Lisa. For reasons which have nothing to do with the ownership of the pigment and canvas. A hypothetical alien which rearranged the molecules of the Mona Lisa for artistic reasons of its own would destroy the image - the software, the information content - even if the museum that owns it still owned all the molecules that it had previously owned before the act of interplanetary vandalism took place.
quote:And alas, I don't.
But if you're agreeing with me that ...
quote:A universe in which there is nothing but matter, energy, and the processes of physics, etc.--nothing supernatural, metaphysical, teleological, or for that matter ontological apart from an array of purely human notions of things, themselves merely an arrangement of atoms.
Put it another way - what do you mean by a "materialist universe" ?
quote:Close, perhaps. Obviously part of the definition of "just like our present one" would be precisely what's at issue. And of course it would not have to just be atheists vs. Christians but vs. most religions/supernatural beliefs/etc.
I know that you don't think we live in one. The obvious meaning is a universe just like our present one except that the atheists are right and the Christians deluded (instead of vice versa). Is that what you mean ?
quote:I'm not sure about this--though of course in a theistic cosmology, there would always be a Someone to perceive meaning.
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
quote:A key feature of meaning is that whatever kind of reality we want to classify it as, it is inseparable from human perception. If anything means something, it means it to/for someone. Take away that association and the meaning does not exist.
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
What does "meaning" mean?
quote:I don't understand.
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
That makes no sense - there is only morality because we have choice, by virtue of being Homo Sapiens. Apples and all that.
quote:whether or not there are sapient beings - morality is a choice of right/wrong - a stone can't make a choice. It just rolls. A mouse has no morality as such - it just does what mice do. We seem to be different - we can choose good or evil.
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
...
Certainly as far as I am concerned, the existence of a "real morality" means something that would exist whether or not there are any sapient beings around to perceive it, just as the laws of logic, mathematics, physics, etc. would exist.
quote:whether or not there are sapient beings - morality is a choice of right/wrong - a stone can't make a choice. It just rolls. A mouse has no morality as such - it just does what mice do. We seem to be different - we can choose good or evil.
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
...
Certainly as far as I am concerned, the existence of a "real morality" means something that would exist whether or not there are any sapient beings around to perceive it, just as the laws of logic, mathematics, physics, etc. would exist.
quote:Since creativity is inseparable from meaning, if we define God as creator of the universe, and therefore see God as creativity itself, it follows that God is also meaning itself. Therefore, meaning is separable from human perception since much of the universe is not perceived by humans yet is still by definition created by God.
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
A key feature of meaning is that whatever kind of reality we want to classify it as, it is inseparable from human perception.
quote:I am dubious about data processing as a metaphor here. In part because I don't think that turning a series of inputs into a series of outputs does have any meaning without the ability to interact with the source of the input. If one doesn't have the ability to make decisions one doesn't even have symbolic meaning.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Data-processing? That covers all living organisms, I think. Look at the waggle dance of the honey bee, which communicates a ton of information about food sources. It's symbolic communication, it seems to me. The individual forager bee has been able to process all the data about the food he has found, and then he can communicate it to the other bees, who can process that.
quote:No, it isn't. It's the same problem we had on the other thread. When you talk about "basic essence", you are talking about something that is coherent only if we take as true your particular metaphysical baggage that "essence" is some reified entity we can talk of independently of the context in which it occurs in the natural world.
Is that helpful? (He said, hopefully.)
quote:I think we're using "real" in different ways. Your concept seems to be what I think of as ultimate reality but as you imagine it. Anything you cannot relate to that monolithic reality is for you simply not real. If you like, it seems to be a single canvas on which something is either drawn ("real") or not ("made up").
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
Certainly as far as I am concerned, the existence of a "real morality" means something that would exist whether or not there are any sapient beings around to perceive it, just as the laws of logic, mathematics, physics, etc. would exist.
quote:Terms like 'essence' also seem like private language to me; I think they are OK in that respect, as when someone says, 'that movement expresses the essence of you somehow'.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:No, it isn't. It's the same problem we had on the other thread. When you talk about "basic essence", you are talking about something that is coherent only if we take as true your particular metaphysical baggage that "essence" is some reified entity we can talk of independently of the context in which it occurs in the natural world.
Is that helpful? (He said, hopefully.)
In the case of the dog there are, within the materialist paradigm, various levels of explanation we can work in, the psychological, biological, bio-chemical, physical etc. If you insist the essence of dog is something outside of the physical dog, all you are doing is asserting that your metaphysical view is correct, you are saying nothing at all about dogs in the materialist paradigm.
What you are doing is equivalent to a particular sort of atheist repeating over and over that your sky pixie doesn't exist.
quote:What makes you think that? I'm suggesting that meaning is uniquely associated with human-like being.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Since creativity is inseparable from meaning
quote:Yes, that would work for me.
if we define God as creator of the universe
quote:No, doesn't follow. God creates =/= God is creativity.
and therefore see God as creativity itself
quote:Except without the snark of "sky pixie" I hope. I would not want to do the theist equivalent of that. God knows (no pun intended) there are enough horrible co-religionists I have to distinguish myself from every time I mention being a Christian.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:No, it isn't. It's the same problem we had on the other thread. When you talk about "basic essence", you are talking about something that is coherent only if we take as true your particular metaphysical baggage that "essence" is some reified entity we can talk of independently of the context in which it occurs in the natural world.
Is that helpful? (He said, hopefully.)
In the case of the dog there are, within the materialist paradigm, various levels of explanation we can work in, the psychological, biological, bio-chemical, physical etc. If you insist the essence of dog is something outside of the physical dog, all you are doing is asserting that your metaphysical view is correct, you are saying nothing at all about dogs in the materialist paradigm.
What you are doing is equivalent to a particular sort of atheist repeating over and over that your sky pixie doesn't exist.
quote:I agree, wholly, not partial
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
No, doesn't follow. God creates =/= God is creativity.
quote:You're right that it doesn't follow logically. Still, I believe it to be true.
Dave Marshall: No, doesn't follow. God creates =/= God is creativity.
quote:There's a scenario that says that in the Afterlife we will become our True Inner Selves™, that what we always wanted to be. I'm convinced that my dog has an Inner Wolf hidden somewhere.
ChastMastr: Am I the only one who wonders about whether dogs, when reborn in the New Creation, will be like they were on Earth or whether they will be more like their wolf ancestors?
quote:We do interact with the input. With our senses. We can think of the stimulus-response of simple life forms as being at one end of a continuum that is meaning. The amoeba senses chemicals towards or away from which it needs to move, it also moves towards and away from light. There is proto-meaning here. In an unconscious chemical way, to an amoeba light "means" move towards it. There is a boundary between the amoeba and the outside world, and there is a very primitive isomorphism between aspects of the outside world and processes within the amoeba. That relationship is where meaning lies. Going to higher levels of complexity it gets more complicated, of course, but the principle is the same. Sensory information has meaning in this sense. A large part of our brain is devoted to processing sensory information. That processing is not just a matter of transferring, say, an image to our internal screen, it's a matter of interpretation. And you can't have interpretation without meaning. In the higher cognitive functions you are talking about here, the interactivity is with our memory.
