Thread: Eric Hovinds presuppositionalism argument Board: Oblivion / Ship of Fools.


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Posted by George Spigot (# 253) on :
 
I enjoy watching a lot of debates and recently came across some Eric Hovind videos.

(By the way please don't think I'm saying that people like Eric Hovind represent all Christians and all christian argument. I don't.)

Anyway the gist of his argument can be summerised as follows.

Eric: "The existence of knowledge only makes sense if we presuppose Gods existence".

Atheist: "That's not true".

Eric: "Could you be wrong about everything you know?"

Atheist: "Well...my senses tell me that..."

E: "But could your senses be wrong? Can you prove without a shadow of a doubt that your senses aren't feeding you false information?"

A: "Well...yes I could be wrong. Bet lets get back to the topic at hand. Here's why I think you're wrong".

E: "But how do you know? You already admitted you can't know anything."

A: "But I could argue the same thing. How do you know god exists?"

E: "Because I have divine revelation from god".

A: "But you just said we can't know anything".

E: "No no that's your world view not mine".

And so on. How would you combat this slippery argument? On the face of it it seems silly I know but surprisingly I've seen a lot of people caught off guard and struggle to answer. For the masochists among you here's a video of Eric using the same argument for most of an hour.

Eric Hovind debate

[ 03. March 2015, 11:55: Message edited by: George Spigot ]
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
There are plenty of flaws there; but 'I have a divine revelation' is pure assertion, and not an argument. If assertions are permitted, then I have a revelation from Chthulu, and he says, eat more nuts.
 
Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :
 
Hmm

The one jump is where he takes best-case scenario for religion and worst-case scenario for non-religion.
Perhaps if you forced him to be on board at each point as well. But he kind of has that wrapped up (by begging the question). And not quite sure how to counter-twist.

quote:

A: "But you just said we can't know anything".

Another jump though is that we don't know nothing. We need to qualify things by saying "our senses are claiming...[X happened]", one possibility is that they are lying, another is that they are right. So we may not be certain about our knowledge, but it may be possible for us to have the knowledge (or may not*).


*though for it to appear as consistent as it is, it's more likely that it's just missing a 'in the currently running matrix program' qualifier if it's not real.
 
Posted by Sipech (# 16870) on :
 
The obvious starting point to me would be to question "how do you know it is a divine revelation?" - If it comes from anything they have ever read, then by their denial of the reliability of sensorial data they are prohibited from using any kind of written source.

If they appeal to the divine revelation having come direct into their heads, then how would they discern what is divine from Descarte's demon?

The weakest link (out of several) is the epistemology of the revelation.
 
Posted by Doc Tor (# 9748) on :
 
The problem - and the solution - is the use of 'world view'. In Hovind's world view, God speaks to him. In the atheist's world view, there is no God to speak.

Reality, as an externality which we interpret through our world view, shows these two world views as mutually exclusive. They might both be wrong, but they cannot both be right.

It's his presupposition that Hovind has to prove, before he proves anything else. And has been shown, that's a much tougher ask.
 
Posted by chris stiles (# 12641) on :
 
It seems that this is a watered down version of the 'Van-Tillian' presuppositionalism that I've seen coming out of Reformed circles for a while. See also Douglas Wilson debating Christopher Hitchens.

I presume Hovind has picked up on it, and is aiming at the more populist end of the market.

[ 03. March 2015, 12:33: Message edited by: chris stiles ]
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
The atheist seems a bit feeble to me. I know where the bathroom is. OK, there is a chance that it's moved, or I'm confused, but I don't therefore dismiss all knowledge or ability. I would counter-argue very vigorously!

Hume even made a joke about this - he says somewhere that skepticism is all very well, but he would still leave a room by the door, not the window.
 
Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :
 
Thinking about it more (on route to the shops)

I think the first problem, is that the straw-atheist has to realise that in one sense the argument is valid. The counter to this is to realise that he doesn't have to fight it.

That is without some cosmic-validator (which we can call 'God'), we are left without our knowing if our knowledge on a firm footing.
However the question of validating the validator is valid and of course meta-stable (ish) and outside the scope. It would have to be taken on faith (again ish).
And basically it could be that all we've got is the hope that leaving by the door will be the right thing this time...in which case it's all we've got.
[that reads a bit negative, but I'm sure it could be put a bit more optimistically, in any case (I assert) that both us theists and atheists are in some sense stuck with it, whatever spin you put on it]

The other alternative is (if you are informed in advance) is to resolutely affirm something that you can quickly and convincingly spin into a closed loop. This would of course be profoundly dodgy as our eye's do lie. But if you can get a consession out here, you can play it when he calls on his spiritual sense.

The second trick, having framed the debate to get the debatee to defend too much, comes in the implicit assumptions. Which I thought I'd got but am struggling to put in words.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
I also find it a very hollow kind of debate. I was comparing it with the Russell/Copleston radio debate, which gave space to each man, to develop a point fully, without the yes/no staccato rhythm, as if in a court room. I suppose the internet has reduced debate to a kind of ping-pong, without charity.

[ 03. March 2015, 15:18: Message edited by: quetzalcoatl ]
 
Posted by Adeodatus (# 4992) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot:
Eric: "The existence of knowledge only makes sense if we presuppose Gods existence".

Atheist: "That's not true".

The Atheist had "lost" as soon as s/he spoke. S/he should have asked Eric to define his terms and argue his hypothesis. I haven't gone through it rigorously, but I suspect that with any defensible definition of "knowledge", Eric's assertion is hogwash.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
Yes, the atheist is utterly feeble. It's a kind of three card trick.
 
Posted by LeRoc (# 3216) on :
 
To me, it sounds rather smug.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
I can just see all the converts flocking in, when they see this debate. Probably like those crowds hammering on the church door, shouting 'kalam, kalam!'
 
Posted by HCH (# 14313) on :
 
I think there are other ways to attack Eric's remark than to confront it directly. I might ask him to pin down the meanings of his words. I might also seize upon his notion that knowledge necessarily derives from sensory data. It seems to me that I have knowledge about myself, for instance, that does not come from the senses. Likewise, one might consider questions of logic and mathematics which do not depend on the senses.

Eric's claim is huge, a sweeping assertion. Would he say there can be no communication unless we presuppose the existence of God? If so, how could he carry on a discussion with agnostics?
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
It seems to rely on a false dilemma between certainty and doubt, as if the doubt is paralyzing, and does not permit logic or argument (since you can't be certain of anything). Oh gee, we used to argue this in the 6th form.
 
Posted by Beeswax Altar (# 11644) on :
 
As a moderate Anglo-Catholic, I'm not the best apologist for a very conservative Reformed system of apologetics that I haven't really studied in 15 years. With that caveat...

quote:
originally posted by quetzalcotl:
There are plenty of flaws there; but 'I have a divine revelation' is pure assertion, and not an argument. If assertions are permitted, then I have a revelation from Chthulu, and he says, eat more nuts.

Really? You had a divine revelation from Cthulu? When did that happen? Who else has this experience? What difference does it make if Cthulu exists or not? The ultimate claim of presuppositional apologetics is that all of our ways of knowing ultimately presuppose the existence of the God of the Bible. Lovecraftian monsters especially not one as minor as Cthulu don't provide a sufficient basis for our epistemology.

quote:
originally posted by Jay-Emm:
Another jump though is that we don't know nothing. We need to qualify things by saying "our senses are claiming...[X happened]", one possibility is that they are lying, another is that they are right. So we may not be certain about our knowledge, but it may be possible for us to have the knowledge (or may not*).