I am dubious about data processing as a metaphor here. In part because I don't think that turning a series of inputs into a series of outputs does have any meaning without the ability to interact with the source of the input.
quote:On second thoughts, I see what you mean. That's a connection I hadn't made. To find meaning is a creative process.
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
quote:What makes you think that?
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Since creativity is inseparable from meaning
quote:I would have agreed at one point. If we only want to create a consistent metaphysical model of reality then God = creativity works. But there is no need to limit God in that way as long as we don't add unnecessary attributes, for example in the way traditional Christianity has with personhood.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
You're right that [God creates implies God is creativity] doesn't follow logically. Still, I believe it to be true.
quote:Exactly. That's how I interpreted it and I agree wholeheartedly.
Quetz wrote:
Yes, my first suggestion, that bacteria process data, and communicate with each other, is not intended to say that this is the same as human linguistic meaning. But it seems reasonable to me to say that it might have led to it, via evolution.
quote:No I'm not. I am outlining how, in a materialist, or more correctly, naturalist, paradigm, meaning, as in semantics, could - and in my opinion, did - come into being. The science, such as it is - I'm no biologist - is there because it is relevant to talk in those terms on a topic about meaning in a materialist universe.
Itsarumdo wrote:
You are conflating personal beliefs with science
quote:I don't really care what you believe science does or does not say. It actually says nothing at all, since it is a practical activity that human beings do to systematically study the natural world. What you seem to be saying is that there are some areas you don't believe are open to the scientific method, and that you know what they are. You may be right about the former, I'm doubtful about the latter.
Science says - we work within the limits of what can be proven, but that may not include everything that exists. Sciencism (the religion of science) says - if science cannot go there, it doesn't exist.
The two are very different statements. The first recognises that there are some areas that will never be open to the scientific method.
quote:Do you have some ultra-Derridean objection to attributing quotations? Is it that you think everything is text and there's nothing outside text and therefore you don't do anything so metaphysical as attribute text to speakers?
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:
quote:Are you being willfully obtuse?
We do interact with the input. With our senses.
quote:Bacteria process data is a metaphor. Computers literally process data. When you say bacteria process data you are using a metaphor drawn from computing. And there are disanalogies between bacteria and computers. Grokesk acknowledged as much, although he misunderstood my point, and therefore evaded having to concede it.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Yes, my first suggestion, that bacteria process data, and communicate with each other, is not intended to say that this is the same as human linguistic meaning.
quote:Certainly there must be continuities between the prelinguistic stage and the linguistic stage. (Even the most Cartesian dualist has to concede that babies are pre-linguistic.) It doesn't do to pretend that there's no continuities between bacteria and humans. But at the same time, it doesn't do to deny that the linguistic dimension is genuinely a new dimension.
But it seems reasonable to me to say that it might have led to it, via evolution.
quote:I don't know whether some atheists are saying that there's nothing more to human cognition that simply manipulating strings of digits.
I don't know whether some theists are saying that there is an unbridgeable gulf between animal communication and morality, and the human equivalents, which must be filled in by the phlogiston. But how will this be defined and demonstrated?
quote:I didn't think you were.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I genuinely don't know if theists say that there is a gulf between animal communication and human language, which cannot be explained via evolution.
By the way, I'm not an atheist.
quote:I'm suggesting that within a naturalist worldview, a sapient computer program - software that achieves personhood - if it can exist (and yes we don't know yet whether it's possible) could do so by mere complexity of interactions of matter. That a sapient program is just a simple program writ large, with perhaps some clever programming thrown in.
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
quote:Er... no, I didn't say that at all. Indeed, I believe that, if this thing we've never encountered, which we don't even know if it could happen at all, ever happens, then something would be at work beyond mere arrangement of the atoms
Originally posted by Russ:
there is no reason in principle why a mere arrangement of the atoms inside a computer should not give rise to a moral obligation.
quote:Not really, it's just how the quotes come out when you don't do the bold ones which look a bit shouty to me. And I think people will recognise their own quotes, and anyway it's the content I'm responding to not the person.
Do you have some ultra-Derridean objection to attributing quotations? Is it that you think everything is text and there's nothing outside text and therefore you don't do anything so metaphysical as attribute text to speakers?
quote:Quetz didn't. I did. He's pleasant. I'm not.
And it doesn't give a pleasant impression (especially if you throw around words like 'phlogiston').
quote:Agreed. God > creativity then. Or God ⊃ creativity?
Dave Marshall: For a model that is compatible with the Christian tradition I think we need to allow for God to be more than creativity should additional attributes turn out to make sense.
quote:Isn't that pretty much saying the same thing I'm saying: That in a materialist universe, the notion of "meaning" as anything more than merely very complex response-stimuli based on matter and energy and physics is basically meaningless?
Originally posted by Grokesx:
We do interact with the input. With our senses. ... That relationship is where meaning lies. Going to higher levels of complexity it gets more complicated, of course, but the principle is the same.
quote:I wholly concur, as some do
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
You are conflating personal beliefs with science
Science says - we work within the limits of what can be proven, but that may not include everything that exists. Sciencism (the religion of science) says - if science cannot go there, it doesn't exist.
The two are very different statements. The first recognises that there are some areas that will never be open to the scientific method. The second assumes that the scientific method - in fact, more or less Aristotle's system of investigation - is a definition of what does or does not exist. The excluded middle (True/False and no other possibility) applied dogmatically leaves all scientific work open to the possibility that the wrong question may have been asked, or the right question with the wrong a priori assumptions.
quote:Just another quick reminder, that I mysulf
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I don't know whether some theists are saying that there is an unbridgeable gulf between animal communication and morality, and the human equivalents
quote:Call it a hunch, but I think it's a glitch
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:Do you have some ultra-Derridean objection to attributing quotations? Is it that you think everything is text and there's nothing outside text and therefore you don't do anything so metaphysical as attribute text to speakers?
Originally posted by Grokesx:
[qb]quote:
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Grokesk acknowledged as much, although he misunderstood my point, and therefore evaded having to concede it.
He may have just disagreed, you know... quote:I'm not a massive fan of DeCartes either, just as a side note. I think he not only got some things wrong but catastrophically wrong in ways that are still with us. Such as this (trigger warning for some of the things he did to animals described in text). God have mercy on his soul. I hope he has learned better now, and that he will be forgiven by all of the creatures whom he and those who followed his philosophy tormented.
Even the most Cartesian dualist
quote:Well, to be fair, I have encountered theists who think in that Cartesian way about humans vs. animals, but honestly they seem to be more on the Fundamentalist end of the spectrum.