The presuppositional apologist would likely say you don't really live like your senses might be wrong. The worldview claim is not a dodge but the heart of the argument. Ultimately, the presuppositional apologist will argue that you live your life as if the God of the Bible actually exists whether you admit or not.

quote:

The obvious starting point to me would be to question "how do you know it is a divine revelation?" - If it comes from anything they have ever read, then by their denial of the reliability of sensorial data they are prohibited from using any kind of written source.

If they appeal to the divine revelation having come direct into their heads, then how would they discern what is divine from Descarte's demon?

quote:
originally posted by Sipech:
The obvious starting point to me would be to question "how do you know it is a divine revelation?" - If it comes from anything they have ever read, then by their denial of the reliability of sensorial data they are prohibited from using any kind of written source.

If they appeal to the divine revelation having come direct into their heads, then how would they discern what is divine from Descarte's demon?

But, the presuppositional apologist doesn't deny the reliability of sensory data because the God of the Bible makes sensory data reliable. What they want to know is why you believe sensory data is reliable. I imagine they get past Descartes demon the same way Descartes got past Descartes demon.

quote:
originally posted by Doc Tor:
It's his presupposition that Hovind has to prove, before he proves anything else. And has been shown, that's a much tougher ask.

He doesn't have to prove it because he is presupposing it. The presuppositionalists are clear what they are presupposing. They want to find out what you are presupposing and if you really act on those presuppositions.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
This argument reminds me a bit of Lewis's argument in relation to reason - that if reason occurs via natural processes (for example, evolution), we have no guarantee that it is reliable. (Rather like the OP argument that if we are not certain of our knowledge, then it is unreliable).

However, I don't think we have to be certain. We might all exist in the Matrix, but we can pragmatically put that on one side, and enjoy our tea, or whatever you call it. In fact, my tea might be a delusion, but I'll take the risk.
 
Posted by anteater (# 11435) on :
 
From what I can gather, Hovind is really out on the extremes, and certainly his Father seems a very controversial figure.

Presuppositionalism has its more mainline advocates. Van Til has been mentioned. It does have some points, and has affinities with Calvinism, because it basically believes that there is no overarching framework of discussion within which atheists and Christians can engage. You cannot reason to God, and will only believe if (and for Calvinists this is a rather big if) God "shines into your heart" and reveals himself to you.

What they would add is that it is not only they who are acting on presuppositions, they are just more aware of it.
 
Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Beeswax Altar:

quote:
originally posted by Jay-Emm:
Another jump though is that we don't know nothing. We need to qualify things by saying "our senses are claiming...[X happened]", one possibility is that they are lying, another is that they are right. So we may not be certain about our knowledge, but it may be possible for us to have the knowledge (or may not*).


The presuppositional apologist would likely say you don't really live like your senses might be wrong. The worldview claim is not a dodge but the heart of the argument. Ultimately, the presuppositional apologist will argue that you live your life as if the God of the Bible actually exists whether you admit or not.


That's what that bit was meant to be addressing.
In that case the double negative wasn't being emphatic. We do know something, we may only KNOW that our senses are acting as if XYZ. But we do know that.

It may be a possibility that the senses are wrong, (regardless of the existence or not of God), but it may be a possibility that they are right. Regardless in any case it's all we've got to go on (again regardless of the existence or not of of God).

And on the whole it adds up as though they were right (e.g. my sensation of remembering asking for a tv on a phone and my sight of seeing something tv like). It's definitely a good workable worldview that our senses are good Whether we ascribe that to coincidence and take that on faith, or pass the matter up a level and have faith that God's given us good senses. Isn't really any different in outcome.

Philosopo-Academically we might have to be ready to put big footnotes on everything when asked,
In practice we can walk through the door and trust that when God says he is the Truth he isn't lying.

[ 03. March 2015, 18:35: Message edited by: Jay-Emm ]
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
I would have thought that we do live probabilistically, as if our senses might be wrong, partly because sometimes they are. We check things and sometimes we double check. When the echo of the Big Bang was first detected, the scientists checked to see if it was pigeons in the dish!
 
Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
This argument reminds me a bit of Lewis's argument in relation to reason - that if reason occurs via natural processes (for example, evolution), we have no guarantee that it is reliable. (Rather like the OP argument that if we are not certain of our knowledge, then it is unreliable).

However, I don't think we have to be certain. We might all exist in the Matrix, but we can pragmatically put that on one side, and enjoy our tea, or whatever you call it. In fact, my tea might be a delusion, but I'll take the risk.

That's interesting, it does.
But then I vaguely agree with that one and am more suspicious on this.
I wonder what the reason is [Help]
(I suspect that I feel the CS Lewis is rejecting a (fictional) proposition with his arg, while this is affirming the inverse. But not sure if that is actually the case (I know the passage but can't find it)
 
Posted by itsarumdo (# 18174) on :
 
I agree with the argument he (Eric) is making, but maybe no the way he is making it. A basic atheist stance is that the senses are fallible - so therefore spiritual experiences are delusional. Turning that argument back on itself is valid - as is to say "that's your world view, not mine". If senses are delusional, then the scientific instruments are no less reliable - because the only way we can pwerceive the data is through our senses. Furthermore, everything that is material and solid in our lives (i.e. anything not wholly contained in the ethereal realm of ideas and thoughts) is perceived through the senses, so to argue from a delusional sense pov is to immediately let go of any claim to a sense of reality, or the capacity to trust anything. The converse - trust in ones own senses - is a prerequisite for any form of embodied spirituality. i.e. any spirituality that relates to day-to-day life rather than just a "nice idea".
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
I'm on a phone, so can't do links, but Anscombe had an interesting rejoinder to Lewis. I suppose in the philosophy of science, instrumentalism is the vogue du jour, so science does not aim for truth or reality. Well, it works, more or less. As I was taught, scientists make observations of appearances, and leave the rest to God.
 
Posted by Beeswax Altar (# 11644) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I would have thought that we do live probabilistically, as if our senses might be wrong, partly because sometimes they are. We check things and sometimes we double check. When the echo of the Big Bang was first detected, the scientists checked to see if it was pigeons in the dish!

Oh..it goes beyond that. Every single second of the day, you assume that what we call the laws of nature will remain the same and not suddenly change. On what rational basis do you make that assumption? The fact that they haven't yet is no guarantee that they won't. In fact, doing science at all presumes the existence of the God of the Bible.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Beeswax Altar:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I would have thought that we do live probabilistically, as if our senses might be wrong, partly because sometimes they are. We check things and sometimes we double check. When the echo of the Big Bang was first detected, the scientists checked to see if it was pigeons in the dish!

Oh..it goes beyond that. Every single second of the day, you assume that what we call the laws of nature will remain the same and not suddenly change. On what rational basis do you make that assumption? The fact that they haven't yet is no guarantee that they won't. In fact, doing science at all presumes the existence of the God of the Bible.
I would have thought that that kind of axiom is a guess, which is then tested out. For example, there may be states of affairs, where the normal laws are abrogated; as an example, determinism has been abandoned in some areas of science. Einstein argued that time does not flow evenly, a la Newton. Nature is very weird.

But the guesses are non-rational, (not irrational, as Anscombe correctly says).
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
I think if you're going to be a foundationalist - that is you think that in order for something to count as knowledge it has to be either evidently true or provable from things that are evidently true - then divine revelation is as good a starting point as any and better than sense data. If the atheist sticks to the claim that the problem with belief in God is that it's not provable, then the presuppositionalist has got the atheist.

However, foundationalism is highly problematic. Nor is it made much better by claiming that the foundations needn't be self-evident, but need merely be presuppositions. If the atheist thinks that something is off about the argument, but can't be sure what it is, it's probably because at root the atheist knows that foundationalism is problematic, but can't articulate that.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
Isn't it that foundationalism is guesswork?
 
Posted by mr cheesy (# 3330) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Beeswax Altar:
Oh..it goes beyond that. Every single second of the day, you assume that what we call the laws of nature will remain the same and not suddenly change. On what rational basis do you make that assumption?

On the basis that it seems to have happened in this way many times before. It is simply simpler to imagine that the universe works in a way which is understandable and predictable (if not fully understood and predicted, of course, due to the lack of full information). The alternative is that the universe is impossible to understand or predict.

Of course, some areas of science are based on the fact that nature will suddenly change at some point in the future which is hard to predict - for example volcanoes erupting, earthquakes etc.

quote:
The fact that they haven't yet is no guarantee that they won't. In fact, doing science at all presumes the existence of the God of the Bible.
Science is not capable of giving guarantees.

And 'doing science' does not presume anything about a deity, hogwash.

[ 03. March 2015, 20:59: Message edited by: mr cheesy ]
 
Posted by itsarumdo (# 18174) on :
 
The basis of reality is belief and thought. If this is explored rationally through the senses, it is found experientially to be correct. Or at least self-consistent, as a triad. Belief, thought, senses as a reliable subjective observation tool. If the material world is considered to be reality, then this inevitably again leads to a necessity to requirte the senses to be unreliable, because they often throw up data which is inconsistent with that starting point, and require thought itself to have a physical basis. This in turn, lwhen the argument is followed to its logical conclusion, leads to an automaton model of all of the living world.

Goswami has formulated quantum mechanics from this starting point (Thought being the creative force), and 10 years ago (I don't know the current status) his wa sthe only QM formulation that was consistent with all experimental results.

For anyone who wants to sit on the fence, the options are thin on the ground - either matter is primary and free will, identity and purpose are illusional (as is experience), or spirit is primary and there is at least some correlation between experience and "reality". Even if I were not already convinced there is a God, the choice is rather stark.
 
Posted by Teufelchen (# 10158) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
Goswami has formulated quantum mechanics from this starting point (Thought being the creative force), and 10 years ago (I don't know the current status) his wa sthe only QM formulation that was consistent with all experimental results.

So I looked up Goswami on Wikipedia.

If anyone wants to know what a Wikipedia page that has not had proper editing looks like, take a look.

Needless to say - as a qualified scientist with more than passing familiarity with relativity and quantum theory - I have not heard of any scientist agreeing that the whole of the current model of QM can only be explained by a single mystic's philosophy. I'd go so far as to call the claim entirely false.

Here's one for the presuppositionalists:

Am I right in understanding that this approach requires the God of the Bible to exist as a philosophical basis for all other epistemology? How then does one determine that the Bible exists at all, or that it is about a deity rather than about car maintenance or ear surgery?

t
 
Posted by itsarumdo (# 18174) on :
 
Well, since he was teaching QM at the time (and happily discusses the various different QM formulations and the way the fit the data or don't), I guess that's a professional disagreement. I don't find Wiki very reliable at all when there is any degree of controversy - it often seems to gravitate to the lowest common denominator.
 
Posted by Timothy the Obscure (# 292) on :
 
I haven't the time or patience for the video, but the dialogue in the OP sounds like a couple of freshman philosophy majors after the third pint. I have more coherent arguments with myself (even after the third pint). And I always win them... Who is this Eric guy, and why does anyone take him seriously?
 
Posted by Ikkyu (# 15207) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
A basic atheist stance is that the senses are fallible - so therefore spiritual experiences are delusional.

Who claims that? One thing does not follow from the other. And conversely the validity of spiritual experiences does not follow from assuming the infallibility of the senses. There are many missing steps in this argument.
 
Posted by Leprechaun (# 5408) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Teufelchen:


Here's one for the presuppositionalists:

Am I right in understanding that this approach requires the God of the Bible to exist as a philosophical basis for all other epistemology? How then does one determine that the Bible exists at all, or that it is about a deity rather than about car maintenance or ear surgery?

t

By not accepting foundationalism. Presuppositionalism seems broadly committed to a coherence view of what makes beliefs justified - he is pointing out that the materialist view is incoherent, not that he has a better epistemological foundation.

I find all of these arguments a bit smartass, and I'm not sure they prove much. I think it IS useful to point out to committed materialists that they are often carelessly using the word "knowledge" (usually as opposed to "faith") without proper consideration of what it means to know something. Most of the time when we are saying we "know" something, our concept includes or is dependent on something that is, in fact faith. But it doesn't get you any further than that.
 
Posted by chris stiles (# 12641) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by itsarumdo:
Well, since he was teaching QM at the time (and happily discusses the various different QM formulations and the way the fit the data or don't), I guess that's a professional disagreement.

I don't think teaching QM necessarily prevents one from spreading BS. He's basically midway between the whackier side of Roger Penrose and Deepak Chopra.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Isn't it that foundationalism is guesswork?

I don't think so.
Rationalism and classical empiricism are both forms of foundationalism: you start from something that we are supposed to be certain of - either axioms of reason or else sense data - and from that we are supposed to prove each step, every time using the previously established steps as evidence. One ought not to believe anything that one hasn't established in that manner, or at least one ought only to give it confidence equal to the likely probability.

Unfortunately, the steps from axioms of reason or sense data to, say, the natural sciences, tend to be highly handwavy, in a way that suggests that the scheme is fundamentally flawed. There are arguments that expose flaws in the scheme directly: one being that in order for something to serve in a logical deduction we have to be able to refer to it when it isn't there; therefore no assertion that it is present, even the thought 'this is a x', can be self-evident, or even evident with a measurable probability.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Leprechaun:
By not accepting foundationalism. Presuppositionalism seems broadly committed to a coherence view of what makes beliefs justified - he is pointing out that the materialist view is incoherent, not that he has a better epistemological foundation.

Presuppositionalism is I think closer to foundationalism than not. If it thinks it can sort beliefs into presuppositions and not presuppositions it is agreeing that knowledge has a deductive structure - that you start from presuppositions and suppositions and work on to conclusions.
A coherence theorist would I think be happier with the claim that no beliefs have axiomatic or presuppositional status.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Isn't it that foundationalism is guesswork?

I don't think so.
Rationalism and classical empiricism are both forms of foundationalism: you start from something that we are supposed to be certain of - either axioms of reason or else sense data - and from that we are supposed to prove each step, every time using the previously established steps as evidence. One ought not to believe anything that one hasn't established in that manner, or at least one ought only to give it confidence equal to the likely probability.

Unfortunately, the steps from axioms of reason or sense data to, say, the natural sciences, tend to be highly handwavy, in a way that suggests that the scheme is fundamentally flawed. There are arguments that expose flaws in the scheme directly: one being that in order for something to serve in a logical deduction we have to be able to refer to it when it isn't there; therefore no assertion that it is present, even the thought 'this is a x', can be self-evident, or even evident with a measurable probability.

A very interesting post. I thought you had mentioned atheists smelling a rat in relation to religious foundationalism; I know plenty of them who say that it's based on guesswork; however, in the interests of fairness, I often reply that there's nothing wrong with a decent guess.

Incidentally, in relation to science, there are various sayings that it progresses over the graves of bad ideas; I think Planck made the rather lugubrious point that it progresses one funeral at a time. Quite a counterblast to any notion of certainty.
 
Posted by chris stiles (# 12641) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:

Incidentally, in relation to science, there are various sayings that it progresses over the graves of bad ideas; I think Planck made the rather lugubrious point that it progresses one funeral at a time. Quite a counterblast to any notion of certainty.

I think we have to be careful with this notion, it doesn't mean that science can never state anything with certainty. Once we move to the realm of experimental science rather than science as natural philosophy, 'bad' ideas tend to involve approximations to reality, rather than being incorrect on all levels.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by chris stiles:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:

Incidentally, in relation to science, there are various sayings that it progresses over the graves of bad ideas; I think Planck made the rather lugubrious point that it progresses one funeral at a time. Quite a counterblast to any notion of certainty.