[qb]I don't know whether this 'I don't know whether some' formulation is simply a passive-aggressive way of imputing a straw man. But it does give that impression.
quote:I think it may be rather critical to point out, as you mention above, that we don't know that such a thing is even possible...
Originally posted by Russ:
[QB] I'm suggesting that within a naturalist worldview, a sapient computer program - software that achieves personhood - if it can exist (and yes we don't know yet whether it's possible) could do so by mere complexity of interactions of matter. That a sapient program is just a simple program writ large, with perhaps some clever programming thrown in.
You seem to be suggesting that while that may appear true
quote:... and therefore, I'm not making any statement at all about what God's conditions for--again, if something like this ever happens, which it hasn't and we don't know that it ever will--bestowing sapience or a soul or ... what have you on a human-created object.
what in fact happens is that when some threshold of complexity is reached, God steps in and
quote:Nope!
Is that what you're saying ?
quote:Amen. I'd even go further and say that it doesn't justify certain bad treatments of non-intelligent beings. I believe we are permitted to eat animals, and to use them in various ways, but that there are still limits to what we can do to Brother Ox and Sister Hen.
Which is to your credit. Making moral treatment of sapient software, or animals, or slaves, or anything else, conditional on theological reasoning as to whether they have a soul, would be to greatly over-estimate the reliability of theology. Hot air does not justify treating another intelligent being badly.
quote:Actually, I get confused about whose quote is whose myself, though I try to quote the person with their name first, and then keep quoting them till the next new array of quotes come by. People may recognize their own quotes but then be confused pages later about whose position is whose.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
Not really, it's just how the quotes come out when you don't do the bold ones which look a bit shouty to me. And I think people will recognise their own quotes, and anyway it's the content I'm responding to not the person.
And if I misunderstood your post, no problem. I don't understand many of them, or at least don't see the point of many.
quote:Have fun! Is "hols" a student/university thing or holidays in the UK in general? I've only encountered the term in the Narnia books.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
Apologies for the double post. It'll be my last for a few days - off on my hols.
quote:Well, we can always improve, of course.
He's pleasant. I'm not.
quote:There's some cool stuff about phlogiston in Alan Moore's Tom Strong series.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I thought 'phlogiston' was a good joke.
quote:If!!!! If I encountered such a being.
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
Heck, I encountered such a being, for all I know, it could even be a Tsukumogami or something.
![[brick wall]](graemlins/brick_wall.gif)
I have not (thus far) knowingly done so. quote:I'd hesitate to go with either. The "extension" I'm thinking of has to do with God being the first cause of the universe rather than the act/process of causing, if that makes sense. It may be that's an artificial distinction, but it seems significant and necessary.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
God > creativity then. Or God ⊃ creativity?
quote:So you reject naturalistic explanations for the development of personhood (and thus moral sense), because you can't see how it could work.
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
I'm not making any statement at all about what God's conditions for.. ..bestowing sapience or a soul or ... what have you on a human-created object.
) So I'm disinclined to rule out the possibility that other accomplishments may be within its grasp.quote:That's not what I said. What I said was above. Remember, we're talking about "what if a computer became a person somehow?" If a computer becomes a person someday, which we don't know will ever happen. We're not saying, "Here, meet our mechanical friend HAL/Marvin/Vision/Reddy/Pinocchio/Data/C-3P0/Warlock. He shows all the signs of genuine personhood, but he was built rather than born. How do you think he metaphysically came to be?" We're saying, "What if someone like that existed, and we had to figure out how?" So far, they don't. (Don't get me wrong, part of me thinks it would be really cool, but part of me thinks that it might not be cool for the person created that way. If a mistake in genetic engineering--with God knows how many mistakes and missteps in between which might be simply killed and thrown away
Originally posted by Russ:
quote:So you reject naturalistic explanations for the development of personhood (and thus moral sense), because you can't see how it could work.
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
I'm not making any statement at all about what God's conditions for.. ..bestowing sapience or a soul or ... what have you on a human-created object.
--could lead, because of dicking around with things, to a sapient being who turns out to be blind, with Down's syndrome, in constant pain--no, that kind of risk would be too much to play around with. And so, too, with making a computer into a person. I would not want to be someone's experiment. "You mean I didn't have to be born like this? You just wanted to see if you could make something cool?" I don't even agree with some of the things that are being done to real, non-sapient animals...)quote:I think you keep thinking I am saying things that are not.
Why is "I can't see how that could work" a valid reason for rejection of the concept in one case but not the other ?
quote:I would honestly say that playing chess and the like is vastly different, not in degree, but in kind, than anything like personhood. Again, this is one of those "essence" things, and so back to "meaning" and oh God I think we're going to wind up in circles again.
In my lifetime, computer software has got much better at playing chess. (Much faster than I have...
quote:Of course, thilly! It means that Jesus shops at the Gap!
Do you know what we mean by "God of the gaps" ?
quote:Well, duh. I mean, yes, and that isn't my approach to it.
And why that approach to religion isn't a good idea ?
quote:I admit to having been a bit tongue-in-cheek when I included God in an expression with mathematical symbols. In fact, I thin I'd prefer to keep it at a rather vague "God = creativity and more". I'm not very enamoured with first cause arguments.
Dave Marshall: I'd hesitate to go with either. The "extension" I'm thinking of has to do with God being the first cause of the universe rather than the act/process of causing, if that makes sense. It may be that's an artificial distinction, but it seems significant and necessary.
quote:But if it is merely generated by the brain, and not an actual perception of genuine metaphysical truths, then it would be basically an illusion, or so it seems to me.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
It just looks to me that you are saying that the brain cannot generate abstract thought. If it does, then metaphysics could be said to be a part of that abstract thinking.
quote:Yes, your good-natured frustration is reciprocated.
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
I would honestly say that playing chess and the like is vastly different, not in degree, but in kind, than anything like personhood. Again, this is one of those "essence" things, and so back to "meaning" ...
quote:Well, duh. I mean, yes, and that isn't my approach to it.
Do you know what we mean by "God of the gaps" ? And why that approach to religion isn't a good idea ?
I hate the fact that we (that is, me and everyone I'm disagreeing with here) seem to be going around in circles, and I really want to figure out how to bridge this gap
quote:Hello, I see we have another 'merely' cropping up!
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
quote:But if it is merely generated by the brain, and not an actual perception of genuine metaphysical truths, then it would be basically an illusion, or so it seems to me.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
It just looks to me that you are saying that the brain cannot generate abstract thought. If it does, then metaphysics could be said to be a part of that abstract thinking.
quote:I don't actually see that dualism helps here. If we can't see how to understand how inner world and consciousness result from material mechanisms I don't see how they can result from non-material mechanism either. It seems to me that it's the analysis of processes using mechanist metaphors, rather than the materialism, that causes the problems here.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
But there is an 'I', a whole mental inner universe that can't be explained by this. Even if with every thought we have we can exactly point at the synapse that is firing (I don't think we'll be able to do that, but for argument's sake), this still doesn't explain this inner world.
quote:Materialism is a metaphysical position. 'Matter' is a metaphysical entity. Indeed, the further assertion that the only real qualities are primary qualities is a metaphysical position. The argument isn't between a metaphysical position and an empiricist position. It's between two (at least) different metaphysical positions.
Originally posted by lilBuddha:
This is a genuine problem with this debate. Those with a philosophy which includes the metaphysical are not letting go of it enough to grasp the entire argument.
quote:Exactly. We can map neurons all we want (and we should), but this doesn't explain where this 'inner space' comes from.
quetzalcoatl: Of course, one basic problem is explaining how patterns of neurons produce mental activity, and it's possible that there is some fundamental gap here, which cannot be solved.
quote:I didn't say that dualism helps here.
Dafyd: I don't actually see that dualism helps here.
quote:On the other hand, if you were unfortunate enough to have a stroke, or a bad car crash, involving head injuries, you might find that your mental activity is severely compromised.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
quote:Exactly. We can map neurons all we want (and we should), but this doesn't explain where this 'inner space' comes from.
quetzalcoatl: Of course, one basic problem is explaining how patterns of neurons produce mental activity, and it's possible that there is some fundamental gap here, which cannot be solved.
quote:I didn't say that dualism helps here.
Dafyd: I don't actually see that dualism helps here.
quote:Of course. I don't deny that there is a link between the brain and our 'inner space'. But this doesn't explain where this inner space comes from.
quetzalcoatl: On the other hand, if you were unfortunate enough to have a stroke, or a bad car crash, involving head injuries, you might find that your mental activity is severely compromised.
But also that there are skilled people available, who will attempt to repair your brain, and consequently, your mental faculties.
Alzheimer's is another obvious example, where brain deterioration can lead to cognitive deterioration, even the collapse of personality, where very little seems to have meaning.
quote:Yes, that's a nice way to put it.
quetzalcoatl: This reminds me of Nagel's famous article, 'What is it like to be a bat?', in which he argues that we might find out a huge amount about bats, but that would not tell us what it is like to be one.
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Materialism is a metaphysical position. 'Matter' is a metaphysical entity. Indeed, the further assertion that the only real qualities are primary qualities is a metaphysical position. The argument isn't between a metaphysical position and an empiricist position. It's between two (at least) different metaphysical positions.
quote:I'm rather tempted to respond with the old joke about Tonto and the Lone Ranger: "What do you mean 'we,' Paleface?"
Originally posted by Russ:
When we can't see a scientific answer, we tend to fall back on pre-scientific ways of thinking. s
![[Biased]](wink.gif)
quote:I'm sorry, but it's not. What I'm saying, I mean.
And that's a philosophical error. That reduces God to a label for what we don't understand, so that our perception of His sphere of activity shrinks as our knowledge increases.
And that error seems precisely what you're saying here.
quote:It's not a matter of complexity or simplicity at all. It's a matter of essence. Not of degree, but of kind.
We don't know how the sort of abstract reasoning and self-awareness which so far we've only seen humans do (despite advances in software and various studies with chimps) relates to simpler forms of cognition.
quote:The notion of a materialist universe, as I understand it, would be one in which the notion of "people" --but really this would include all notions--is meaningless.
With that backdrop, can we follow up on your idea of what a materialist universe is ? It contains matter and energy, yes. What about information ? Does it contain writing - symbols by which people communicate ideas, combinations of symbols that are culturally associated with meanings ? Or is it a universe without people ? Or one in which people never evolved beyond the intelligence level of cats ?
quote:As was pointed out by LeRoc, I think, it would be the existence of an "I" to start with in the first place. All of the notions of a materialist or a supernatural universe kind of fall apart at that point if there is no real "I" and no metaphysical truths (including, if it were so, of materialism) to be apprehended by that "I." And no, I am not talking about any kind of increasing complexity of neurons or cultural memes or anything like that--I'm talking about something so philosophically primal that all of human knowledge, whether of atoms or neurons or anything else, hangs on it. If there is no real meaning--if it is "nothing but" atoms--then there is no reason to believe in atoms in the first place. Nor would there be anyone to believe in it.
If you start from atoms and work up, what's the first gap that you think can't be bridged without violating the assumption of a materialist universe ?
quote:If experiences were generated in the brain we would be unable to communicate. Indeed, we would probably be unable to remember whether one experience was or wasn't the same experience as an earlier experience. (See Wittgenstein, private language argument.)
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Now I don't really understand what you mean by an illusion. Are you saying that if an experience is generated in the brain, it is not real? But aren't all experiences generated there? I'm using my brain to write this sentence - so is it an illusion?
quote:Where does what you're saying differ ?
Originally posted by ChastMastr:
quote:I'm sorry, but it's not. What I'm saying, I mean.
Originally posted by Russ:
a philosophical error. That reduces God to a label for what we don't understand, so that our perception of His sphere of activity shrinks as our knowledge increases.
And that error seems precisely what you're saying here.
quote:You mean you're agnostic about animal intelligence - you don't believe in Dog ?
It''s not a matter of complexity or simplicity at all. It's a matter of essence. Not of degree, but of kind.
quote:Which is your definition here and which your conclusion ? Can a materialist universe contain life ? Plants ? amoebas ? Dogs ? Chimps ? Humans ? Once you've said what you mean, we can then talk about whether concepts are meaningful to us, or whether we think it would be meaningful to the humans (if there are humans) in that universe.
The notion of a materialist universe, as I understand it, would be one in which the notion of "people" --but really this would include all notions--is meaningless.
quote:I've been trying to express the difference for the last five pages, apparently without success.
Originally posted by Russ:
Where does what you're saying differ ?
quote:No, I'm saying that meaning has to be beyond a material cause and effect by its own nature. Again, this is a philosophical matter, not one of material cause and effect.
You wouldn't be saying it if there were a material cause-and-effect that you understood.
quote:I would say that this is perhaps because the notion of genuine meaning in a purely materialist cosmos pretty much, as far as I can tell, self-destructs instantly once the starting point is reached.
"I can't see how..." is the starting point for your argument (which frankly doesn't seem to have advanced all that far beyond its starting point).
quote:No, I'm not trying to avoid anything at all, nor am I "using" anything to try to do that; that would be dishonest, and I hope I'm not being accused of that.
You're using the ineffability of God to avoid putting forward any detail of your hypothesis.
quote:I don't think it's subtle at all, but as I said above, I don't seem to have been able to communicate it effectively for five pages here and for longer over on the previous thread.