I think we have to be careful with this notion, it doesn't mean that science can never state anything with certainty. Once we move to the realm of experimental science rather than science as natural philosophy, 'bad' ideas tend to involve approximations to reality, rather than being incorrect on all levels.
Fair enough. I was just guying the idea, that since we can't be certain that the sun will rise, therefore we are paralyzed by uncertainty.
 
Posted by Leprechaun (# 5408) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by Leprechaun:
By not accepting foundationalism. Presuppositionalism seems broadly committed to a coherence view of what makes beliefs justified - he is pointing out that the materialist view is incoherent, not that he has a better epistemological foundation.

Presuppositionalism is I think closer to foundationalism than not. If it thinks it can sort beliefs into presuppositions and not presuppositions it is agreeing that knowledge has a deductive structure - that you start from presuppositions and suppositions and work on to conclusions.
A coherence theorist would I think be happier with the claim that no beliefs have axiomatic or presuppositional status.

Hmmm, I'm not sure about this. I'm not sure coherence denies knowledge has a deductive structure, just that warrant is implied by fit with the collection of other warranted beliefs, rather than by connection to a solid foundation. So beliefs are still deduced one from the other, but there isn't any one foundational truth from which all other truths are deduced. Deduction per se still takes place.

Preuppositional apologetics is, AFAICT a discipline in which you try to highlight others' presuppositions and point out that they are incoherent. I don't think it necessarily then implied Christianity has solved the foundation problem, but rather that the propositions gain warrant by coherency in a way the unbelievers' do not. As I said, not my cup of tea because it seems a rather smartass game.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
In the OP, 'you've already admitted that you can't know anything', is really taking liberties. Surely, in a live debate, the opposite side would question this vigorously. This is the false dilemma, it seems to me. Either we are certain, or know nothing. Well, no.
 
Posted by chris stiles (# 12641) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
In the OP, 'you've already admitted that you can't know anything', is really taking liberties. Surely, in a live debate, the opposite side would question this vigorously. This is the false dilemma, it seems to me. Either we are certain, or know nothing. Well, no.

Which plays to the idea that pre-suppositionalism is not so much about debating, as shutting the other person up.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by chris stiles:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
In the OP, 'you've already admitted that you can't know anything', is really taking liberties. Surely, in a live debate, the opposite side would question this vigorously. This is the false dilemma, it seems to me. Either we are certain, or know nothing. Well, no.

Which plays to the idea that pre-suppositionalism is not so much about debating, as shutting the other person up.
Yes, I've heard them called 'shut up, that's why' arguments.

I can imagine that when you first encounter it, it might throw you off balance, as the OP seems to demonstrate. But after that, you will know to fire back, when those misrepresentations start to flow.

It seems awfully jejune to me.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
I find the issue of axioms interesting, and presumably a presupper will charge that materialism, naturalism, physicalism, et. al., are based on axioms that are either weak or irrational, or something equally bad. Some serious reading on the Munchhausen Trilemma is called for; or shall I have a drink instead?
 
Posted by Beeswax Altar (# 11644) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by chris stiles:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
In the OP, 'you've already admitted that you can't know anything', is really taking liberties. Surely, in a live debate, the opposite side would question this vigorously. This is the false dilemma, it seems to me. Either we are certain, or know nothing. Well, no.

Which plays to the idea that pre-suppositionalism is not so much about debating, as shutting the other person up.
A few things on that...

One, conservative Calvinists of that stripe have a different goal than other apologists. The point is not to convince you to accept Jesus Christ as your personal Lord and Savior. In their view, only the elect will come to salvation regardless of how good or bad the argument happens to be. Pointing out that one's epistemology is incoherent unless the existence of God is assumed demonstrates that each of us knows instinctively that God exists. It's the same basic underlying reason for why Westboro Baptist Church isn't concerned with converting anybody. The Presuppositionalists I've met have been decent enough people.

Second, in order for a debate to take place, the two sides have to have some agreement about what counts as a good argument. Presuppositionalists hold that believers and unbelievers don't share enough common assumptions to make a normal debate possible. Therefore, the debate must begin at the most basic level of how we know what we know.

Third, new atheists smugly arguing warmed over logical positivism and using ridicule as their primary rhetorical weapon can't really complain the other side isn't arguing in good faith.

[ 04. March 2015, 15:09: Message edited by: Beeswax Altar ]
 
Posted by chris stiles (# 12641) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Beeswax Altar:

One, conservative Calvinists of that stripe have a different goal than other apologists.

In general the disciples of Van Til and Bahnsen are in the minority even amongst the conservative Reformed, even if you get a watered down variant of bits of pre-suppositionalism elsewhere.

quote:

Pointing out that one's epistemology is incoherent unless the existence of God is assumed demonstrates that each of us knows instinctively that God exists.

To an extent - though I remain convinced that presuppostionalism is bad philosophy - though as I find most of them to be batshit, I suppose you could argue that I go into the debate with unfair presuppositions.
 
Posted by Leprechaun (# 5408) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
In the OP, 'you've already admitted that you can't know anything', is really taking liberties. Surely, in a live debate, the opposite side would question this vigorously. This is the false dilemma, it seems to me. Either we are certain, or know nothing. Well, no.

Quite. IME it's materialists conflating knowledge and certainty which is where a bit of this can be useful.
 
Posted by George Spigot (# 253) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Beeswax Altar:
Conservative Calvinists of that stripe have a different goal than other apologists. The point is not to convince you to accept Jesus Christ as your personal Lord and Savior. In their view, only the elect will come to salvation regardless of how good or bad the argument happens to be. Pointing out that one's epistemology is incoherent unless the existence of God is assumed demonstrates that each of us knows instinctively that God exists.

That sounds very close to what Sye ten Bruggencate argues. I have to admit I'd find it...disconcerting to debate with someone who believed I was lying. When I've heard this argued before I've wondered if it comes from a belief in hell. Could the believer be reasoning as follows:


Something like that?
 
Posted by Beeswax Altar (# 11644) on :
 
The presuppositionalist isn't accusing your of lying but being blinded by the effects of sin. Is it about Hell? In a round about way, I suppose it is for some of them.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot:
I have to admit I'd find it...disconcerting to debate with someone who believed I was lying.

As I understand it from what has been said in this thread, it is closer to the claim one sometimes gets on the internet that the reason one party is getting angry is that deep down they know the other party is right; or perhaps to Freudian ascriptions of repressed knowledge.
Of course, those kinds of claim are also pretty annoying and don't conduce to constructive debate, but they're not quite the same as ascriptions of conscious adishonesty.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot:
I have to admit I'd find it...disconcerting to debate with someone who believed I was lying.

As I understand it from what has been said in this thread, it is closer to the claim one sometimes gets on the internet that the reason one party is getting angry is that deep down they know the other party is right; or perhaps to Freudian ascriptions of repressed knowledge.
Of course, those kinds of claim are also pretty annoying and don't conduce to constructive debate, but they're not quite the same as ascriptions of conscious adishonesty.

Does this mean that presuppers don't think that you could ever be convinced by their argument, (or even understand it), in any case, since you are blinded by sin, or in denial about the obvious existence of God? It would give a piquant flavour to any debate. There is a debate between Bruggencate and Dillahunty on youtube, but it's 2 hours long. Too long.
 
Posted by George Spigot (# 253) on :
 
I tend to listen to them while doing house work.

[ 04. March 2015, 17:54: Message edited by: George Spigot ]
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
I managed an hour of it, and then my wife knocked on the door, and told me to stop screaming. It's like eating cardboard.
 