What key subtlety of your position have I missed, that totally transforms it from a "God of the gaps" argument into something else ?
quote:I like the pun, but I'm not talking about a difference in degree/kind re animal/human intelligence, but re meaning/nonmeaning, self/nonself, person/nonperson. I do not absolutely know what animal consciousness is like (but then I don't absolutely know what other people's consciousnesses are like either. I know mine but I've occasionally pondered what it would be like to switch into other people's as it might be interestingly alien to me...), but from what I see/experience/encounter, at least some types seem to be "persons" in some real sense as humans are. I would not be surprised to find that even wee insects (or even smaller, not even getting into inorganic things many people tend to assume are just matter...) have some sort of spiritual essence that we shall encounter someday in the world to come.
quote:You mean you're agnostic about animal intelligence - you don't believe in Dog ?
It''s not a matter of complexity or simplicity at all. It's a matter of essence. Not of degree, but of kind.
quote:I'm not sure a "materialist universe" can contain anything. The notion of the universe that a given materialist philosopher may have could include all sorts of things.
Which is your definition here and which your conclusion ? Can a materialist universe contain life ?
quote:I'm not talking about things being meaningful to humans here or to any beings in any other universe that might exist. I'm talking about things being meaningful, full stop. I'm talking not about the perception of meaning, but of meaning itself.
Once you've said what you mean, we can then talk about whether concepts are meaningful to us, or whether we think it would be meaningful to the humans (if there are humans) in that universe.
quote:What does language have to do with anything? Language points to meaning, but I am talking about the meaning it points to.
Is meaninglessness (rather than absence of the supernatural) your definition of a materialist universe ? A universe without language ?
quote:Is that only true if you equate 'materialism' with 'studiable by science'? The domain of science is the repeatable, the testable, and the modellable. Thus scientific knowledge is universally humanly accessible in the sense that descriptions can be written in a shared language with reference to precise, shared concepts (mostly mathematical).
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
... it's often objected that a pure 100% materialism cannot account for what a person is.
quote:It's a ridiculously vague word, from the meaning of a word, to the meaning of my life. This makes equivocation quite easy, and also, confusion.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
TBH, I'm not sure if 'meaning' is the right angle through which to approach the question of the OP. It's a vague concept, even in a non-materialist universe. I think it's much better to approach the question through the angle of choice.
quote:I'm sorry, this is gibberish. There is no definition of 'materialist universe' that makes sense to me if it includes 'material stuff' that is outside of science. On what ground do we call this stuff 'material' then?
que sais-je: There may be material stuff which is outside of science. My sense of 'I' may be such a thing.
quote:There's two ways in which I think que sais-je's point could hold.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
quote:I'm sorry, this is gibberish. There is no definition of 'materialist universe' that makes sense to me if it includes 'material stuff' that is outside of science. On what ground do we call this stuff 'material' then?
que sais-je: There may be material stuff which is outside of science. My sense of 'I' may be such a thing.
quote:Thanks Dafyd, that's sort of what I was thinking about but your description is much clearer. You're better at explanation, gibberish is more my thing.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Likewise, say colours. Science as presently constituted largely relies on correlating numbers. It can't handle well anything that cannot be measured and assigned numbers. So, when it comes to colours it can only say that such and such a wavelength corresponds to a particular colour as seen by us. Unless you're Daniel Dennett, colours as seen by us cannot be assigned numbers so that they yield to the mathematical modelling that science uses. Now, if a materialist thinks that colours are mind-independent properties of matter, then that materialist thinks that matter has mind-independent properties that nevertheless are not amenable to science as presently constituted.
quote:I do think that there's a genuine problem, even if it's hard to pose the problem in a way that isn't hand-wavy and potentially equivocating.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
But I think Dafyd made a good point early on - can the advocates of non-materialism explain meaning? I am all agog.
quote:Mind-mapped significance?
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
can the advocates of non-materialism explain meaning?
quote:That just sounds like a synonym to me.
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
quote:Mind-mapped significance?
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
can the advocates of non-materialism explain meaning?
quote:I have the feeling that the parameters of the discussion are getting a bit fuzzy here.
Dafyd: There's two ways in which I think que sais-je's point could hold.
quote:Nothing stops colour from being a real property in a materialist universe.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
I didn't understand your example about economics very well, but about your second example: I'm not convinced that perception of colours like you described it exists in a materialist universe.
quote:Then your imaginative idea of a materialist universe differs from some other people's intuitions. How do you imagine someone would experience colour in a materialist universe?
Originally posted by LeRoc:
I personally don't believe we live in a materialist universe, but I can certainly imagine one.
...
I'm not convinced that perception of colours like you described it exists in a materialist universe.
quote:
Every man is not a proper Champion for Truth, nor fit to take up the Gantlet in the cause of Veritie: Many from the ignorance of these Maximes, and an inconsiderate zeale unto Truth, have too rashly charged the troopes of error, and remaine as Trophees unto the enemies of Truth: A man may be in as just possession of Truth as of a City, and yet bee forced to surrender: tis therefore farre better to enjoy her with peace, then to hazzard her on a battell.
quote:How so? I'm a confused nominalist on maths - a consequence of having been a computer scientist perhaps.
posted by Dafvd
A physicalist can believe that numbers and sets and other mathematical objects exist without having any material instantiation
quote:I'm a bit sloppy with terminology sometimes. Whenever I say 'materialism', you may substitute 'physicalism' for it. My basic argument is the same.
Dafyd: It sounds to me as if by materialism what you mean is a conjunction of materialism with physicalism?
quote:They wouldn't. In a materialist / physicalist universe, there would be a receptor that would physically register the wavelength, just like my electronic camera does. And there would be a processor that would transform this into the word 'blue'. But there wouldn't be an 'I' that experiences the colour blue.
que sais-je: How do you imagine someone would experience colour in a materialist universe?
quote:The argument starts by noting that a physicalist obviously cannot be a nominalist about physics. Then, physics requires, as a premise, that mathematics successfully models the physical universe and therefore has genuine predictive power. To suppose that mathematics has genuine predictive power requires realism about mathematics, and it is hard to have realism about mathematical objects and materialism at the same time. (For example, what material state of affairs determines the non-nominal existence of a set?)
Originally posted by que sais-je:
quote:How so? I'm a confused nominalist on maths - a consequence of having been a computer scientist perhaps.
posted by Dafvd
A physicalist can believe that numbers and sets and other mathematical objects exist without having any material instantiation
quote:emergence from a mathematical point of view
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
itsarumdo
Surely, the solution to that is emergence. We don't really think that the table in front of us is a collection of quarks and emptiness, do we?
quote:Very amusing. So what are you saying, matter cannot generate morality, therefore the Nicene Creed?
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
quote:emergence from a mathematical point of view
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
itsarumdo
Surely, the solution to that is emergence. We don't really think that the table in front of us is a collection of quarks and emptiness, do we?
quote:I wonder then what you mean by explain. Ok, it doesn't add any new context to the discussion, but it helped me understand meaning better.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
quote:That just sounds like a synonym to me.
Originally posted by Dave Marshall:
quote:Mind-mapped significance?
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
can the advocates of non-materialism explain meaning?
quote:No. Just no. The idea that mathematics can be used to successfully model the physical universe is not a premise of physics, it's a conclusion reached after a lot of painstaking observation going back at least as far as Kepler. Trying to pretend it's an underlying premise hand waves away a lot of hard work by several century's worth of dedicated scientists.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
The argument starts by noting that a physicalist obviously cannot be a nominalist about physics. Then, physics requires, as a premise, that mathematics successfully models the physical universe and therefore has genuine predictive power.
quote:I think the problem here is the use of the word "exist".
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Nothing stops colour from being a real property in a materialist universe.
Let's make a distinction between materialist and physicalist.
A materialist believes that everything that exists is made up of matter (or energy).
A physicalist believes that everything that exists can be mentioned within something like our present understanding of physics.
These are not necessarily the same. A materialist can believe that colours really exist, so that a physical understanding of colour as light of a certain wavelength is not the whole story but merely that part that shows up in physics. A physicalist can believe that numbers and sets and other mathematical objects exist without having any material instantiation.
It sounds to me as if by materialism what you mean is a conjunction of materialism with physicalism?
quote:There are a lot of concealed assumptions here, which I think are mistaken, and which are certainly highly contestable, and really I don't know where to start.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
The idea that mathematics can be used to successfully model the physical universe is not a premise of physics, it's a conclusion reached after a lot of painstaking observation going back at least as far as Kepler. Trying to pretend it's an underlying premise hand waves away a lot of hard work by several century's worth of dedicated scientists.
quote:I feel that this is just objecting to one way of posing the problem, rather than resolving the problem.
Originally posted by Russ:
What light consists of - according to our best understanding of physics - is an electromagnetic wave. We have the experience of seeing different colours, according to the wavelength. If the physics somehow doesn't explain the quality of the experience, that doesn't mean that the experience is unreal - that would be an error (reductionism ? scientism ?). But it equally doesn't mean that the physics is faulty by omitting some phlogiston-like "essence of blueness" - that would also be an error. One that was labelled earlier as the "fallacy of composition", but could perhaps be seen as reifying into a Thing an experience that results from what photons do.
quote:Naah. Firstly, physicalism being true or false is independent of how we talk about it.
Dafyd wrote
Roughly speaking, in order for physicalism to be true, it should be possible to recast the above sentences without using any nouns that aren't part of the language of physics.
quote:Aspects of morality, experience, consciousness etc can usefully be talked about in the languages of psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, evolutionary biology, computer science, artificial intelligence and neurology, among others. Physics? Why bother?
Let’s say you want to understand the population dynamics of a species of plants, for instance belonging to an invasive species (this comes straight out of my work as an empirical scientist, as you might have guessed). It is of no use to point out that plants, “ultimately” are made of quarks. A quantum mechanical theory of population dynamics — even if possible in principle — is never going to be developed and it wouldn’t help anyway because it would be far too complicated (and unnecessarily so) for a human to comprehend. Instead, the population biologist looks at population genetics (circa one level of complexity below that of organismal biology) and at ecosystem theory (circa one level of complexity above).
quote:Speak for yourself.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
We are all doing a sort of philosophy here - mostly pretty badly, but hey ho -
quote:So, naah, but yes? Pardon me if I'm not convinced you've got a devasting rebuttal either here, or anywhere else in your post.
Naah. Firstly, physicalism being true or false is independent of how we talk about it.
Secondly, if physicalism were true, yes, it would be possible in the future to recast those sentences to your satisfaction provided mankind works out a complete account of the whole of physical existence.
quote:Naah. Multiple issues. A) Naah, as in ontology is not dependent on epistemology. B) Possible, in some distant future if some conditions were met that are by no means certain, but that possibility does not preclude hypothesizing on the logical possibilities in the here and now based on current knowledge C) Irrelevant anyway.
So, naah, but yes?
quote:Yes. I think that about sums up my response to your post.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
Irrelevant anyway.
quote:That's because I haven't been trying to do anything of the sort.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
That's as may be, but your good philosophy has not made it clear to me at any rate why the language of physics is any way relevant to consciousness, morality etc.
quote:You really have no idea what my line of reasoning is, do you?
At first blush your line of reasoning is similar to the creationist who says that evolution is just a theory and that until you can provide an account of every mutation from the supposed common ancestor to modern humans, your sciency guess is as good as my biblical interpretation one.
quote:Well you brought up the notion of talking about experience and quality in the language of physics and you seem to be implying that the language of physics is the only way a physicalist can talk about things like quality and experience and that until the ultimate reduction is done, what they are doing with all this crazy talk is just theory.
That's because I haven't been trying to do anything of the sort.
quote:No I haven't. Maybe if you drew it in a different colour, that might help.
You really have no idea what my line of reasoning is, do you?
quote:Observing and measuring things is one of the things people do. Recognizing patterns is another. To take a fairly simple (and pre-scientific) example of this, it was eventually noted that if the Nile flooded a little famine would follow, if it flooded a moderate amount everything would be fine, and if it flooded too much it would be disastrous. Eventually this was formalized into an instrumental measurement. I'm not sure where the change in premises occurred. It seems more like a formalization of an observed process (the fertility of Egypt is dependent on the flooding of the Nile, therefore we should observe and measure the behavior of the Nile).
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:There are a lot of concealed assumptions here, which I think are mistaken, and which are certainly highly contestable, and really I don't know where to start.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
The idea that mathematics can be used to successfully model the physical universe is not a premise of physics, it's a conclusion reached after a lot of painstaking observation going back at least as far as Kepler. Trying to pretend it's an underlying premise hand waves away a lot of hard work by several century's worth of dedicated scientists.
Firstly, you're assuming that the hard work in question can be adequately characterised as 'drawing conclusions from painstaking observation', as opposed to 'rejecting old premises and coming up with new ones'.
Related to this is the assumption that it would actually be possible for someone to reach the conclusion that mathematics models the world by reflecting upon data.
(How are they supposed to notice mathematical correlations if they aren't measuring things? But why are they measuring things if they don't already believe that mathematics models the world?)
quote:I don't insist on the term and don't particularly feel like wrangling semantics. If you feel better with "those who make observations of physical reality and draw conclusions therefrom" or some other phrase you think more apt, feel free to substitute it.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Secondly, you're assuming that there's no problem in referring to the people in question as 'scientists' even though the word 'scientist' is anachronistic.
quote:That is not a clear argument - the isea that one can take a water level and immediately have some idea of usefulness is based on an underlying assumption as to the datum for the measurement. If your datum is to local land elevation, then the statement is true. If it's to a regional or universal elevation, then not necessarily true - sedimentation, isostasy, etc can change all that. Measurement only has relevance if what is being measured, how it is being measured and how the common unit of measurement is defined - are all adequately and clearly and consciously defined. It is very rare that this level of disambiguity is available. As the situation becomes more generalised or more complex, the likelihood that there is a conscious disambiguation decreases rapidly.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
quote:Observing and measuring things is one of the things people do. Recognizing patterns is another. To take a fairly simple (and pre-scientific) example of this, it was eventually noted that if the Nile flooded a little famine would follow, if it flooded a moderate amount everything would be fine, and if it flooded too much it would be disastrous. Eventually this was formalized into an instrumental measurement. I'm not sure where the change in premises occurred. It seems more like a formalization of an observed process (the fertility of Egypt is dependent on the flooding of the Nile, therefore we should observe and measure the behavior of the Nile).