Posted by chris stiles (# 12641) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
I managed an hour of it, and then my wife knocked on the door, and told me to stop screaming. It's like eating cardboard.

There are a couple of videos of Hitchens debating Doug Wilson that are similar.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
Dillahunty is very slick but rather mechanical; Bruggencate is weird, and keeps asking D how he knows anything. D looks like a real pro, but, man, it's so boring.
 
Posted by chris stiles (# 12641) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Dillahunty is very slick but rather mechanical; Bruggencate is weird, and keeps asking D how he knows anything. D looks like a real pro, but, man, it's so boring.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g6UU9C-WmvM

There you go. There is also a film featuring a debate, which includes little vignettes of them agreeing over other topics.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
Does this mean that presuppers don't think that you could ever be convinced by their argument, (or even understand it), in any case, since you are blinded by sin, or in denial about the obvious existence of God? It would give a piquant flavour to any debate.

I think for any Christian no purely natural means can bring about faith; only grace can do that. God can however ordain that particular natural occasions are the occasion for grace.
The implications of this get a bit tricky if you're not a universalist obviously.

For Calvinists more so - and Calvinists are quite prepared to bite the bullet on the implications. So I suppose the presuppositionalists hope that God will use their apologetics as the occasion for grace, or at least the occasion for human beings to realise their own insufficiency without God.
 
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Leprechaun:
Quite. IME it's materialists conflating knowledge and certainty which is where a bit of this can be useful.

IME other than new atheist converts, materialists beyond their teen years don't take any stock in "certainty" at all.
 
Posted by Leprechaun (# 5408) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
quote:
Originally posted by Leprechaun:
Quite. IME it's materialists conflating knowledge and certainty which is where a bit of this can be useful.

IME other than new atheist converts, materialists beyond their teen years don't take any stock in "certainty" at all.
Tell that to Richard Dawkins.

But I meet materialists all the time saying stuff like "I don't take stuff on faith, I only accept what I can be certain of." I'm quite willing to concede that the ones I know are weird. [Smile]
 
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Leprechaun:
quote:
Originally posted by mousethief:
quote:
Originally posted by Leprechaun:
Quite. IME it's materialists conflating knowledge and certainty which is where a bit of this can be useful.

IME other than new atheist converts, materialists beyond their teen years don't take any stock in "certainty" at all.
Tell that to Richard Dawkins.
Who is stuck in a seemingly endless adolescence of lashing out against that which he does not understand. One wonders if his prefrontal cortex ever really got hooked up right.

I will admit that perhaps my slice of experience is unbalanced. Most of the vocal atheists I have known have been philosophy grad students, who know better than to bark about chimerae like "certainty."

[ 05. March 2015, 13:35: Message edited by: mousethief ]
 
Posted by George Spigot (# 253) on :
 
Could we argue then that a presuppositional argument is begging the question?
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot:
Could we argue then that a presuppositional argument is begging the question?

It's often described like that, or as just circular. If God, therefore God. I suppose one of their tactics, is to challenge the other person's presuppositions; hence, how do you know what you know.

But I think there is some sleight of hand also, in the way that certainty and doubt are handled; hence, in the OP, 'you don't know anything'. Not correct.
 
Posted by Beeswax Altar (# 11644) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot:
Could we argue then that a presuppositional argument is begging the question?

Van Til would say that all reasoning is ultimately circular. Indeed, Van Til argued that even logic should not be presupposed by Christians. Still, presuppositionalists will allow their opponents to presuppose their worldview for the sake of argument. The argument is that presupposing anything but the God of the Bible leads to a contradictory and incoherent worldview. This is what the Hovinds is getting at when making the point about the atheist's worldview versus his own.
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot:
Could we argue then that a presuppositional argument is begging the question?

As I understand it, there's a strong version and a weak version.
The weaker version goes, 'everyone has presuppositions; I am honest about it, and some of your commitments mean you cannot be.'
The stronger version, I suppose, would go, 'the only coherent possible set of presuppositions are mine'. That seems to me rather stronger than could ever be warranted. But it's not exactly begging the question.
 
Posted by Jay-Emm (# 11411) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Beeswax Altar:

We've quoted one Lewis, but the other one has something relevant.
Lewis C
 
Posted by Teufelchen (# 10158) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Dafyd:
quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot:
Could we argue then that a presuppositional argument is begging the question?

As I understand it, there's a strong version and a weak version.
The weaker version goes, 'everyone has presuppositions; I am honest about it, and some of your commitments mean you cannot be.'
The stronger version, I suppose, would go, 'the only coherent possible set of presuppositions are mine'. That seems to me rather stronger than could ever be warranted. But it's not exactly begging the question.

This sounds a bit like Terry Pratchett's account of the Anthropic Principle, in which the strongest form is roughly expressed as "The universe came into being to facilitate the creation of the Chair of Applied Anthropics and its current occupant".

t
 
Posted by Eliab (# 9153) on :
 
I listened to the debate. Hovind doesn't come across well. His atheist opponent seemed both smarter and nicer, but not much of a debater.

She clearly wasn't remotely interested in the whole 'what is truth/how do you know' stuff, and wanted, not unreasonably, to discuss the actual claims and practices of religion, but Hovind wouldn't move on even after it was clear the subject was a dead end, and she failed to engage with him, because, I think, she suspect that his questions were designed to trap, so even when he set out premises that she couldn't disagree with, she didn't have the confidence to agree either.

If I were an atheist answering the argument, I'd try something like this:

"I see where you're going. If materialism is true, all my thought processes are at least potentially subject to interference from non-rational causes. My sense data and my conclusions from it are therefore somewhat precarious - I could always be deceived. OK. I agree.

And I also agree that my degree of certainty that my world view is true can at most be the maximum degree of certainty that my world view permits me to have in any other conclusion. That follows necessarily. And I've already agreed that my knowledge cannot be absolutely certain, so my confidence in atheism similarly cannot be absolute. But my thoughts and knowledge are, in general, good enough for most practical purposes.

The upshot of that is that IF materialism is true, the maximum level of justified confidence is in principle lower than it would be if theism was true. But that doesn't get us very far - we both agree that this is a question that lots of people get wrong, we just disagree about which they are. Human reasoning on this point clearly is not infallible, whichever of us is right. I don't claim to be able to prove atheism to mathematical certainty - you've established that I couldn't even if I wanted to. Shall we move on?"

It wouldn't work against Hovind, because he'd keep pushing false dichotomies, but it does at least engage with his legitimately points.


From the Christian point of view, I think the argument can be legitimately made that any worldview has to at least establish grounds for reasonable confidence that the thinking by which we arrive at that worldview is valid. Reconciling materialism (which at least arguably implies determinism) with the proposition that mental processes can be valid truth insights is a problem that atheism has to address: if all the atoms in my brain are only obeying physical laws, the idea that they have happened upon a reliable truth-finding strategy of general applicability is certainly not an obvious one. If the difficulty were insurmountable - if we can't on a materialist worldview justify valid thought, consciousness, free will, objective right and wrong - and yet are in practice convinced they exist, we have a reason not to be materialist.

Hovind, in the sample debate, didn't get anywhere near proving that, though, and if he had proved it, he'd be a long way off justifying Christianity, creationism, homophobia and the other issues that his opponent was trying to get him to address.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
I think that the problem of consciousness has led some atheist philosophers to abandon materialism. For example, Chalmers, who has discussed the 'hard problem' at length, is a dualist; other solutions are panpsychism and idealism, although maybe the latter leads us inexorably back to God. Also, dual aspect monism, which, curiously, was favoured by Bertrand Russell for a period.

Also, I'm not sure about Buddhist and Hindu atheists; and some atheists seem to reject all metaphysics.