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:There are a lot of concealed assumptions here, which I think are mistaken, and which are certainly highly contestable, and really I don't know where to start.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
The idea that mathematics can be used to successfully model the physical universe is not a premise of physics, it's a conclusion reached after a lot of painstaking observation going back at least as far as Kepler. Trying to pretend it's an underlying premise hand waves away a lot of hard work by several century's worth of dedicated scientists.
Firstly, you're assuming that the hard work in question can be adequately characterised as 'drawing conclusions from painstaking observation', as opposed to 'rejecting old premises and coming up with new ones'.
Related to this is the assumption that it would actually be possible for someone to reach the conclusion that mathematics models the world by reflecting upon data.
(How are they supposed to notice mathematical correlations if they aren't measuring things? But why are they measuring things if they don't already believe that mathematics models the world?)
quote:I don't insist on the term and don't particularly feel like wrangling semantics. If you feel better with "those who make observations of physical reality and draw conclusions therefrom" or some other phrase you think more apt, feel free to substitute it.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
Secondly, you're assuming that there's no problem in referring to the people in question as 'scientists' even though the word 'scientist' is anachronistic.
quote:Physicalism does not require a one-stage translation into physics. You can inherit.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
Well you brought up the notion of talking about experience and quality in the language of physics and you seem to be implying that the language of physics is the only way a physicalist can talk about things like quality and experience and that until the ultimate reduction is done, what they are doing with all this crazy talk is just theory.
quote:Just because everybody else has problems doesn't mean physicalism doesn't. That everybody has a problem doesn't mean it's not a problem.
quote:No I haven't. Maybe if you drew it in a different colour, that might help.
You really have no idea what my line of reasoning is, do you?
quote:It seems like that because you think it must have happened like that. If people work out a way of measuring things, then they must have reached it by concluding it from painstaking observations. The Egyptians worked out a way of measuring things. Therefore the Egyptians must have reached the conclusion that they could measure things from painstaking observations.
Originally posted by Crœsos:
I'm not sure where the change in premises occurred. It seems more like a formalization of an observed process (the fertility of Egypt is dependent on the flooding of the Nile, therefore we should observe and measure the behavior of the Nile).
quote:The point remains. The ancient Greeks did not have a single term that covered all of 'those who make observations of physical reality and draw conclusions therefrom' and nobody else. That gives us reason to suppose they did not think of what they were doing in those terms, given that there is little to no evidence that they did think of what they were doing in those terms.
I don't insist on the term and don't particularly feel like wrangling semantics. If you feel better with "those who make observations of physical reality and draw conclusions therefrom" or some other phrase you think more apt, feel free to substitute it.
quote:In principle, there is, in supervenience/emergentism. Now, you might say, emergence/shmemurgence as others have and leave it at that because you don't personally find it convincing, and that's fine. But that's about the same level of significance as my scepticism of all things godly, ie somewhere around zero.
But you do have to show that there's an in principle possible translation somewhere.
quote:If what you want to do is point out problems with physicalism, fill your boots. I've not said there are no problems with it, that is not what the discussion has been about. The point at issue has been whether a particular problem in physicalism can only be resolved by jettisoning it and adopting non physicalism instead. The fact that everyone has problems now becomes germane, and we all have reasons for favouring one position over others and in many instances reasonable, rational people can come to different, maybe provisional conclusions.
Just because everybody else has problems doesn't mean physicalism doesn't. That everybody has a problem doesn't mean it's not a problem.
quote:That's not an explanation. That's just a word. (Consider water, which is the usual analogy here. We can explain why water is wet in terms of the electrical and physical structure of a water molecule.)
Originally posted by Grokesx:
quote:In principle, there is, in supervenience/emergentism. Now, you might say, emergence/shmemurgence as others have and leave it at that because you don't personally find it convincing, and that's fine.
But you do have to show that there's an in principle possible translation somewhere.
quote:Ok then. Why do you want to jettison physicalism? You think it conflates ontology and epistemology? I think that's an unfair reading of it.
The point at issue has been whether a particular problem in physicalism can only be resolved by jettisoning it and adopting non physicalism instead.
quote:Plenty more words about it on the internet. Plenty of problems, too.
That's not an explanation. That's just a word.
quote:I don't, I'm being told I have to if I want to keep the concepts of morality, consciousness etc.
Ok then. Why do you want to jettison physicalism?
quote:Why would non-material solutions need to be assessible?
quetzalcoatl: One of the problems with non-material solutions is what method could be used to assess them. If I say, for example, that a non-material force beam is causing gravity, how could that be assessed? I don't know.
quote:I don't think they need to be. But if you can't assess them, there are no constraints, are there? My non-material force beam is as valid as Venusian angels pulling stuff down to the centre of the earth.
Originally posted by LeRoc:
quote:Why would non-material solutions need to be assessible?
quetzalcoatl: One of the problems with non-material solutions is what method could be used to assess them. If I say, for example, that a non-material force beam is causing gravity, how could that be assessed? I don't know.
quote:So why people who "see it" have so many different versions of "it" lots of them incompatible with each other?
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
That's the usual response - if it's non physical it could be space pixies or blue rabbits from betelgeuse, or whatever. That is only true for someone who refuses to engage with the non-material. The interesting thing is that the non-material is accesible through the senses - it's just that a) it's necessary to be somatically proficient rather than just interested in ideas, and b) "you'll see it when you believe it" is one of the rules of the game.
quote:That's true.
quetzalcoatl: But if you can't assess them, there are no constraints, are there? My non-material force beam is as valid as Venusian angels pulling stuff down to the centre of the earth.
quote:But again, there are no constraints here. Anything supernatural is as valid as anything else, isn't it?
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
That's the usual response - if it's non physical it could be space pixies or blue rabbits from betelgeuse, or whatever. That is only true for someone who refuses to engage with the non-material. The interesting thing is that the non-material is accesible through the senses - it's just that a) it's necessary to be somatically proficient rather than just interested in ideas, and b) "you'll see it when you believe it" is one of the rules of the game.
quote:well - exactly. None of it is. It's natural. It's just that the definition of natural has taken on an extremely limited and literal "materialist" meaning.
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
...
I never thought this was supernatural though. ...
quote:In this debate that limited understanding has been on the side of those who deny that consciousness, morality etc can arise from the complex interactions of molecules, and who deny that it is possible for everything to supervene on the physical, which is the modern physicalist/materialist view.
well - exactly. None of it is. It's natural. It's just that the definition of natural has taken on an extremely limited and literal "materialist" meaning.
quote:This may or may not be true. It is however nothing to do with materialism as a philosophical position.
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
For years anyone claiming to be able to feel anything even vaguely super-"natural" (in its limited sense) has been derided and ostracised from mainstream professions.
quote:Being pedantic: mere supervenience is enough to make materialists happy. A physicalist has to posit explanatory dependence as well.
Originally posted by Grokesx:
it is possible for everything to supervene on the physical, which is the modern physicalist/materialist view.
quote:Originally posted by Dafyd:
In principle, there is, in supervenience/emergentism.
quote:There does seem to be a phenomenon whereby people feel more comfortable with a label that somehow excuses them from not being able to explain.
That's not an explanation. That's just a word.
quote:I don't think this is what is normally meant by emergence, and it certainly isn't sufficient to resolve any of the problems that people have been citing.
Originally posted by Russ:
By "emergence" I understand something like the Law of Large Numbers. Lots of real-world variables turn out to be normally distributed. And that's because mathematically, if you add together lots of independent similarly-distributed variables the limiting distribution is a normal distribution.
That means that if you have lots of similar widgets, then regardless of the physics of how a widget works or is made, the characteristics of the population of widgets will be described by a normal distribution.
quote:It's far more than a philosophical position. The reversal of science via Occam's Razor is that if there is no known mechanism for anythng then it doesn't exist - there is no need for it to exist. This was applied by neurologists in the early 20th century to the sensory systems of babies. The assumption behind the training of 2 or 3 generations of doctors was that the neurology of a baby is so poorly developed that it is incapable of feeling any pain, and that therefore crying is just a reflex. This proceded to justify a whole series of medical procedures - scalp blood samples, operations without anaesthesia, etc - which are only just being removed form mainstream western medical practice. Not to mention medical advice on the proper care of newborns by parents. Philosophy in action. The mindset that created this little situation is no different from the one that questions the more subtle senses and considers their existence unporoven - therefore improbable - with no attempt to investigate experientially. Quoting a couple of research papers to imply that this is no longer an issue (i.e. we can think and debate about sensory information until the cows come home but not bother actually exploring its subjective sensibility) is cynical armwaving mollification.
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:This may or may not be true. It is however nothing to do with materialism as a philosophical position.
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
For years anyone claiming to be able to feel anything even vaguely super-"natural" (in its limited sense) has been derided and ostracised from mainstream professions.
quote:Yes - starlings ware very beautiful
Crap spouted by Ikkyu:
A nice example of Emergence. The flock of starlings produces something that is clearly more than "just the sum of its parts".
starlings
quote:You have to admit that the lack of curiosity and unwillingness to believe the possibility in that little episode was not exactly scientific. More culturally consistent with the belief in spontaneous eruption of frogs from the ground. An erroneous institutional belief in something or not-something is remarkably difficult to shift. * think the scientific method operates not unlike the UK legal and parliamentary debating system - it's confrontational and favours the institutional norm, regardless of its worth, until there is no option but to give in. The "discovery" of meteorites required that someone already in the institution got on his horse and brought back the jam. The examples of brilliant new discoveries in physics and chemistry that immediately caught the imagination are unrepresentative of the daily norm in the medical sciences, which is more the playground of human senses. * have spent a decade reading around a specific topic in physiology, and have gradually lost respect for the peer review system and the capacity of the scientific process with respect to human biology to learn and adapt over less than biblical lifespans. So * would also make a division between materialists who purely look at physical phenomena, and materialists who look at the (human) body-mind. In the latter, the conflict between objectivity and subjectivity causes a lot of difficulty in addition to the usual institutional inertia.
@itsarumdo
The lack of imagination of some scientists does not imply that there is no materialist explanation to those "more subtle senses", if they exist, they are amenable to scientific investigation.
For a long time "common sense" dictated that most scientists considered rocks falling from the sky
as absurd folklore. But with time scientific understanding could account for meteorites.
But scientists were convinced by the accumulation of evidence. No need for "faith in meteorites".
quote:This is a major issue in terms of human capacity. Senses are necessarily subjective, not objective. Little-used senses are not only subjective but also ephemeral - they are not always easy to access, especially under pressure or when presented with a complex environment. The suggestion that a belief in something automatically confers access is obfuscatory. Senses, just like a muscle, require practice to be able to use. We train artists over years so that they learn how to see light and shadow fully, rather than just being vaguely aware. You can't just believe that you can see light and shadow and immediately see like an artist. Neither can you believe that you can see the subtle variations in vegetation and elevation that exist in the Kalhari and immediately have the capacity to read that unfamiliar landscape. Or that you can see form and space and function in the same way that an architect does. Magnetic senses - you would have to be curious about the possibility, then spend some time learning how that sense might present itself to your consciousness, and then practice that so it became both familiar and reliable. It takes years. If you grew up in one of the human cultures that use it regularly, this would not be an issue. By the time you were talking., you would already be fluent in the use of this sense.
To convince materialists to take something seriously, like people with "magnetic compasses" in their heads. You just need to produce examples of that purported "fact" making a difference to some observable events. If the effect is large enough and consistent enough people will eventually take it seriously.
And * would not start my investigation by "believing that * can" and then leaving my GPS at home.
). It is possible to know the effect that an action or thought has one both oneself and other people. In order to use that it is necessary to have at least a belief that this is possible (which is different from a religious Belief in the way you are using the word), and a Belief in the ability of your own senses to be reliable given enough practice and familiarity with them. Which does require unswerving confidence in ones own senses - which may be learned over time by using them, just like you would gain confidence in a friend by learning over time that s/he was reliable. And like a friend, a certain amount of trust is necessary, plus a willingness to spend time, in order to make the friendship work. quote:There's something in this, but there may be more to it. Recently quoted this pithy sentence in a DH thread.
Crap spouted by Ikkyu:
@itsarumdo
About the moral "sense" it seems to me you are describing empathy. Something most people have to some degree except sociopaths.
quote:The concept of emotional intelligence, the ability to 'relate', empathy, moral sense, all overlap somehow. You get paradoxes of course. Including this special one from Asimov which gets quoted a lot, often by me.
'Just because you've got the emotional range of a teaspoon doesn't mean we all have'.
Hermione to Ron (in HP and the Order of the Phoenix).
quote:One can get reductionist about this, say it demonstrates that morality is no more than an expression of community dynamics at some point in time in some place. But * think that the awareness that 'we are members, one of another', or that 'no man is an island' is an abiding aspect of what it means to be human.
'Never let your sense of morals prevent you from doing what is right.' Salvor Hardin in the Foundation series
quote:Fair point. Characteristically human does not necessarily mean exclusively human.
Crap spouted by quetzalcoatl:
At this point, empathy in animals should be mentioned
quote:Yes.
good point by Barnabas62:
quote:Fair point. Characteristically human does not necessarily mean exclusively human.
good point by quetzalcoatl:
At this point, empathy in animals should be mentioned