[ 06. March 2015, 23:03: Message edited by: quetzalcoatl ]
 
Posted by Martin60 (# 368) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Beeswax Altar:
quote:
Originally posted by George Spigot:
Could we argue then that a presuppositional argument is begging the question?

Van Til would say that all reasoning is ultimately circular. Indeed, Van Til argued that even logic should not be presupposed by Christians. Still, presuppositionalists will allow their opponents to presuppose their worldview for the sake of argument. The argument is that presupposing anything but the God of the Bible leads to a contradictory and incoherent worldview. This is what the Hovinds is getting at when making the point about the atheist's worldview versus his own.
Van Til isn't wrong. And presupposing the God of the Bible leads to a contradictory and incoherent worldview.

I, of course, superiorly presuppose a pre- and post- Biblical God. Which leads to a superior contradictory and incoherent worldview.
 
Posted by HughWillRidmee (# 15614) on :
 
Moses knowses
 
Posted by kankucho (# 14318) on :
 
This from the OP:
quote:
A: "But I could argue the same thing. How do you know god exists?"

E: "Because I have divine revelation from god".

A: "But you just said we can't know anything".

E: "No no that's your world view not mine".

The atheist's subsequent line of questioning – which I haven't gleaned from the comments so far – should be: "via what receptor does God reveal himself to you? And "could that receptor be wrong?"

Because with this claim all Hovind is doing is saying he hears a voice inside his head or has a warm, fuzzy feeling that a benign unseen presence is watching over him (perhaps someone with enough time on their hands to have watched the linked video in its entirety would tell us whether Hovind unwraps the specific details of his revelatory experience). The supposed revelation is only coming from God IF God exists. If God DOESN'T exist, the presuppositionalist is just another schizophrenic.
 
Posted by Beeswax Altar (# 11644) on :
 
No...the presuppositionalist wouldn't appeal to religious experience as evidence of divine revelation. For them, the Bible is divine revelation. How do they know it's divine revelation? They don't know that it is necessarily. However, the next phase of presuppositional apologetics is to demonstrate how rational thought only makes sense by presupposing that the Bible is divine revelation. Basically, presuppositional apologists use questions as a sword and biblical prooftexts as a buckler.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by kankucho:
This from the OP:
quote:
A: "But I could argue the same thing. How do you know god exists?"

E: "Because I have divine revelation from god".

A: "But you just said we can't know anything".

E: "No no that's your world view not mine".

The atheist's subsequent line of questioning – which I haven't gleaned from the comments so far – should be: "via what receptor does God reveal himself to you? And "could that receptor be wrong?"

Because with this claim all Hovind is doing is saying he hears a voice inside his head or has a warm, fuzzy feeling that a benign unseen presence is watching over him (perhaps someone with enough time on their hands to have watched the linked video in its entirety would tell us whether Hovind unwraps the specific details of his revelatory experience). The supposed revelation is only coming from God IF God exists. If God DOESN'T exist, the presuppositionalist is just another schizophrenic.

Well, OK, but the schizophrenia reference is bollocks. You're not really going to say that religion is a mental illness, are you?
 
Posted by kankucho (# 14318) on :
 
Leaving aside any number of begged counter-arguments, an honest conclusion may then be acceptance that there is no such thing as rational thought: merely IRrational thought with attitude. Acceptance/ mindfulness of that makes the godless universe not such a bad place. There's What Is and there's how consciousness perceives What Is from a myriad of perspectives (Buddhism has neat expressions for that: 'kyo' and 'chi', the idea being that reality is a fusion of the two). It's an inability to deal with the possible impossibility ( [Ultra confused] ) of objective thought that sends people scuttling for such imagined comfort blankets as presuppositionalism.
 
Posted by kankucho (# 14318) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
You're not really going to say that religion is a mental illness, are you?

Unless you are saying fuzzy feelings and/or voices in the head are acceptable proofs of religious claims, then no.

Chill. [Cool]
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by kankucho:
Leaving aside any number of begged counter-arguments, an honest conclusion may then be acceptance that there is no such thing as rational thought: merely IRrational thought with attitude. Acceptance/ mindfulness of that makes the godless universe not such a bad place. There's What Is and there's how consciousness perceives What Is from a myriad of perspectives (Buddhism has neat expressions for that: 'kyo' and 'chi', the idea being that reality is a fusion of the two). It's an inability to deal with the possible impossibility ( [Ultra confused] ) of objective thought that sends people scuttling for such imagined comfort blankets as presuppositionalism.

That's interesting; I've spent about a year debating objective morality, (elsewhere), and I think you're right. The absence of objectivity seems to freak some people out. I blame the parents.
 
Posted by Eliab (# 9153) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by kankucho:
Because with this claim all Hovind is doing is saying he hears a voice inside his head or has a warm, fuzzy feeling that a benign unseen presence is watching over him (perhaps someone with enough time on their hands to have watched the linked video in its entirety would tell us whether Hovind unwraps the specific details of his revelatory experience). The supposed revelation is only coming from God IF God exists. If God DOESN'T exist, the presuppositionalist is just another schizophrenic.

No, it's a better argument than that. He's not appealing to personal experience, but saying, in effect, that you can only have confidence that a worldview is true, if that worldview gives you reasons for thinking that human sense data and reasoning is valid.

Suppose I were to say that my worldview was that all human thought was the direct physical result of the random firing of synapses, and there was no reason to suppose that the experience that emerges has anything but random content. It is (I hope) obvious that I could never have any good reason for thinking that this worldview was true. I have denied the possibility of having a good reason for believing anything.

Hovind is saying that his worldview allows for the possibility of his thoughts NOT being merely the consequence of random (or deterministic) physical causes. His challenge to the atheist is a real one - can atheism provide a basis for thought being valid at all? His error was pursuing that philosophical line in a debate with an opponent who wasn't remotely interested in engaging with it, and nonetheless pushing it well past the bounds of utility, entertainment and courtesy.

There is an argument with real weight concealed behind the bluster - although it doesn't prove that atheism/materialism is actually false. At best it could only establish that if atheism/materialism were true, we couldn't have any rational grounds for asserting that with confidence.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
Isn't instrumentalism one of the replies to that? For example, that science is not aiming for truth or reality? But science works, more or less; it's a tool, or a method, not a philosophy. Hence, methodological naturalism does not say, there is only nature.

Well, this is akin to postmodernism, but let's not go there.

[ 19. March 2015, 16:35: Message edited by: quetzalcoatl ]
 
Posted by kankucho (# 14318) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Eliab:
quote:
Originally posted by kankucho:
Because with this claim all Hovind is doing is saying he hears a voice inside his head or has a warm, fuzzy feeling that a benign unseen presence is watching over him (perhaps someone with enough time on their hands to have watched the linked video in its entirety would tell us whether Hovind unwraps the specific details of his revelatory experience). The supposed revelation is only coming from God IF God exists. If God DOESN'T exist, the presuppositionalist is just another schizophrenic.

No, it's a better argument than that. He's not appealing to personal experience, but saying, in effect, that you can only have confidence that a worldview is true, if that worldview gives you reasons for thinking that human sense data and reasoning is valid...
But that challenge cannot be the meaning of, nor justification for, "I have divine revelation from god", which can only be interpreted as a claim to his own experience. If he's not prepared to satisfactorily unwrap that claim before shifting the locus to his opponent's grounds for certainty, then the debate should be declared in his opponent's favour at that point.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
That's a good point; from what I've seen of debates with presuppers, they launch attack after attack on the other speaker's ability to know anything, but smugly assume their own incorrigibility. Hence, get your retaliation in first.
 
Posted by Beeswax Altar (# 11644) on :
 
quote:
originally posted by kanchuko:
But that challenge cannot be the meaning of, nor justification for, "I have divine revelation from god", which can only be interpreted as a claim to his own experience. If he's not prepared to satisfactorily unwrap that claim before shifting the locus to his opponent's grounds for certainty, then the debate should be declared in his opponent's favour at that point.

He isn't claiming he has divine revelation from God. He's claiming that the Bible is divine revelation from God. The proof is that rational thought is impossible without the Bible. Before you question if the Bible is the word of God, the presuppositional apologist will want you to establish the basis for your attack. Again, he will have prooftexts at the ready to justify any question you ask. If you claim to reject the notion of rational thought, the questioning will then turn to probing to see if you actually live as if you reject the possibility of rational thought. If you suggest a different religion, the questioning will then turn to the claims of that religion.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
Looking at it again, the presupp side just seems sour and empty and uncharitable to me. What a ghastly and immature way to discuss anything. I watched one of the debates and it made me feel ill.
 
Posted by Beeswax Altar (# 11644) on :
 
Which I'm obliged to tell you is a strong indication that you are among the preterite and will burn in hell

Not that you can do anything about it or anything.

[Big Grin]
 
Posted by kankucho (# 14318) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Beeswax Altar:
He isn't claiming he has divine revelation from God.

I quoted the exact words attributed to him in the OP. They were 'I have a divine revelation from God'.

I appreciate the OP is a summary. However, if he's actually claiming that his revelation comes from having read a book, then he has to account for the same problem of unreliable sensory perception that he accuses his opponent of.
 
Posted by Beeswax Altar (# 11644) on :
 
The Bible is the divine revelation from God. It provides the basis for presuppositional apologists epistemology. Using reason only makes sense if you presuppose the existence of God of the Bible. The presuppositionalist presupposes that. So, his use of reason makes sense. He wants to know why you can claim to know anything without presupposing the existence of the God of the Bible.
 
Posted by kankucho (# 14318) on :
 
There's a delicious irony to such an irrational claim to a monopoly on rational thought, isn't there? I guess it's the sort of stuff that ends up on YouTube under the banner 'Hovind bores atheist a second asshole' despite it being plain for all to see that only one asshole is involved in the exchange.
 
Posted by Beeswax Altar (# 11644) on :
 
Only if you can demonstrate that he is wrong. Again, new atheist arguments consist of ridiculing straw men and smugly proclaiming long discredited philosophical ideas as what all the smart people believe. The next new atheist I see who isn't an asshole arguing in bad faith will be the first.
 
Posted by HughWillRidmee (# 15614) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Beeswax Altar:
Only if you can demonstrate that he is wrong. Again, new atheist arguments consist of ridiculing straw men and smugly proclaiming long discredited philosophical ideas as what all the smart people believe. The next new atheist I see who isn't an asshole arguing in bad faith will be the first.

1- I'm definitely an old atheist, but feel free to consider me an asshole if it makes you happy.

2 - I have real and adopted relatives in UK and US who fervently believe that the earth was made by God as it is (almost) some 6000ish years ago, that their God can, and does, suspend the laws of physics with impunity, and that the sun shines out of the rear end of Eric Hovind and his ilk. Your straw man is not their straw man and they will be as sure of their philosophical superiority as you appear to be of yours.

3 - What I suspect you have in common with said relations is the belief in a deity, that said deity somehow interacts with humanity, that people are bad and the deity is good, that humanity should defer to an undemonstrable concept, that science is OK when it does what you want but not when it doesn't fit with your beliefs, that said deity loves us, will inflict heaven or not-heaven on us and is useless with money. Are some/all/none of these long discredited philosophical ideas?

Sorry if I've misconstrued your beliefs. The reason that the "straw man/you don't understand my belief" line is so superficially successful is because there are so many different versions of Christian belief that each Christian (unless they take the view that "whatever my church/pastor believes is what I believe") holds a unique belief package. I spent time last spring with a delightful guy who believes that Obama is a Muslim, that the earth is less than 10k years old, that every word in the Bible is inspired by a triune God and therefore somehow true, that saying the "sinner's prayer" guarantees heaven, the office of pastor is limited to men, that Christians must oppose homosexuality (since being gay is a demon-inspired choice by the individual), that marriage has always been between one man and one woman (I don't think he's heard of the stories about King Solomon)....but when I mentioned "speaking in tongues" explained quite forcefully that that was only granted to the apostles (as in 12) and anyone who claimed to do so today is a Pentecostalist and just play-acting. Finding that lot out took many minutes and leaves huge areas of his (totally sincere) christianity untouched.

Have you watched The Courtier's Reply

Would you consider it necessary to immerse yourself in the great expositions of astrology before deciding that the apparent location of various suns is unlikely to be linked to whether you will meet a man wearing a pink hat on next Tuesday rather than next Wednesday?

I know that there are many books written about fairies, some with several full page colour plates, I know that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle believed in them and that Disney has several web pages devoted to them; should I expect to find a colony larking around at the bottom of my garden?

What reason do we have for assuming that the ideas which you think have replaced the "long discredited philosophical ideas" won't themselves, ere long, be the next generation of "long discredited philosophical ideas"?
 
Posted by Beeswax Altar (# 11644) on :
 
Thank you for proving my point. Heck, you prove the presuppositionalists point. The verification principle is self refuting. It Wil always be self refuting. If some new atheist would like to demonstrate how it isn't, I'll be happy to listen. Until then, new atheism is nothing more than logical fallacies supported by appeals to more logical fallacies. While presuppositions apologetics is not likely to win many converts, it does at least start the debate where it has to be started.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
Which atheists follow verificationism? I thought that was dumped by Popper in the 30s?
 
Posted by Dafyd (# 5549) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by HughWillRidmee:

Have you watched The Courtier's Reply

Ah - the Richard Dawkins Charter for the Construction of Straw Men?

quote:
Would you consider it necessary to immerse yourself in the great expositions of astrology before deciding that the apparent location of various suns is unlikely to be linked to whether you will meet a man wearing a pink hat on next Tuesday rather than next Wednesday?
Do astrologers really think they can predict whether you will meet a man wearing a pink hat on Tuesday rather than Wednesday?

Rather more importantly, I am not writing books about why astrology is wrong. I am not posting on a website for astrological unrest.
I cannot engage with and evaluate every belief system that differs from mine. The principle of selection is the people with whom I interact. Not whether my straw man construction of their ideas meets my a priori standards of argument. That would be just an excuse for me to evade criticism of my beliefs.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
One of the interesting aspects of the presupp position is that it seems ultra-skeptical, at least to others' claims, but argues that it is vouchsafed certain knowledge of some kinds by God.

This sounds rather like Pyrrhonism, which I think Hume, amongst others, resurrected, for example, in the discussion of history - how do we know that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, and so on. Some writers argue also that Popper incorporated Pyrrhonism into his thinking, but I don't know enough about that.

Anyway, the ultra-skeptic can indeed say that knowledge is impossible. What is the opponent to say (not always an atheist, by the way)?

Well, Popper argued that science is always an approximation; you can also cite the role of guesswork, but your guesses have to be tested via further observations.

In a more homely manner, I don't know that the sun will rise tomorrow, but I can guess that it will, and lo and behold, it seems to work.

I think here the presuppers might say that my knowledge is not rationally founded; well, I think that's true, it's non-rational rather than irrational, however.

Here you usually get arguments about tools and so on - for example, I can use a certain type of logic as a tool, but I adopt it by fiat. That's the work it works, and by gum, it does work. I believe Mr Dawkins has the rather indelicate saying, 'science, it works, bitches'. Dear me.

There is further stuff about science not aiming for reality, but that is controversial, bitches.
 
Posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider (# 76) on :
 
Aye, Quetz. That's the thing. It works. Mostly.

It seems to me that the argument's just pushing the "how can you really know?" argument back a notch, to "God said so." I'm not sure why the presupposition of the existence of God is so much better than the presupposition that we can on the whole trust our senses; the latter gives us space travel, computers, modern medicine and telly. The former - well, only stuff you can perceive by faith, it seems, apart from crusades, autos da fe, etc.
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider:
Aye, Quetz. That's the thing. It works. Mostly.

It seems to me that the argument's just pushing the "how can you really know?" argument back a notch, to "God said so." I'm not sure why the presupposition of the existence of God is so much better than the presupposition that we can on the whole trust our senses; the latter gives us space travel, computers, modern medicine and telly. The former - well, only stuff you can perceive by faith, it seems, apart from crusades, autos da fe, etc.

I think the presuppers might say that you can't rationally claim that your senses are reliable; but we can adopt it as a provisional tool again. Or in fact, we can adopt it by fiat, which is not rational, of course, but again, it produces results.

In fact, you can presuppose anything you like, as with Last Thursdayism, or the Matrix, it's just not very interesting or productive.
 
Posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider (# 76) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
quote:
Originally posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider:
Aye, Quetz. That's the thing. It works. Mostly.

It seems to me that the argument's just pushing the "how can you really know?" argument back a notch, to "God said so." I'm not sure why the presupposition of the existence of God is so much better than the presupposition that we can on the whole trust our senses; the latter gives us space travel, computers, modern medicine and telly. The former - well, only stuff you can perceive by faith, it seems, apart from crusades, autos da fe, etc.

I think the presuppers might say that you can't rationally claim that your senses are reliable; but we can adopt it as a provisional tool again. Or in fact, we can adopt it by fiat, which is not rational, of course, but again, it produces results.

In fact, you can presuppose anything you like, as with Last Thursdayism, or the Matrix, it's just not very interesting or productive.

But I don't see how you can rationally claim God as a presupposition either. Indeed, Ockham's Razor would rather point to the trustworthiness of the senses as a better supposition than God, to my mind.
 
Posted by Beeswax Altar (# 11644) on :
 
Why is Ockhams Razor valid? Why is pragmatism valid? You have to establish the validity of those things before the presuppositional apologist will bother to address an argument based on them. The presuppositional apologist will contend he has no problem with science and that science only makes sense if you presuppose the existence of the God of the Bible.

And "But Science" is a poor argument period. Also, the argument that religion gave us nothing but violence while the enlightenment which owes nothing to religion gave us science, peace, and ice cream castles has no basis in history. Other than that...
 
Posted by Leprechaun (# 5408) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider:
quote:
Originally posted by quetzalcoatl:
quote:
Originally posted by Karl: Liberal Backslider:
Aye, Quetz. That's the thing. It works. Mostly.

It seems to me that the argument's just pushing the "how can you really know?" argument back a notch, to "God said so." I'm not sure why the presupposition of the existence of God is so much better than the presupposition that we can on the whole trust our senses; the latter gives us space travel, computers, modern medicine and telly. The former - well, only stuff you can perceive by faith, it seems, apart from crusades, autos da fe, etc.

I think the presuppers might say that you can't rationally claim that your senses are reliable; but we can adopt it as a provisional tool again. Or in fact, we can adopt it by fiat, which is not rational, of course, but again, it produces results.

In fact, you can presuppose anything you like, as with Last Thursdayism, or the Matrix, it's just not very interesting or productive.

But I don't see how you can rationally claim God as a presupposition either. Indeed, Ockham's Razor would rather point to the trustworthiness of the senses as a better supposition than God, to my mind.
Yes, but this is about presuppositions. The presupper points out that if we presuppose that we are made in the image of God we should be able to trust our senses, whereas if it is pure materialism there is no reason to presuppose that.

I find the strength of that to be overstated - but where it's useful is where (as per Yorick above) people start setting up science (fact) vs faith (not). Trusting that our senses give us access to the world outside us is an act of faith. Theists say they have a good reason to make that act of faith and (e.g.) materialists don't.

[ 20. March 2015, 15:58: Message edited by: Leprechaun ]
 
Posted by quetzalcoatl (# 16740) on :
 
I would say that trusting our senses is a mixture of guesswork and habit. It works most of the time, but not all the time.

That's why I would say that this is not a rational foundation; but then I don't think there are any.

As to materialism - since I'm not one, I'm not sure, but I know atheists who argue that science is not after truth in any case.

Obviously, some people do argue for science as a truth-seeker, but I'm not sure how they justify that - I suppose because it works?

But then I think that Yorick overcooks the case for materialism.

[ 20. March 2015, 16:13: Message edited by: quetzalcoatl ]
 
Posted by Callan (# 525) on :
 
Originally posted by Leprechaun:

quote:
I find the strength of that to be overstated - but where it's useful is where (as per Yorick above) people start setting up science (fact) vs faith (not). Trusting that our senses give us access to the world outside us is an act of faith. Theists say they have a good reason to make that act of faith and (e.g.) materialists don't.
Not convinced by that. I am currently suffering from sciatica and find that exercise, ibuprofen and paracetamol do something to alleviate the matter. Now for a non-prenup that is quite sufficient. AFAICS a presup would say, 'aha! unless you believe i the God of Scripture, how can you be sure it works?' AFAICS the presup position is that they can be sure that my mixture of exercise, ibuprofen and paracetamol work because it is guaranteed by a guarantee handed down by Almighty God from heaven and because my leg hurts less. As a non-presupper I would say that I trust it because my leg hurts less.

AFAICS, it's a case of the quickness of the 'and deceives the 'heye. Yer presupper insists that belief can only be justified if it is founded on belief on Almighty God. For most of us belief is provisional. If it works this time it's fine.
 
Posted by Leprechaun (# 5408) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Callan:
Originally posted by Leprechaun:

quote:
I find the strength of that to be overstated - but where it's useful is where (as per Yorick above) people start setting up science (fact) vs faith (not). Trusting that our senses give us access to the world outside us is an act of faith. Theists say they have a good reason to make that act of faith and (e.g.) materialists don't.
Not convinced by that. I am currently suffering from sciatica and find that exercise, ibuprofen and paracetamol do something to alleviate the matter. Now for a non-prenup that is quite sufficient. AFAICS a presup would say, 'aha! unless you believe i the God of Scripture, how can you be sure it works?' AFAICS the presup position is that they can be sure that my mixture of exercise, ibuprofen and paracetamol work because it is guaranteed by a guarantee handed down by Almighty God from heaven and because my leg hurts less. As a non-presupper I would say that I trust it because my leg hurts less.

AFAICS, it's a case of the quickness of the 'and deceives the 'heye. Yer presupper insists that belief can only be justified if it is founded on belief on Almighty God. For most of us belief is provisional. If it works this time it's fine.

Of course. But I guess most of the discussions are about questions like "what is it to live correctly?" or "what are properly held beliefs?" "What works this time" is rather harder to pin down in those cases.

If the ultimate aim is to feel the least pain possible no need to even have the discussion with the presupper. They tend to induce, not cure, headaches. [Smile]
 
Posted by Beeswax Altar (# 11644) on :
 
Actually, the presuppositional apologist would say that your actions in taking the pill for pain because it worked for pain in the past presupposes the existence of God. For the presuppositional apologist, any reliance on induction presupposes the existence of God.
 
Posted by mousethief (# 953) on :
 
quote:
Originally posted by Beeswax Altar:
Actually, the presuppositional apologist would say that your actions in taking the pill for pain because it worked for pain in the past presupposes the existence of God. For the presuppositional apologist, any reliance on induction presupposes the existence of God.

Sounds like they've defined themselves up their own arse, frankly.
 


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